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Abstract 
The major concern of this thesis is about the current professional standard of care under 
Saudi Arabian medical law, regarding doctors’ duty to disclose information and risks to 
competent adult patients about a proposed medical treatment. Additionally, the thesis has 
highlighted other legal deficiencies that occur as a result of applying the professional 
standard in Saudi Arabia and considered how reforms can be introduced, based on English 
law experience in a way that is in harmony with Islamic Sharia. 
The thesis has undertaken a novel approach by critically studying and comparing the current 
practice in Saudi Arabian medical law to the comparative English law approach. The reason 
for this is to provide a comprehensive legal literature review based on the extremely well-
developed English law experiences in the same matters. 
Realising the significance of the principle of the respect for autonomy, the thesis has placed 
a noticeable emphasis on this principle by arguing that considering and respecting autonomy 
would lead the law to protect the patient’s autonomy and self-determination in a medical 
context. The thesis has argued that both Western and Islamic Sharia medical ethics have 
considered the notion of the respect for patients’ autonomy, but that consideration has been 
approached differently, as the thesis has shown. 
Further, the thesis has critically discussed how the English law standard of care has been 
developed in the last three decades, in order to move from the professional standard of care 
to a new standard that protects patients’ autonomy and self-determination. These 
developments and years of experience have provided sufficient arguments and supports for 
the thesis’s motion to recommend and suggest that Saudi Arabian medical law departs from 
the professional standard and adopts the prudent patient standard to protect patients’ 
autonomy in compliance with Islamic Sharia. 
In addition to proposing a legal formula for the prudent patient standard that can be adopted 
by Saudi Arabian medical law, this thesis has also proposed other formulas as solutions for 
other legal deficiencies, based on English law experience and in accordance with Islamic 
Sharia.  
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Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the current Saudi Arabian legal approach to the standard of 
care required of doctors in providing information to adult competent patients about proposed 
medical treatment. This will include consideration of; the quality and quantity of information 
provided and the amount of information on risk that should be disclosed; whether doctors 
should inform the patient about the alternative available treatment options when seeking 
consent to treatment; the duty to answer patients’ questions; the need to ensure that patients’ 
understand the information given and the application of the therapeutic exception to 
withhold information. It will also consider the way in which complaints about doctors’ 
provision of information are dealt with by the Saudi Arabian legal system, in particular in 
its reliance on the professional standard to establish doctors’ liability. 
As a way of examining the adequacy of the current legal approach in Saudi Arabia, this thesis 
will compare it with the English legal position. It will discuss the development of the law in 
both jurisdictions and what the law does and should be seeking to achieve. Evaluation of the 
adequacy of the two legal approaches will involve considering the ethical concept of respect 
for autonomy and its origins in Western1 medical ethics and its place in Islamic Sharia in the 
context of consent and information disclosure. 
English law has been selected as a comparator to Saudi Arabian law for the following 
reasons.  
First, there have been many comparative studies and researches which have been written to 
compare Saudi Arabian or Islamic laws to English law and presented the possibility as how 
to learn some lessons from English law. Other studies and researches have been focusing on 
the relationship between Saudi Arabian or Islamic laws and English law. Most of this studies 
and researches show that there are several common areas and grounds between Islamic and 
Saudi Arabian laws and English law in various aspects of law such as commercial, 
arbitration, administrative, criminal and so forth 
Those common areas can found in the following examples: 
A. A Legal Comparative Study of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Saudi 
and English Law. (Thesis submitted to the University of Newcastle in 2015 by Naif 
Binlebdah). 
																																								 																				
1	In	general,	the	concept	of	Western	has	been	used	to	describe	in	a	single	word	the	political,	economic,	social	
movement,	culture,	ethics	and	so	forth	that	occurred	in	Europe	and	North	America	in	the	19th	century.	W	Bynum	et	al.	
The	Western	Medical	Tradition:	1800-2000	(1sted	CUP	2006)	P.	11-15.	
Introduction 
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B. The Saudi Arabian Arbitration Regulations: a Comparative Study with the English 
Act of 1996 and the Arbitration Scotland Act of 2010 (Thesis submitted to the 
University of Stirling in 2015 by Albara Abulaban). 
C. A Research to Develop English Insurance Law to Accommodate Islamic Principles. 
(Thesis submitted to the University of Manchester in 2013 by Mahfuz Mahfuz).  
D. Frustration of Performance of Contract: A Comparative and Analytic Study in 
Islamic Law and English Law. (Thesis submitted to Brunel University in 2013 by 
Ibrahim Alhowaimil). 
E. A Study of Islamic Law and English Common Law on Aspects of Islamic Finance 
Securitisations. (Thesis submitted to University of Oxford in 2010 by Hanaan 
Balala). 
F. The Law Regarding Universities in Saudi Arabia and England: A Comparative Study. 
(Thesis submitted to the University of Newcastle in 2000 by Hussain AlSharif). 
This shows that it has been accepted that both legal systems can benefit from each other and 
that some principles can be extracted in order to be adjusted then adopted. Therefore, 
following on the same path and precedents this thesis applied the same approach to compare 
Saudi Arabian law to English law in the area of medical law. 
 
Second, Islamic Sharia has no barrier to learn from other legal systems whatever their 
background, so long as they are not in conflict with its principles. Therefore, in terms of 
offering a comparative study, I contend that the differences between legal systems do not 
mean that one cannot learn from another’s experiences and approaches. It can be argued that, 
in respect of a different aspect of medical law, in developing some aspects of Saudi Arabian 
medical law, it is justifiable and appropriate to learn from English law experiences and 
developments. Of particular significance here, given the subject of this thesis, which seeks 
to compare an Islamic state’s laws with those of a Western secular state, is the statement by 
scholar Ibn Qayyim AlJawziyyah (1292-1350),2 one of the most respected and influenced 
Muslim scholars. He declared that Islamic Sharia is not only the teaching and understanding 
of its two main sources – the holy Quran and Messenger PBUH Sunnah traditions – but also 
the recognition of all other jurisprudences, principles and experiences that do not conflict 
with them.3 A similar view was expressed by the Saudi Arabian Grand Mufti and head of 
Saudi scholars, scholar Abdulaziz ibn Baz (who held this position from 1993 until his death 
																																								 																				
2	L	Holtzman	‘Ibn	Qayyim	alJawziyyah’	in	Essays	in	Arabic	Literary	Biography:	1350-1850	(Book	17)	in	R	Allen,	J	Lowry	
and	D	Stewar	(eds)	(Harrassowitz	Verlag	2009)	p.	202-223.	
3M	Ibn	Qayyim	alJawziyyah	Altorq	Ahokmih	fi	Alsiash	Alshreeh	(Islamic	Judicial	Procedure).	(1sted	Dar	Elhadith	
Publishing,	2002)	p.	17-18.	(Arabic).	
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in 1999).4 When he was asked about the Islamic Sharia view regarding the applying of non-
Islamic laws into Islamic country legal system, the Grand Mufti Abdulaziz said that, as long 
as the law is in a harmony with Islamic Sharia traditions, not in conflict with them, and is in 
the public interest, then it is acceptable to adopt and apply non-Islamic law.5 Although there 
are obvious differences between the backgrounds of Saudi Arabian and English law - for 
example, different legal origins - both systems share some similar legal aspects6 which 
suggests there may be some similarities to be found in the types of provisions that apply to 
protect patients’ autonomy and rights. For example, in The Fiqh of Medicine Response in 
Islamic Jurisprudence to Development in Medical Science7; the author has argued that some 
of the medical principles in Islamic Sharia and English law coincide. One of them is the 
application of the professional standard of care, where Islamic Sharia has applied the same 
reasoning as is found in the Bolam test,8 which used to be applied by English law.9 Thus this 
book shows that there is a common sense and ground between some of Islamic Sharia and 
English law principles which make it a valuable comparator.  
 
Third, English law is a common law jurisdiction and therefore it differs from Islamic Sharia 
and Saudi Arabian law. This difference, however, reinforces the value of the comparison, as 
it allows for in-depth consideration of any barriers to the absorption of legal principles from 
one legal tradition into another. Furthermore, the same legal problems that English law has 
dealt with during the last 30 years since the landmark case of Sidaway (as will be discussed 
in Chapter three) – while most of them have been cleared up recently by Montgomery,10 - are 
still unresolved under current Saudi Arabian medical law as will be discussed throughout this 
thesis. The relatively slow changes to English law allow for in-depth analysis of the rationales 
for change – this also facilitates consideration of how, and how far, Saudi Arabian law may 
learn from the English experience.  
The relative slowness of the development of English law regarding the standard of 
information disclosure cannot allow for in depth analysis of the justifications for change, 
																																								 																				
4	The	Grand	Mufti	Abdulaziz	ibn	Baz	was	born	in	1910	in	Riyadh,	where	he	was	educated,	further	he	held	different	
positions	such	as	a	teacher,	judge,	university	president	and	member	of	many	national	and	international	Islamic	religious	
and	academic	institutions.	He	published	many	books	and	fatawa.	He	died	from	cancer	in	1999.	‘His	Eminence	
Shaykh	AbdulAziz	ibn		Abdullah	ibn	AbdulRahman	ibn	Muhammad	ibn	Abdullah	Al	Baz’	GPSRI	at	
http://www.alifta.net/Fatawa/MoftyDetails.aspx?ID=2		(accessed	25/03/2015).	
5A	brief	of	the	Mufti	lecture	‘Rulers	and	scholars	should	be	obeyed	in	virtue,	because	that	would	make	stability’	at	
http://www.binbaz.org.sa/mat/8371	(accessed	29/03/2015)	(Arabic).	
6	See	for	example,	M	Gaudiosi	‘Influence	of	the	Islamic	Law	of	WAQF	on	the	Development	of	the	Trust	in	England:	The	
Case	of	Merton	College’	(1988)	136	U.	PA.	L.	REV.	1231-1261.	
7	A	Yacoub	the	Fiqh	of	Medicine	Response	in	Islamic	Jurisprudence	to	Development	in	Medical	Science	(Taha	Publishers	
Ltd	2001)	p.	8.	
8	Ibid	p.111-112	
9	Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11.	
10	See	Chapter	three	for	further	discussion.		
Introduction 
4	
	
which further reflects on the relative dearth of Saudi law in this area. During the 30 years 
(since Sidaway11 was decided) there have been significant English law cases and academic 
debates, discussions, analysing and criticising of the professional standard of care.12 Such 
robust literature is the result of principled consideration of what patients (wherever they may 
be) what patients want and need, and of an increasing emphasis on protecting their rights and 
respecting their autonomy.13 
That can be clearly understood from the decision in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health 
Board.14 In this important case, the Supreme Court reinforced the importance of respect for 
patients’ rights and autonomy, saying: 
‘The social and legal developments which we have mentioned point away 
from a model of the relationship between the doctor and the patient based 
upon medical paternalism. They also point away from a model based upon a 
view of the patient as being entirely dependent on information provided by 
the doctor. What they point towards is an approach to the law which, instead 
of treating patients as placing themselves in the hands of their doctors (and 
then being prone to sue their doctors in the event of a disappointing outcome), 
treats them so far as possible as adults who are capable of understanding that 
medical treatment is uncertain of success and may involve risks, accepting 
responsibility for the taking of risks affecting their own lives, and living with 
the consequences of their choices.’15 
 
While it is accepted that there may be problems associated with implementation of the 
changes proposed in this theses, based on the developments in English law, it is important to 
bear in mind that – with limited exceptions, such as in the case of refusal of life sustaining 
treatment – it is increasingly the case that the need to respect rights and autonomy in 
healthcare (along the lines of the recent English case law) is taking on increased significance 
in debates in Saudi Arabia.  
 
Fourth, English law has a long history of dealing with the issue of recognising – in theory at 
least – the value of patient autonomy. The historical reluctance to focus on patients’ rights 
rather than doctors’ duties has contemporary relevance in Saudi Arabian medical law, 
providing a rich source of information and guidance on how laws can develop, based on 
principles which (as will be argued) are broadly similar between the jurisdictions (albeit with 
some differences which will be explored infra).  
																																								 																				
11	Sidaway	v	Bethlem	Royal	Hospital	Governors	[1985]	1	AC	871.	
12	See	Chapter	three.	
13	Ibid.		
14	Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11.	
15	Ibid.	para	81	
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This relative newness of considering patient’s rights and the extent to which it is protected 
in Saudi Arabia, was considered at a conference – the first of its kind - which was held in 
Riyadh (Saudi Arabia’s capital) in 28-29 February 2016 under the title of ‘The 1st Gulf 
Patient Rights Conference.’16 The mere holding of this Conference shows that the issue of 
patients’ rights is receiving more attention and serious consideration in Saudi Arabia, 
suggesting that patients’ autonomy and rights may become more central in the delivery of 
healthcare in the country. 
Therefore, analysis of the well-developed English law approach to patients’ rights can 
provide comprehensive and comparative views for current Saudi Arabian medical law, and 
can provide useful information as to how any deficiencies may be remedied. English law has 
numerous and rich ethical and legal literature which provides considerable information and 
will prove a very useful source of information for this study. Additional to the rich legal and 
academic heritage provided by judges and legal writers, the other benefit English law has as 
a comparator is the participation by different medical institutions, such as the Royal College 
of Surgeons, the British Medical Association and the General Medical Council etc.17 These 
institutions have conducted a considerable amount of work in establishing professional 
principles by collecting the legal principles and translating them in simple frames for 
professionals and patients. These can be seen in the different guidelines which have been 
published by these institutions and which provide useful extra-judicial guidance. 
This wide variety of ethical and legal medical issues have been considered and discussed in 
depth in English law, in particular the principle of respect for autonomy and its relationship 
to consent to medical treatment and information disclosure. Hence, the study of English law 
may present options to deal with a variety of matters that have not been discussed yet under 
Saudi Arabian medical law. English law has largely dealt with the issues of consent and the 
standard of information disclosure in a medical context through case law, and there are 
extensive analyses and discussions about the relevant legal principles themselves, what 
issues judges have considered when developing and applying the law and the merits and 
disadvantages of different models of information disclosure. Study of this material will 
present a number of possible legal approaches to compare with Islamic Sharia and Saudi 
Arabian law. For example, both English and Saudi Arabian medical laws have made use of 
the concept of the professional (reasonable doctor) standard of care, as will be discussed. 
 
																																								 																				
16	For	further	information	visit	‘The	1st	Gulf	Patient	Rights	Conference’	http://gulfpatientrights.net/en/home-page	
(accessed	15/02/2016)	
17	See	Chapters	one	and	three.	
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Fifth, English law is a common law system which allows judges to interpret Acts and set 
precedents and legal principles when there is an area of ambiguity or deficiency, thus 
empowering courts to remedy some of the statutory gaps.18 Therefore, such a legal system 
can offer comprehensive analysis provided by judges in the field of respecting patients’ 
autonomy and protection of rights. As will be discussed in Chapter four Sharia Medical 
Panels (SMPs) as medical courts in Saudi Arabia are only authorised to apply the law, so 
they are not permitted to go beyond the law or set a new legal principle, as the country does 
not apply precedents, except in rare cases and only by the Supreme courts as I will explain 
throughout this thesis. Again, this difference is a prime source of comparison and highlights 
the extent to which reception of laws is feasible, despite apparently different approaches. 
Saudi Arabia currently lacks the experience and history specifically in the area of giving 
more protection to patients’ autonomy and rights as will be identified throughout this thesis. 
For example, the current Law of Practicing Healthcare Profession 2005 (LPHP2005) and 
Code of Ethics for Healthcare Practitioners 2013 (CEHP2013) are silent in regard to the 
amount of information and risk that should be disclosed; whether doctors should inform the 
patient about alternative available treatment options; the duty to answer patients’ questions; 
the need to ensure that patients’ understand the information given and the application of the 
therapeutic exception to withhold certain information. These legal vacuums still exist despite 
the fact that the medical regulations in Saudi Arabia have undergone some developments 
during the last three decades (as will be discussed in Chapters two and four). Therefore, 
LPHP2005 and CEHP2013 can still be characterised as underdeveloped regulations that lack 
the level of detail which is required in an effective legal instrument in the modern medico-
legal climate. An example of that is the failure of both LPHP2005 and CEHP2013 to address 
the above issues.19 These deficiencies have created a considerable need to reconsider some 
aspects of the present Saudi Arabian laws as the current stance is capable of generating 
doubts among lawyers, patients and medical professionals about the legal rights and 
obligations arising in relation to information disclosure. 
While the Saudi Arabian legal system has been to some extent influenced by other legal 
systems - an example has been highlighted  by Hanson in his article  ‘The Influence of French 
Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia’20  where the author claimed that the Saudi 
Companies Law of 1965 has been influenced (coincide in some aspects) by French law21 – 
																																								 																				
18G	Slapper	and	D	Kelly	The	English	Legal	System	(9thed	Routledge.Cavendish	2009)	p.	3.	
19	See	Chapter	four	for	further	discussion.	
20	M	Hanson	‘The	Influence	of	French	Law	on	the	Legal	Development	of	Saudi	Arabia’	(1987)	2(3)	Arab	Law	Quarterly	
272-291.	
21	Ibid	p.	290.		
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there is no reason to believe that it cannot also benefit from analysis of other jurisdictions, 
such as English law. Of particular significance is that both the Saudi Arabian and the UK 
governments have recently signed a judicial memorandum of understating in September 
2014,22 which was approved by the Saudi Arabian government in April 2015.23 This might 
suggest that if there is an official judicial agreement between Saudi Arabian and the UK 
governments, the influence of English legal principles and approaches may become 
increasingly important in the development of Saudi law, not least because there is a current 
agreement which allows cooperation with the English judicial system.24 Additionally, given  
the long relationship between the UK and Saudi Arabia, in terms of  political cooperation,25 
the historical link between these two countries, may be beneficial in terms of evaluating, and 
potentially adopting, some of the best practice from English law and applying this to reform 
the Saudi Arabian information disclosure standard.  
Further, English law and Saudi Arabian laws share some common areas of legal principles. 
For example, the Saudi Arbitration Law 2012 (SAL2012) and English Arbitration Act 1996 
AA1996) have some similar aspects and principles one of which is related to what is called 
‘Consent Award or Award on Agreed Terms’ where both article 45 SAL2012 and section 51 
in AA1996 are alike and list the same principles.26 
Another example can be extracted from the new Saudi Companies Law 201527 (SCL2015)  
which seems to adopt and learn some principles from English Companies Act 2006 
(CA2006).  For example, SCL2015 and CA2006 coincide in relation to the establishment or 
formulation of a joint stock company by a single person. That was not allowed under the 
																																								 																				
22	‘Saudi	Arabia	and	the	UK	minsters	of	justice	signed	a	judicial	memorandum	of	understating’	Saudi	Press	Agency	
http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?newsid=1271369	(accessed	15/02/2016)	(Arabic)		
23	‘	Saudi	Arabian	Councils	of	Ministers	approved	a	judicial	memorandum	of	understating’	Alriyadh	newspaper	
http://www.alriyadh.com/1041152		(accessed	15/02/2016)	(Arabic).		
24	Ibid,	Alriyadh	newspaper	stated	that:	‘The	major	features	of	this	agreement	is:	1.	Both	countries	will	strengthen	the	
scope	of	judicial	cooperation	between	them	under	the	jurisdiction	of	the	powers	of	each,	according	to	the	priorities	of	
cooperation	that	they	agreed	for.	2.	The	two	countries	agreed	to	the	development	of	cooperation	in	a	number	of	areas,	
including:	The	exchange	of	publications,	research	and	information	relating	to	judicial	systems	and	the	administration	of	
justice	and	the	methods	of	the	exercise	of	judicial	work,	and	hold	seminars	and	lectures	with	a	view	to	sharing	
experiences	and	developments	in	the	judicial	field	between	the	two	countries,	and	work	to	promote	cooperation	in	the	
training	and	transfer	of	professional	legal	experience	between	the	legal	experts	of	both	countries	to	enhance	the	ability	
to	exercise	the	legal	profession	on	a	global	scale.’	
25	The	UK	and	Saudi	Arabia	has	a	political	relationship	for	more	than	80	years	‘When	King	Abdul	Aziz	met	Churchill’	
http://www.arabnews.com/node/213541	Arab	News	newspaper	(accessed	15/02/2016).	‘Bilateral	relations	with	Saudi	
Arabia’		http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmfaff/88/8807.htm	the	UK	Parliament	
(accessed	15/02/2016)		
26	Z	ALQurashi	‘Grounds	for	Setting	Aside	Arbitral	Awards	Relating	to	Arbitration	Agreement:	A	Comparative	Analysis	of	
Saudi	and	English	Arbitration	laws.’	Vol11(1)	Majleat	ALhqoq	(2013)	334-386	p	354-356	
27	E	Reda	and	R	Bassi	‘New	Saudi	Companies	law’	
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/saudiarabia/insights/publications/2015/11/new-saudi-arabian-companies-law/	
(accessed	28/09/2016)	
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annulled Saudi Companies Law 1965, but now under article 55 from SCL2015 it is permitted 
which is similar to CA 2006 section 7(1).28 
These examples demonstrate both that there are mutual areas and grounds between the two 
legal systems, and also that Saudi law has already learned from English law. Obviously, there 
are some clear differences in both legal systems29 where a line cannot be crossed but these  
differences do not always mean that it is not possible or permissible to learn some lessons 
from each other especially with the recent judicial memorandum of understating signed 
between Saudi Arabia and the UK. Therefore, it is possible and not uncommon for Saudi 
Arabian law to absorb lessons from English law experiences where there is no conflict with 
basic Islamic principles. Indeed, there are aspects of law, I would argue potentially including 
respect for autonomy, where Saudi law shares more with English law than it does with some 
other non-Islamic jurisdictions 
Therefore, this thesis will provide a comparison of how English and Saudi Arabian laws 
have dealt with the matter of information and risk disclosure standard in the context of 
medical treatment. This will enable a conclusion to be drawn as to whether specific reforms 
to Saudi Arabian medical law can and should be introduced by learning from the English 
law experience, and to recommendations based on this. The thesis therefore by doing that 
adopts a novel manner of reconsidering Saudi Arabian medical law by comparing it with a 
more developed legal approach to the same issues. Therefore, the thesis will be novel by 
pointing out the above legal deficiencies, comparing them to another legal system by 
emphasising on the notion of the principle of respect for autonomy to show how can be learnt 
from other experiences. This thesis will therefore contribute to the literature through its 
discussion and recommendations and it is hoped that it may assist Saudi Arabian lawmakers 
in considering reforms in this area. 
 
Sixth, in apparent recognition of its actual and potential importance, English law is being 
taught in one of Saudi Arabian private universities (Dar-AlHekma University).30 On the other 
hand, throughout Saudi Arabia, no other non-Islamic legal systems are taught in any 
educational institutions. This is a clear example showing that it is not only important to study 
English law in its home land and learn some lessons but also it is seen to be a relevant 
comparator in Saudi Arabia. 
																																								 																				
28	See	also	article	71	section	1	from	SCL2015	and	section	175(6)	from	CA2006	which	considered	the	same	duty	to	avoid	
conflicts	of	interests	in	a	joint	stock	company. 
29	Such	as	some	aspects	of	criminal	law	for	example,	death	penalty.		
30	A	Rogowska	‘English	Law	in	Saudi	Arabia’	(27)	Arab	Law	Quarterly	(2013)	271-279		
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Further, as Rogowska has argued, commercial arbitration is important in Saudi Arabia where 
there are many national and international investments and some (arbitral) legal disputes are 
decided in London, so it is obvious for Saudi students to learn both English language and 
law.31 
This suggest that any research or comparative studies that include English law rather than 
other laws can be easily welcomed in Saudi Arabia So for this thesis to study and compare 
English law and argue that some lessons can be learnt that can be defendable, acceptable and 
familiar in Saudi Arabia where with other laws might not be. 
On a more practical note, as my studies were undertaken in the United Kingdom, and as there 
are relatively few Scottish cases in this area, the best available resources to address the 
thesis’s proposals and goals were related to English law.     
English law has a rich heritage and accessible sources that can be traced and studied. Further, 
there are more sources which have discussed and studied the relationship between English 
law and Islamic and Saudi Arabian laws than any other non-Islamic law  
 
This thesis will propose specific reform of Saudi Arabian medical law to provide greater 
recognition and protection of patients’ rights to receive information about proposed treatment 
in order to give a sufficiently informed consent, but in a way that is in accordance with 
Islamic Sharia traditions. It will argue that it is important to make such legal changes by way 
of legislation in order to properly respect patients’ autonomy.  
1. An overview 
Islamic Sharia was founded 1400 years ago and includes a combination of elements centred 
on religious faith. Most significant are the articles of faith of the religion and instruction on 
worship, such as requirements for prayer. However, because the religious principles 
concerned are regarded as fundamental and applicable to all areas of life, they also form the 
basis of legal requirements, which may be referred to as Sharia law. A country that applies 
Islamic Sharia is called an Islamic country. One such is Saudi Arabia, which has recognised 
the supremacy of Islamic Sharia as the main source of its laws. However, Saudi Arabia also 
has a legislative system. The procedure to set, amend and propose an act or adopt an 
international treaty or law in Saudi Arabia will be explained in Chapter two in this thesis, 
but it is worth giving a brief outline of it here before explaining its relationship with Sharia 
law. 
																																								 																				
31	Ibid.	p	275-278.	
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As Saudi Arabia is a monarchy country the King has the ultimate power (the King is both 
the head of the state and the prime minster),32 so by a Royal Order he can enact, annul and 
amend any acts without	consulting the legislative authorities (the Council of Ministers and 
Shura (consultative) Council).33 The Basic Law of Governance 1992 (BLG1992)34 granted 
him that power.35 For example, the late King Abdullah by a Royal Order in 2006 amended 
article 5 of the BLG1992, in relation to the rule of the succession, as the King established 
the Allegiance Commission, which according to its Act is responsible for the throne’s 
succession.36 
The second way to legislate is through the Shura Council, which proposes a bill or an 
amendment. The proposal will be sent to the Council of Ministers for further discussion and 
consideration, and if an agreement is reached between both Councils, a Royal Decree will 
approve the act. If there is no agreement, the proposal will be sent back to the Shura Council 
for further consideration, and then it will return to the Council of Ministers. Then, if there is 
no agreement, the bill will be sent to the King for the final decision. 
The third way is through the Council of Ministers, which has the power to propose a bill or 
amendment, with no need to send it to the Shura Council and the bill will be approved by a 
Royal Decree. 
There are other legislative bodies which can participate in legislation: (1) General Presidency 
of Scholarly Research and Ifta (GPSRI), but its declarations must be adopted by the 
government to be an Act or part of it. (2) The Supreme Courts as the Law of the Judiciary 
2007 (LJ2007) and Law of the Board of Grievances 2007 (LBG2007) give them the power 
to establish a general principle, which becomes legally binding to be applied by the lower 
courts. 
The BLG1992 stated clearly that: ‘Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its 
authority from the Book of God and the Sunnah of the Messenger, which are the ultimate 
																																								 																				
32	BLG1992	article	56,	at	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=4&VersionID=240	
(accessed	12/09/2015).	
33A	AI-Fahad	‘Ornamental	Constitutionalism:	The	Saudi	Basic	Law	of	Governance’	(2005)	30	The	Yale	Journal	of	
International	Law	375-396	p.	384-389.	
34BLG1992	is	factually	and	practically	the	Kingdom’s	constitutional	law.	It	is	based	on	Islamic	Sharia	and	thus	gives	
Sharia	law	supremacy.		
35	BLG1992	articles	44,	56	and	70.	
36	‘King	Abdullah	names	members	of	the	Allegiance	Commission’	the	Royal	Embassy	of	Saudi	Arabia	in	Washington.	At	
http://saudiembassy.net/latest_news/news12100801.aspx	(accessed	20/05/2015).	
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sources of reference for this Law and the other laws of the State’.37 Therefore, this obligation 
requires the Saudi Arabian lawmakers to form law in harmony with Islamic Sharia.  
The thesis’s major work is not to explain all elements of Islamic Sharia laws, but it will 
discuss the sources of Islamic Sharia, as this explains its origins. However, it is useful to 
provide in this Introduction a short outline of the forms of Islamic Sharia laws, such as the 
basis of a number of criminal offences, liability and punishment, the status of marriage and 
parenthood and a wide range of other areas such as inheritance, debt, trade, investment and 
so forth.  
Some of these laws have been considerably developed over time through scholarship and 
practical application and contain a great deal of detail about the area they consider. For 
example, inheritance law has been set by the holy Quran38 and the Messenger Mohammad39 
Peace and blessing be upon him (PBUH) traditions and Muslim scholars have paid great 
attention to seeking to understand and explain its principles and procedure. Inheritance law, 
has stated clearly who can inherit and how much and why he or she should inherit that share 
or percentage.40 This approach is regarded as so settled that it has recently been able to be 
used in a computer program, where a person just needs to fill in the required information, 
and then the program will automatically determine the people who are entitled to the 
inheritance and their share.41 
However, there are some aspects of Islamic Sharia law that have been less fully developed 
and, as a result, their application in a contemporary context is more open to interpretation. 
Many statements provide general principles that are required to be considered in specific 
contexts which either did not exist at the time of writing or which have undergone 
considerable change. There is reference to the practice of medicine in the Islamic Sharia but 
this thesis will argue that it is one of the areas that remain underdeveloped and its application 
to modern medical practice and the legal regulation of it has been unclear. 
This thesis will therefore examine the Islamic Sharia perspective on medical practice 
because it is the foundational source of Saudi Arabian law, religious and ethical principles. 
																																								 																				
37BLG1992	article	7.	See	also	article	1	‘The	Kingdom	of	Saudi	Arabia	is	a	sovereign	Arab	Islamic	State.	Its	religion	is	Islam.	
Its	constitution	is	Almighty	God's	Book,	The	Holy	Quran,	and	the	Sunna	(Tradition)	of	the	Prophet	(PBUH).	Arabic	is	the	
language	of	the	Kingdom.	The	City	of	Riyadh	is	the	capital.’	
38	The	holy	Quran	in	translation	(CH4:	11,12,13,14	and	176).	
39	Messenger	Mohammad	PBUH	is	the	Muslims’	and	all	nations’	Messenger,	he	was	born	in	Makkah	in	571	and	he	
became	a	Messenger	in	610.	He	died	in	AlMadinah	AlMunawwarah	in	643.	S	Almubarakpuri	The	Sealed	Nectar	-	
Biography	of	the	Noble	Messenger	(Darussalam	publisher	2002)	p.	71,	86	and	558.	
40For	example,	A	Hussian	the	Islamic	Law	of	Succession	(Darussalam	2005).	
41	For	example,	the	Saudi	Arabia	Ministry	of	Justice	at	
http://www.moj.gov.sa/arsa/courts/eforms/pages/mawarith.aspx	(accessed	22/03/2014).	
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For this thesis to provide an appropriate understanding of the position of Islamic Sharia and 
of its influence on Saudi Arabian legislation, it needs to establish some general points of 
reference. Therefore, it will provide some background information about basic concepts and 
terminology, for example, the sources of Islamic Sharia: the holy Quran, the Sunnah and 
the method of interpretation through religious and legal scholarship.  
In addition to Sharia Law, Saudi Arabia also has legislation that governs some areas of 
medical practice. The most relevant for the purpose of this thesis are the LPHP200542 and 
the CEHP201343 which is also legally binding, as I will explain in Chapter two. 
The focus of the thesis, therefore, is to examine Saudi Arabian and English law in order to 
identify whether there are any lessons to be learnt from English experience. Hence, the thesis 
will evaluate the development of the law in both jurisdictions and explore what it does and 
should be seeking to achieve. This will involve considering the ethical concepts of respect 
for autonomy and their origins in Western medical ethics and Islamic Sharia especially in 
the context of consent and information disclosure. The doctors’ responsibility to provide 
good medical care has also played a large part in the approach to the practice of medicine in 
both countries and it has been explained in terms of patients being able and encouraged to 
trust in their medical providers.44 
However, concerns have been raised in the context of Western medicine that the element of 
trust leads to overly paternalistic behaviour by doctors and it will be argued that there has 
been a shift away from reliance on medical providers simply to act in the best interests of 
their patients and an expectation of a more equal partnership. It will be argued that the 
principle of respect for patient autonomy has become increasingly dominant in Western 
medical ethics and has replaced a more paternalistic approach. It will also be argued that this 
has been reflected in English law and that a professional practice based standard to 
information disclosure has been eroded so that one based more on the perspective of the 
rights of patients to information to make informed choices has been developed. While respect 
for autonomy is crucial, whether the legal standard could or should fully meet the ethical 
requirements for respect for autonomy will be considered.  
																																								 																				
42LPHP2005	at	http://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=164&VersionID=178#search1	
(accessed	05/12/2014).	
43	CEHP2013	issued	by	the	SCHS.	at	
http://www.scfhs.org.sa/en/registration/ClassAndRegister/Reregister/Documents/Ethics%20for%20Health%20Practitio
ners.pdf		(accessed	12/09/2015).	
44	For	example,	O	O’Neill	Autonomy	and	Trust	in	Bioethics	(1sted	CUP	2002)	and		M	Khedhiri,	A	Adlan	and	M	Abolfotouh	
‘Informed	Consent	in	Clinical	Care:	Models	of	Patients’	Satisfaction	and	Attitude	Based	on	General	Trust	and	Risks	
Disclosure’	(2013)	46(2)	International	Journal	of	Medicine	and	Medical	Sciences,	1171-1177.	
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By contrast, it will be argued that the approach in Saudi Arabia has continued to place more 
weight on the concept of trust in doctors rather than respect for autonomy and that this has 
influenced the development and application of legislation concerning medical law. While 
this approach may itself have rested on interpretation of Islamic Sharia, it will be suggested 
that Sharia law can in fact be interpreted in a way that is consistent with ensuring greater 
respect for patient autonomy. Presenting and analysing these different perspectives on the 
legal and ethical approaches to information disclosure allows an evaluation of which is a 
preferable way of approaching the issue and, although there may be no perfect solution, it 
will be proposed that some reform of Saudi Arabian legislation is warranted and would 
remain consistent with Islamic Sharia law.  
In terms of the recommendations that this thesis will provide on reform of the current Saudi 
Arabian medical law position, they are therefore intended to achieve the following benefits: 
first and foremost they seek to protect patients’ autonomy and change the culture to 
emphasise respect for patients’ wishes and needs, but in a way that can be in harmony with 
Islamic Sharia teaching. Second, they seek to give doctors the confidence they need to 
practice medicine in an ethically and legally appropriate way by ensuring that their approach 
to seeking and obtaining consent to treatment adequately respects patients’ autonomy. 
Although the proposals for these recommendations are intended to be drawn from principles 
of Islamic Sharia law and to be compatible with it, Saudi Arabian legislative bodies have 
recently made it clear that the preferred route for legal development and reform is to enact 
legislation, as it has been contended that this would be easier to consider and apply.45 This 
can be demonstrated in practice by a recent Royal Order that was issued in the beginning of 
2015 to establish a committee that includes Saudi Arabian scholars and lawyers tasked with 
setting statutory laws in the areas that have no statutory laws.46 This shows that the Saudi 
Arabian government is intending to form Islamic Sharia principles into statutory laws, 
clarifying certain areas and filling perceived gaps in coverage. 
Hence, the approach of this thesis is to provide recommendations that may be of assistance 
to Saudi Arabian lawmakers when considering issues arising from allegations of inadequate 
information disclosure in medical treatment.  
																																								 																				
45	For	example,	F	Vogle	Studies	in	Islamic	Law	and	Society,	Islamic	Law	and	Legal	System:	Studies	of	Saudi	Arabia:	Legal	
System	of	Saudi	Arabia	(Brill	Academic	Pub	2008).	
46Royal	Order	no	A/20	in	2015.	(Arabic)	
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It is also important to note that, although the Islamic Sharia is the principal source of Saudi 
Arabian laws, and all Saudi Arabian law must be consistent with it, that does not mean that 
it is a barrier that obstructs the further development of Saudi Arabian medical legislation. 
The Islamic Sharia itself cannot be changed, but the Fiqh (jurisprudence) and scholars’ 
understandings are changeable because they rely on specific matters, times, and customs.47 
Accordingly, legislation passed in Saudi Arabia that is based on Islamic Sharia law is also 
able to be developed and reformed. Muslim scholars have dealt with some medical law issues 
in Sharia, but much of this scholarship was undertaken when the practice of medicine was 
not as complicated as it is now, and when information about risks, benefits and options for 
treatment were not as extensive. The need for patients to be involved in making treatment 
decisions was therefore arguably less significant than it is now. Accordingly, there are some 
general principles for matters that relate to medical law in Sharia, but these principles need 
to be extracted, collected, developed and reviewed to be put into practice in accordance with 
current medical issues.48 
This new perspective on Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian law, focusing on consent to 
medical treatment and information disclosure by comparing them to English law, makes this 
work novel as it provides examination of a little-researched topic in Saudi Arabian 
comparative jurisprudence. Further, this study will benefit non-Arabic readers who are 
interested in conducting comparative studies of medical law based on Islamic Sharia, Saudi 
Arabian and English law, by researching and providing basic references and sources. 
Recently a number of theses and studies in the area of Islamic Sharia and English medical 
law have been written in English.49 This work will add a new subject to these resources. 
After completion of this thesis I intend to translate it into Arabic which then will provide 
both Arabic and English libraries with a comparative study of medical ethics, consent to 
medical treatment and information disclosure in the Saudi Arabian and English legal 
systems. It is hoped that it will encourage and support further comparative study, 
consideration and analysis of Saudi Arabian medical laws. 
																																								 																				
47A	Yacoub	The	Fiqh	of	Medicine	Response	in	Islamic	Jurisprudence	to	Development	in	Medical	Science	p.	8.	
48For	example,	M	Ibn	Qayyim	Aljauziyah	Healing	with	the	Medicine	of	the	Prophet,	translated	by	J	Abu	al	Rub.	
(Darussalam	Publisher	2003).	
49	For	examples,	F	Elgariani	‘Al-	Qawid	al-Fiqhiyyah	(Islamic	Legal	Maxims):	Concept,	Functions,	History,	Classifications	
and	Application	to	Contemporary	Medical	Issues’	a	PhD	thesis	submitted	to	the	University	of	Exeter	in	2012,	A	Al-
Hammadi	‘Medicine,	Medical	Liability,	and	Doctors'	Criminal	Liability	and	Punishments	in	Islamic	Sharia	and	the	UAE’	a	
PhD	thesis	submitted	to	the	University	of	Exeter	in	2004	and	A	Yacoub,	‘The	Fiqh	of	Medicine	Response	in	Islamic	
Jurisprudence	to	Development	in	Medical	Science’	a	PhD	thesis	submitted	to	the	University	of	London	in	2000.	Which	
was	published	as	a	book	in	2001.	
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2. The research method and the use of Islamic Sharia, Saudi Arabian legislation 
and Arabic language sources 
The study will use a comparative, critical and analysis-based method of research using legal 
authorities, resources and commentaries relevant to the two jurisdictions. This thesis is 
concerned with the Sunni Islamic schools of thought on Sharia law. This should not be 
considered as showing disrespect towards other Islamic schools of thought but is due to the 
focus of this thesis being on Saudi Arabia, where the Sunni school predominates, as will be 
discussed in Chapter two. 
Nevertheless, while there is a rich tradition of Islamic scholarship on Sharia law, compared 
with the array of materials available on the English legal position on medical treatment and 
information disclosure, there is a comparative shortage of Arabic language sources and 
materials, and even less those relating specifically to Saudi Arabia. The available materials 
in Sharia law that have a bearing on medical law are often not directly related to the topic 
of consent to medical treatment, and as noted, some were written a very long time ago, which 
leads to the observation that this is an area which is presently underdeveloped. It also lends 
itself to the need for Sharia law to be interpreted in a contemporary medical treatment 
context. 
A matter to be explained is that there will be, in some places in this thesis, multiple uses of 
the same Sharia materials to illustrate different points. This is because the nature of the use 
and interpretation of Islamic Sharia requires such an approach. For example, the Messenger 
PBUH said: ‘[a]ny physician who practises medicine when he was not known as a 
practitioner before that and he harms (the patients) he will be held responsible.’50 This 
prophetic statement can be cited to illustrate different points. Firstly, it can be used by 
scholars or lawyers to argue that, as the statement just included the liability of unqualified 
doctors, so those who are qualified should not be held liable if they make a medical error, 
because they are out of the statement’s ambit.51 Secondly, it can be used to argue that a doctor 
may incur civil or criminal liability if either s/he is an ignorant in the way s/he conducts 
his/her practice or if s/he acts outside his/her own speciality, such as a family doctor who 
performs heart surgery.52 
																																								 																				
50	S	Abi	Dawud	Sunan	Abi	Dawud	at	http://sunnah.com/abudawud/41/94	(accessed	25/08/2015).	
51K	Almshegeeh	‘Tdamien	Altabiabfe	De	AlshariaAlislamih	(Doctor’s	Liability	in	the	Light	of	Islamic	Law)’	(2000)	6	AlAdl	
1-23	p.	12-13	(Arabic).	
52M	Ibn	Qayyim	Aljauziyah,	Healing	with	the	Medicine	of	the	Prophet,	p.	124.	
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Therefore, it is common practice in Islamic scholarship to cite the same sources to support a 
number of different points and this method will be used in this thesis where required. 
I have attempted not to cite Arabic language sources and to refer instead to English language 
materials as long as they address the same issues and provide sufficient information to cover 
the discussion of the issue. The reason for that is to give more reliability to the study by 
avoiding misconceptions of the ideas in the original sources in Arabic as there are some 
terminologies that do not have a synonym in the English language. However, some important 
sources are not officially available in English and the research for this thesis has required 
translation of some materials (books and journal articles) into English. This material I have 
translated myself, making every effort to ensure that the translation properly reflects the 
author’s idea. 
Further, in respect of Saudi Arabian statutory laws, I have where possible cited official 
translations into English, although even these may have some translation issues, which I will 
highlight where necessary - for example, the translation of an Act into English with the title: 
Law of Practicing Healthcare Profession 2005 which is provided by the Bureau of Experts 
at the Council of Ministers.53 This might be more appropriately translated as the Law of the 
Practicing Healthcare Professions 2005. If there is no official translation of Saudi Arabian 
statutory laws, I have translated the Act’s title and the relevant part of the Act myself. As 
with other Arabic language sources, I have sought to ensure that the translation reflects the 
original meaning of the Act. The materials obtained therefore provide coverage of both 
Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical law materials from the full range of available and 
accessible sources. 
For clarity, I will only use the Gregorian year for the citation that is the equivalent to the 
year in Hijri calendar.54 For example, citing a statutory law is a similar to an English law 
citation regarding the use of the title of the Act and date. For example,  
Saudi Arabia: Law of Practicing Healthcare Profession 2005. 
																																								 																				
53	At	http://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=164&VersionID=178#search1	(accessed	
05/12/2014).	
54	The	official	calendar	of	Saudi	Arabia	is	the	Islamic	calendar	(Hijri	calendar).	The	Hijri	calendar	was	set	to	start	by	the	
date	when	Messenger	Mohammad	PBUH	emigrated	to	AlMadinah	AlMunawwarah	in	A.D.	622.	The	Hijri	calendar	
contains	12	months	354	or	355	days.	The	start	and	end	of	each	of	month	relies	on	the	beginning	and	end	of	the	moon.	
Each	month	is	either	29	or	30	and	not	fixed,	which	may	change	depends	on	the	moon	counting.	Now	we	are	in	the	year	
of	1436	which	is	2015	by	Gregorian	calendar.	S	Abou-Samra	‘Muslim	calendar,	Holy	days	and	Festivals’	in	Islamic	Beliefs,	
Practices,	and	Cultures	(Muslim	World)	(Cavendish	2010)	p.	151-174.	
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On the other hand, whereas English law statutes are generally divided into parts, sections, 
subsections, paragraphs and subparagraphs, Saudi Arabian statutes are divided into parts, 
chapters, articles, sections and subsections. For example:  
Saudi Arabia: Law of Practicing Healthcare Profession 2005, article 2, section 
B(1). 
3. The thesis structure 
Beside this Introduction, the thesis will be composed of four Chapters and a Concluding 
Chapter, as follows: 
Chapter one 
The Chapter will be used to provide the context for the argument that the principle of respect 
for autonomy has been a major factor in the development of the present legal approach to 
information disclosure and consent to medical treatment in England. Accordingly, Chapter 
one will discuss the concept of the principle of respect for personal autonomy and the 
approaches that have been taken to it in Western ethical literature, and in particular in 
Western medical ethics. The aim is to show how the ethical concept has developed in the 
context of medical treatment and the values that it seeks to protect in order to form a 
foundation for the analysis of the approach of English law. The Chapter will conclude that 
the principle of respect for autonomy would suggest full information disclosure of any matter 
that might affect the decision of a patient to proceed with medical treatment, although 
difficulties in achieving this will be acknowledged. An alternative approach, based on the 
principle of trust, will be considered, but will conclude that it has not assumed dominance in 
Western medical ethics as a foundation for the appropriate ethical approach to information 
disclosure and consent to treatment. One of the problems it has is that it may come into 
conflict with the principle of respect for autonomy and encourage overly paternalistic 
behaviour. Although some attempts have been made to meet this difficulty, it will be 
concluded that respect for patient autonomy is the major concept underpinning the Western 
ethical approach to information disclosure to patients. However, it will be suggested that full 
disclosure might pose difficulties if it were to be imposed as a legal standard and this will be 
discussed further in Chapter three.  
Further, the Chapter will briefly present the sources and foundations of English law and how 
it is formed as well as its relation to ethics in general. As an aim to present how English law 
has considered ethics particularly in the area of consent and information disclosure, to 
examine that in Chapter three.  
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Chapter two 
One of the main focuses of Chapter two is to present the sources of Islamic Sharia, to 
establish the foundation of Saudi Arabian medical ethics and laws. The Chapter also discuss 
if there is a common ground between Islamic Sharia English common law, by discussing 
whether the are some difficulties in Islamic Sharia adapting in line with English law. The 
Chapter will explain the Saudi Arabian sources of law and how the laws are formulated in 
the country and the influence of Islamic Sharia on its formulation.  
The Chapter will explain that the standard of information disclosure to patients has not been 
stated by the primary sources of Islamic Sharia, so the issue has been opened for discussion 
and different interpretation by scholars and lawyers. However, there are a number of 
principles that are relevant to this discussion. 
In terms of Islamic Sharia medical ethics, the Chapter bases its discussion on the idea that 
Islamic Sharia has a major concern about the maintaining of an individual’s health, as it is 
taken as an important precept that a person should keep healthy and not cause any harm to 
his/her health or body or doing something against his/her faith. It is one of the general 
principles stated by the holy Quran that a person should not put him/herself in danger.55 
The Chapter will then consider the issue of respect for autonomy from the Islamic Sharia 
perspective and how that has been debated in Islamic Sharia medical ethical literature. The 
Chapter will point out that there are potential differences in the Islamic approach and 
understanding of the concept of autonomy which may have implications for considering the 
extent that patients’ autonomy should be respected in relation to the provision of information 
as part of seeking consent to treatment. However, another general principle of Islamic Sharia 
is that Muslims should be trustworthy in general and the craft of medicine is considered to 
be one of the noble professions. Accordingly, those who practice it should be trustworthy, 
as they will be treating people who are likely to need to rely on their expertise. The notion 
of trust still plays a vital role in current medical practice, regulations and public general 
attitudes toward the doctor/patient relationship. It will be argued that the culture of Saudi 
Arabia has led to an approach to the interpretation of Islamic Sharia based more upon 
patients trusting their doctors than upon respect for autonomy.56 
																																								 																				
55	The	holy	Quran	in	translation	(CH2:195).	
56	For	example,	A	Adlan	‘Informed	Consent	in	Saudi	Arabia’	in	R.G.	Beran	(ed.),	Legal	and	Forensic	Medicine	(Springer-
Verlag	Berlin	Heidelberg	2013)	893-907.	
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While the primary sources of Islamic Sharia do not make specific reference to information 
disclosure in the context of medical treatment, nevertheless, the Chapter will come to the 
conclusion that respect for autonomy from an Islamic Sharia perspective can be used to 
support full information disclosure of any material fact that might affect the patient’s 
decision whether to consent to medical treatment. This thesis would propose that full 
information disclosure based on the principle of respect for autonomy is an ideal ethical 
concept and it is compatible with Islamic Sharia medical ethics. While it would represent a 
shift in attitude to prioritise respect for autonomy over trust in the medical profession, it will 
be contended that this is justifiable and appropriate in a contemporary context.  
Chapter three 
The Chapter will examine how English law has developed its approach to consent to medical 
treatment in general and in respect of information disclosure and consent to treatment in 
respect of competent adult patients and the role of the judiciary in that process and the 
approach to expert evidence. 
Chapter three will demonstrate the importance of patient consent and the consequences of 
not obtaining it. It will also consider how English law has drawn a distinction between a 
failure to provide adequate information disclosure which results in the absence of a legally 
valid consent to treatment, and where there has been a legally valid consent but the patient 
may bring a claim in negligence. It will be explained that the vast majority of claims 
concerning inadequate information disclosure are dealt with by the law relating to civil 
liability for negligence and this forms the main focus of further consideration in this Chapter. 
It will consider a number of models of information disclosure, that could form the basis for 
a legal test for adequate information disclosure. It will also examine how the legal approach 
has been influenced by the ethical principle of respect for autonomy discussed in Chapter 
one. This Chapter will also discuss the development of the professional standard of care in 
respect of information disclosure and the criticisms there have been of it as insufficient to 
adequately protect the principle of respect for autonomy. It will consider more recent 
developments that have been argued to provide greater respect for patient autonomy and 
whether there has been a move to a more patient based standard of information disclosure, 
as illustrated by the recent Supreme Court case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health 
Board.57 The case has highlighted the importance of respecting the basic human rights of the 
patient in regard to self-determination.  
																																								 																				
57Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11.	
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The Chapter will conclude whether the English legal approach does provide an adequate 
standard of information disclosure and whether there are reasons why the law could or should 
not provide a standard of full information disclosure. The conclusions reached will enable 
the English law approach to be compared and contrasted with the current Saudi Arabian 
medical law approach in Chapter four. It will form the foundation for the advice and 
recommendations that the thesis will propose for possible reforms to Saudi Arabian medical 
law based on lessons learn from English jurisdiction. 
Chapter four 
In this Chapter, the thesis will present how Saudi Arabian medical law has taken into account 
the ethical principles that have been set by Islamic Sharia, which the thesis discussed in 
Chapter two, in terms of patient consent and the standard of information disclosure. The aim 
is to highlight the areas that need to be resolved to provide a foundation to present advice 
and recommendations for law reform. 
The Chapter will consider the legal consequence of the absence of a valid patient consent or 
the failure of adequate information disclosure. It will examine the current practice of 
applying the professional standard of care in terms of how much information and what risks 
should be disclosed. Further, the Chapter will explore the areas of deficiency in Saudi 
Arabian medical law in terms of the principle of respecting patient autonomy. In examining 
this issue, the thesis will consider more recent commentary that has been made by other 
researchers.58 
The Chapter will conclude that there is a legal deficiency in relation to the current Saudi 
Arabian professional standard of care for disclosure of information to patients as it fails to 
adequately ensure respect for patient autonomy in accordance with Islamic Sharia. This 
might have emerged because of the lack of the appreciation of the principle of respect for 
autonomy and the greater reliance on the notion of trust. A number of matters are currently 
unresolved. These include uncertainty over the amount of information and the of type risks 
that should be disclosed to competent adult patients; the doctors’ legal duties to inform the 
patient about the available alternative treatments; the doctors’ legal duty to answer the 
patients’ questions and how they should be answered; whether doctors have a legal duty to 
																																								 																				
58For	example,	M	Abolfotouh	and	A	Adlan.	‘Quality	of	Informed	Consent	for	Invasive	Procedures	in	Central	Saudi	Arabia’	
(2012)	5	International	Journal	of	General	Medicine	269–275.	B	Jamjoom	et	al	‘Attitudes	Towards	Informed	Consent:	A	
Comparison	between	Surgeons	Working	in	Saudi	Arabia	and	the	United	Kingdom’	(2011)	26(1)	Oman	Medical	Journal	
29-33.	H	Al-Faleh	et	al.	‘Detailed	Disclosure	to	Saudi	Arabian	Patients	on	Risks	Related	to	an	Invasive	Procedure’	(2010)	
31(7)	Saudi	Med	J	814-818.		
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ensure that the patient can understand the information provided; and the application of 
therapeutic privilege to withhold information.  
However, the Chapter will conclude that the current professional standard of care 
undermines  respect for the patient’s autonomy and so it should be replaced by the prudent 
patient standard, which can be supported by Islamic Sharia. Saudi Arabian medical law 
reform must be compatible with Islamic Sharia and it has been argued that ensuring greater 
respect for patient autonomy is compatible with Islamic Sharia. These proposals will be set 
out in the Concluding Chapter.  
Concluding Chapter 
The Chapter will deliver recommendations for legal reform based on the discussion and 
analysis of the earlier discussions and arguments. These recommendations aim to ensure 
more legal recognition of a requirement to respect patients’ autonomy but in a way that is in 
harmony with Islamic Sharia traditions. This would limit the reliance placed on medical 
expert evidence and change the role of the doctor in relation to providing information to 
patients. It is acknowledged that this would require a change to the culture in the provision 
of medicine but enshrining a more patient based standard of care in legislation would 
undoubtedly be an important step in achieving this.  
As I have stated in this Introduction, it is permissible to learn from the experience of other 
legal systems so long as this does not conflict with the primary principles of Islamic Sharia, 
and this chapter will identify ways in which English law might inform Saudi Arabian law in 
this area in light of this important caveat.  
These recommendations will include reconsidering the current professional standard of care 
to be in line with the prudent patient standard, and placing legal requirements on doctors to 
provide a certain level of information, including that relating to risk. Saudi Arabian medical 
law must place a legal duty on doctors to inform patients about the available alternative 
treatments and to answer patients’ questions fully and truthfully. Further, a legal duty must 
be put on doctors to take all reasonable steps to seek to ensure that the patient can understand 
the information provided. Finally, the application of therapeutic privilege to withhold 
information should only be used in circumstances where the disclosure would cause serious 
harm to the patient, though it should not be used to prevent the patient from making an 
informed decision. 
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Chapter one: The principle of respect for autonomy and trust: a Western view 
1. Preface 
This Chapter aims to present Western perspectives on medical ethics, specifically the 
principle of respect for autonomy and its relationship to consent to treatment and information 
disclosure. It is chiefly focused on competent adult patients, as the thesis is limited to these 
categories of patients. It will also consider the notion of trust as an alternative or additional 
principle to respect for autonomy. The connection between consent and information 
disclosure with autonomy has been considered central in Western medical ethics.1 It has also 
been said that the legal framework of consent and information disclosure for competent adult 
patients is grounded on the principle of respect for autonomy.2 However, it can be suggested 
that trust has been recognised as an alternative model for regulating the ethical provision of 
medical treatment in Western medical ethics and as relevant to consent, and for that reason 
I will also consider it.3 Furthermore, while autonomy is recognised in Islamic Sharia 
(religious law) and Saudi Arabian medical ethics literature as an important principle, it will 
be suggested that trust has been likely to play a more significant role as a foundation of 
patients’ care and the ethical and legal provision of treatment. This will be considered in 
Chapters three and four. 
However, the main argument of this Chapter is to establish that respect for patients’ 
autonomy is recognised as the primary ethical basis for providing information to patients 
when seeking their consent to treatment in Western medical ethics. It is this concept, rather 
than the notion of trust in the medical profession to provide necessary information, which 
has developed prominence. Respect for patient autonomy by the provision of full information 
to the patient about the proposed treatment will be suggested to be an ethical ideal. However, 
full information disclosure has practical limitations as a standard to be applied by the law for 
reasons that will be considered throughout this thesis.   
																																								 																				
1For	examples,	S	McLean	Autonomy,	Consent	and	the	Law	(1sted	Routledge.Cavendish	2010),	G	Dworkin.	The	Theory	
and	Practice	of	Autonomy	(CUP	1988),	T	Beauchamp	and	J	Childress	Principles	of	Biomedical	Ethics	(7thed	OUP	2013),	A	
MacLean	Autonomy,	Informed	Consent	and	Medical	Law	a	Relational	Challenge.	(1sted	CUP	2009),	J	Coggon	and	J	Miola	
‘Autonomy,	Liberty,	and	Medical	Decision-Making.’(2011)	17	The	Cambridge	Law	Journal,	523-547,	D	Lawrence	‘The	
Four	Principles	of	Biomedical	Ethics:	A	Foundation	for	Current	Bioethical	Debate’	(2007)	14	Journal	of	Chiropractic	
Humanities	34-40,	A	Dawson	and	E	Garrard	‘In	Defence	of	Moral	Imperialism:	Four	Equal	and	Universal	Prima	Facie	
Principles’(2006)	32		J	Med	Ethics	200–204.	
2Naik	Aet	al.		‘Patient	Autonomy	for	the	Management	of	Chronic	Conditions:	A	Two-Component	Re-Conceptualization’	
(2009)	9(2)	The	American	Journal	of	Bioethics	23-30.	
3	For	example,	O	O'Neill.	Autonomy	and	Trust	in	Bioethics	and	M	Hall	‘Law,	Medicine	and	Trust’	(2002)	55(2)	Stanford	
Law	Review	p.	463-527.	
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The conclusion of Chapter one will be considered in Chapter three as part of an examination 
of how far English law in fact protects the ethical concepts set out here and whether it goes 
far enough in doing so. Case law since the decision in the landmark case of Sidaway v 
Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors4 until the recently decided case of Montgomery v 
Lanarkshire Health Board5 will be examined. It will be argued that the law has progressively 
focused on the recognition of the ethical concept of respecting patient autonomy in 
information disclosure. However, while it provides some protection of competent adult 
patients’ autonomy, it does not appear to require full information disclosure. Nonetheless, 
this thesis will argue that it goes further than present Saudi Arabian medical law, which will 
be discussed in Chapter four. The background to the development of this law based on the 
concepts of autonomy and trust in Islamic Sharia will be discussed in Chapter two. Whether 
there are reasons for a less protective legal approach to competent adult patients’ autonomy 
in Saudi Arabia than in the UK, due to a different perspective on the concepts of autonomy 
and trust, will be considered. This will form the basis for making recommendations to reform 
the law on information disclosure in Saudi Arabia as part of seeking consent to medical 
treatment in the concluding Chapter.  
This Chapter is divided into three main sections; the first will discuss the principle of respect 
for autonomy, the second will focus on the notion of trust. The third will briefly discuss how 
English law has developed and, as a general issue, its reliance on ethical principles. In order 
to contrast the approach taken to the development of law and the central place of ethical and 
religious principles in Saudi Arabia a brief overview will be given of relevant aspects of the 
English legal system. 
2. The principle of respect for autonomy 
The aim here will be to explain the importance that autonomy has assumed in Western 
medical ethics before examining in Chapter three the way in which the law has approached 
the issue of respect for autonomy through the principles of consent to treatment and, in 
particular, the requirement for information disclosure. The discussion in the following 
section will focus on the importance of autonomy to an individual by explaining what is 
understood by the Western concept of autonomy: what are its foundation and values? It will 
then turn to how autonomy is linked to consent and information disclosure. 
																																								 																				
4Sidaway	v	Bethlem	Royal	Hospital	Governors	[1985]	1	AC	871.	
5Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11.	
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2.1. A general overview of autonomy 
The word autonomy, in its original sense, derives ‘from Greek autonomia, 
from autonomos having its own laws, from autos self [and] nomos law.’6 However, different 
understandings and definitions of the idea of autonomy have been noted.7 Dworkin, for 
example, has contended that it is unlikely that a ‘core meaning’8 of autonomy can be 
established. Nevertheless, there have been many attempts to consider what autonomy may 
include.9 Dworkin himself, for example, provided a list of what could be included, stating 
that autonomy ‘...is equated with dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, 
responsibility, and self-knowledge’.10 He then acknowledged that autonomy can also be 
‘...identified with qualities of self-assertion, with critical reflection, with freedom from 
obligation.....’11, and further added that autonomy ‘…is related to actions, to beliefs, to 
reasons for acting, to rules, to the will of other persons, to thoughts and to principles’.12 To 
Dworkin’s lengthy list concerning the concept of autonomy, Faden and Beauchamp 
suggested that it may also contain ‘self-mastery, choosing freely, choosing one’s own moral 
position and accepting responsibility for one’s choice.’13 O’Neill adds again to Faden and 
Beauchamp’s suggestions with ‘self-control’ and ‘self-determination’.14 Nevertheless, 
despite Dworkin’s assertion of the difficulty on establishing a core meaning, there does 
appear to be a certain key concept and I would agree with MacLean that this can be 
understood by the etymology of the word autonomy.15 However, as the word autonomy came 
to be applied to individuals it transformed into the idea of ‘self-government’16 and therefore 
now at its heart ‘refers to the capacity for, or the right to, self-determination’.17 As 
Beauchamp and Childress noted, it is clear that being self-ruling and having freedom from 
control by others have been the crux of understanding autonomy.18 
From what has been said, I would argue that most of the attempts to define autonomy 
ultimately focus on giving the person the power to make his/her own personal choice. Hence, 
																																								 																				
6	Oxford	online	dictionary	at	http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/autonomy?q=autonomy	(accessed	
04/12/2014).	See	also	A	Duncan,	G	Dunstan	and	R	Welbourn	Dictionary	of	Medical	Ethics	(1sted	Darton,	Longman	
&Todd	1977)	p.	212.	
7S	Darwell	‘The	Value	of	Autonomy	and	Autonomy	of	the	Will’	(2006)	116(2)	Ethics	263-284	p.	284.	
8	G	Dworkin	The	Theory	and	Practice	of	Autonomy	p.	6.	
9A	MacLean	Autonomy,	Informed	consent	and	Medical	Law	a	Relational	Challenge.(1sted	CUP	2009)	p.	9.	
10G	Dworkin	the	Theory	and	Practice	of	Autonomy	p.	6.	
11	Ibid.	
12	Ibid.	
13R	Faden	and	T	Beauchamp	the	History	and	Theory	of	Informed	Consent	(OUP	1986)	p.	7.	
14	O	O'Neill	Autonomy	and	Trust	in	Bioethicsp.	22.	
15	A	MacLean	Autonomy,	Informed	Consent	and	Medical	Law	a	Relational	Challenge	p.	10.	
16	J	Varelius	’The	Value	of	Autonomy	in	Medical	Ethics’	(2006)	9	Medicine,	Health	Care	and	Philosophy	377-388	p.	377.	
17A	Duncan,	G	Dunstan	and	R	Welbourn	Dictionary	of	Medical	Ethics	p.	212-213.	
18T	Beauchamp	and	J	Childress	Principles	of	Biomedical	Ethics	p.	101-102.	
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it can be said that autonomy allows a person to base his/her actions and decisions on his/her 
wishes on how to live his/her life.19 Accordingly, it has been said that ‘to respect autonomy 
is to accept a person who has a right to hold views, make choices and take action based on 
personal values and beliefs’.20 This makes us distinctive human beings, in charge of our 
personal affairs.21 
It may be suggested that the concept of autonomy in Western ethics has been substantially 
developed based on the philosophical thoughts of two philosophers in particular: Immanuel 
Kant and John Stuart Mill.22 Their approaches to the concept of autonomy have been 
described as being a rational view (Kant) and a classic liberal view (Mill).23 Kant wrote 
extensively on autonomy and in particular on the idea of ‘autonomy of will’.24 He considered 
autonomy as ‘meaning the self-ruling of practical rationality’,25 saying that ‘deliberated self-
rule is a special attribute of all moral agents’.26 Kant’s view is commonly used in discussions 
about the principle of respect for autonomy in ethical fields.27 According to Kant’s theory of 
autonomy, in order to respect individuals’ right to self-determination everyone is required to 
‘act so that you treat humanity whether in your own person or in that of another, always as 
an end and never as a means only’.28 To this extent, then, autonomy is not about total 
individual freedom of choice and action: there are limitations on it, imposed by duties to 
respect others’ rights, including their right to autonomy. Accordingly, O’Neill understands 
Kant’s view on autonomy as follows: 
‘Kantian autonomy is manifested in a life in which duties are met, in which there 
is respect for others and their rights, rather than in a life liberated from all bonds. 
For Kant autonomy is not relational, not graduated, not a form of self-
expression; it is a matter of acting on certain sorts of principles, and specifically 
on principles of obligation.’29 (Her emphasis). 
																																								 																				
19U	Kihlbom	‘Autonomy	and	Negatively	Informed	Consent’	(2008)	34	J	Med	Ethics	146	-149	p.	146.	
20J	Herring	Medical	Law	and	Ethics	(5thed	OUP	2014)	p.	25.	
21	G	Gillett	‘The	Art	of	Medicine	Autonomy	and	Selfishness’	(2008)	372	The	Lancet	1214-1215	p.	1214.	
22M	Donnelly	Healthcare	Decision-Making	and	the	Law:	Autonomy,	Capacity	and	the	Limits	of	Liberalism.	(1sted	CUP	
2010)	p.	16.	
23Ibid	p.	17-21.	
24M	Komrad	‘A	Defence	of	Medical	Paternalism:	Maximising	Patients’	Autonomy’	(1983)	9	Journal	of	Medical	Ethics	38-
44	at	38.	
25M	Quante	‘In	Defence	of	Personal	Autonomy’	(2011)	37	J	Med	Ethics	597	–600	p.	597.	
26	R	Gillon	‘Medical	Ethics:	Four	Principles	Plus	Attention	to	Scope’	(1994)	309	BMJ	184-188	p.	184-185.	
27	M	Komrad	‘A	Defence	of	Medical	Paternalism:	Maximising	Patients’	Autonomy’	p.	38.	
28	J	Azetsop	and	S	Rennie	‘Principlism,	Medical	Individualism,	and	Health	Promotion	in	Resource-Poor	Countries:	Can	
Autonomy-Based	Bioethics	Promote	Social	Justice	and	Population	Health?’	(2010)	5(1)	Philosophy,	Ethics,	and	
Humanities	in	Medicine	at	1-10	p.	4.	
29O	O’Neill	Autonomy	and	Trust	in	Bioethics	p.	83-84.	
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The liberal philosopher Mill in fact did not make use of the term ‘autonomy’ in his work.30 
Nevertheless, respect for autonomy can be seen as relevant to his view, which has been 
described as being akin to ‘the modern understanding of autonomy as the right to be self-
governing…’.31 To represent this idea, Mill used the term ‘liberty’.32 
Mill considered a person’s liberty within a social agenda, so interference based on an 
individual’s ethical or physical good is not a sufficient justification.33 Hence, for Mill: ‘The 
only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which 
concerns others. In the part that merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, 
absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.’34 Further, 
Mill held that respecting individual liberty has other benefits, such as allowing a person to 
develop his ability to think and act,35 so that people can achieve happiness in their lives.36 It 
therefore has a consequential or utilitarian value, which is often contrasted with Kant’s view 
which is seen as representing a more deontological approach.37. 
2.2. Consequentialism/utilitarianism versus deontology 
The ethical theory of consequentialism/utilitarianism emerged from the Bentham and Mill 
traditions and became an alternative ethical approach to one based on Christian theological 
approaches in the late eighteenth century.38 The tradition of utilitarianism based on the 
notion that morality is not based on obeying religious obligations, but in the maximisation 
of people’s welfare and minimizing suffering.39 
The main focused of the consequentialists/utilitarians has been said to prompt the utility of 
a group of people over the individual.40 However, consequentialists/utilitarians judge 
whether an action is ethically right or wrong based on its consequences; thus the action will 
be considered to be ethically correct if the outcome of it is ‘good’ otherwise it is a wrongful 
action because its outcome is ‘bad’.41 Thus, sacrificing the life of a person to save the lives 
of other four or five persons may be preferable ethically, because the outcome is ‘good’ for 
																																								 																				
30	Ibid	p.	30.	
31S	McLean	Autonomy,	Consent	and	the	Law	p.	15-16.	
32Ibid	p.	16.	
33	S	Mill	On	Liberty	(3rded	London,	1864)	p.	22.	
34Ibid	p.	22.	
35ibid	p.	79-80.	
36	Ibid	p.	83-84.	
37J	Driver	Ethics	the	Fundamentals	(1sted	Blackwell	2006)	p.	121-123	
38T	Beauchamp	and	J	Childress	Principles	of	Biomedical	Ethics	p.	354-355	and	E	Jackson	Medical	Law	Text,	Cases	and	
Materials	(3rded	OUP	2013)	p.	11.	
39S	Pattinson	Medical	Law	and	Ethics	(3rded	Sweet	and	Maxwell	2011)	p.	6.	
40J	Driver	Ethics	the	Fundamentals	p.	40-41.	
41G	Spielthenner	‘Consequentialism	or	Deontology?’(2005)	33	(1-4)	Philosophia	217-235	p.	219.	
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the greatest number of people.42 However, it should be noted that whether it is ethically 
preferable depends on whether allowing individuals to kill others to save lives leads to 
greater harms, such as lack of respect for human life, social disorder and so on. The critical 
point here is that it is weighing of the nature and severity of consequences and their potential 
for good or ill that is at the heart of the ethical decision-making approach. 
A problem that emerges with consequentialism is what is meant by a ‘good’ outcome to 
regard the action being ethically justified. The Millian approach to consequentialism is 
focused on people’s happiness, where it can be said that good is judged in relation to what 
would make people happy, so what makes more people more happy can be regarded as 
good.43 However, that creates significant difficulties in making decisions because it would 
require that each person should be able to accurately judge the consequences of every 
decision or action. This would make the process of making a decision very difficult and 
complex in terms of seeking to verify whether the outcome is good or bad for each decision 
and whether the decision is ethically right or wrong.44 It should also be noted that Mill limits 
liberty by application of the harm principle, which will be discussed later, but for the moment 
it is sufficient to note that while in general respect for individuals’ liberty is regarded as 
likely to promote the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people, it may be limited 
where it is likely to significantly harm the liberties of others. 
Another version of utilitarianism called ‘rule utilitarianism’ seeks to set general rules that 
would lead to the best consequences.45 It has been said regarding rule utilitarianism that 
‘even if in the particular case following the rule will not produce the best outcome, if having 
the strict rule produces overall the best for society we should adopt it.’46 
Deontology can be defined based on its ‘emphasis on moral rules, most often articulated in 
terms or rights and duties.’47 (Original emphasis). The deontological ethical theory is based 
on the tradition of Kant.48 It has its aim to prompt ‘...the interests of the individuals rather 
than the collective.’49 However, for a Kantian approach to respecting an action, that action 
should be based on a ground that can be universalised so that it can be applied in all 
																																								 																				
42	M	Crockett	‘Models	of	Morality’	(2013)	17(8)	Trends	in	Cognitive	Sciences	363-366	p.	363.	
43	S	Mill	On	Liberty	p.	83-84.	
44	J	Herring	Medical	Law	and	Ethics	p.	13.	
45	J	Harsanyi	‘Rule	Utilitarianism	and	Decision	Theory’	(1976)	11(1)	Erkenntnis	25-53	p.	30-33.	
46	J	Herring	Medical	Law	and	Ethics	p.	14.	
47	J	Greene	‘The	Secret	Joke	of	Kant’s	Soul’	in	T	Nadelhoffer	(ed.)	Moral	Psychology:	Historical	and	Contemporary	
Readings	(1sted	Wiley-Blackwell	2010)	359-373	p.	360.	
48J	Driver	Ethics	the	Fundamentals	p.	80.	
49	S	Pattinson	Medical	Law	and	Ethics	p.	7.	
Chapter one: The principle of respect for autonomy and trust: a Western view 
 
29	
	
circumstances.50 Thus, the person should ‘act in accordance with the universally valid moral 
principles that pass the requirements of the categorical imperative.’51 In consequence, it has 
been said that deontologists do not accept the ‘aggregative’ view of people’s interests; 
instead, they are ‘distributive’, as what is important to them is the duty that is owed, not the 
number of people involved.52 
A Kantian approach seems to dismiss the theory that is used by consequentialists to judge 
the morality of an action. For deontologists, evaluating the morality of an action, whether it 
is a good or bad, is based on the action itself and the set of rules relevant to it, irrespective 
of the circumstances or the consequences.53 In this sense, it has been argued that the 
deontological theory is the negation of consequentialism theory.54 Kant’s principle to treat 
the person as an end and not simply as a means can be applied to the example of killing a 
person to save others’ lives. For deontologists such an action would not be acceptable 
ethically as killing that person is considered as a treating him as means to an end.55 
Therefore, the justification that the consequentialists use to judge the ethicality of an action 
(the outcome), is for deontologists neither acceptable nor applicable, because for them, 
breaching an ethical principle cannot be justified by the outcome.56 
However, the deontological approach has been criticised by arguing that a refusal to consider 
the consequences of applying a principle in practice is not a good idea.57 Relying on duties 
and rules in the belief that they are univeralisable, may be problematic. For example, some 
of the rules that were accepted in Kant’s time may not be necessarily accepted today. 
Determining what rules must be followed or should be abandoned is difficult.58 Other 
criticisms include how to resolve conflicts between ethical duties, which is in theory more 
straightforward for consequentialists, based on the best outcome.59 
In conclusion, there are valid criticisms of both the consequentialists/utilitarian and the 
deontological approaches to ethical decision-making. Nevertheless, in the following I will 
																																								 																				
50	G	Gaus	‘What	is	Deontology?	Part	Two:	Reasons	to	Act’	(2001)	35	the	Journal	of	Value	Inquiry	179–193	p.	181.	
51	S	Sucher	the	Moral	Leader:	Challenges,	Tools	and	Insights:	Challenges,	Insights,	and	Tools	(1sted	Routledge	2008)	p.	
191.	
52	S	Pattinson	Medical	Law	and	Ethics	p.	7.	
53	M	Crockett	‘Models	of	Morality’	p.	363	
54	G	Spielthenner	‘Consequentialism	or	Deontology?’	p.	221-222.	
55J	Herring	Medical	Law	and	Ethics.	p.	15.	
56	C	O’Gormanet	al.	‘What	is	the	Difference	Between	Deontological	and	Consequentialist	Theories	of	Medical	Ethics?’	
(2013)	106(2)	Ir	Med	J	15-16	p.	16.	
57	A	Shakil	‘Kantian	Duty	Based	(Deontological)	Ethics’	at		http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/morality-101/kantian-duty-
based-deontological-ethics	(accessed	13/06/2015).	
58	J	Herring	Medical	Law	and	Ethics	p.	15.	
59	S	Pattinson	Medical	Law	and	Ethics	p.	9.	
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consider the value of autonomy based on both the Kantian and Millian traditions to show 
their significance in terms of the development of the notion of respect for autonomy as an 
ethical principle, and consider this specifically in the context of medical ethics. Despite the 
lack of consensus on which approach, if either, is correct, both these approaches may be seen 
to remain influential in medical ethics and also in informing the legal approach to 
information disclosure and consent to treatment.  
2.3. The value of autonomy 
In considering the value of autonomy, it has been suggested that it has both intrinsic and 
instrumental value.60 Kant’s and Mill’s theories on autonomy (or liberty) can both be 
considered as relevant to these concepts. First, the intrinsic value of autonomy can be 
described as ‘the value that autonomy has in itself or for its own sake, as opposed to it being 
valuable for the sake of something else’.61 Based on autonomy’s intrinsic value, it can be 
argued that respect for autonomy is ‘…essential for the good life, rather than being valuable 
only insofar as it helps secure other valuable things’.62 The intrinsic value of autonomy can 
thus be understood as following from Kant’s view as it has been stated that ‘Kant claims that 
autonomy has such value that we should act in such a way so as to treat ourselves and others 
as an end, and never simply as a means to an end…’.63 
However, Young, for example, has argued that Mill’s view can also be the basis for 
autonomy’s intrinsic value.64 As Darwall observed, ‘…a utilitarian can take the position that 
Mill seems to take, that personal autonomy is intrinsically beneficial to a person, that it is a 
constituent part of her well-being or happiness’.65 Then Darwall went on to explain: 
‘This makes autonomy intrinsic to that which is intrinsically morally desirable, 
happiness or welfare, but not yet intrinsically morally worth promoting in itself. 
What makes an outcome intrinsically worth promoting from the moral point of 
view is still happiness or well-being; it is just that Mill believes that autonomy 
is an intrinsic part of that.’66 
It has also been argued that ‘autonomy’s value derives from its place within the matrix of 
our conception of what it is to be an interacting, responsible, principled, responsive human 
																																								 																				
60	A	MacLean	Autonomy,	Informed	Consent	and	Medical	Law	a	Relational	Challenge	p.	23.	See	also	R	Young	‘The	Value	
of	Autonomy’	(1982)	32(126)	The	Philosophical	Quarterly	35-44	and	S	Darwall	‘The	Value	of	Autonomy	and	Autonomy	
of	the	Will’		
61	J	Varelius	‘The	Value	of	Autonomy	in	Medical	Ethics’	p.	378	
62	T	O’Shea	‘Autonomy	and	Value’	Essex	Autonomy	Project	Green	Paper	Report	(University	of	Essex:	Essex	Autonomy	
Project,	2011).	at		http://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/autonomy-and-value	(	accessed	31/12/2014).	
63	V	Ashley,	'Philosophical	Models	of	Autonomy,'	Essex	Autonomy	Project	Green	Paper	Report(University	of	Essex:	Essex	
Autonomy	Project,	2012)	at	http://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/philosophical-models-of-autonomy	(accessed	31/12/2014).	
64R	Young	‘The	Value	of	Autonomy’	p.	37.	
65S	Darwall	‘The	Value	of	Autonomy	and	Autonomy	of	the	Will’	p.	265-266.	
66Ibid	p.	266.	
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being’.67 Further, it has been proposed that the role of autonomy in relation to a person’s 
identity gives it intrinsic value, because it may promote the development of a person’s 
character. It does so since autonomy allows people to set their goals, choose how to obtain 
them and how to behave towards other people, so autonomy is ‘crucial to our self-
definition’.68 Young has also said that ‘[t]he exercise of personal autonomy is able to be seen 
as intrinsically desirable or valuable because of its foundational place for moral personhood 
and self-esteem, without its exercise on particular occasions being act-evaluatively for the 
best, or even for the good’.69 In other words, even where the exercise of autonomy may be 
seen as producing unfortunate or harmful outcomes, it is ‘good in itself’ rather than 
depending for its own value on the result.  
However, autonomy has also been regarded as having instrumental value and despite the 
point noted above that Mill’s view can be used to support intrinsic value, it is perhaps more 
common to regard it as promoting the idea that respect for liberty (autonomy) is justified 
because it promotes other things of value.70 The instrumental value of autonomy can be 
subdivided into two distinct values. The first is that, to respect a person’s autonomy would 
in itself benefit the ‘well-being’ of people generally, and hence benefit the greatest number.71 
The second, instrumental, value is that to treat a person as autonomous may encourage him 
or her to take responsibility for his or her actions and to hold obligations, by acting morally, 
which may benefit both the person himself and his/her community in general.72 It has 
accordingly been argued that to treat a person as if he/she has autonomy is valuable because 
those determined to respond to moral obligations will do so provided moral obligations exist. 
Thus, treating people as if they are autonomous may result in behaviour being modified in a 
way that is beneficial to the individual and the wider community.73 
It can be concluded that employing either an intrinsic value or an instrumental view of 
autonomy seems to give respect to the person to make decisions in way that reflects his/her 
individual needs and choice. However, this raises the issue of whether autonomy is an 
absolute right that must be respected by others in all circumstances or whether it has some 
limitations. 
																																								 																				
67H	Levi	Respecting	Patient	Autonomy	(UIP	1999)	p.	64.	
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2.4. The limitation of autonomy and the principle of harm 
Maclean has stated that: ‘If autonomy were to be seen as an absolute right to decide for 
oneself the consequence would be the risk of chaos with the vulnerable left to the mercy of 
the strong. In fact, if conceived as a right then it is logically impossible for it to be absolute.’74 
I would agree with this conclusion, since if there were to be an absolute right that each 
individual’s autonomy was respected and the wishes of individuals conflicted then, without 
reference to other principles, this right could not resolve disputes and they would likely be 
settled in accordance with power imbalances between the individuals. As we live in a non-
isolated world and we interact and communicate with others, a claim that a person can enjoy 
an absolute right to autonomy is not defensible, because the person cannot do whatever 
he/she wants irrespective of others whose right to autonomy may be affected by his/her 
action. Therefore, autonomy has great value, but it must be subject to limitations. A key 
concept that has been used to place limitations on the extent of respect for an individual’s 
autonomy is therefore that of harm. 
It has been argued that: ‘The requirement to respect autonomy ends where harm to others 
begins: we are not obliged to enable some to act in ways which compromise the interests of 
others.’75 This argument for limiting respect for autonomy was encapsulated in Mill’s 
understanding of the harm principle, explained in his book On Liberty.76 According to Mill’s 
understanding of individual liberty, noted earlier, a person can enjoy the right to act or make 
a decision regardless of whether others consider that choice to be ‘rational’ in the sense that 
Kant suggests. Instead, he provided justification for why self-harming or irrational decisions 
should nonetheless be respected, while at the same time restricting autonomy where it would 
result in harm to other people.  
‘The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member 
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own 
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully 
be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because 
it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be 
wise, or even right.’77 
Hence, an autonomous decision that can be respected based on Mill’s approach is that which 
a competent person makes for him/herself, so long as it does not cause harm to others. Mill 
observed that: ‘The principle [of autonomy] requires liberty of taste and pursuits, of forming 
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the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such 
consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what 
we do does no harm to them.’78 This approach can be illustrated in Gorovitz’s observation:  
‘No person is to be merely the instrument of another person’s plans; no person 
is to be treated in a manner that is blind to the plans, desires and values that are 
the fabric of his or her life and identity. Roughly speaking, we believe that it is 
obligatory to leave people alone, unless we have powerful reasons for not doing 
so’.79 
However, to apply the harm principle is not straightforward; for example it may not be easy 
to distinguish, even after a decision to take action has been made, whether harm has occurred 
or if that action is what has made the person’s situation case worse than it would have been.80 
It may be even more difficult to establish in advance what the outcome of a particular action 
will be. Further difficulties may arise in that in some cases a person’s action may seem likely 
to produce a harmful outcome without it being clear whether that outcome is a sufficient 
justification for intervention, because there will disagreement about whether the degree of 
harm anticipated is sufficient to warrant intervention to prevent it.81 
Harm may be considered in terms of harms to other specific individuals or to the community. 
Feinberg, for example, has written extensively on the issue of whether and in what 
circumstances restricting the behaviour of individuals may be justified for the protection of 
society.82 This idea of protecting the community by limiting the principle of respect for 
autonomy might be applicable in term of public medical threats, for example to control the 
risk of spreading infectious disease. In such situations, an action of coercion or force might 
be justifiable to detain the infected person or treat him/her to prevent the spread of disease 
to others.83 Hence, where the exercise of individual autonomy would cost the community 
too high, respect for autonomy may be overridden in consequence of the application of the 
harm principle.84	
Nonetheless, despite Mill’s justification for allowing self-harm in the exercise of personal 
autonomy,85 an absolute acknowledgment of the right to autonomy might also be 
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controversial in relation to decisions concerning the person him/herself.86 O’Neill for 
example has argued that some individual’s action might be ‘impulsive’ or ‘out of control’,87 
thus a person may sometimes take a regrettable or reckless decision. Therefore, it has been 
contended that an individual’s autonomy can be limited to prevent the person him/herself 
from self-harming behaviour.88 Therefore, when there is an anticipated ‘self-inflicted harm’, 
violating respect for autonomy by taking a paternalistic approach to prevent that harm may 
be justified.89 If a person does not meet the grounds for autonomous decision making, which 
will be considered briefly later, there may be greater justification for intervening to protect 
him/her from him/herself. However, this thesis is concerned with competent adults so the 
presumption will be in discussion that the person is capable of exercising autonomy. The 
extent to which paternalistic actions to protect a competent person from taking or making 
decisions that may be harmful to them will also be considered further later. 
For the moment, however, it can be concluded that while autonomy has an obviously very 
significant value it is not absolutely protected, as the principle of harm may allow 
interference with a person’s autonomy by limiting it, at least on the ground of preventing 
harm to others. Having outlined the principle of respect for autonomy and limitations on it 
in a broader philosophical context, it is now important to consider how the principle of 
respect for autonomy has been considered more specifically in the context of medical ethics 
and focusing on information disclosure and consent. 
2.5. The notion of beneficence and the respect for autonomy in Western medical 
ethics 
The principle of beneficence ‘refers to a statement of moral obligation to act for the benefit 
of others.’90 It has been observed that the principle of beneficence includes the following 
general rules: ‘1. Protect and defend the rights of others. 2. Prevent harm from occurring to 
others. 3. Remove conditions that will cause harm to others. 4. Help persons with disabilities. 
5. Rescue persons in danger.’91 It may be justified from both a Kantian and a Millian 
perspective: as a rule that one should act to benefit others, and as an approach that seeks to 
provide the best outcome for the greatest number of people by acting to benefit others. 
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However, as will be discussed, it may be questioned whether one is indeed benefiting others 
if acting against their wishes and whether seeking to produce a good medical result by not 
respecting an individual’s autonomy is the best outcome. 
However, the principle of beneficence has a very long and close relationship with medical 
practice and it has been said that: ‘The traditional goals of medicine are to preserve, protect 
and/or restore the patient’s health.’92 The principle of beneficence shows the ancient idea of 
medicine and healthcare obligations. During the history of medicine, doctors’ duties to care 
for their patients have been considered as the pledge of beneficence.93 The principle of 
beneficence can be clearly seen in the Hippocratic tradition of medical ethics, stemming 
from the work of Hippocrates, the father of traditional medicine.94 This tradition thus can be 
traced back to Ancient Greece, which is widely regarded as the birthplace of Western 
philosophy. The Hippocratic tradition was focused on the principle of beneficence as can 
been seen in a statement that directs the doctor to help patients and to not cause harm to 
them.95 Doctors were also sworn to conduct their duties in their patients’ best interests.96 
Ever since those days, the expression ‘doctors know best’ has been ‘a watchword that not 
only acknowledges and endorses the physician’s entitlement to power, but also implies the 
etiquette between doctor and patient that buttresses and validates that power.’97 McLean has 
noted that this may reinforce the idea that duties of beneficence toward patients assume that 
doctors know what is good for patients, and that their goal is restoring health by selecting 
the appropriate medicine or medical procedure while ignoring the patient’s wishes and 
views.98 
Indeed the Hippocratic tradition recognised the idea that physicians should bind themselves 
as follows: to ‘perform [your duties] calmly and adroitly, concealing most things from the 
patient while you are attending him…turning his attention away from what is being done to 
him…revealing nothing of the patient’s future or present condition’.99 This suggests the 
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absence of recognition of a principle of respect for patients’ autonomy in the sense of them 
being self-determining about their treatment, as patients were passively to surrender their 
care to their physicians and not to entertain any ideas of contradicting them.100 Even if the 
doctor were to consult with the patient, the final treatment decision would be made by the 
doctor alone.101 
Interpreted in this way, the principle of beneficence gives doctors, based on their medical 
judgement, the power to make decisions about treatment so that concerns for the patient’s 
autonomy are dismissed or marginalised.102 Following on from the Hippocratic tradition that 
medical practitioners had a protective role to play towards their patients there was developed 
what has become known as the paternalistic approach to medical practice. It has been argued 
that: ‘Paternalism centres on the notion that the physician...has better insight into the best 
interests of the patient than does the patient, or that the physician’s obligations are such that 
he is impelled to do what is medically good, even if it is not ‘good’ in terms of the patient’s 
own value system.’103 Hence, paternalism, based on this view, has been said to represent the 
relationship between doctors and their patients until the latter part of the last century.104 
A paternalistic approach seems to allow a person’s actions or decisions to be overridden for 
their own benefit.105 It is important to note that benefit here is seen as being in respect of 
health outcomes for the patient. It has been said that if this approach is followed patients are 
likely to feel that their autonomy and choices, views, goals, and decisions are not respected 
or appreciated.106 A duty based on the principle of beneficence (where beneficence is 
considered to be to provide the best medical outcome) may therefore be seen as being in 
conflict with a duty of respect for self-determination.107 Veatch has commented that this has 
created ‘a conflict between the old Hippocratic paternalism (having the physician do what 
he or she thought was best for the patient) and a principle of autonomy’.108 However, 
although paternalism has been justified under the principle of beneficence it has been 
criticised. It has been suggested that a better view of the principle of beneficence is that it is 
one that takes account of the patient’s views on what is in their best interests and obliges 
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doctors to enter into discussion with the patient to obtain a consent to treatment.109 As White 
and Seery have stated, ‘proponents of patient autonomy – and indeed society as a whole – 
stress the prime importance of letting the autonomous patient decide, by asserting that only 
patients can really decide what is in their best interests overall, as opposed to merely being 
in their medical best interests’.110 In other words, a doctor’s duty to promote the welfare of 
the patient not only consists of the duty to restore health but also to respect them as 
individuals capable of deciding what is best for them. 
This approach would require that more respect should be paid to patients’ views and to 
facilitate their involvement in the medical decision. A paternalistic approach has been 
increasingly rejected, primarily because paternalism is seen as breaching patients’ personal 
rights most notably to respect for autonomy.111 People may be believed to increasingly want 
the freedom to act, make free choices, and be independent. In our current climate, it seems 
to be accepted that the notion of freedom of choice and respect for patients’ autonomy should 
be supported.112 Approaches that ignore the role of the individual in deciding whether to 
undertake proposed medical treatment based on what others consider would be for their 
benefit are treated with suspicion.113 Callahan has stated that: 
‘In the context of medicine, it [autonomy] is a value that has served to establish 
the rights of patients over physicians, and the right to be spared the paternalistic 
interventions of those who think they understand my welfare better than I do. 
The purpose of autonomy is to make me my own moral master.’114 
Arneson has observed that: ‘The consequences of coming to rely on the dispensation of 
paternalistic aid are mischievous, as are the consequences of dispensing paternalistic aid and 
the consequences of observing paternalistic aid dispensed to others.’115 In fact, Gillon has 
argued that respect for autonomy should be regarded as an essential principle in the field of 
medical ethics.116 Gillon justified this by suggesting that it has support from widely differing 
social or political positions; ‘autonomy is, then, de facto given a place of honour because the 
thrust of individualism, whether from the egalitarian left or the market oriented right, is to 
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give people maximum liberty in devising their own lives and values’.117 It has been argued 
previously that the notion of respecting personal autonomy is based on the perceived ethical 
importance of a person’s right to freedom and self-determination. Applying that to a patient’s 
position ‘…respect for autonomy dictates that patients with decision-making ability have a 
right to voice their medical treatment preferences, and physicians have the concomitant duty 
to respect those preferences’,118 which gives autonomy its value as a ‘nurtured and 
promoted’ principle.119 Simply, doctors cannot know every single detail about what would 
be in the patients’ best interests, especially in connection with the patients’ personal desires, 
needs, and beliefs, which will be different from one patient to another and obviously will 
also differ between patients and doctors. Therefore, ‘physicians cannot and do not know 
enough about their patients’ wants, needs, interests, hopes and fears to make decisions for 
them’.120 Further, illness does not remove patients’ basic rights; their rights to autonomy and 
free decision-making remain even if they may be in difficult circumstances and no one can 
override these rights as long as patients are competent adults.121 
Based on the above discussions, it can be argued that the traditional Hippocratic approach to 
minimising the role of patients in taking decisions about their healthcare, due to doctors’ 
special and superior knowledge in medicine, has been critically attacked. Speaking from a 
medical practitioner’s perspective, Atkins has indicated that the preference for doctors to 
pay attention to the notion of the principle of respect for autonomy rather than paternalism 
is the need to ‘accede to our fundamental fallibility and an epistemological humility.’122 As 
the focus on paternalism as being the sole or pre-eminent guiding principle in medical ethics 
has retreated, to be replaced by a greater emphasis on patient autonomy,123 it is now expected 
that competent adult patients should have the final say regarding their healthcare decisions 
and doctors are usually no longer justified in simply acting on their patients’ behalf in 
accordance with the doctor’s view of what is best for them.124 
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2.6. Summary 
Based on the above, it can be concluded that respect for the principle of autonomy is a central 
concept in Western philosophy and this has been increasingly recognised in medical practice. 
There has been a retreat from a paternalistic tradition in medical ethics and paternalism has 
been replaced by a recognition of the fundamental importance of patient autonomy. In the 
following discussion, the Chapter will consider the relationship between autonomy and 
consent to treatment. It will then discuss the requirements for a decision to be regarded as 
autonomous so that it can be relied upon and acted in accordance with by others. The main 
aim of discussing this is to demonstrate how the principle of respect for autonomy has led to 
the requirement for a competent adult patient to make a properly informed decision before 
consenting to (or rejecting) treatment. 
2.7. Autonomy and consent to medical treatment 
The importance of a competent adult patient’s autonomy and of respect for it can be seen as 
central in Western healthcare. If to respect patients’ autonomy is to allow them make 
decisions based on their values,125 this requires patients to be enabled to properly consider 
the choices available, express those choices and have their decisions regarded as binding.126 
There is an obvious connection between respect for autonomy and seeking consent from a 
competent adult patient before medical treatment is undertaken. Consent127 may be described 
as the expression of the patient’s decision to accept recommended medical treatment, and is 
therefore the means for conveying the autonomous wish of the patient that is to be respected. 
It has been described more fully as follows:‘[C]onsent means a voluntary, uncoerced 
decision, made by a sufficiently competent or autonomous person on the basis of adequate 
information and deliberation, to accept rather than reject some proposed course of action that 
will affect him or her.’128 
Therefore, broadly, there are three main elements to be considered for a patients’ consent to 
be regarded as ethically valid: competence of the decision-maker, voluntariness in reaching 
the decision and adequate information disclosure before reaching the decision.129 
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2.8. The autonomous decision 
2.8.1. Competence of the decision-maker 
As has been said in the Introduction to the thesis, the scope of this research is the competent 
adult patient, since particular issues arise when dealing with the treatment of children or 
those who are deemed to be incompetent by reason of illness or injury. Nonetheless, it is 
useful to briefly outline the conditions for a person to be deemed to have capacity to make 
decisions for themselves, since this sheds further light on the nature and importance of 
autonomy. Put simply, competence means that a person has the ability to undertake a task 
and perform that task.130 The need for a patient to be deemed competent in order to rely on 
his or her decision has been significant in medical ethics.131 So, for example, it has been said 
that ‘the principle of respect for autonomy, simply stated, requires healthcare providers to 
allow competent patients to make their own healthcare decisions, based on their own values 
and goals.’132(Emphasis added). According to Pattinson also, in his book Medical Law and 
Ethics, ‘for a patient’s decision to be truly autonomous it must be freely made with sufficient 
information and understanding’.133 The assessment of a person’s capacity relies on the level 
of his or her ability to understand the information that has been provided to him/her in 
relation to the course of the treatment and the use of that information to arrive at a decision.134 
The patient can be regarded as having sufficient capacity if he/she can make his or her 
decision based on an adequate understanding of and ability to consider the information that 
has been provided.135 A further practical issue is, of course, that a patient is able to effectively 
communicate his decision to the doctors. At its core, though, competence turns on the 
patient’s ability to receive and process information so that they can weigh it to arrive at a 
choice based on that information.136 
As noted, the scope of this thesis is the competent adult patient, so it will be assumed that 
the patients under consideration are deemed to have the necessary abilities to understand and 
weigh information to arrive at a decision. This focuses attention on the remaining elements 
for a decision to be regarded as sufficiently autonomous to be respected: voluntariness and 
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information disclosure. Therefore, the following discussion will consider how these two 
aspects have been reflected on and the kinds of issues that arise in the context of medical 
treatment based on the principle of respect for autonomy.  
2.8.2. Voluntariness in reaching the decision 
The second element required for an autonomous decision has been stated by Faden and 
Beauchamp: ‘Persons should be free to choose and act without controlling constraints 
imposed by others.’137 It is also has been indicated that the main reason for and consequence 
of respecting our autonomy is to have the authority to not allow other to be involved in our 
affairs without our permission.138 
Therefore, respect for autonomy prioritises the idea that individual patients should be free to 
make personal, self-determining decisions without undue influence from another. In other 
words, a person’s choice must represent his or her own decision, rather than being dictated 
by others.139 This type of consideration in respect of patients can be seen in the statement by 
Delaney that ‘respecting the autonomy of…a patient in a clinical context requires respecting 
the person as an equal; in particular acknowledging an equality in the ability to self-reflect 
and make choices’.140 
The question arises of whether the competent adult’s decision can truly ever be regarded as 
his or her own and not subject to other influences and, if not, to what extent can it be 
considered as an autonomous decision?  
It has been suggested that humans by their nature cannot ideally live in isolation as they are 
‘social animals’, and that a person would not be a part of his or her society if he/she does not 
interact with it.141 Therefore, it is unlikely that a person would not be affected by the 
surrounding environment, people, religions, backgrounds and political systems.142 Dawkins 
has argued that humans may be programmed by genes,143 but concedes that this would not 
necessarily mean that people cannot use their minds ‘…to depart from the dictates of the 
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selfish genes and to build for ourselves a new kind of life...’144 This is because even if it is 
accepted that genetic programming plays a significant part in a person’s life, it is not ‘fully 
deterministic’, which suggests that a person can make a decision which has not already been 
programmed.145 Nonetheless, although the issue regarding whether humans are already 
genetically programmed to make certain decisions and the extent to which they have their 
own free will to depart from that is interesting to discuss, not least because it casts some 
doubt on the concept of full exercise of autonomy (as it has been understood by the ethical 
theories described) as achievable in practice. However, it has not been considered central to 
discussion of medical ethics or law and this idea will not be considered further.  
To examine whether autonomy is respected and the decision is made autonomously, it is 
more useful in the context of this thesis to consider three other types of suggested influences 
upon decision-making that may interfere with voluntariness: 
2.8.2.1. Coercion 
Coercion has been described as where a person has been subject to another person’s 
intentional use of a credible and grave threat of harm that causes the first person’s action to 
be controlled.146 To be considered as credible, both the threatened person and the threat 
maker must believe that the threat can affect the threatened.147 Alternatively, the threat maker 
must successfully be able to mislead the threatened person to believe that the threat can affect 
him or her.148 Thus, for a patient to be considered to be coerced, the act of coercion must 
have its intention to put him/her under pressure to make a decision in a particular way and 
the threat must be credible, as mere perception in the patient’s mind that he/she is being 
coerced cannot be considered as sufficient to establish that coercion has occurred.149 
However, if coercion is established, a decision made as a result of this influence that the 
patient would not otherwise have reached cannot be considered an autonomous decision.150 
Autonomy has been nullified by coercion.151 Even if the decision is informed, coercion 
invalidates it.152 Others have argued that exercising influence over another may be justified 
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in rare cases, even involving a degree of coercion.153 However, I would agree with MacLean 
that a patient’s decision must be taken ‘…in the absence of undue influence that attempts to 
control the patient’s decision by unfairly exploiting the patient’s weaknesses or 
vulnerability’.154 Therefore, a person’s decision should be free from coercion so as not to 
undermine respect for the patient’s autonomy. 
2.8.2.2. Persuasion 
Persuasion may be said to take place when one person intentionally uses reasoning or 
arguments that make another person freely conduct or accept or believe something.155 It has 
been argued that the decision made as a result of persuasion can be considered as 
autonomous,156 because persuasion is not regarded as controlling.157 Further, a decision that 
is grounded on persuasion is based on advancing reasons, choices and explanations to the 
decision-maker, who makes his own judgement.158 
Indeed, some would go further. Barilan and Weintraub have argued that ‘[a]biding by 
unexplored expressed wishes does not necessarily amount to respect for persons, since 
respect for persons is much more than submission to social boundaries’.159 Instead, unlike 
coercion (which is not ethically acceptable), the act of persuasion has been suggested to be 
a ‘basic human obligation.’160 On this view, MacLean has argued that a ‘positive strategy’ 
to persuade is grounded on the idea that ‘...a true respect for autonomy requires more than 
simply abandoning patients to whatever choice they make’.161 Hence, respect for patients’ 
autonomy may involve the use of persuasion provided that the communication of points of 
view and information still allows patients to make a decision for themselves.162 As it has 
been argued, ‘…if a physician wishes to act with respect for the person of his or her patient, 
the physician must participate in a conversation in which he or she will do his or her best to 
persuade the patient to consent, or to create a mutually agreeable compromise’.163 Based on 
that, it can be said that for the patient to clearly consider what is in his/her own interests, 
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which s/he might not be clear about, may require persuasion and the participation of his 
doctor to make the decision plain for him/her.164 Therefore, where the patient is not clear 
about what to choose, doctors can step in and give help in determining what is  the most 
suitable decision.165 Further, it might be ethically acceptable for doctors to persuade the 
patient towards a certain decision by highlighting any ‘logical inconsistencies or irrational 
reasoning...where patients have formalised their goals but are mistaken in how best to 
achieve them.’166 Thus, it can be said in such cases that the act of persuasion is ethically 
permitted167 and may even become a duty that the doctor should undertake, if it assists the 
patient to make their own decisions based on what the patient wants.168 
2.8.2.3. Manipulation 
Manipulation has been described as a kind of influence used on a person in a ‘clever or 
unscrupulous way’.169 It can be thought of as an influence that is neither coercive nor 
persuasive, but the manipulator wants another person to act in a particular way and believes 
that this will not happen if the person is left to make their own decision.170 Therefore, 
manipulation can be a controlling act if the manipulator forces the person to submit to or 
reject something that the person himself does not really want. In other cases, it may be a 
non-controlling action, which can be considered more like persuasion.171 A clear example 
of manipulation, which is ethically unacceptable, is information manipulation. Not providing 
patients with information or lying to them or misleading them in a way that affects their 
belief about what treatment is appropriate for them would affect their ability to make a 
sufficiently autonomous decision.172 The manipulator may believe that a particular decision 
would be better for that person, so may have good intentions, but because the manipulator 
usually avoids the use of honest reasoning to persuade the other it has been said that ‘there 
is something unsavoury about it [manipulation]...it is often self-serving and involves 
deception.’173 Manipulation that includes the withholding of the information would abuse 
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the right of the other person to information hence that would undermine the person’s 
autonomy.174	
In summary, voluntariness is regarded as an ethical requirement for a person’s decision to 
be autonomous. It protects the patient’s autonomy to make his/her own free decision. 
Persuasion can be ethically accepted, but it should be limited to just assisting the patient to 
make his/her own decision. On the other hand, the patient’s autonomous decision must be 
free from coercion and manipulation, as that is ethically unacceptable and would undermine 
the respect for the patient’s autonomy.  
After having discussed the elements of competence and voluntariness and shown their 
importance to a patient’s autonomous decision, the final requirement is of the greatest 
importance to this thesis: the requirement that the decision be based on adequate information 
for the patient to make his/her decision. Some aspects of the need for patients to have 
sufficient information to exercise choice have been mentioned already, but, in addition to 
concerns about manipulation of patients by withholding or misrepresenting information, the 
availability of information can be seen as significant in itself and therefore critical, even 
where there is no improper motive of the medical practitioner for not providing it. Thus, in 
the following the element of adequate information will be discussed.  
2.8.3. Adequate information 
There have been many ethical theories regarding the necessity for provision of appropriate 
medical information to the patient175 (such as the notion of trust, as will be discussed later 
on), but I would agree with McLean that the most important among them is the principle of 
respect for autonomy, which places an ethical duty on the doctor to provide the patient with 
medical information to assist him/her to make a decision based on his/her own values and 
priorities.176 It will be clear that enabling a patient to make a sufficiently autonomous 
decision requires information to be provided regarding his/her health condition and possible 
treatments for it and the implications of consenting to or refusing them.177 
In fact, throughout the history of medicine, consideration of information disclosure has been 
gradually developed from the Hippocratic tradition that advocated leaving patients in 
ignorance about medical information and their health conditions. As mentioned earlier, the 
general thrust of that approach appears to dissuade physicians from being open with their 
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patients and may even lead them taking a decision on their patient’s behalf.178 It was argued 
that there has been a retreat from the dominance of paternalism as an accepted approach in 
medical practice in more recent times and an increased recognition of the importance of 
respect for patient autonomy in making decisions about their medical care.179 However, this 
is not an entirely new approach and I would argue that, in the Western medical ethics 
heritage, there has been some prominent consideration of the matter of information 
disclosure; for example, Benjamin Rush,180 a notable medical ethics philosopher writing in 
the 18th century, held that doctors should share medical information with their patients and 
deliver that information to the patients in a truthful way.181 John Gregory,182 another notable 
Scottish figure in medical ethics in the 18th century, also acknowledged the notion of doctors’ 
duties to educate patients and the public to learn medicine; to be honest with their patients; 
to use and apply proper methods to tell their patients about their cases; and to use an 
appropriate manner to break the news to patients when their health was in a critical 
situation.183 This approach places emphasis on the patients’ need to be provided with 
information to make their decisions. It can clearly be argued that an autonomous decision 
relies on the prior sharing of relevant information, and accordingly in order to respect 
autonomy, that doctors should be under a duty to provide it. Accordingly, this view rejects 
the idea of paternalism being exercised by doctors as sole determiners of whether treatment 
is given and instead places greater priority on respect for patient autonomy.184 To respect 
patients’ autonomy is to allow them to be in charge of their decision-making (subject to 
caveats regarding the clinical appropriateness of treatment and resource constraints).185 In 
fact, it has been argued that in our modern society it becomes difficult to not rely on sufficient 
information that would be given to us by experts as we cannot properly make a decision 
without access to specialist knowledge.186 Therefore, it follows that doctors have a similar 
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duty, so a failure to do so with intention or not would lead to ‘a false reliance that undermines 
the individual’s autonomy’.187 
Hence, information is essential to patients’ decisions, but the question here is what kind of 
information should be provided to them? There is a continuing debate over the amount and 
type of information that should be given to patients and there is no clear answer, as it would 
not be easy to satisfy everyone about what should be disclosed. McLean, for example, has 
proposed that:  
‘While it could be argued that only full and complete disclosure would allow for 
an autonomous decision to be made, in practice this would likely prove 
impossible and, some would argue, may even be counter-productive. It is 
increasingly recognised that demanding full disclosure of every piece of 
information within the healthcare professional’s knowledge would be 
unreasonable and even potentially unhelpful’.188 
Waller also shares this concern, with which I agree, that to give an enormous amount of 
information to the patient which he cannot understand and absorb would not empower the 
patient to be in charge of his decision.189 
Although information is fundamental to the patient’s autonomous decision there may be 
information that is not helpful or necessary for the patient to know, such as all the details of 
a medical procedure.190 This is because knowing the exact details of how a procedure will 
be performed is important for the person who will conduct it, but it is not necessarily needed 
for the person to whom it will be applied in order to agree to it.191 MacLean has given the 
following example to stress the point ‘it is completely unnecessary for patients to know that 
a purse-string suture is employed to close the defect left when an appendix is excised.’192 
Indeed, such information may tend to confuse or mislead the patient and might negatively 
affect the patient’s decision, because the patient may pay more attention to the details of the 
procedure and less attention to the information that he really should consider in making his 
decision. Another type of information which may not be helpful to disclose to the patient ‘is 
details of the scientific evidence in support of the procedure.’193 The patient might need to 
know that there is research that has indicated that procedure A is better and more effective 
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than procedure B; on the other hand, the patient does not necessarily need to know or 
understand how the research demonstrated that.194 
Another argument suggests that there would be difficulty if ‘full knowledge’195 was a 
prerequisite for considering the decision as autonomous, as it has been said that requiring 
full knowledge before a person could be deemed to be making an autonomous decision is 
‘just a means of limiting action: sometimes an underhand means. No one has perfect 
knowledge, and a demand for it permits those with power to close in when a person is trying 
to make an unusual decision.’196 
Hence, it seems that from an ethical point of view a standard of full disclosure of information 
concerning proposed options for the care of a patient might at first sight be an ideal position, 
since it would ensure that all information available was given to the patient. However, it 
seems to not be an achievable or even necessarily a desirable standard for the reasons given. 
So, the question is; is there an approach under which it is easier to satisfy an individual 
patient’s relevant information needs than to require complete and full disclosure of all 
available information? 
There have been different suggestions to find an alternative ethical standard for disclosing 
information, which may better satisfy the patient’s need for information, and in the following 
I will consider some standards that have been proposed. 
O’Neill has agreed that full information disclosure is a problematic matter, and has asserted 
that this is not defendable or achievable.197 She has suggested that:  
‘At best we may hope that consent given by patients in the maturity of their 
faculties, although not based on full information, will be based on reasonably 
honest and not radically or materially incomplete accounts of intended treatment, 
and that patients understand these accounts and their more central implications 
and consequences to a reasonable degree.’198 
O’Neill then associated her suggestion of information disclosure to the idea of a patient-
doctor participation and trust relationship as forming the basis for providing information.199 
However, I would suggest this has difficulties, as it may be seen as implementing and 
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supporting the paternalistic doctor relationship, which, as I argued above, would undermine 
respect for patient autonomy. This option, to rely on the notion of trust is a difficult standard 
to be adopted by law also since would also raise practical difficulties as to how the law could 
enforce it. I will revisit O’Neill’s argument and consider it further later in this Chapter when 
examining the concept of trust in more detail. 
Another alternative to full disclosure has been suggested that, rather than setting out 
particular rules about disclosing certain amounts or types of information, proposes that the 
emphasis should be on what would help the individual patient make a sufficiently informed, 
and hence autonomous, decision: 
‘...meeting a person’s individual needs for information and choice based on a 
deeper understanding of their autonomy means that rules and procedures of 
communication become less important than adoption of attitudes of respect, 
curiosity and concern to find out about the patient’s needs, capacities and 
preferences.’200 
Therefore, the disclosure of information required is the information and knowledge that is 
likely to be relevant to a particular patient’s conditions and in relation to their own choices 
and decisions.201 This would involve a more active role for doctors in determining the 
information needs of patients rather than viewing themselves merely as passive providers of 
medical knowledge. Patients must be given relevant information about their health 
conditions and be actively encouraged to seek information, accepting the responsibility to 
‘participate in the informed consent process’202 by conversing with the physicians, sharing 
information and asking questions in order to comprehend any unclear information.  
What this approach also suggests is that to just provide patients with information with no 
understanding by them would arguably make their decision not a sufficiently autonomous 
one, as McLean has described such a decision as ‘impaired’.203 Waller has also argued that 
‘[i]nformation is an important element of autonomous control; but unless the patient has 
confidence and competence to understand, it provokes stress rather than providing 
comfort.’204 Therefore, for a decision to be regarded as an autonomous, it should be grounded 
on understandable and clear information.205 For patients to be said to have understood 
information that relates to their health condition, it has been said that they should at least 
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understand what health professionals would think necessary as a requirement to agree to or 
refuse the proposed medical treatment.206 However, more than that, it has been suggested 
that the information that is provided to the patient should be based on his/her views and 
values as well as conveying information on the consequences of the treatment, in order to 
help patient understanding.207 
Beauchamp and Childress have recommended that information should be provided in simple 
language and using simple explanations that the patients can understand.208 This approach 
has a support in medical practice, and it has been said that a doctor should use clear 
statements to explain the risks involved in the medical treatment or procedure by using 
percentages or written information with clear examples in order to present the risks in an 
understandable way.209 Patients’ understanding can be enhanced, as above-mentioned, 
through involvement and communication between doctors and their patients, so that patients 
are actively engaged in discussion about treatment options rather than passive recipients of 
information.210 
Nonetheless, it would be ethically ideal to place a duty on a doctor to ensure that the patient 
has understood the information given, but that is not possible in practice. It has been 
observed that there is an ‘epistemological aspect’ to ensuring that a patient has understood 
the information, which has been provided to him/her.211 The issue is that, if a patient has 
given consent and signed a consent form, that may be taken to indicate that the patient has 
in fact understood the information with no more assessment being made of his/her 
understanding.212 In other words, mere transmission of information and agreement does not 
necessarily mean that the patient has understood. In fact, it may be impossible to ensure that 
a patient has understood even given the best and clearest explanations.  
Thus, in conclusion I would agree with the suggestion that what can be aimed at instead is 
to ensure that doctors make the effort to ensure so far as possible that patients have 
understood by communicating with their patients and engaging in a clear discussion and 
explanation. The aim is to leave the patient free to make a decision that reflects his/her values 
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and interests in the light of the adequate information that has been provided,213 as that can 
be applied and achieved by the law, as I will discuss in Chapter three. 
Therefore, this thesis is not in favour of adopting the stance that to satisfy the ethical 
principle of respect for autonomy it is necessary for there to be full information disclosure, 
in the sense of disclosing all possible information about a patient’s condition and options for 
treatment, for the reasons that have been stated. Instead, it is concluded that sufficient 
information is necessary for competent adult patients to be self-determining and to respect 
their autonomy. The kind of information that might reasonably be expected to be included 
would cover diagnosis, prognosis, proposed treatments and their risks and benefits as well 
as the available alternative options for treatment. This information should be presented in a 
way that so far as possible enables the fullest understanding of the patient. Thus, I would 
suggest that a doctor will be under an ethical duty to supply the patient with sufficient 
information which is clear, can be understood and reflects the patient’s values, needs and 
desires. It can be said that giving such information to the patient shows respect for his 
autonomy, choices and wishes.214 
The standard of information disclosure that should be set should follow from this and 
Chapter three will consider to what extent this standard has been met by UK law, in order to 
examine how has English law considered it in its development for consent law and the 
standard of information disclosure in the light of Western medical ethics. Specifically, the 
recognition of the principle of respect for patient autonomy. 
While this is the approach that will be advocated in this thesis, a further important issue 
remains to be considered: whether the doctor may decide to withhold information and not 
discuss some issues concerning the patient’s condition or treatment. If the notion of respect 
for patients’ autonomy assumes that patients must be fully informed215 it can be argued that 
withholding information that is relevant to patients’ decision-making would appear to be 
contrary to the idea of respect for patient autonomy.216 
However, as discussed previously, there is a distinction between providing all information 
available and providing information that is relevant and useful to patient choice. Based on 
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MacLean’s earlier arguments, it seems the information that the patient needs in order to 
allow a proper exercise of autonomy is what would enable him to consider the risks and 
effects of the available options (including not receiving treatment at all) rather than details 
of procedures that would have no importance to the decision whether to give consent. A 
doctor might therefore legitimately decide to withhold information that would not be helpful 
to the patient in making his decision, such as details of the kinds of instruments that will be 
used in surgery. This is not without difficulty, since individual doctors and patients may 
differ about the relevance of particular information. This emphasises the need for discussion 
with patients about what kind of information it is important to them to know.  
However, it has been observed that there might be other situations when withholding 
information might be considered, for example, when doctors believe that the treatment or 
medical procedures would be beneficial and in the patients’ best interests, and in such cases 
they may wish to withhold information if they believe that patients might not consent to the 
treatment if they were told about the risks.217  
Thus another justifiable case based on beneficence principle is when the disclosing of the 
information would cause serious harm to the patient; in such a case, it can be argued that the 
doctor can be permitted to withhold such information, as providing it would cause distress 
to the patient and may worsen his conditions.218 Thus, it can be argued that the use of 
withholding information indicates that there might be a very small scope for such a 
conclusion to be drawn, that withholding information might be ethically justifiable. It is here 
that the distinction between beneficence and paternalism is at its most significant. The notion 
of beneficence focuses on the idea of informing the patient about the best options for the 
patient, while allowing/enabling them to make their own decisions, whereas, paternalism is 
an absolute disregarding of the patient’s wishes and views, because paternalistic doctors are 
deciding on behalf of their patients.  
This notion of withholding information seems to be considered by Islamic Sharia medical 
ethics and by both English and Saudi Arabian laws, though it has been narrowed and used 
with caution, as the thesis will discuss in Chapters two, three and four. 
The consideration of whether it is ever ethically acceptable to withhold information leads to 
a further question; whether the patient is obliged to receive information in order for his 
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decision to be regarded as an autonomous one. It has been said there is no ‘right to not be 
informed’ since to recognise this kind of right is critically damaging to the notion of ethical 
agency.219 Nevertheless, there has been some discussion of and support for a right not to 
know, for example in relation to genetic information. It has been suggested that people may 
have a desire to remain ignorant regarding significant genetic information about oneself: 
whether or not an individual has a gene for a distressing illness that may affect his children 
or family.220 Although there are some arguments that would support the right not to know 
regarding genetic information,221 this is a matter about which there is considerable debate, 
and others take the view that even such information requires to be disclosed.222 As this thesis 
is not focused on genetic information, this particular situation will not be discussed further 
but the issue has arisen in the context of consent to treatment. 
Beauchamp and Childress have suggested that there can be situations where a patient may 
voluntarily waive the right to receive information him/herself but enable it to be given to 
another (a representative) or for information not to be provided at all.223 Nevertheless, 
Beauchamp and Childress seem to hold that such a right exists, although they have argued 
that an acceptance of the right to not receive information would be ‘dangerous’ because great 
number of patients ‘have an inordinate trust’ in their doctors and may make the patient very 
‘vulnerable’ specifically when the interests of the doctor and patients are different and 
conflict.224 The issue of waiving will be discussed in Chapter two based on Islamic Sharia 
perspective. 
However, in relation to the right not to know, it can be argued that the provision of sufficient 
information has become regarded as an essential element to exercise autonomy and to a 
decision being regarded as sufficiently autonomous. Thus, a decision that is made without 
sufficient information cannot be considered as autonomous and is not consequently 
deserving of respect. Firstly, as Rhodes expressed that ‘if autonomy determines my right to 
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knowledge, it cannot also justify my refusing to be informed.’225 Secondly, the principle of 
respect for autonomy involves an obligation to respect a competent adult patient’s 
autonomous decision because if ‘...respecting decisions is about enabling a person to develop 
his or her vision of the good life, then those decisions will help to achieve the goals the 
person is aiming for only if the person has the information needed to reach that decision.’226 
Thus, a patient decision’s to remain ignorant about significant facts makes his/her decision 
not an autonomous one, so based on this argument there is no right not to know 
information.227 On the other hand, I would argue that, if the patient refuses to be informed, 
it would be better to say that doctors can and should seek to persuade the patient to accept 
information in order to arrive at a choice.228 As I have argued above, persuasion to assist the 
patient to make his/her decision would not breach the respect for his/her autonomy or 
invalidate his/her consent, although doctors should not force information on a clearly 
unwilling patient and they can treat on this basis. In such cases, decisions made should 
probably be treated with caution, but it should not be open to a patient to say that his/her 
decision was not sufficiently autonomous if he/she refused to be given information. 
Based on what has been discussed above about autonomy in the medical context, it seems 
clear that autonomy has played a vital role in setting the standard of information disclosure 
and what should be disclosed, as well as how that information should be delivered. I would 
conclude that there is a clear connection between the development of the standard of 
information disclosure and respect for patient autonomy. This is because, for a decision to 
be considered autonomous, information should be provided that is clear and that the patient 
can understand. This kind of protection and focus on the amount of information shows that 
autonomy is a crucial factor in medicine, as it has underpinned the protection of patients and 
enabled them to make free decisions.   
2.9. Conclusion 
In this section, I have examined the concept of the principle of respect for autonomy and its 
values and limitations. The principle of respect for autonomy has been examined through 
the heritages of Kant and Mill and it has been explained that although in some ways their 
approaches are very different, both have expressed support for the fundamental importance 
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of autonomy. It has also been shown that, while Western medical ethics and practice were 
founded on the principle of beneficence, which led to paternalistic approaches to providing 
care, this has been retreated from and respect for patient autonomy has become of 
fundamental importance. It now seems to underline most doctor-patient interactions 
including consent to medical treatment and information disclosure. 
Although there are limitations to respect for autonomy such as the harm principle, this does 
not undermine autonomy as the most dominant ethical principle in current Western medical 
ethics. For a decision to be regarded as autonomous there are some conditions that should 
be met. Among those elements are competence and voluntariness. As the focus of this thesis 
is the competent adult, these concepts will not be treated in further detail. The final element 
of considering the patients’ decisions as autonomous ones is that they should be based on 
adequate information. From what has been discussed, I would argue that the principle of 
respect for autonomy places an ethical duty on doctors to provide patients with medical 
information regarding their health conditions and treatments. 
A further vital issue is regarding what the appropriate standard of information disclosure 
might be. I have presented the approach of full disclosure of information to patients which 
seems as if it might be an ethical ideal but as above discussed it is unlikely to be achievable 
or necessarily desirable in achieving the object of allowing patients to make decisions 
effectively for themselves. Instead, there have been different alternative standards 
considered. O’Neil’s suggested proposal relies on the notion of trust. Relying on trust was 
argued to be problematic as it may retain the idea of paternalism. Further difficulties in the 
concept of trust will be explored in more detail in the next section, but for these reasons this 
approach was rejected. Instead, this thesis proposes to adopt as an ethical ideal a standard of 
information disclosure that places emphasis on the needs of the patient for relevant 
information to be able to arrive at a decision. This information would include diagnosis, 
prognosis, proposed treatments and their risks and benefits as well as the available 
alternative options of treatment. Further, it should also be acknowledged that the patient 
needs to have understandable and clear information so information should be provided to 
support as far as possible the understanding of the patient. 
It should also be said that the standard of information disclosure should not be set too high 
as that would be difficult to meet for both doctors in terms of requiring them to provide 
information and for patients. Furthermore, although there have been ongoing arguments 
about the nature and degree of information that should be disclosed to patients, it seems that 
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respect for autonomy would insist that the patient should be sufficiently informed to consider 
his decision as an autonomous one. 
Having set out what the ethical ideal is for the standard of information disclosure in order to 
respect patient autonomy, Chapter three will consider to what extent this standard has been 
met by UK law.  
Before turning to that, however, there are two remaining issues to consider. The next section 
will go on to examine an alternative principle as a means of establishing the duty to provide 
information to patients. It will explore the notion of trust and how it has been considered 
from a Western ethical point of view, and discuss its relationship to the principle of respect 
for competent adult patients’ autonomy. Earlier in this Chapter, it was argued that the notion 
of trust should not be emphasised in terms of patients’ consent and information disclosure 
as that would recall the era of paternalism, which has fallen into disfavour. However, it is 
still important to consider it here since the issue of trust will be revisited in Chapter two. 
There it will be argued that it is still significant as one of the fundamental ethical principles 
of the provision of care under Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical ethics, and that this 
has influenced the direction of legal regulation in Saudi Arabia. 
3. The notion of trust 
3.1. An overview of trust 
In general, trust can be described as a ‘firm belief in the reliability, truth or ability of someone 
or something’.229 The term trust is frequently used interchangeably with other terms, for 
example, confidence and belief in another.230 It has therefore been observed that ‘trust is a 
dynamic aspect of interpersonal relationships that involves the complex and interwoven 
perspectives of the truster, the one trusted, and the object of one’s trust’.231 It can be argued 
that without trust, a person would not be able to co-operate with another person or be 
involved in activities with others.232 Trust in others is essential to people and without it they 
could not live and thrive.233 
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O’Neill has linked the idea of trust to the concept of relationships and obligations as trust is 
one of the main elements in any personal relationship.234 Jones has also suggested that trust 
is vital in relationships,235 and other commentators have noted that ‘…trust encourages us to 
see and respect each other as moral agents’.236 Therefore, the question here is whether trust 
as a concept can be considered as the ethical basis for information disclosure and consent to 
treatment in the case of competent, adult patients. 
3.2. Trust, patient’s consent and information disclosure 
It has been argued that the doctor-patient relationship can be considered as a caring 
relationship, because doctors take care and provide treatment to patients to benefit the 
patient’s health.237 Thus, to achieve the goal of benefiting the patient’s health through the 
doctor-patient relationship, that relationship demands trust, ‘because of the significant 
benefits that it [trust] promotes and the harms that it [trust] helps to prevent.’238 A 
relationship that is built on trust would support the idea of shared decision-making, to 
recognise the doctors’ duty to act in a trustworthy sense. Rhodes has held that ‘all reasonably 
farsighted physicians must recognize that in order to practice medicine, they must seek trust 
and deserve it.’239 (Her emphasis). Rhodes has justified that ‘[b]ecause this rule follows from 
a reasonable consideration of the basic requirements for medical practice, it is the 
fundamental prima facie moral imperative for doctors, the ethical rule that must always be 
taken into account in their practice.’240 (Her emphasis). This view in fact seems to hold that 
the notion of trust should be the main ethical principle in the doctor-patient relationship and 
marginalises other ethical principles such as respect for autonomy. This follows from 
Rhodes’s assertion that ‘...all doctors must accept [to] seek trust and deserve it as their moral 
law, as their creed.’241 (Her emphasis).Thus, doctors should act in a way that promote trust 
and make ‘themselves trustworthy practitioners.’242	
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Bearing in mind Rhodes’s argument above, it can be argued that the notion of trust seems to 
be not clear enough to be considered as adequate to protect patients in the healthcare context. 
Arguably, even O’Neill with her major work on trust did not give a straightforward answer 
to what the concept of patients’ trust in their doctors is founded on; she noted that 
‘[s]ometimes we may know that good will is lacking, and yet we trust’.243 As an example, 
she stated that ‘[a] patient may know a doctor finds him particularly irritating and bears him 
little good will, and yet trust the doctor to exercise proper professional judgement’.244 This 
may indicate that even where the personal relationship is problematic, patients may still trust 
doctors to conduct themselves professionally.245 On the other hand, patients might not trust 
their doctors, but they might still rely on them because they do not have other options or 
choices.246 Therefore, trust can be said to be marginalised if the patient puts his care into 
doctors’ hands where he does not have a choice.247 Therefore, it has been suggested that for 
the notion of trust to work maximally it requires confidence in both the ability and good will 
of the trusted.248 
It has been claimed that trust is one of the central elements in the relationship between 
patients and their physicians and indeed McCullough has suggested that ‘trust...should be 
understood as a foundation for the physician-patient relationship’.249 Therefore, it has been 
argued that the idea of trust is very important in the concept of ethical medical practice.250 
Based on that it has been suggested that patients’ giving consent to treatment was seen as 
being built on trust,251 and that this concept would help to make co-operation between 
patients and their doctors easier. Thus, trust can play an important role in providing a benefit 
to the patient in terms of health outcomes, since the patient may be involved in making 
his/her own decision, by communicating with doctors so that would be a part of the success 
of the treatment course.252 
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However, for the arguments that see trust as an important factor for obtaining the patient 
consent,253 it is equally vital for the same arguments to hold that patients would trust their 
doctors to provide them with the information that they need and wish to know about their 
health conditions to make a decision regarding their cases.254 Trust can be related to 
providing a patient with information if the doctor is regarded as having a duty to offer the 
patient information that is ‘accessible and reliable.’255 There is some evidence that 
demonstrates that a large number of patients continue to trust doctors and medical staff and 
allow them to be involved in making their decision, rather than seeing this as a matter entirely 
for a patient to make alone.256 Some studies have found that patients’ involvement in their 
decision-making is different based on their social and cultural background.257 Certain 
patients may rely on their doctors and not wish to be involved in the decision-making 
process, so doctors may take a more major role in deciding upon treatment.258 
However, to rely entirely on the notion of trust can be seen as undermining the competent 
adult patient’s autonomy and ability to make their decision freely because ‘[t]o trust is thus 
to let go, to be vulnerable and deferent to another’s competence and responsibility.’259 It 
might imply that a patient is to be regarded as a ‘vulnerable’ person who leaves others to act 
on his or her behalf. In other words, once a relationship of trust is entered into, patients need 
not be actively involved in making decisions, since they can trust their doctor to do what is 
best for them. In this way, reliance on a principle of trust is clearly related to the notion of 
paternalism, which as has been discussed, may come into conflict with a principle of respect 
for autonomy that sees individuals as being best placed to make decisions for themselves. 
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It has been argued that the idea of competent adult patients making their own decisions and 
not automatically conceding the power to others, even doctors, to make decisions for them 
has become vital to medical ethics due to the rise in prominence of the principle of respect 
for autonomy.260 From what has already been said about the retreat from paternalism it 
appears now that this respect for autonomy in the practice of medicine is widely regarded as 
being more significant than the notion of trust. Despite this, Rowe and Calnan have argued 
that the idea of ‘inter-dependence’ between patients and their doctors means that the need 
for the notion of trust in medical encounters has not been dismissed, but ‘…trust is now more 
conditional and negotiated and depends on the communication, provision of information, 
and the use of ‘evidence’ to support decisions’.261 This claim shows the weakness of 
considering the notion of trust rather than autonomy as the main principle of the patient-
doctor relationship that should determine the duties of a doctor to disclose information. 
Indeed, as suggested here, establishing and maintaining trust may be conditional upon the 
provision of information, rather than providing the reason for doing so. Other factors have 
also been put forward as relevant to trust. For example, it has been argued that factors such 
as the level of care and comfort received, how doctors behave, and whether there are good 
interactions and communication skills are all important.262 These factors can be seen to be 
significant and affect patients’ satisfaction, which may in a circular way also have an impact 
on patients’ trust in their doctors.263 This line of argument would suggest that it should be 
recognised that trust requires consideration and support of a range of patients’ rights.264 
These would include the idea that doctors should encourage patients to be involved in the 
decision-making.265 If this is accepted, then this must surely require doctors to provide 
information and find out about patients’ needs in order to involve them in a meaningful way. 
In fact, such an argument would show that the focus is on doctors’ behaviour and how they 
deal with patients, which may suggest that trust is always focused on how the professional 
should behave and deal with patients. Such an emphasis would suggest that to inform the 
patient or to obtain his or her consent is left to the way the doctor behaves rather than the 
respect for patient autonomy, which retains the idea of paternalism. 
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Plainly, another weakness of the notion of trust can be understood from the concern about 
the potential for a type of trust that may be deemed ‘blind trust’, which may, for example, 
discourage patients from asking questions that it might be thought necessary and important 
to ask. For example, Mechanic and Meyer have cautioned that: ‘In emphasizing the 
importance of trust, we do not suggest that patients should trust blindly. Patients and 
professionals both need better preparation for establishing effective therapeutic alliances’.266 
It can be said that, even with the avoidance of the idea of ‘blind trust’, it seems that relying 
on trust as a basis for approaching information disclosure would be problematic as some 
patients would be likely to feel that their autonomy and views, goals, and decisions were not 
being sufficiently respected or appreciated if they are not in control of decisions about their 
healthcare.267 For patients to not feel any kind of acknowledgement that their own views and 
wishes deserve respect from the doctors who would act on their behalf may also lead them 
to lose confidence and trust in medical care.268 In turn, this might deter them from seeking 
medical advice and treatment because they feel that they are not being respected for 
themselves or for their freedom to make decisions.269 Reliance on trust as a concept might 
therefore ultimately undermine the establishment of a relationship of trust in practice, and 
lead to worse health outcomes for patients. 
Davies has sought to avoid the principles of respect for autonomy and trust as being seen to 
be in conflict. Instead he has emphasised that both trust and giving information to patients 
should work side by side and reciprocally and that valid consent should be based on both 
information and trust, stating that ‘[c]learly, information is only half the story’.270 On this 
view, that fact that information has been provided is less significant to being able to rely on 
the patient’s consent than it would be if respect for autonomy alone were the guiding 
principle: there must also be trust. Davies then has justified his view by saying that 
‘[p]atients are unlikely to have confidence in the information they are given unless they have 
confidence in the system providing it, and that confidence is a function of the patient’s trust 
in the doctor’.271 In fact, Davies claims that the notion of trust he has offered is not in conflict 
with patients’ ‘autonomy’ or ‘rights’ ‘to be provided with or to decline information’.272 
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However, I would argue that Davies’s view would retain the idea of paternalism in the 
medical context as doctors could find justification and support to provide the information 
that they want to give, instead of what patients need and require, as he stated that 
‘…developing trust entails full cognisance of the patient’s rights and of the doctor’s 
responsibilities, including the recognition that doctors have other important duties to their 
patients than solely respecting their autonomy’.273 
In the same line with Davies’s view, Brewin who is a strong supporter of a trust based ethic 
of healthcare argued that the strongest arguments against it being given priority in the doctor-
patient relationship are from those who he described as ‘anti-paternalist’ who would prefer 
others to be given facts to make their own choices, aiming to respect their autonomy.274 He 
himself seemed unhappy for others to be given facts about their health conditions and limited 
their involvement in decision-making to being advised, which seems to be a firmly 
paternalistic view. Brewin suggested that ‘[w]hat we need is better communication; more 
explanation for those who need it, less for those who don’t; [sic] and greater empathy and 
understanding of the patient’s real needs, fears, and aspirations’.275 Brewin did not stop his 
attack on ‘anti-paternalists’ and ultimately autonomy, as he then argued that ‘[w]hat we don’t 
[sic] need is unhelpful rhetoric; a wholesale attack on trust; excessive emphasis on ‘fully 
informed consent’ and ‘autonomy’; and a serious distortion of priorities with a consequent 
fall in standards of care’.276 Brewin then justified his argument for two reasons: 
‘Firstly, because noble principles often give contradictory advice. Every patient 
has a right to full information. He also has a right to be treated with compassion, 
common sense, and respect for his dignity-a respect that is not usually enhanced 
by asking him, ‘Do you want us to be frank about all the risks or not?’ Secondly, 
because we are all the prisoners of time, the more time we spend trying to explain 
things, the less there is for other aspects of patient care.’277 
With all due respect to Rhodes’s and Brewin’s views, these views would clearly retrieve the 
notion of paternalism as they may be taken to suggest that the patient should just passively 
attend hospital and leave the decision-making for doctors only. This idea of paternalism has 
now no place in modern medical ethics. As the thesis has argued, acting paternalistically 
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violates and breaches the patient’s autonomy to make a free choice and decision. In fact, 
even the law,278 as will be discussed in Chapter three, has rejected the idea of paternalism. 
Arguably trust should not be absolutely dismissed, but to regard it as the fundamental ethical 
principle on which to base an appropriate approach to information disclosure would be 
difficult to apply and defend. For example, although Rhodes holds that trust is vital in 
medical ethics, she seems to attempt to adjust her view to accommodate it with the principle 
of respect for autonomy. She argued that:  
‘To be trusted, the doctor will also have to pay serious attention to the patient’s 
view of what is good. People like to have their own way, and when decisions are 
intimately concerned with the patients’ own body and life, differences between 
alternatives can be tremendously important to them.’279 
Rhodes has admitted that ‘[s]ometimes a doctor’s view of what is best can be at odds with a 
patient’s view. In some circumstances a patient will actually consider the doctor’s choice to 
be no good at all.’280 She then argued that, as the doctor-patient relationship builds on 
trusting doctors, that would not allow doctors to impose their view against the patients’ own 
views.281 However, when Rhodes has concluded her discussion she seems to hold the 
opposite view, as she has said: ‘In sum, in order for doctors to be trusted to a degree that 
allows them to act for their patients’ good, they are committed to making themselves 
professionally competent, caring, and respectful of patient values.’282 
I would argue that Rhodes seems, on one the hand, to argue that trust is a vital ethical element 
that should underpin medical ethics and allow doctors to act in their patients’ interests, which 
would suggest that providing information to patients to enable them to make their own 
decisions is less of a priority. On the other hand, she seems to contradict her argument, as 
doctors should not impose their own view in order to respect the patient’s values and desires. 
This shows that she seems to support the principle of respect for autonomy but at the same 
time still holding the support of trust.  
It seems from the arguments above that, nonetheless, the notion of trust may still have a 
place in medical ethics, but more emphases on it would not be defendable. This is because 
the notion of trust would undermine the patient’s view, values and wishes, as trust seems to 
suggest that doctors can decide what information should be given and even may consent on 
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behalf of the patients. This would show difficulties in how to set a standard of information 
disclosure that just relies on trust, which prefers to empower doctors and marginalise 
patients’ views and wishes.283 I have argued above that the principle of respect for patient 
autonomy would give more power to the patient and balance the doctor-patient relationship. 
Thus the notion of respect for patient autonomy is defendable and would give more 
protection to patients and their views and wishes would be respected and considered. Thus, 
respect for autonomy would require doctors to respect patients’ values and views and provide 
them with sufficient information to make their free decision. Thus, as the thesis will argue 
in Chapter three, it is the notion of the respect for patient autonomy rather than trust that 
convinces the law to change to consider patients’ views and provide them with information.  
3.3. Conclusion 
To conclude this discussion about the notion of trust, following the discussion of alternative 
approaches to trust, the question remains whether the concept of trust can be used as the 
overarching principle for determining the rights and duties of patients and doctors in respect 
of information disclosure and consent, rather than seeing autonomy as the pre-eminent 
principle that should be applied. With all due respect to some who have argued that the 
notion of trust is a vital concept in the medical ethics context and plays an important role in 
both patient consent and information disclosure, my conclusion is that it cannot fulfil such a 
central role.284 
I would suggest that a preference for trust over the principle of respect for autonomy is not 
appropriate, since it would inevitably reintroduce the idea of paternalism. Patients’ views 
and decisions would not be regarded as having as great a significance as they do under the 
principle of autonomy, and this would reverse the trend that I set out earlier.  
I would argue that trust as the foundation of information disclosure would not be the right 
and defensible approach since it has been observed that: 
‘Trust is necessary in asymmetrical relationships with all their imbalances of 
knowledge and power. It is, thus, largely reliant on ignorance and uncertainty, 
and may be protected by secrecy. The stranglehold that doctors traditionally 
enjoyed over medical knowledge and information about the quality of healthcare 
has been significant in sustaining trust.’285 
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Hence, to ground providing information to patients in the notion of trust maintains the power 
imbalance whereas my position would be that making respect for autonomy the guiding 
principle seeks to redress that. Providing information to patients, as a consequence of their 
right to respect for autonomy, gives them knowledge to make their own decisions rather than 
having treatment decisions based on a matter of having to trust the doctor to give them 
information or make the ‘right’ decision for them. In fact, a reliance on trust in the form 
above discussed would generate a barrier between doctor and their patients in decision 
making, because doctors could ignore a patient’s views if they believed that this was in the 
patient’s best interests and that they were being trusted only to produce a good medical 
outcome.  
Thus, what patients need is to be respected and provided with information that meets their 
own needs, wishes and values to allow them to make an autonomous decision not to just 
remain passive and rely upon the judgement of their doctors because they are required to 
trust them.286 That can only be achieved by respecting the patient’s autonomy and his 
autonomous decisions. The issue of trust is a concept that has remained central in Saudi 
Arabia, as will be examined in Chapter two. 
After having discussed the Western medical ethics perspective on  respect for autonomy and 
the notion of trust and how have they been considered in the medical context, in the 
following it is worth considering English law sources and their relation to ethics, to show 
how English law has considered ethics. This will be further explored in Chapter three.    
4. The sources of English law and its relation to ethics 
As the thesis is examining the matter of the information disclosure standard for competent 
adult patients’ from both ethical and legal perspectives, it is important to understand the 
relationship between them. The legal system of Saudi Arabia is based very clearly on 
religious and ethical principles derived from the Islamic faith and this continues to be central 
to its development. It is therefore useful to provide a brief overview of the sources and 
development of English law as a means of comparison and to give some consideration to 
what has been said about ethics, in particular medical ethics, in relation to English law.  
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4.1. English law: sources of law 
The development of English law has a long history.287 The English legal system is a common 
law system which is ‘case-centred and hence judge-centred, allowing scope for a 
discretionary, ad hoc, pragmatic approach to the particular problems that appear before the 
courts.’288 (Original emphasis).  
Historically, the term common law has its association with the notion that it is the English 
people’s common law, which has existed since the Norman Conquest of England when a 
unified legal system was necessary to demonstrate the affirmation of the power of the 
sovereign over the state.289 
Common law is still one of the most fundamental sources of the legal principles and rules 
that are applied through the doctrine of precedent.290 In fact, the early main notion of 
developing the common law was that ‘a right only existed if there was a procedure for 
enforcing it ..., and for this reason substantive law became inextricably bound up with 
procedure.’291 Therefore, the nature of the matter came to determine which court is the right 
one for considering that matter. However, in terms of the common law system of hierarchy, 
decisions made in the higher courts are binding on the lower courts, as well as generally 
dealing with more complex matters.  
Besides the common law as the traditional source of English law, the other major source of 
law is legislation. 
4.1.1. Legislation 
The United Kingdom (UK) Parliament at Westminster is the main legislative body for 
England.292 Most legislation is proposed by the elected Government though it is possible for 
private members bills and in rare cases proposals from those outside Parliament to become 
Bills. The legislation must be debated and approved by both Houses of Parliament – the 
elected House of Commons and the unelected House of Lords.293 Parliament, since its 
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establishment294 has become one of the major sources of English law through the enactment 
of statutes and associated legislation, and legislation has increasingly become the dominant 
form for creation of laws and legal reform. The courts have acknowledged that by preferring 
that the development of any new legal principle should be considered by Parliament, rather 
than through the development of common law.295 Parliament has the power to establish laws; 
to reform, amend or abolish an existing common law principle and existing legislation and 
it can also adopt international laws or treaties.296 
Apart from these major sources of English law, a brief mention may be made of some 
others although this is not intended to provide an exhaustive list. The concept of 
equity arose to correct perceived inflexibility and deficiencies in common law. The 
existence of equity generated two different legal systems and courts for common law 
and equity.297 However, these were merged by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875. 
Custom has also played a part in the development of English law. Although it is rarely 
directly used to determine legal issues now, many rules of customary law have been 
adopted and developed by judges through the common law, others have become part 
of statute law.298 
Canon law is also particularly worth mentioning since, as will be seen later, law in Saudi 
Arabia is profoundly influenced by religion. Canon law is the law that has been based on the 
teachings and authority of the Catholic Church and which was used to deal with both 
offences against the church and other matters such as inheritance of property.299 However, 
it has been said that ‘mediaeval canon law is part of English law only to the extent that it is 
incorporated into English law. It may be incorporated in one of two ways: (1) expressly, by 
being codified as statute law or (2) implicitly, by the sanction of ‘immemorial usage and 
custom’ law.’300 (Original emphasis).	
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Despite not forming part of it, arguably canon law influenced English law in many ways, 
such as the use of punishment for crimes and the nature of Christian marriage and family 
affairs.301 Other influence of canon law can be seen in term of the nature of equity law, 
because initially at least most of the Chancellors of the equity courts were clerics who 
applied religious moral and principles to the cases.302 It has been suggested that Christian 
religious perspectives have continued to have some influence on English law for example, 
in Donoghue v Stevenson303 as Lord Atkin established the ‘neighbour principle’. It has been 
said that Lord Atkin’s motivation to set the principle was driven by his Christian faith, which 
was influential in his life.304 Such conclusions are hard to verify as they are based on 
observations about an individual’s personal convictions and there is no suggestion that 
Christian traditions should be treated as legally binding principles in themselves.305 
However, it may at least suggest that the influence of religion may still play a role in legal 
development.306 
Of much greater modern importance is the role of the European Union (EU). Since 
1973, European Community (EC) law has become part of the UK legal system.307 EC 
organisations were transformed into the EU by a series of changes ending with the 
Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Any English law in relation to the EU should be considered 
within the framework of EU law; in other words, the EU law can take precedence 
over the UK law.308 Further as the UK is a member of the Council of Europe, and 
following the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
into UK law by means of the Human Rights Act 1998, both legislation and court 
decisions should be compatible with the terms of the Convention.309  
As will be explained in Chapter three, it has not generally been necessary to rely on the 
ECHR in order for a patient to have the legal right to make a decision for himself to consent 
to or refuse medical treatment, since this has been established under domestic law. There are 
some examples where patients have sought to allege that UK law that affects consent to 
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treatment is in breach of the ECHR, but these have usually concerned controversial types of 
treatment such as assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia310 or assisted reproduction.311 The 
ECHR will therefore not be discussed in detail in this thesis, but a brief mention of some of 
its Articles will be made in so far as it supports the contention that respect for patient 
autonomy can be found in this Convention and reference to its influence on UK law 
in more recent decisions such as Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board.312 
Article 2(1) states that: ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
deprived of his life intentionally...’.313 This article presents as a primary principle the right 
to life, and the requirement of the State to preserve and protect it. On the other hand the 
Article has also been cited to justify the idea of the patient’s right to refuse medical treatment 
as Wicks observed that the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment which she described 
as ‘a passive, voluntary euthanasia’ has its basis under ECHR article 2(1).314 She has 
indicated that the objective of article 2(1) is to protect a person against being 
intentionally killed by others, and for passive euthanasia there is no need for someone 
to hasten death, just a requirement for withholding treatment that is prolonging life.315 
Therefore, because there is no positive obligation to prolong the patient’s life or a 
duty to impose on the person to live, it seems that article 2 is not breached or violated 
by a competent adult’s refusal of medical treatment.316 English law317 still does not 
recognise the act of active euthanasia, but it has for a long time accepted the right of 
the patient to refuse medical treatment under common law as in the case of Re T(Adult: 
Refusal of Medical Treatment);318 which will be referred to in Chapter three. 
Other ECHR articles that are applicable to patients’ affairs include Article 3, which 
states that: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
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punishment.’319 It is illegal to perform an operation or treatment on a competent patient 
without his valid consent under UK law and such an act might also be a breach of the 
patient’s rights under Article 3.320 So, article 3 could also be seen as protecting the 
patient from being subjected to any medical treatment that he does not want, again 
supporting the patient’s autonomy in deciding whether or not to accept treatment.321 
Article 8(1) states that; ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence.’322 This article protects a person’s ‘physical integrity’ 
as this can be seen as a part of the right to respect the private life of the patient: 
‘In the sphere of medical treatment, the refusal to accept a particular treatment 
might, inevitably, lead to a fatal outcome, yet the imposition of medical 
treatment, without the consent of a mentally competent adult patient, would 
interfere with a person’s physical integrity in a manner capable of engaging the 
rights protected under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention.’323 
In the recent case of Montgomery, the Supreme Court considered the notion of 
patients’ rights and their protection by human rights’ declarations, stating that 
‘Under the stimulus of the Human Rights Act 1998, the courts have 
become increasingly conscious of the extent to which the common law 
reflects fundamental values.	As Lord Scarman pointed out in Sidaway’s 
case, these include the value of self-determination.... As well as underlying 
aspects of the common law, that value also underlies the right to respect 
for private life protected by article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The resulting duty to involve the patient in decisions 
relating to her treatment has been recognised in judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights... as well as in a number of decisions of courts in 
the United Kingdom.’324(Original emphasis). 
However, the Supreme Court also stressed that the value of patients’ rights is 
recognised by English common law. Therefore, while acknowledging the influence of the 
ECHR, its Articles were not directly applied and in fact rather more attention was paid to 
national medical regulations and standards, such as those of the General Medical Counsel 
(GMC),325 rather than to the ECHR. 
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In fact, it is also important to note that Article 8 is not an unlimited right, it is a qualified 
right. Thus, such a right can be lawfully limited; this limitation must have a balance between 
the interests of the individual and the community as a whole. Therefore, that limitation must 
be in compliance with the law and it is necessary to consider that it may include the 
prevention of crimes or protection of the freedom and rights of others.326 Similarly, 
nonetheless, Article 10 has granted everyone the right of the freedom of expression, for 
example to hold an opinion and to receive information,327 but it is also a qualified right. This, 
I would argue, is in line with the earlier discussion that individuals do not have unlimited 
rights and the rights of others may need to be weighed in the balance.	
In conclusion, it can be said that the ECHR and decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights, as fundamental international principles, underpin respect for individual 
autonomy, although this is not without limitation. It can be said that the influence of 
the ECHR law on the content and application of English law is therefore an important 
external influence.328	
4.2. English law and medical ethics 
English law has been based on and influenced by a number of different sources as mentioned 
above, which obviously may show why English law may also have been influenced by 
medical ethics. It has been suggested that the influence of the recognition of respect for 
patient autonomy that has been shown in medical ethics has also been influenced in its turn 
by greater recognition of human rights and freedoms and contributed to the fading of the 
traditional paternalistic approach to healthcare.329 
In term of considering medical ethics and law it seems that ‘there are a series of tensions and 
discrepancies between what is ‘legal’ and what is ‘ethical’ in the context of medical 
treatment, which may be confusing for healthcare professionals and patients alike.’330 This 
kind of tension seems to occur because the requirements of the law and the requirements of 
ethical principles in  a specific medical matter may differ. It has been suggested that it is 
likely that ethical standards may require more than what the law asks for. An example of 
that may include information disclosure for consent to treatment where medical ethics (such 
																																								 																				
326	For	example,	L	Kiestra	The	Impact	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	on	Private	International	Law	(Asser	
Press	2014)	p.	173	and	S	Harris-Short,	J	Miles,	R	George	Family	Law:	Text,	Cases,	and	Materials	(3rded	OUP	2015)	p.	8.	
327	ECHR1950.	
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329	S	McLean	Autonomy,	Consent	and	the	Law	p.	7.	
330E	Jackson	‘The	Relationship	between	Medical	Law	and	Good	Medical	Ethics’	(2015)	41	J	Med	Ethics	95-98	p.	95.	
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as, the notion of full information disclosure) may demand more information than what the 
law has considered as sufficient.331  
This can be observed in the GMC guideline which has acknowledged and recognised some 
ethical principles that the law may not require. For example, the issue of how doctors should 
present information to the patient. ‘Consent: patients and doctors making decisions together’ 
guidance advised doctors to provide: 
‘Clear, accurate information about the risks of any proposed investigation or 
treatment, presented in a way patients can understand, can help them make informed 
decisions. The amount of information about risk that you should share with patients 
will depend on the individual patient and what they want or need to know. Your 
discussions with patients should focus on their individual situation and the risk to 
them.’332 
In another other section, the guidance requires doctors to inform the patient about risks, 
saying that doctors ‘...must tell patients if an investigation or treatment might result in a 
serious adverse outcome, even if the likelihood is very small. You should also tell patients 
about less serious side effects or complications if they occur frequently…’.333 (Emphasis 
added). Interestingly, the guidance does not leave the phrase ‘a serious adverse outcome’ 
unexplained; in its endnote it is explained that: ‘An adverse outcome resulting in death, 
permanent or long-term physical disability or disfigurement, medium or long-term pain, or 
admission to hospital; or other outcomes with a long-term or permanent effect on a patient’s 
employment, social or personal life.’334 This seems to be a good example of a situation where 
the GMC ethical guideline arguably requires more from doctors than is demanded by law.335  
Despite the seemingly higher standard set by the GMC guideline, the standard of information 
disclosure that will be examined in the following Chapters is the standard that requires 
doctors to disclose sufficient and understandable information to enable a competent adult 
patient to be self-determining and to respect his/her autonomy. Thus, the ethical standard 
that has been proposed will be considered throughout the following Chapters to demonstrate 
if the law has met such a requirement or if the law has required less or more than this. 
Another example of a tension between medical ethics, particularly the principle of respect 
for autonomy, and English law can be seen where a competent adult patient wishes to end 
his/her life with the active assistance of other (assisted suicide). The stance of the law as that 
																																								 																				
331	Ibid.	
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335	In	Montgomery	the	Supreme	Court	cited	with	approval	section	32	of	‘Consent:	patients	and	doctors	making	
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it is illegal to do so.336 This is an issue that may arise in the medical context where patients 
with a terminal or debilitating illness are prevented from obtaining the legal assistance of 
doctors to end their own lives, despite expressing a clear and competent request on how they 
wish to die.337 This is despite the fact that, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
three, a competent adult has a right to refuse treatment even if it is life-saving. McLean has 
said that ‘the law’s approach to end of life decision-making in terms of respect for autonomy 
is schizophrenic.’338 She then explained this by saying that: ‘On the one hand, the role of 
consent (or refusal) in respecting patient autonomy is trumpeted where a patient can achieve 
a chosen death by rejecting life-sustaining treatment. On the other, the autonomy of the 
individual is denied when that death requires active assistance.’339 
While there are a vast number of justifications that have been given for allowing or refusing 
to permit a person to seek medical assistance to end their lives, these are beyond the scope 
of this thesis.340 However, it must be recognised that the harm principle discussed earlier 
could be used as a means of arguing from an ethical perspective for limitations on individual 
autonomy, such as permitting others to help end one’s life. Nevertheless, this example shows 
that the principle of respect for individual autonomy may produce contrary responses, and 
provoke debate in both ethics and law, even in decisions that might be regarded as so 
personal as the manner of one’s death. 
In fact, the tensions between ethics and law can arise in many cases, but courts always have 
to consider and judge the matter based on legal principles rather than ethical principles. 
Nevertheless, while the courts are required to decide on the basis of legal principles, 
undoubtedly they are influenced by ethical principles more or less consciously.341 It was 
recognised by Lord Coleridge over a hundred years ago that ‘it would not be correct to say 
that every moral obligation involves a legal duty; but every legal duty is founded on a moral 
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obligation. A legal common law duty is nothing else than the enforcing by law of that which 
is a moral obligation without legal enforcement.’342 
The potential conflict between ethical and legal principles has been specifically considered 
by some case law. A notable example is Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical 
Separation).343 The case involved conjoined twins, where J was stronger than M and could 
live independently but M relied on the organs of her sister. Medical evidence showed that, 
if the twins were left as they were, M’s demands on J’s body would strain J, so both would 
die. However, if the separation operation was performed, M would inevitably die, whereas 
for J there was a strong chance to stay alive independently. The children’s parents refused 
to give consent for the operation. Doctors then sought a court declaration that it would be 
lawful to operate on the conjoined twins. The declaration was granted by the High Court but 
the decision was appealed. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.344 It has been said that 
in Re A the question of both medicine and ethics came together before a court of law.345 
Ward LJ has observed the difficulty of the issue; he stated that: 
‘I freely confess to having found it exceptionally difficult to decide—difficult 
because of the scale of the tragedy for the parents and the twins, difficult for the 
seemingly irreconcilable conflicts of moral and ethical values and difficult 
because the search for settled legal principle has been especially arduous and 
conducted under real pressure of time.’346 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged the matter of ethics in the case, but sought to distance 
itself from the ethical debates.347 Thus, the focus of the Court of Appeal was to say that it 
was considering the matter on the legal principles not on ethical principles, as Ward LJ held 
that:  
‘It is, however, important to stress the obvious. This court is a court of law, not 
of morals, and our task has been to find, and our duty is then to apply, the relevant 
principles of law to the situation before us—a situation which is quite unique.’348 
Further, in relation to the matter which the Court of Appeal was considering, Ward LJ has 
made the position of the court clear as he has stated that: ‘Deciding disputed matters of life 
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and death is surely and pre-eminently a matter for a court of law to judge. That is what courts 
are here for.’349 
Nevertheless, although Ward LJ seems very clearly to hold the view that law should not be 
engaged in making decisions on ethical rather than legal principles, Brazier and Ost have 
claimed that Ward LJ in his distinction between law and ethics was misleading himself. They 
have stated that: ‘The Court of Appeal in Re A was, like it or not, a court of morals.’350 
Brazier and Ost then have argued that: ‘But in its [the Court of Appeal] moral reasoning, 
bioethics played a role subsidiary to that of older and more generalised notions of morals 
and moral philosophy, and even theology.’351 
In conclusion, it can be said that, although the UK courts may stress that their roles are to 
ground the judgment on legal principles rather than ethical principles, it is impossible to 
entirely divorce law from ethical considerations since they deal with all issues of life about 
which an ethical perspective can always be taken. Thus, the courts may be in a position 
where they are able to choose what is the most appropriate principle or view that they should 
adopt, or to develop the law in order to reflect changing social views, including views on 
ethics. It is interesting to note here that in fact, such conflict and tension between ethics and 
law would not occur in Saudi Arabian courts, as the sources and foundations for both ethics 
and laws are the same (Islamic Sharia). This will be explored in Chapters two and four. 
Arguably, as will be discussed in Chapter three it seems that the UK courts in recent times 
have begun to pay more attention to some of the medical ethics principles, for example 
respect for patient autonomy. This may be illustrated by a significant change in the way 
English courts protect the patient’s autonomy through the law relating to information 
disclosure.  
Thus, it can be said that English law is not unaware of the need to consider ethical 
principles.352 One of the notable cases for this thesis is Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital 
Governors.353 Sidaway dealt with the issue of the proper legal standard for information 
disclosure which raised an issue that had become increasingly important in medical ethics, 
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the principle of respect for patient autonomy.354 Miola has noticed that the issue of 
information disclosure was significant in Sidaway because: firstly, in 1985 when the 
judgment of Sidaway was pronounced ‘...it might have been expected that the medical ethics 
renaissance would have started to have had an effect on the courts.’355 Secondly, it was for 
the first time that the House of Lords in Sidaway ‘...has dealt with a non-negligence case, 
and the issue was, in substance if not in form, more concerned with ethics than technical 
medical practice.’356 As will be discussed in depth in Chapter three, the majority of judges 
in Sidaway paid attention to consider the notion of patients’ self-determination to be 
informed. 
Sidaway set out a number of different approaches that the law could adopt to setting the 
standard of information disclosure, which will be discussed in the Chapter three. However, 
it is worth noting here that this case was subsequently used to support an approach to 
information disclosure based on a professional standard, with liability largely depending on 
evidence from the profession about what information ought to be disclosed. It will be argued 
that since this case was heard, as in medical ethics, the law has shown an increased support 
for the principle of respect for autonomy in determining the duties of the medical profession. 
This can be seen, for example in Chester v Afshar.357 In this case, the judiciary placed greater 
emphasis on the importance of respect for patient autonomy, for example Lord Steyn cited 
in Chester Dworkin’s view in his book Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, 
Euthanasia and Individual Freedom,358 to emphasise and conclude His Lordship’s point of 
view regarding respect for the patient’s autonomy. 
Finally, in the most recent significant case on information disclosure, Montgomery, it will 
be argued that respect for patient autonomy has become even more central and this has led 
the law to change its stance on the information disclosure standard, by moving from a 
professional based standard to a more patient-centred standard.359 Therefore, it can be said 
that the principle of respect for autonomy which has come to be central in medical ethics has 
also come to be regarded as central to the development of the approach of English law to 
information disclosure. It has been observed that consent to medical treatment not only has 
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an ethical role in medical treatment but also has an important legal role.360 This is due to the 
fact that ‘...rules about the provision of consent are a method of providing for the protection 
of the autonomy of the individual’.361 Nevertheless, as will be discussed in Chapter three, 
there may still be a gap between what respect for autonomy might require in terms of the 
ethical ideal standard that has been proposed in this Chapter and what standard the law could 
and does impose. Based on the conclusions of this Chapter and Chapter three, Chapters two 
and four, will argue that Saudi Arabia can also develop its laws to protect patient autonomy 
better, but at the same time it needs respect its own ethical and religious traditions. 
5. Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I have presented a discussion of ethical principles from a Western 
perspective, particularly the principle of respect for autonomy and the notion of trust. This 
discussion has been provided in order to establish the basis for an examination of how 
English law has considered respect for the principle of autonomy in term of patients’ consent 
and information disclosure. This Chapter has addressed the theoretical basis for the 
autonomy principle and at its development and application in the area of medical practice. 
This has demonstrated that the principle of respect for autonomy, as discussed in medical 
ethics, has been strongly influenced by philosophical writings, such as those of Kant and 
Mill. It has been argued that, although the concept of autonomy remains subject to differing 
interpretations, it is a fundamental concern of medical ethics and it has assumed particular 
significance in recent medical ethics discussion. The principle of respect for autonomy 
places ethical duties on doctors to respect patients’ choices and to provide patients with 
understandable, sufficient and relevant information. Thus, the proposed ethical standard 
requires doctors to disclose sufficient and understandable information to enable a competent 
adult patient to be self-determining and to respect his/her autonomy. 
It has also shown that another approach to ethical duties in healthcare that is of relevance to 
provision of information is that of trust. There clearly is a relationship between trust and 
respect for autonomy, in that in order to be able to rely on information to arrive at choice, 
there needs to be an element of trust in the person providing information. Similarly, for a 
trust relationship to arise, it has been argued that this requires patients to feel that their wishes 
will be respected, although this is not a universally held view. However, the thesis has argued 
that the notion of trust as above discussed would not sufficiently protect patients, as despite 
																																								 																				
360S	McLean	and	G	Maher	Medicine,	Morals	and	the	Law	(Gower	1983)	p.	79.	
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attempts to re-evaluate the notion of trust, at its heart trust in this context relies on an 
imbalance of power. This imbalance is something that respect for autonomy can and, I argue 
should, be used to redress. It has been shown that Western medical ethics have moved away 
from a paternalistic approach to a more individualistic one based on a patient’s right to make 
treatment decisions, and this is an approach I endorse. Nevertheless, the thesis will revisit 
the principle of respect for autonomy and the notion of trust in the medical ethics context in 
Chapters two and four, to consider how Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian laws have 
interpreted them since it will be argued that has had an effect on the development of the legal 
approach to information disclosure and consent in Saudi Arabia.  
Finally, to provide a comparison between the way in which law has developed in Saudi 
Arabia and England, the major sources of English law have been outlined. The relationship 
between the ethical principle of respect for autonomy and the law’s approach to this in the 
area of information disclosure has also been introduced and this will be examined further in 
Chapter three.  
It will discuss how the principle of respect for autonomy has attained recognition as forming 
a central part of the legal responsibilities of doctors towards patients. This has been achieved 
through the legal doctrine of consent to medical treatment. Kennedy and Grubb have argued 
that the legal concept of consent is the law’s reflection of the ethical principle of respect for 
individual autonomy.362 It has been said that ‘[t]he law therefore hands the responsibility for 
protecting and enhancing patient autonomy to the doctrine of consent’.363 Indeed, as McLean 
observes, ‘[i]t might, therefore, reasonably be assumed that the growing acceptance of the 
value of autonomy has been paralleled and enhanced by an increased legal focus on a tightly 
drawn and coherent doctrine of consent....’364 The legal doctrine of consent, therefore, 
promotes patient autonomy by seeking to protect people from any physical intervention they 
have not agreed to.365 The competent adult is generally free to make a decision and act as he 
or she chooses, provided that his or her decisions do not cause significant harm to others in 
the eyes of the law, and that decision must be respected.366 In terms of medical treatment, 
this means that a legally valid consent to treatment must be obtained.367 It can be concluded 
that ‘the legal rules of consent are founded upon the right to autonomy and the principle of 
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(respect for) autonomy’.368 Nevertheless, the question remains: in what ways has English 
law recognised this principle of respect for autonomy? This will be considered in detail in 
the Chapter three, focusing on information disclosure. In the light of what has been argued 
are the central features of respect for autonomy in this Chapter, the extent to which the law 
provides adequate protection will be evaluated. But before turning to that, in the next Chapter 
the thesis will examine the same issues that have been discussed in this Chapter focusing on 
Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian law perspectives.  
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Chapter two: Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabia medical ethics and law 
1. Preface 
In Chapter one, the thesis discussed the issue of Western medical ethics in relation to 
competent adult patients’ consent and information disclosure. It was concluded that full 
information disclosure might seem be an ethical ideal to protect individual autonomy, but 
that it would be difficult to achieve in practice and may not, in any case, meet the intended 
aim. Therefore, I have proposed an ethical standard that requires doctors to disclose 
sufficient and understandable information to enable competent adult patients to be self-
determining and to respect their autonomy. This proposed ethical standard will be examined 
against English law in Chapter three and will be examined against Saudi Arabian medical 
law in Chapter four, to demonstrate whether the current legal standard of information 
disclosure in both jurisdictions can meet it. 
In this Chapter and Chapter four the thesis will consider the approaches that have been 
adopted in both Islamic Sharia (in respect of ethical principles) and Saudi Arabian law (in 
respect of legal obligations). An evaluation of whether Saudi Arabian ethical and legal 
approaches are different to those of Western ethics and English law will be made. Based on 
the conclusions reached, a proposal for developing Saudi Arabian law will be provided in 
the Concluding Chapter. As Islamic Sharia law permits some lessons to be learned from the 
approaches of other jurisdictions, provided that any changes are not in conflict with Islamic 
Sharia principles, the Concluding Chapter will assess what, if anything, Islamic Sharia law 
can learn from the English law experience. It should be noted that since the issue of 
information disclosure in medical treatment has not yet been widely discussed by Muslim 
scholars or in Saudi Arabian medical law, there are limited ethical and legal sources and 
references. Nevertheless, I have sought to gather such information as is available in both 
Arabic and English to present a comprehensive discussion and argument. The fact that the 
standard of care in information disclosure has suffered from a lack of consideration by 
Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian ethical and legal literature and regulations supports the 
point I have made that this area is one in need of examination.1 In fact, such an absence I 
contend also has led to confusion among patients, lawyers and doctors as to what should be 
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considered and disclosed and in consequence a lack of respect for a patients’ right to 
information. Thus, this issue should be discussed both to confirm that patients’ autonomy 
and right to information should be more recognised and protected, and to show what role 
law can play to safeguard patients’ rights by clarifying areas of doubt or insufficiency.  
In this Chapter, the thesis will address both the Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical 
ethics perspectives on the principle of respect for autonomy. Thus, in order to understand 
the context of Islamic Sharia and medical ethics principles it is necessary first to explain 
Islamic Sharia sources and the relationship between Islamic Sharia (as the supreme and 
principal source of the country’s culture and laws) and the Saudi Arabian legal system. After 
explaining this, the Chapter will turn to considering how that influence has been interpreted 
generally in terms of both medical ethics and laws in Saudi Arabia, and more specifically in 
relation to consent to treatment and information disclosure.  
2. Islamic Sharia 
In order to understand how Saudi Arabian law has been formulated and applied and how 
Islamic Sharia has dealt with medical ethics issues, the thesis will start by explaining Islamic 
Sharia’s sources and its relation to Saudi Arabian laws.  
2.1. An overview of Islamic Sharia 
To begin with, Islam as an Arabic term literally means submission to the will of Allah.2 The 
Islamic religion is one of the major religions in the world; it has been said that, ‘Islam 
continues to deeply influence the beliefs, values and customs’3 of almost 1.6 billion people 
around the world.4 Islam was founded by the Messenger Mohammad PBUH, who received 
the holy Quran from Allah. The holy Quran is believed by Muslims to contain Allah’s holy 
words.5 However, Islam is not only a religion that aims to provide guidance and instruction 
on how to worship Allah, it is also a set of advice and rules which are applicable to all of 
humanity as well as all daily activities of Muslims.6 Hence, ‘Islam is both a religion and a 
complete way of life. It is a universal religion comprising all nationalities of the world, 
holding no distinctions based on colour, race or ethnicity.’7 
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Sharia is an Arabic word which means the path or the way that the water is running through.8 
Therefore, as has been said, ‘water symbolises the source of life, so the Sharia represents 
the source of Muslim existence.’9 The term Islamic Sharia or Sharia includes all aspects of 
the Islamic religion, including worship, prayers, faith, ethics, laws and so forth.10 However, 
Islamic Sharia has primary, secondary and supplementary sources.11  
2.2. The two primary sources of Islamic Sharia 
Generally, the two primary sources of Islamic Sharia are applicable to almost all Islamic 
schools of thought. The foundation of Islamic Sharia is based on the two primary sources: 
the first is the holy Quran, which contains Allah’s words (6326 verses (Ayah) in 114 chapters 
(Surah)) and each chapter in the holy Quran is given a title.12 The holy Quran mainly deals 
with matters such as Islamic faith13 and worship,14 along with narratives about some 
sciences15 and different ancient religious and historical texts (such as the story of Judaism, 
and Christianity). The holy Quran in its entirety is not a codified law but around 500 verses 
of the holy Quran deal with what are regarded as legal rulings.16 Hence, the Quran, as 
Reinhart observed:  
‘[I]s a source of knowledge in the way that the entire corpus of legal precedent 
is for the common law tradition: not as much as an index of possible rulings as 
a quarry in which the astute inquirer can hope to find the building blocks for a 
morally valid, and therefore, true system of ethics.’17 
The other primary source of Islamic Sharia is the Messenger Mohammad’s PBUH traditions, 
called in Arabic Sunnah - the term in Arabic means ‘a clear path’. Sunnah contains his PBUH 
sayings and actions together with lessons implied from his silent or tacit approval.18 Allah in 
more than one verse in the holy Quran gives the authority to the Messenger PBUH Sunnah 
																																								 																				
8	B	Weiss	The	Spirit	of	Islamic	Law	(UGP	1998)	p.	17.	
9	A	Siddiqui	‘Ethics	in	Islam:	Key	Concepts	and	Contemporary	Challenges’	(1997)	26(4)	Journal	of	Moral	Education	423-
443	p.	425.	
10A	Borroni	and	C	Tabor	‘Caveat	Emptor’s	Current	Role	in	Louisiana	and	Islamic	Law:	Worlds	Apart	yet	Surprisingly	Close’	
(2009)	2	(1)	Civ.	L.	Stud	61-100	p.	65.	
11	For	example,	I	Nyazee	Outlines	of	Islamic	Jurisprudence	(Advance	legal	studies	institute	2010)	Chapter	II.	
12	A	Padel	‘Islamic	Medical	Ethics:	A	Primer.’	(2007)	21(3)	Bioethics	169-178	p.	175.	
13	The	holy	Quran	in	translation	for	example,	states	that:	‘the	Messenger	(Muhammad	SAW)	believes	in	what	has	been	
sent	down	to	him	from	his	Lord,	and	(so	do)	the	believers.	Each	one	believes	in	Allah,	His	Angels,	His	Books,	and	His	
Messengers.	They	say,	"We	make	no	distinction	between	one	another	of	His	Messengers"-	and	they	say,	"We	hear,	and	
we	obey.	(We	seek)	Your	Forgiveness,	our	Lord,	and	to	You	is	the	return	(of	all).’	(CH2:285).	
14	The	holy	Quran	in	translation	for	example,	states	that:	‘Be	firm	in	devotion;	give	Zakat	(the	due	share	of	your	wealth	
for	the	welfare	of	others),	and	bow	with	those	who	bow	(before	God).’	(CH2:43).	
15I	Ibrahim	A	Brief	Illustrated	Guide	to	Understanding	Islam	(2nded	Durussalam	1997)	p.	14-16.	For	example,	the	organ	of	
the	universe,	the	holy	Quran	in	translation	states:	‘Do	not	these	unbelievers	see	that	the	heavens	and	the	earth	were	an	
integrated	mass,	then	We	split	them	and	made	every	living	thing	from	water?	Will	they	not	believe	even	then?’	
(CH30:21).	
16	G	Bader	‘Islamic	Law:	Its	Relation	to	Other	Legal	Systems’	(1978)	26(2)	American	Journal	of	Comparative	Law	187-	198	
p.	188.	
17	A	Reinhart	‘Islamic	Law	as	Islamic	Ethics’	p.	189.	
18M	Kamali	Principles	of	Islamic	Jurisprudence	(The	Islamic	Texts	Society	2003)	p.	58.	
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as a source of Islamic Sharia. The holy Quran in translation states ‘...and accept [Muslims] 
whatever the Noble Messenger gives you; and refrain from whatever he forbids you....’.19 
The Messenger’s PBUH Sunnah was collected and recorded many years after his PBUH 
death by many Muslim scholars in several books, which were labelled and referred to by the 
name of the collector.20 The most famous authentic collections for Islamic Sunni schools 
(discussed below) are: Sahih Al Bukhari and Sahih Muslim.21 The name of these two books 
literally mean: Al Bukhari’s collection22 and Muslim’s collection.23 
In general, Sunnah works in accordance with the holy Quran in three major ways:24 (1) It 
may retell what has been mentioned in the holy Quran.25 (2) It may explain a range of verses 
in the holy Quran.26 (3) It may potentially and importantly encompass a ruling that the holy 
Quran is silent about.27 Therefore, both the holy Quran and the Sunnah ‘have constituted a 
foundational resource for Muslim beliefs, values and practices.’28 
Based on Reinhart’s statement above, I would argue that Islamic Sharia and English common 
law can learn and benefit from each other’s experiences although they have different origins. 
As we have already seen, Islamic Sharia has no barriers to learning and exchanging some 
ideas from other legal systems’ experiences so long as they are not in conflict with its basic 
principles. Similarly, English common law has benefited from some of Islamic Sharia 
experiences. For example, English common law has adjusted, adopted and applied some of 
Islamic Sharia legal aspects, Makdisi has argued that:  
‘The Islamic legal system was far superior to the primitive legal system of England 
before the birth of the common law. It was natural for the more primitive system to 
look to the more sophisticated one as it developed three institutions that played a 
major role in creating the common law. The action of debt, the assize of novel 
disseisin, and trial by jury introduced mechanisms for a more rational, sophisticated 
legal process that existed only in Islamic law at that time. Furthermore, the study of 
																																								 																				
19	The	holy	Quran	in	translation	(CH59:7).	
20	For	example,	M	Gulen	Messenger	of	God	Muhammad:	An	Analysis	of	the	Prophet’s	Life	(2nded	The	Fountain	2005)	
chapter	11.	
21	There	are	other	collections	for	Sunni	schools	such	as,	Sunan	Ibn	Majah,	Muwatta	Malik,	Sunan	Abi	Dawud	etc.	
22	M	AlBukhari	Sahih	Al	Bukhari	at	http://sunnah.com/bukhari	(accessed	25/06/2015).	
23	M	AlHajjaj	Sahih	Muslim	at	http://sunnah.com/muslim	(accessed	25/06/2015).	
24M	Kamali	Principles	of	Islamic	Jurisprudence	p.	81-84.	
25	For	example,	both	the	holy	Quran	and	the	Sunnah	prohibited	the	crime	of	theft.	
26	For	example,	the	holy	Quran	orders	Muslims	to	pay	Zakat.	Zakat	is	an	Islamic	religious	duty	to	pay	a	sum	of	money	
from	the	person’s	income	or	wealth	to	the	poor	each	year,	but	the	holy	Quran	does	not	explain	in	detail	the	
percentage,	how	it	should	be	collected,	from	which	kind	of	wealth	should	be	taken	and	so	forth.	The	Sunnah	defined	all	
of	that	in	detail.		
27	For	example,	Sunnah	stated	the	right	of	pre-emption	(Hiq	al	Shuf)	which	the	holy	Quran	remains	silent	about	it.		
28	A	Nanji	‘Medical	Ethics	and	the	Islamic	Tradition’(1988)	13	The	Journal	of	Medicine	and	Philosophy	257-275	p.	258.	
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the characteristics of the function and structure of Islamic law demonstrates its 
remarkable kinship with the common law in contrast to the civil law.’29  
He concludes: 
‘Finally, one cannot forget the opportunity for the transplant of these mechanisms 
from Islam through Sicily to Norman England in the twelfth century. Motive, 
method, and opportunity existed for King Henry II to adopt an Islamic approach to 
legal and administrative procedures. While it does not require a tremendous stretch 
of the imagination to envision the Islamic origins of the common law, it does require 
a willingness to revise traditional historical notions. ’30  
Further it has been argued that English common law has been influenced by some Islamic 
Sharia jurisprudence (Fiqh) books which have had an impact on English legal writers and 
legal principles, for example during the 18th and 19th centuries while India (where Islam and 
Islamic law have been practised for a long time) was under British colonisation, some 
English’s writers and legal principles in England have been influenced by the Islamic Hanafi 
school31 as result of the translation of a huge part of scholar Ali al-Marghinani’s book al-
Hiddaya al-Marghinani (The Hedaya)32 by Charles Hamilton.33 Those examples and others34 
show with no doubt some influences of Islamic Sharia on English common law.  
Clearly, there are some areas where Islamic Sharia and English law are unlike and cannot be 
in agreement such as the Islamic Sharia practice of punishment by death. Nonetheless, the 
focus here is on an area where both systems have traditionally applied the professional 
standard of care (in the UK, at least until the Montgomery case was decided)35 and therefore, 
historically, have been broadly in agreement with each other.  
For the purposes of this discussion, there are several interesting consequences of comparing 
and contrasting English and Saudi Arabian law in this area.  First, this permits an analysis of 
the rationale(s) for the reliance of both systems on the professional standard.  Second, 
analysis of the change of emphasis in English law allows exploration of the reasons for 
change and what influenced the Supreme Court’s decision. Whether or not the same (or 
similar) circumstances exist in Saudi Arabia will inform the extent to which, if at all, it would 
be feasible/acceptable to draft such a change into its law. The discussion in this Chapter of 
Sharia law and ethics will directly affect the concluding recommendations of the thesis. 
																																								 																				
29	J	Makdisi	‘The	Islamic	Origins	of	the	Common	Law’	(1999)	77	North	Carolina	Law	Review	1635-1740	p.	1731	
30	Ibid.	
31	See	the	school	definition	below	in	this	Chapter.		
32	J	Strawson	‘Islamic	Law	and	English	Texts’	(1996)	VI(1)	Law	and	Critique	21-38	p.	26-27.	
33Charles	Hamilton	(1752-1792)	http://www.newulsterbiography.co.uk/index.php/home/viewPerson/2072	(accessed	
24/02/2016)			
34	M	Gaudiosi	‘Influence	of	the	Islamic	Law	of	WAQF	on	the	Development	of	the	Trust	in	England:	The	Case	of	Merton	
College’.	
35	See	Chapter	three	for	further	discussion.		
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Thus, I would argue that to learn some lessons from other legal systems’ experiences is not 
simply to copy and paste their experiences or principles;  rather, it is to take the best from 
them to be investigated, shaped, adjusted where necessary into a form that can be adopted 
and transplanted by the recipient jurisdiction.36 Thus it can be said that it is not wrong or 
impractical to learn from other legal experiences.37 For example, Messenger Mohammad 
PBUH said: ‘A wise word is the lost property of the believer, so wherever he finds it, he has 
more right to it’.38 Thus, where there is a principle or law or a piece of information or 
knowledge that is worthy and good for Muslims whoever has stated it, it should be 
considered and accepted as long as it is not in conflict with Islamic Sharia basic principles.39  
One of the common areas between Islamic Sharia and common law is the way in which its 
principles develop.  As has been said in Chapter one, English law is a common law system 
which mainly relies on judges’ interpretation, reasoning and precedent. This system allows 
for discussion of the reasoning of individual judges and enables analysis of the rationale for 
their decisions. 
Arguably, this is similar to the way in which Muslim scholars study, investigate and consider 
an issue based on Islamic Sharia main sources. Those sources ‘actually cover only a small 
part, or outline some basic principles of norms and values’;40 the rest is left to the  
interpretation of Muslim scholars who identify the way to understand and apply Islamic 
Sharia in different situations.41  
Therefore, ‘[l]ike common law, Islamic law is not a written law. But whereas the rule of 
precedent makes common law a judicial law, the provisions of Islamic law are to be sought 
																																								 																				
36	For	example,	Saudi	Arabia	has	signed	the	Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	Discrimination	against	
Women,	with	some	reservations,	because	that	is	in	conflict	with	some	of	its	basic	principles,	
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm	(accessed	24/02/2016).	See	for	examples,	A	
Watson	Legal	Transplants:	An	Approach	to	Comparative	Law	(2nded	UGP	1993)	and	A	Watson	‘Legal	Change:	Sources	of	
Law	and	Legal	Culture’	(1983)	131(5)	University	of	Pennsylvania	Law	Review	1121-1157.		
37	See	for	example,	O	Kahn-Freund	‘On	Uses	and	Misuses	of	Comparative	Law’	(1974)	37(1)	The	Modern	Law	Review	1-
27.	R	Williams	‘Archbishop’s	lecture	-	Civil	and	Religious	Law	in	England:	a	Religious	Perspective’	
http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1137/archbishops-lecture-civil-and-religious-law-in-
england-a-religious-perspective	(accessed	24/02/2016),	C	Hope	and	J	Kirkup	‘Muslims	in	Britain	should	be	able	to	live	
under	sharia,	says	top	judge	[Lord	Phillips]’	The	Telegraph	(in	03	Jul	2008)	
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2242340/Muslims-in-Britain-should-be-able-to-live-under-Sharia-law-says-
top-judge.html	(accessed	24/02/2016)	and	J	Bingham	‘Islamic	law	is	adopted	by	British	legal	chiefs’	The	Telegraph	(in	22	
March	2014)	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/10716844/Islamic-law-is-adopted-by-British-legal-chiefs.html	
(accessed	25/02/2016).		
38	M	Majah	Sunan	Ibn	Majah	http://sunnah.com/urn/1343070	(accessed	25/02/2016).	
39	GPSRI	fatwa	no	21010	
http://www.alifta.net/fatawa/fatawaDetails.aspx?View=Page&PageID=10414&PageNo=1&BookID=3&languagename=	
(accessed	25/02/2016)	(Arabic).	
40	A	Siddiqui	‘Ethics	in	Islam:	Key	Concepts	and	Contemporary	Challenges’	p.	425.	
41	S	El-Fishawy	‘Contract	and	Litigation	in	Islamic	Law’	(1982)	76	Proceedings	of	the	Annual	Meeting	American	Society	of	
International	Law	62-65	p.	62.	
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first and foremost in the teachings of the authoritative jurists. It may therefore be called a 
lawyer’s law if common law is a judge’s law.’42 While this quotation points to the differences 
between the two systems, it also highlights the similarities, in that interpretation and 
reasoning are needed in order to reach an appropriate conclusion. Certainly, Islamic law 
relies quite heavily on statute, but where there are no clear rules it is for that interpretation 
and reasoning to resolve any problems. Scholars interpret the main sources of Islamic Sharia 
and then extract their views, understanding and analysis from the main sources like the 
‘astute inquirer’43 to establish and set Islamic Sharia principles that can be applied by 
Muslims or codified by a State.  
Muslim scholars since the third century onward have understood the holy Quran as a 
guidance which shows the way to set ethical principles; by using that guidance, scholars seek 
to identify an act which is ethically valid and provide them with knowledge for the 
assessment of the acts ‘the five rulings’.44 Therefore, to examine whether an act is religiously, 
legally and ethical valid, scholars search for an indication in the holy Quran which will set 
the right religiously, legal and ethical place for the act and allow the scholar to be informed 
about the act’s assessment.45 Additionally, Muslim scholars, beside applying the holy Quran, 
also apply the Messenger PBUH traditions as religious, legal and ethical guidance. Thus, 
both the holy Quran and the the Messenger’s traditions provide the basic principles and 
foundations of religious, legal and ethical guidance for Muslim scholars and the way that 
they set the Islamic Sharia  principles.46  
After the holy Quran and the Messenger’s PBUH Sunnah come (1) the secondary and (2) 
the supplementary sources of Islamic Sharia. The status and interpretation of these sources 
rely on the understanding of particular Islamic schools of thought. In order to appreciate why 
each Islamic school of thought has its own approach to secondary and supplementary 
sources, the main schools of thought will be outlined.  
2.3. Islamic schools of thought 
The secondary and supplementary sources of Islamic Sharia have developed during the 
history of Islam after the Messenger PBUH death. Their developments relied on Muslim 
scholars’ and jurists’ understanding and analysis of the primary sources of Islamic Sharia 
																																								 																				
42	G	Bader	‘Islamic	Law:	Its	Relation	to	Other	Legal	Systems’	p.	189.	
43	A	Reinhart	‘Islamic	Law	as	Islamic	Ethics’	p.	189.	
44	See	their	explanations	below	in	this	Chapter.	
45	A	Reinhart	‘Islamic	Law	as	Islamic	Ethics’	p.	191	
46	Ibid.	
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and how they are to be applied to new issues.47 Islam has many schools of thought but the 
ones followed most by Muslims are the Sunni school, then the Shiite school.48 
First, the Sunni school  gained its name due to its emphasis on the Messenger’s PBUH 
Sunnah (traditions).49 The Sunni school is followed by the majority of Muslims in the world 
and it bases its teaching and understanding on the holy Quran, Messenger’s PBUH traditions 
and what his companions said.50 Even within the Sunni school of thought, however, there 
are further divisions that apply their understanding broadly via two approaches. The first is 
known as the traditional approach, which firmly follows the Messenger’s PBUH traditions. 
If there is no statement in the holy Quran, scholars and jurists do not go beyond the primary 
sources.51 In other words, generally their view must be based on a statement from the holy 
Quran or Messenger’s PBUH traditions. Sunni schools following a traditional approach are: 
Maliki school, founded by scholar Malik ibn Anas (715-795),52 Shafii school, founded by 
scholar Mohammad AlShafii (767-820)53 and Hanbali school, founded by scholar Ahmad 
ibn Hanbal (780-855).54As will be explained later, it is the Hanbali school which has 
traditionally been followed in Saudi Arabia and which formed the basis of Saudi Arabian 
jurisprudence from the formation of the State, although it appears that the exclusive use of 
the Hanbali approach may now no longer represent the way that laws will be developed in 
the future. The other approach, which should be mentioned for comparison, is known as the 
eliciting and analogical school, which relies on scholars’ making arguments by analogy and 
by their understanding of and eliciting views about not only on the Islamic Sharia primary 
sources, but also on secondary sources.55 In other words, if there is no clear statement by the 
holy Quran or the Messenger’s PBUH traditions they apply their analogies to state their 
view regarding an issue. The Sunni school applying this approach is the Hanafi school, 
founded by scholar Abu Hanifah Numan ibn Thabit (702-767).56 
The second major school of thought is the Shiite school, which was formed based on the 
claim to support and follow the rule of the fourth Muslim Caliph, Ali ibn Abi Talib who 
																																								 																				
47	A	Philips	The	Evaluation	of	Fiqh:	Islamic	law	and	the	Madh-habs.	(International	Islamic	Publishing	House	2006)	at	73-
85.	
48	Most	of	the	other	are	minority	schools,	such	as	Batiniyya,	Qadiriyya,	Zahiri,	Zaidiyyah,	etc.	For	further	information,	P	
Bearman	The	Islamic	School	of	Law:	Evolution,	Devolution,	and	Progress	(Harvard	Series	in	Islamic	Law)	(HUP	2006)	
49	K	Armstrong	Islam	a	Short	History	(The	Modern	Library,	2002)	p.	63-65.	
50	Ibid.	
51	B	Weiss	‘The	Madhhab	in	Islamic	Legal	Theory’	in	P	Besrman,	R	Peters	and	F	Vogel	(ed.)	The	Islamic	School	of	Law	
Evolution,	Devolution	and	Progress.	(HUP	2005)	1-9	p.	2-5.	
52	For	further	detail	U	Abd-Allah	Malik	and	Medina:	Islamic	Legal	Reasoning	in	the	Formative	Period	(Brill	2012).	
53	A	Philips	The	evaluation	of	Fiqh:	Islamic	Law	and	the	Madh-habs.	p.157-158.	
54	For	further	detail	C	Melchert	Ahmad	ibn	Hanbal	(Oneworld	2006).	
55B	Weiss	‘The	Madhhab	in	Islamic	Legal	Theory’	p.	2-5.	
56	A	Philips	The	Evaluation	of	Fiqh:	Islamic	Law	and	the	Madh-habs.	p.	154-155.	
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ruled after the assassination of the third Caliph, Uthman Ibn Affan, in 656 until 661.57 The 
Shiite school strictly follows Imams58 drawn from Caliph Ali’s descendants and it is vital to 
the Shiite school to follow and respect those Imams and their views, as it is believed that 
those Imams are infallible, sinless and lawgivers.59 This Shiite perspective is one of the main 
differences between it and the Sunni school, as the Sunni school believes that only Allah’s 
Messengers (Moses, Jesus, Mohammad PBUH and so forth) are infallible, sinless and 
lawgivers, and no other people have that status. The Shiite school follows the holy Quran 
and Messenger’s PBUH traditions, but based on their own sources and how their Imams 
have interpreted them.60 The Shiite school has within it many schools of thought such as the 
Imamate school (twelve doctrines)61 and Ismailism school.62 
However, since Saudi Arabia is a majority Sunni country, it is not necessary to consider the 
divisions of the Shiite school in further detail. Instead, the following discussion on the 
secondary and supplementary sources of Islamic Sharia will focus on the Sunni school only. 
2.4. The Sunni secondary sources 
The secondary sources include what the majority of Sunni Muslim scholars agree on in 
respect of particular problems where there are no solutions for them in the primary sources. 
The tool for reaching agreement is through Ijma (consensus of opinion) and Qiyas 
(analogical reasoning). 
The question arises as to who can determine the secondary sources of Islamic Sharia. Under 
Islamic teachings and among Muslim society, a scholar (Mujtahed) has a great and noble 
reputation and is given immense respect as a result of his knowledge.63 It is believed that the 
scholar’s deep knowledge and experience that he has gained by studying Islamic Sharia in 
mosques, schools and universities and teaching it, qualifies him to understand matters which 
require a kind of personal reasoning or ‘utmost effort’ (Ijtihad).64 The scholar studies a new 
																																								 																				
57W	Ende	and	U	Steinbach	Islamin	the	World	Today:	A	Handbook	of	Politics,	Religion,	Culture,	and	Society	(Cornell	
university,	2010)	p.	12-15.	
58In	the	Shiite	school,	the	concept	‘Imams’	always	refers	to	the	Caliph	Ali’s	descendants.	In	the	Sunni	school	the	concept	
of	‘Imams’	is	a	much	broader	one	and	it	can	be	used	as	a	title	for	a	scholar,	prayer	leader,	ruler	etc.	
59M	Lippman,	S	McConville	and	M	Yerushalmi	Islamic	Criminal	Law	and	Procedure	(1sted	Praeger	1988)	p.	17-19.	
60	For	more	detail	about	Shiite	school	sources	and	ways	to	apply	Islamic	Sharia,	H	Nahim	The	Division	After	Prophet	
Muhammad	(Xlibris	Corporation,	2012).	
61	For	further	detail	J	Subhani	The	Doctrines	of	Shiism:	A	Compendium	of	Imami	Beliefs	and	Practices	translated	by	R	
Shah-Kazemi	(I.B.	Tauris	and	Co	Ltd,	2001).	
62	For	further	detail	F	Daftary	The	Ismailis:	Their	History	and	Doctrines	(1sted	CUP	1990).	
63	The	holy	Quran	in	translation	states	that	‘Allah	will	exalt	in	degree	those	of	you	who	believe,	and	those	who	have	
been	granted	knowledge...’	(CH58:11).	
64	A	Mujtahed	‘must	be	a	Muslim	and	a	competent	person	of	sound	mind	who	has	attained	a	level	of	intelligence	
competence	that	enables	him	to	form	an	independent	judgement.’	M	Kamali	Principles	of	Islamic	Jurisprudence.	p.	476.	
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matter and offers his opinion according to Islamic jurisprudence in cases which are not dealt 
with specifically by the holy Quran or the Messenger’s PBUH traditions. 
Having done so, the scholar issues a declaration on the matter. Thus, it can be said that a 
declaration is the tool or device that presents the Sunni Muslim scholars’ Ijtihad. Normally, 
Muslim scholars are answering a question that has been submitted to them and in this way 
issuing a declaration develops and formulates Islamic Sharia in different areas such as ethics 
and law.65 The concept of a declaration has an important role in Muslim communities and 
has been applied broadly as a source for comparative legal studies by researchers and 
commentators.66 Muslim scholars’ declarations can be applied as the secondary sources of 
Islamic Sharia when their declarations are accepted as Ijma or based on Qiyas, which then 
become part of the law of the community and would be incorporated as part of the Sharia.67 
It should be noted that, if a declaration (fatwa) is issued by a single scholar to enforce or 
declare a principle that has been already stated by the holy Quran or the Messenger PBUH 
traditions or Ijma or Qiyas (for example, if the declaration (fatwa) says stealing other’s goods 
is a crime of theft), in this case the fatwa should be followed because it is just an enforcement 
of an established principle. On the other hand, if the fatwa is issued by a single scholar on a 
matter that has no clear reference in the holy Quran or the Messenger PBUH traditions or 
Ijma or Qiyas, in this case his fatwa should not be strictly followed; it is a subject for debate 
and it can be overruled or changed by the scholar himself or challenged by other scholars. 
For example, before the consensus (Ijma) of the majority of Muslim scholars in the 1970s 
and 1980s to legalise organ donation and transplantation, there were different fatawa among 
scholars on these practices. This was because there was no straightforward reference for the 
lawfulness or unlawfulness for this new matter in the holy Quran or the Messenger PBUH 
traditions or Ijma or Qiyas. Hence, a single fatwa could be the subject of debate and 
challenge. However, once there was a consensus (Ijma), organ donation and transplantation 
are regarded as legal, since the majority agreement on this.68 
Accordingly, a single fatwa for a matter where there is no reference for it in holy Quran or 
the Messenger PBUH traditions or Ijma or Qiyas, can be challenged and changed by other 
scholars. Therefore, this differentiation and the use of the terms majority consensus (Ijma) 
																																								 																				
65	A	Padela	‘Medical	Ethics	in	Religious	Traditions:	A	Study	of	Judaism,	Catholicism,	and	Islam’	(2006)	38	JIMA	106-117	p.	
114.	
66Ibid.	
67	D	Pearl	A	TextBook	on	Muslim	Law	(2nded	Croom	Helm	Ltd	1987)	p.	14.	See	also	G	Hourani	‘The	Basis	of	Authority	of	
Consensus	in	Sunnite	Islam’	(1964)	21	Studia	Islamica	13-60.	
68	For	further	discussion,	D	Atighetch,	Islamic	Bioethics:	Problems	and	Perspectives.	(Springer,	Vol	31	2009)	p.	161-197.	
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or a single scholar’s view should be borne in mind throughout this thesis. To complete the 
picture of Islamic Sharia sources the following part will discuss further the circumstances 
where Muslim scholars’ views should be followed and cannot be changed.  
1. Ijma (consensus of opinion) 
Ijma is the consensus of the majority of qualified Muslim scholars regarding new legal, 
ethical, and other issues.69 There are two approaches to identifying whether the resolution of 
an issue has been made by Ijma: it is either found that there has been a resolution in the 
scholarly heritages as they have agreed on one view on the same issue and that agreement 
has been recognised.70 Alternatively, it may be considered to have been resolved through 
recently developed Islamic institutions; famous institutions now include the Al Azhar 
Mosque in Egypt, the GPSRI in Saudi Arabia, and the International Islamic Fiqh Academy 
(IIFA). However, of most relevance to this thesis is the role of the GPSRI and the IIFA. The 
GPSRI is the highest religious authority in Saudi Arabia. It was established in 1971 and it is 
responsible for issuing religious declarations in regard to a religious or a legal issue that has 
been submitted to it by the King’s office or other authorities etc. The GPSRI’s declarations 
can be enforced as a legal rule if the government has adopted them. I will revisit the GPSRI’s 
role for legislation in Saudi Arabia later on in this Chapter. The IIFA was established in 1981 
in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, and it is composed of a scholar from each Islamic country and a 
country that has Muslims as a minority.71 One of the IIFA’s aims is to make a study of new 
matters that arise for all Muslims and which require Muslim scholars to issue a declaration 
based on the majority consensus.72 In relation to this research, the thesis will use declarations 
that are issued by Saudi Arabia GPSRI as the highest religious authority in the country. It 
will also use the IIFA declarations as they are widely acknowledged in the country. 
However, although the procedure of Ijma is to apply the Islamic Sharia to new legal or 
ethical matters that have arisen, the majority of Muslim scholars have to consider them and 
establish their views and they must search first for an answer in the holy Quran.73 If there is 
no clear statement in it, they have to search through the Messenger’s PBUH traditions. If 
there is no clear sign there either, they then must apply their knowledge and understanding 
and agree on a consensus view, ensuring that view does not conflict with other Islamic basic 
																																								 																				
69M	Kamali	Principles	of	Islamic	Jurisprudence	p.	228-232.	
70M	Farooq	Toward	Our	Reformation:	From	Legalism	to	Value-Oriented	Islamic	Law	and	Jurisprudence	(The	
international	Institute	of	Islamic	Thought	2011)	p.	141-167.	
71	E	Ihsanoglu	The	Islamic	World	in	the	New	Century:	The	Organisation	of	the	Islamic	Conference,	1969-2009	(1sted	C	
Hurst	&	Co	Publishers	Ltd	2010)	p.	91-93.	
72	Ibid.	
73	A	Reinhart	‘Islamic	Law	as	Islamic	Ethics’	p.	190-191.	
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principles.74 Thereafter, that view, agreed by the majority of Muslim scholars 
(Mujtahedeen), becomes a common principle adopted by Muslim nations. It must be 
respected by Muslims and cannot be changed.75 
2. Qiyas (analogical reasoning) 
Qiyas – a singular word – means comparing something to something else that has the same 
characteristics. If there is no clear statement in the holy Quran or the Messenger’s PBUH 
traditions, or there is no Ijma, Muslim scholars have to identify a ‘correlation with an already 
accepted norm.’76 For example, the holy Quran states that the use of wine is prohibited;77 
therefore, as substances such as heroin or cannabis cause the same kind of intoxicating 
condition, based on the principle of Qiyas, these kinds of drugs are banned.78 However, a 
Qiyas is different from Ijma as follows: 1) Qiyas can be issued by one scholar or more, 
whereas Ijma has to be issued by a majority of Muslim scholars, 2) Qiyas is a way to classify 
or accommodate a new case within an old or existing approach to an issue which has the 
same character, but Ijma is for establishing or introducing a new rule to Islamic Sharia.79 
However, Qiyas like Ijma must be respected and cannot be changed.80 
After having discussed the secondary sources of Sunni Islamic Sharia (Ijma and Qiyas), now 
an outline of supplementary sources and principles will be presented: 
2.5. The Sunni supplementary sources 
These sources are also considered and applied by Muslim scholars when making their 
declarations (Fatawa).  
1. Revealed laws preceding the Islamic Sharia. This source of Islamic Sharia shows that 
Islam has a relationship to previous divine beliefs, specifically Judaism and Christianity; 
many verses in the holy Quran have established this, such as in the areas of crimes and 
punishments, where the holy Quran in translation declares: 
‘And there (in the Torah [Bible]) We [Allah] had ordained for them a life for a 
life, and an eye for an eye, and a nose for a nose, and an ear for an ear, and a 
tooth for a tooth, and for wounds retribution, though he who forgoes it out of 
																																								 																				
74M	Kamali	Principles	of	Islamic	Jurisprudence	p.	231-232.	
75	A	Siddiqui	‘Ethics	in	Islam:	Key	Concepts	and	Contemporary	Challenges’	p.	426	and	M	Kamali	Principles	of	Islamic	
Jurisprudence	p.	232.	
76	A	Siddiqui	‘Ethics	in	Islam:	Key	Concepts	and	Contemporary	Challenges’	p.	426.	
77	The	holy	Quran	in	translation	states	that:	‘O	People	who	Believe!	Wine	(all	intoxicants),	and	gambling,	and	idols,	and	
the	darts	are	impure	–	the	works	of	Satan,	therefore	keep	avoiding	them	so	that	you	may	succeed.’	(CH5:90).	
78	A	Siddiqui	‘Ethics	in	Islam:	Key	Concepts	and	Contemporary	Challenges’	p.	426.	
79M	Lippman,	S	McConville	and	M	Yerushalmi	Islamic	Criminal	Law	and	Procedure	p.	31-32.	
80	M	Kamali	Principles	of	Islamic	Jurisprudence	p.298-301.	
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charity, atones for his sins. And those who do not judge by God’s revelations are 
unjust.’81 
2. Every declaration issued by the Messenger’s PBUH companions after the Messenger’s 
PBUH death regarding any matters that have not been addressed by Islamic Sharia primary 
sources. For example, there was only one call for Muslims to attend the speech and prayer 
for Friday prayer (Jumuah) which was set by the Messenger PBUH. Caliph Uthman Ibn 
Affan, one of the Messenger’s PBUH closest companions, who ruled from 644 to 655 (many 
years after the Messenger’s PBUH death), added a first call to be performed an hour before 
the existing one.82 The reason for the additional call was to give plenty of time to Muslims 
who are far away from the mosques or at work to be prepared and enabled to gather with 
those who are already in the mosque to listen to the speech then pray.83 This declaration set 
by Caliph Uthman is still in practice and regarded as obligatory. 
3. Istihsan (equity in Islamic law) means for Muslim scholars the need to find a just solution 
for a new matter that has no reference in the Islamic Sharia primary sources.84 
4. Maslahah Mursalah (consideration of public interest), such as the establishment of 
taxation on foreign goods, to protect local producers.85 
5. Urf (custom) are ‘recurring practices that are acceptable to people of sound nature’,86 such 
as the system of Diyah (blood money), which existed before the Islamic era and has been 
adopted by Islamic Sharia with some amendments.87 
6. Istishab (presumption of continuity), such as the continuation of the validity of a contract 
between parties which has been established for a long time, unless they – or one of them –
have proven that the contract is no longer valid.88 
7. Sadd al-Dharai (blocking the means), which basically means banning a lawful action in 
order to prevent an illegal action, such as control of some types of trades;89 for example, 
selling grapes to wine producers: Without the rule of Sadd al-Dharai, selling grapes to wine 
producers would be lawful, but because making and using alcohol are illegal for Muslims 
																																								 																				
81	The	holy	Quran	in	translation	(CH5:45).	
82	Scholar	Abdalziz	bin	Baz	(Q&A)	at	http://www.binbaz.org.sa/node/1322	(accessed	26/06/2015)	(Arabic).	
83	Ibid.	
84	A	Yacoub	The	Fiqh	of	Medicine	Response	in	Islamic	Jurisprudence	to	Development	in	Medical	Science	p.	26.	
85M	Kamali	Principles	of	Islamic	Jurisprudence	p.	351.	
86Ibid.	p.	396.	
87A	Yacoub	The	Fiqh	of	Medicine	Response	in	Islamic	Jurisprudence	to	Development	in	Medical	Science	p.	26.	
88M	Kamali	Principles	of	Islamic	Jurisprudence	p.384.	
89Ibid.	p.397.	
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under Islamic Sharia, Muslims should not support those who make it by selling them 
grapes.90 
It will be seen that Islamic Sharia has a rich and wide range of sources that have been used 
to establish principles to govern and guide Muslims. It relies on long respected beliefs and 
traditions but also allows for principles to be adapted and developed, provided that this does 
not conflict with core values. After having presented Islamic Sharia sources, based on the 
Sunni school, and explained the possibility that Islamic Sharia can learn some lessons from 
English law experiences, the discussion can now turn to considering how Islamic Sharia has 
influenced Saudi Arabian law and how it is relevant to the formation and development of 
Saudi Arabian laws. 
3. The relationship between Islamic Sharia and the Saudi Arabian’s legal system 
3.1. A historical background 
The current Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established on 1932,91 on the Arabian Peninsula, 
the birthplace of Islam. It is where the divine book, the holy Quran, was revealed to the 
Messenger PBUH, who was born, became a messenger, died and was buried in this area.92 
Saudi Arabia contains the two holiest places for all Muslims: the holy city of Makkah 
alMukarrama, which has the grand mosque, and the holy city of alMadinah alMunawwarah, 
which has the Messenger’s PBUH home, mosque, and burial place.93 As the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia is such a place of holiness for Islam, it is not surprising that ‘[t]he legal system 
of Saudi Arabia is an exceptional one in the world of Islam, where the Sharia is applied’.94 
This is illustrated by the fact that, on the day of its establishment, the founder of the current 
Kingdom (King Abdulaziz Al-Saud95) declared that the Kingdom would be driven by, and 
would conduct itself according to, the teachings of the Islamic Sharia.96 King Abdulaziz 
selected one of the Islamic Sunni schools, the Hanbali school, to be the main authority for 
Saudi Arabia’s lawmakers and for its judicial system.97 Therefore, since that time, most of 
																																								 																				
90For	example,	GPSRI	declaration	no	17853	at	
http://www.alifta.net/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&PageNo=1&FromMoeasrID=1103
7&PageID=4643&BookID=7	(accessed	25/06/2015).	
91J	Wynbrandt	A	Brief	History	of	Saudi	Arabia	(2nded	Infobase	Publishing	2010)	p.	187.	
92Ibid.	p.	24.	
93	S	Almubarakpuri	The	Sealed	Nectar	-	Biography	of	the	Noble	Messenger	-	p.71,	86	and	558.	
94R	Peters	Crime	and	Punishment	in	Islamic	LawTheory	and	Practice	from	the	Sixteenth	to	the	Twenty-First	Century	
(1sted	CUP	2005)	p.	184.	
95	King	Abdul	Aziz	was	born	in	1876,	and	in	1932	he	established	the	Kingdom.	He	died	in	1953.	‘History	of	The	Kingdom	
of	Saudi	Arabia’	at	
http://www.mofa.gov.sa/sites/mofaen/ServicesAndInformation/aboutKingDom/Pages/CountryDevelopment36143.asp
x		(accessed	11/09/2015).	
96M	Hanson	‘The	Influence	of	France	Law	on	the	Legal	Development	of	Saudi	Arabia’	p.	274.	
97	G	Wash	‘Islamic	Law	in	Saudi	Arabia:	What	Foreign	Attorney’s	Should	Know’	(1991)	25	Journal	of	International	
Economic	Law	131-170	p.	141.	
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Saudi Arabia’s written laws and principles were based on and applied according to the 
Hanbali school of thought.98 Notwithstanding that, it could be argued that the policy of Saudi 
Arabian lawmakers has slightly changed recently. The BLG1992 did not mention a specific 
Islamic school of thought, but stated that: ‘Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
derives its authority from the Book of God and the Sunnah of the Messenger (PBUH), which 
are the ultimate sources of reference for this Law and the other laws of the State’.99 This 
approach can also be seen in the Law of Procedure before Sharia Courts 2013 (LPSC2013): 
‘Courts shall apply to cases before them provisions of Sharia laws, in accordance with the 
Quran and Sunnah of the Messenger and laws promulgated by the State that do not conflict 
with the Quran and Sunnah…’.100 It appears from this that Saudi Arabian legislators and 
courts are not restricted to applying a specific Islamic Sunni school of thought and can apply 
views from any Islamic Sunni school, not only from the Hanbali tradition.101 It also remains 
the case as a matter of general principle in Saudi Arabia that, in the event that no written 
laws or acts deal with specific or general matters, the courts and regulators have to apply 
Islamic Sharia sources.102 Therefore, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its people, heritage, 
culture, laws, and literature are hugely influenced and shaped by Islamic Sharia. Islamic 
Sharia is, therefore, the foundation that inspires and characterises the country and the Saudi 
Arabian nation.103 
3.2. Legislative bodies and procedures in Saudi Arabia 
There are several methods to enact, repeal and amend legislation in Saudi Arabia. As I have 
mentioned in the thesis introduction, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, the King of 
Saudi Arabia, has enormous power. Accordingly, the first way to enact, repeal or amend any 
laws in the country is by a Royal Order issued by the King, by the authority of the King as 
the head of the State.104 The second way to issue or amend or repeal a law or adopt 
international or regional treaties or declarations starts with the Saudi Arabian legislative 
bodies (Council of Ministers and Shura Council)105 proposing a bill or an amendment to a 
																																								 																				
98A	Alghadyan	‘The	Judiciary	in	Saudi	Arabia’	(1998)	13(3)	Arab	Law	Quarterly	235-251	p.	235.	
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105	The	Shura	Council	members	are	appointed	by	the	King	for	four	years	term	(their	memberships	can	be	renewed	for	
further	term/s).	The	current	Shura	Council	members	are	150,	20%	of	them	are	women.		Shura	Council	Law	1992	
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(accessed	12/09/2015).	
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current Act.106 If the bill is proposed by the Shura Council, it has to be transferred to the 
Council of Ministers for discussion. Once both Councils agree, the bill will be approved by 
a Royal Decree, by the King’s authority, as he is the Prime Minster.107 However, if the 
Council of Ministers proposes a bill or an amendment there is no need to send it to the Shura 
Council for discussion; the bill only requires the King’s (as the Prime Minster) Decree to 
become a valid Act.108 If the views of both Councils conflict, the bill is returned to the Shura 
Council for further reconsideration or amendment, and then the bill will be sent to the King 
(as the Prime Minster) to take the final decision regarding the approval of the bill by Royal 
Decree.109 After the Act is approved, it must be published in the official gazette and comes 
into force after the period specified in the Act.110 Throughout this procedure, the bill must 
be reviewed and read with regard to Islamic Sharia.111 
In addition, the GPSRI, established in 1971,112 is the supreme religious organisation in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, headed by the Mufti (the Head of Saudi Arabian scholars) and its 
21 members, who are all appointed by the King.113 It is responsible for both religious 
research and studies and for formulating declarations (fatawa).114 Nonetheless, the GPSRI 
is not a regular part of the Saudi Arabian legislative authorities, but it can participate in the 
legislative process for enacting a law or amending one that has been approved by the King 
or adopted by other authorities.115 As a result, it can be said that the GPSRI is always 
involved in legal and ethical issues116 and, as will be seen, it has played a vital role in setting 
and regulating many medical legal and ethical principles. Most of them have been directly 
adopted with no reservation117 by the Saudi Arabian legislative authorities and become a 
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position	was	separated	in	the	government	reform	in	the	beginning	of	the	1970s.	Then	in	1994	the	position	of	Mufti	
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113BLG	1992	article	58.	
114Ibid.	article	45.	
115A	Allami	‘Zakat	as	Islamic	Taxation	and	its	Application	in	the	Contemporary	Saudi	Legal	System’	(2009)	5	JISPIL	8-110	
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116A	Baamier	Sharia	Law	in	Commercial	and	Banking	Arbitration	(MGP	book,	2010)	p.	28-30.	
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part of Saudi Arabian medical regulations,118 which will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter four. 
Nonetheless, the legal system of Saudi Arabia is based on legislation and codification that 
has been formulated in accordance with Islamic Sharia principles. There has not been a 
tradition of case law precedent in terms of establishing, developing or reforming existing 
Acts or principles.119 However, in 2007 the King enacted the current120 LJ2007121 and 
LBG2007122 which established the Supreme Court123 and the Administrative Supreme 
Court124 in the Board of Grievances.125 Based on both Acts, arguably there is now room for 
applying case law precedent in Saudi Arabia, as the thesis will explain. 
Saudi Arabia has a dual judicial system, where there are, firstly, Sharia (general) courts for 
any criminal, or family affairs, civil, commercial and similar disputes and secondly, the 
Board of Grievances (administrative courts) for any cases that the government or its 
administrative bodies are part of.126 In both Sharia courts and Board of Grievances, there 
are; first degree courts, Courts of Appeal and Supreme Courts.127 Additionally there are 
many Quasi-Judicial committees. The reason for quasi-judicial committees’ existence is a 
historical one as some judges in Sharia courts in the 1960s and 1970s baulked at applying 
government regulations in certain areas, holding that Islamic Sharia should not be codified 
in legislation.128 Thus, to avoid this contretemps, the government authorised quasi-judicial 
committees to act as courts when necessary.129 Although such reservations by most judges 
have disappeared, quasi-judicial committees are still in use. One type is significant for this 
thesis, which is the SMPs, which will be discussed in Chapter four. Some quasi-judicial 
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committees also have their appeals heard before quasi-judicial committees, such as the 
Appellate Custom Committees, that hear appeals by parties in relation to the decision of the 
first degree Custom Committees.130 However, for other of the quasi-judicial committees the 
judgments may be appealed against at the Administrative Court of Appeal in the Board of 
Grievances. The SMPs is one of those committees where appeal lies to the Administrative 
Court of Appeal in the Board of Grievances.131 
In term of the courts’ authority to set general principles that can be applied as a law, that 
authority is given by the relevant Acts to the Supreme Court and the Administrative Supreme 
Court only. Both Courts are located separately in the capital city, Riyadh.132 Each Court is 
composed of a President133 and 10 other judges, all drawn from the position of the head of a 
Court of Appeal.134 Both Courts have authority as Cassation Courts,135 and as the 
Constitutional Courts.136 Furthermore, the general panel of the Supreme Court has a 
particular duty to ‘...establish general principles on matters related to the judicial 
system...’.137 The Administrative Supreme Court has the same power to set general 
principles that are related to administrative laws and cases and these must be followed and 
applied by lower administrative courts.138 
This makes it plain that the LJ2007 and LBG2007 have granted both the Supreme Court and 
the Administrative Supreme Court (in the Board of Grievances) the power to establish legal 
principles, which must be followed and applied by the lower courts, so in that sense both 
Courts can participate in establishing law in Saudi Arabia.139 Thus, it may suggest that Saudi 
Arabia’s legal system may now apply precedent law as part of its development or 
establishment of the law. Nonetheless, I would argue that as the country traditionally relies 
on legislation, the application of the doctrine of precedent might be used in very rare cases, 
as it is not very common for a case to reach the Supreme Court or the Administrative 
Supreme Court (in the Board of Grievances). Furthermore, as I have mentioned in the thesis 
Introduction, a Royal Order established a committee at the beginning of 2015 to translate 
Islamic Sharia principles into legal codes, so this may also suggest that the use of precedent 
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is expected to be very limited. Finally, it is rare for medical law cases to reach the 
Administrative Supreme Court (in the Board of Grievances), thus to rely on this court to 
develop medical law is not likely to be a practical proposition. 
In conclusion, the Chapter so far has presented Islamic Sharia principles, sources and the 
possibilities for Islamic Sharia to learn some lessons from English law experiences. 
Additionally, the Chapter has argued that Muslim scholars have a vital role to set Islamic 
Sharia principles based on their understanding of Islamic Sharia main sources. Scholars’ 
views are vital to determine the classification of an act whether it is allowed or not, thus their 
views become legally binding and a source of Islamic Sharia as discussed above in Ijma 
(consensus of opinion) for example. Therefore, Muslim scholars’ views and understandings 
are fundamental (in a way similar to precedent), such as the establishment and the application 
of the five rulings to determine the permissibility of an action as this thesis will show 
throughout its discussion in this Chapter and Chapter four. 
Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s legislative bodies and process and the court system have been 
addressed. From the foregoing, it is clear that Saudi Arabia is bound by Islamic Sharia laws 
and principles and it has the ultimate authority above all other Saudi Arabian regulations. In 
comparison with English sources of law, which I discussed in Chapter one, it is clear English 
law in its formulation and development is traditionally based on common law although 
legislation has also played an increasing part in establishing and developing it. However, 
Saudi Arabia’s legal system is based on Islamic Sharia and legislation, although there is a 
very limited prospect for the use of the legal doctrine of precedent developed through the 
Supreme Court or the Administrative Court (in the Board of Grievance). The implications 
of this are that although English law has developed its legal principles concerning 
information disclosure through case law, the same approach is unlikely to be useful - at least 
at the present time - in Saudi Arabia and it is for this reason that a legislative solution to the 
perceived deficiencies in medical law will be proposed for this country.  
This part of the thesis has outlined the relationship between Islamic Sharia and the legal 
system of Saudi Arabia. Islamic Sharia therefore has considerable importance in that context 
as a foundation for all Saudi Arabian law, including that which relates to medical practice. 
However, before turning to discuss medical law further in Chapter four it is necessary to 
consider the relationship between Islamic Sharia and ethical principles. In what comes next, 
the thesis will discuss the issue of the principles that form the basis of medical ethics from 
both an Islamic Sharia and more specifically a Saudi Arabian perspective. It will focus on 
how the approach of Islamic Sharia to the principle of respect for autonomy has contributed 
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to the understanding of medical ethics and the obligations of doctors and patients in Saudi 
Arabia and, in consequence, how it is relevant to consent to medical treatment and 
information disclosure. The conclusion of this Chapter will lead to a discussion of Islamic 
Sharia and Saudi Arabia’s legal approach to consent and information disclosure in Chapter 
four.  
4. Islamic Sharia on medical ethics 
It is evident that the influence of Islamic Sharia on Saudi Arabian daily life, legal system 
and laws is considerable. This is because it has been said that what Islamic Sharia states both 
ethically and legally is what Saudi Arabia must apply and acknowledge.140 Therefore, in the 
following the thesis will address the issue of the sources of principles relevant to medical 
ethics in Islamic Sharia. It will then go on to examine the principle of respect for personal 
autonomy in the medical context. 
4.1. The foundation of Islamic Sharia medical ethics 
Islamic Sharia, specifically the holy Quran and the Messenger’s PBUH traditions, plays an 
essential role in all aspects of all Muslims’ lives.141 In terms of Islamic Sharia ethics and 
morals, the holy Quran states many general ethical principles such as ‘[k]indness to parents, 
forgiveness to those who err, piety, equity, just dealing, compassion, restraint of lust, 
nobility, modesty etc.’142 Given the importance of Islamic Sharia as the foundation for all 
ethical conduct it is unsurprising that the same sources of Islamic Sharia are applied in both 
Islamic law and in Islamic medical ethics.143As Padela has stated: ‘Islamic medical ethics 
relates to Islamic law, Sharia. The Sharia is not only a source of law but assigns moral values 
to actions in Islam. Hence, any discussion on medical ethics in the light of Islam must refer 
to it.’144 (His emphasis). In respect of the application of Islamic Sharia to medicine, it has 
also been stated that medical ethics is ‘inseparable from the religion itself, which emphasizes 
[sic] continuities between body and mind, the material and spiritual realms and between 
ethics and jurisprudence.’145 Thus, there is unlikely to be any significant difference between 
Islamic Sharia sources and views and Islamic Sharia medical ethics.146 Accordingly, most 
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of the materials that are cited as references for Islamic Sharia medical ethics are based on 
the Islamic Sharia primary or secondary sources.147 
Islamic Sharia has a sizeable heritage of knowledge and material to assist in considering 
issues of medical ethics and in resolving new questions which have recently emerged and 
there are examples of literature in Arabic that illustrate this.148 An early instance of this in 
the 9th century was the work of AlRuhawi,149 Adab alTabib (Practical Ethics of the 
Physician).150 The main focus of the book was on doctors’ characters: how they should 
behave themselves and how they should deal with their patients.151 The book also focused 
on doctors’ training and education, and how to treat patients and take care of them in a way 
that respects patients’ dignity and the profession of medicine.152 
AlTabari153 has summarised key principles of medical ethics that have been acknowledged 
by Muslim society to arise from Islamic Sharia as follows: 
‘The physician ought to be modest, virtuous, merciful, not slanderous or addicted 
to liquor and speak no evil of men of repute in the community or be critical of 
their religious beliefs. He should be honest towards women and should not 
divulge the secrets of his patients… He should avoid predicting whether the 
patient will live or die. He should speak well of his acquaintances, colleagues, 
and clients and not be a money grabber. He should dress in clean clothes, be 
dignified.... He ought not to lose his temper when his patient keeps asking many 
questions, but should answer gently and patiently. He should treat the strong and 
the weak, the rich and the poor, the wise and the illiterate alike, and God will 
reward him if he offers medical help to the poor… He should be punctual and 
reliable... avoiding wrangling about his fees with a patient who is very ill, but 
rather he should be thankful no matter how much he is paid.’154 
However, although there is a significant amount of material relevant to Islamic medical 
ethics, most of it, as Padela notes, is scattered in Islamic Sharia sources which require 
investigation and the formulation of principles in this specific context.155 
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4.2. The relationship between Islamic religion, ethic and law 
Firstly, as has been argued above and emphasised, Islamic religion, ethics and law are based 
on the same sources. Therefore, to discuss any religious or ethical or legal matters, the same 
sources must be used and applied.156 However, Reinhart has observed in this regard that: 
‘Islamic law is more basic to Islamic ethics than is either Islamic theology or philosophy’.157 
This observation by Reinhart can be justified because ‘...moral and legal acts are so 
intricately related in the Sharia to submission to God, by contrast with a far greater autonomy 
from religion accorded morality and law in Christianity’.158 Nevertheless, arguably there is 
a bright and crucial line to distinguish whether the issue is only a religious and ethical matter 
or is a religious, ethical and legal matter.159 This has an obvious and significant bearing on 
how conduct which is not in accordance with Islamic Sharia is dealt with, and this will 
include breaches of obligations by doctors. To make that clear, I will illustrate it in the 
following example: 
Islam prohibits lying,160 so to not always be truthful161 is a religiously and ethically wrong 
action and whoever lies is committing a sin. Muslims who lie are in disobedience of Allah’s 
orders, so the liar will be judged for that in the afterlife.162 However, the question is: by 
lying, is the Muslim breaching Islamic law? In other words, should he or she be disciplined 
for all types of lie in this life? The answer commonly is no, except specific instances of lying: 
for example, that which is committed when a Muslim gives evidence under oath (perjury).163 
In this situation, the action of lying is not only religiously and ethically wrong, but also 
obviously legally wrong.164 
Therefore, it can be said that, in order to distinguish if an action might be only religiously 
and ethically wrong, one needs to look at whether Islamic Sharia considers that action to be 
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in a breach of Islamic law (as a criminal or civil wrong).165 So for example, murdering an 
innocent person is religiously, ethically and legally wrong, because it is not only sinful, but 
also a crime.166 Other actions might be only ethically and religiously wrong, such as not 
returning a greeting to another person in a similar or better way. Such behaviour is ethically 
and religiously wrong because of the lack of courtesy, but it is not legal wrong as it is not a 
crime.167 
Secondly, as I have mentioned above, it is important to note that under Islamic Sharia, an 
issue (whether it involves religion, ethics or law) may be classified in five different ways 
depending on the degree of obligation and value ascribed to adhering to it. It has been argued 
that, 
 ‘the scale of the values attached by Islamic law to the acts of man comprises 
five values, whereas other legal systems know only three values: an act may be 
mandatory in law, prohibited or indifferent. In this last category are lumped 
together the three Islamic categories of praiseworthy, blameworthy and 
indifferent’.168 
These five rulings or values (al-Ahkam al-Khamsah) concerning the degree or scale of 
permissibility of an action in Islamic Sharia, were introduced to Islamic Sharia 
jurisprudence by Muslim scholars at various times during the history of Islam and scholars 
have also determined which actions should be classified under each ruling.169 The five 
rulings are: Wajib (obligatory), Moharm (forbidden), Makroh (blameworthy), Mandob 
(praiseworthy) and Mobah (indifferent).170 
(1) Wajib (obligatory) is any duty that Islamic Sharia has ordered all Muslims to perform, 
such as praying five times a day and fasting during the month of Ramadan.171 In general, 
Wajib is an act for which there is a reward in the hereafter; however, neglecting or 
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abandoning it is a sin and illegal so there can be a punishment in the hereafter and in this 
life.172 
(2) Moharm (forbidden) is any act that all Muslims have to avoid and must not perform,173 
such as drinking alcohol and committing theft. In general, as with Wajib acts, Moharm is an 
act that is a sin and illegal there can be a punishment in this life and in the hereafter for doing 
it; and for avoiding it there is a reward in the hereafter.174 
(3) Makroh (blameworthy) is any act according to Islamic Sharia that all Muslims ought to 
avoid for piety and virtue, such as drinking or eating while standing.175 In general, Makroh 
is an act which for there is a reward in the hereafter for avoiding it; however, for doing it 
there is no sin or punishment in life or hereafter.176 
(4) Mandob (praiseworthy) is any act that in Islamic Sharia is praiseworthy but not required, 
such as giving.177 In general, Mandob is an act that for which there is a reward in the 
hereafter; however, for not doing it there is no sin or punishment in life or hereafter.178 
(5) Mobah (indifferent) is any act that in Islamic Sharia there is no reward or sin or 
punishment in life or in the hereafter for, whether doing or avoiding them, such as eating 
food, buying and selling and so forth.179 
It has been argued that: ‘These five categories represent not only the Islamic understanding 
of how the upright life is to be lived in the world, but an explicit rejection of the bi-polar 
view of moral categorization as simply good and bad.’180 These five rulings will be applied 
in the discussion of both Islamic Sharia medical ethics and laws in this Chapter and in 
Chapter four. As noted earlier, there are few Islamic Sharia sources that specifically consider 
the matter of respect for patient autonomy in regard to information disclosure as either an 
ethical or a legal issue. It has also been explained that the five rulings set out above have 
been used to judge the permissibility of an action in Islamic Sharia. This has led me to study 
the issue of respecting patients’ autonomy in the light of the five rulings that Muslim scholars 
use to study an issue to determine whether conduct should be considered to be ethically right 
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or wrong. The same approach will be applied in Chapter four to classify the legality of issues 
raised in respect of consent or providing information, for matters that have not been yet 
addressed by Saudi Arabian law.  
However, before turning to the application of these five rulings to the issue of consent to 
treatment and information disclosure and the application of the principle of respect for 
autonomy, it is necessary to consider the role of Saudi Commission for Health Specialties 
(SCHS). The reason for that is because the SCHS is the responsible body in Saudi Arabia 
for medical professionals’ registrations. More importantly for this thesis, the SCHS has 
authority to issue a medical ethics code for the profession. While it is not itself of course an 
Islamic Sharia source, it is significant (as will be explained) as a source of both ethics and 
law for medical professionals, and as such it is expected to be in accordance with Sharia 
principles. Therefore, in the following the thesis will briefly present SCHS’s role. 
4.3. The role of the SCHS 
The SCHS was established by Royal Decree in 1993.181 The SCHS ‘is responsible for 
supervising and evaluating training programs, as well as setting controls and standards for 
the practice of health professions.’182 In terms of considering medical ethics, the SCHS has 
the authority to issue ethical guidelines.183 A review was undertaken of a previous CEHP in 
2011184 and the current Code was published by the SCHS in 2013.185 It is important to note 
that CEHP2013 is legally binding, as LPHP2005 has stated that ‘any ethical guidelines 
issued by the Commission for Health Specialties including the Code of Ethics for Healthcare 
Practitioners are incumbent upon and applicable to all health practitioners’186 in the country. 
Therefore, CEHP2013 is both an ethical and a legal guideline and can be enforced by the 
law.187 Because CEHP2013 covers most medical ethics issues, such as patient consent and 
information disclosure, the discussion in this Chapter and Chapter four will consider 
CEHP2013 as both an ethical and a legal document.  
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In summary, from what has so far been discussed, it can be said that the sources of Islamic 
Sharia ethics and legal principles are the same. Therefore, there may be a very fine line to 
differentiate between whether the matter is an ethical and religious one only, or it is an 
ethical, religious and legal matter. The difference is significant however, as this will have 
consequences for whether an action can be dealt with in the courts as a violation of Islamic 
Sharia law. Of course, as Chapter four will illustrate, legislation makes it clear when some 
matters can become before the courts, but legislation does not cover all matters for which 
there may be legal actions. Further, the thesis has argued that any ethical, religious and legal 
matter should be considered under the five rulings for determining its classification. Finally, 
it should be remembered that CEHP2013 is both an ethical and a legal code. 
In the following, the thesis will move on to discuss the issue of Islamic Sharia’s Saudi 
Arabian medical ethics’ acknowledgment of the principle of respect for autonomy in regard 
to competent adult patients’ consent and the issue of information disclosure. It should be 
remembered that, as there are not many sources that deal with the issue of information 
disclosure and autonomy, the discussion proceeds on the limited material that is available. 
5. The principle of respect for autonomy based on Islamic Sharia its use in Saudi 
Arabian medical ethics 
Although there are few sources directly dealing with information disclosure and consent to 
treatment, Islamic Sharia can be said to manage many aspects of health and medicine by 
establishing a number of principles and rules regarding how to deal with fundamental ethical 
and legal matters.188 According to Islamic Sharia teaching, human beings are born free with 
full rights and freedoms that enable them to act without restriction and which protect them 
from any offences or reckless actions. Caliph Omar Ibn Alkhattab189 thirteen centuries ago 
made a notable declaration of human rights when he asked, ‘when did you enslave people 
who have been born free?’190 Islamic Sharia recognises the basic rights of all humans, not 
just those of Muslims. This recognition of human rights based on Islamic Sharia has been 
acknowledged by the Saudi Arabian BLG1992 which declares that: ‘The State shall protect 
human rights in accordance with the Sharia’.191 
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father’s	position,	but	punished	him,	making	the	famous	declaration.	I	Alharbi	Democracy	in	Islamic	and	International	
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It has been argued that the term ‘autonomy’ or the principle of respect for autonomy, has its 
foundations and roots in such Islamic Sharia sources.192 However, a question for this thesis 
is whether Islamic Sharia acknowledges the principle of respect for autonomy in the same 
way as it is understood in the Western tradition of ethics. A further question arises: what 
might Islamic Sharia principles mean in the context of providing medical treatment, in 
particular obtaining consent and information disclosure? 
The idea of respect for autonomy in Islamic Sharia has appeared in sources where autonomy 
has been discussed in the light of other basic human rights. In the view of Islamic Sharia, 
autonomy can be established by the holy Quran as it states in translation that: ‘And indeed 
We [Allah] have honoured the children of Adam...’193 Based on this holy verse it has been 
argued that respect for the individual is a main aspect of human dignity, and respect for an 
individual implies respect for the individual’s rights, decisions, choices and wishes.194 
Therefore, it has been assumed that individual autonomy has been accepted and exists under 
Islamic Sharia.195 This gives each person the right to make free, autonomous decisions and 
choices based on Islamic Sharia traditions and therefore generally this should be 
respected.196 Therefore, it has been said that ‘there is considerable room for personal 
autonomy in Islam...The sense of personal liberty that this allowed contributed to the 
strength of the social system’.197 
However, the meaning of patient autonomy under Islamic Sharia needs closer examination 
to consider whether it differs in any respect from the interpretations of patient autonomy 
under the Western tradition. In particular, Islamic Sharia places great emphasis on the idea 
of personal responsibilities and rights.198 However,  Islamic Sharia does not allow a person 
to perform actions or make choices solely according to their own wishes and desires.199 
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There are limits on a person’s freedom and choices, as these must be made in line with 
certain rules and these rules are essentially based on Islamic Sharia sources.200 Bommel has 
stated that: ‘For a Muslim patient, absolute autonomy is very rare, there will be a feeling of 
responsibility towards God, and he or she lives in social coherence...’.201 Hence, it can be 
argued that a personal choice can be respected and accepted but only if it is in accordance 
with Islamic Sharia rules.202 AlBar and Pasha have argued that the Western interpretation of 
autonomy should not be universally accepted and applied in the same way, as it has been 
introduced for example by Beauchamp and Childress,203 as there are likely different 
conceptions and understandings of autonomy in other countries’ cultures, religions and 
social backgrounds.204 
The main focus of the thesis is regarding the issue of information disclosure, but it is worth 
mentioning some general Islamic Sharia reservations on the application of the principle of 
respect for autonomy. Based on Islamic Sharia teaching, Muslims are entrusted with their 
bodies, health, lives, wealth and so forth by Allah; therefore, the Muslim can only act in the 
ways set out by the will of Allah and in the teachings of his Messenger’s PBUH about 
them.205 For example, Islamic Sharia values health and the protection of it. It considers 
health as a great blessing, which can be seen when the Messenger PBUH said: ‘There are 
two blessings which many people lose: (They are) health and free time for doing good.’206 
Consequently, the Muslim is not allowed to hurt or cause harm to him/herself or others, and 
doing so is against Islamic Sharia teaching.207 Similarly, based on Islamic Sharia healthcare 
providers have a duty to encourage and educate patients to avoid dangerous behaviours and 
habits that would affect their health, as the healthcare provider is responsible ethically and 
religiously for providing information as well as for providing medical care for their 
patients.208 
Similar to some arguments under English law,209 another limitation on Islamic Sharia’s 
respect for autonomy concerns whether Muslims are allowed to end their own lives. They 
are not permitted to do so because life is given to the person by Allah, so a Muslim is not 
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allowed to kill him/herself.210 Preserving life is fundamental in Islamic Sharia, so where the 
Muslim’s action is to take his or her life, or even to harm him/herself or critically damage 
his or her health, his or her choices should be disregarded.211 In consequence, doctors have 
no right to terminate a patient’s life or assist the patient to die based on respect for his or her 
choices, and they should prevent patients from ending their own lives.212 Doctors and 
patients should consider that there is a vast and infinite reward from Allah for those who 
remain patient in suffering. The holy Quran contains a passage that in translation states that 
‘only those who are patient (forbearing) shall receive their rewards in full, without 
reckoning.’213 However, that does not mean patients should not seek treatment; they should 
seek treatment as part of their obligation to preserve life and health, although this should be 
undertaken in the belief that Allah is the ultimate healer of illness,214 as the holy Quran in 
translation states that ‘and when I am ill, it is He [Allah] who cures me.’215 I will further 
consider this issue of seeking treatment below. 
It can be concluded that Islamic Sharia has acknowledged the notion of respect for the 
principle of patient autonomy, but it is different in some ways from that of the Western 
traditions discussed in Chapter one and which form the basis for current medical ethics in 
the UK.216 Thus, in Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, respect for patients’ autonomy in 
terms of their wishes and choices must be in accordance with Islamic Sharia and it is not 
primarily a matter of respecting patients’ wishes in so far as they do not infringe the rights 
of others.217 
As I have discussed in Chapter one, the foundation of the principle of respect for autonomy 
in Western medical ethics has been influenced strongly by the writings of Kant and Mill. 
The notion of consequentialism/utilitarianism to judge whether an act is ethically right or 
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wrong is based on the outcome of it irrespective of the act itself, which has been developed 
based on Mill’s view. By contrast, deontology has been based on Kant’s view that the 
decision as to the ethical rightness or wrongfulness of an action is based on the action itself, 
regardless of the circumstances or the consequences. It was concluded that there has been 
no universal agreement on which of these two approaches is correct, but that both have been 
regarded as supporting the principle of respect for autonomy.  
Bering in mind the concept of the five rulings, I would argue that the Islamic Sharia view 
on judging whether an action is ethically right or wrong seems to combine aspects of both 
consequentialism/utilitarianism and deontology. As AlBar and Pasha have argued that: ‘In 
Islamic teachings, though the intention is of paramount importance, the means to fulfil such 
an intention bear the same value. However, Islamic teachings look to the consequences and 
if we can predict an evil or bad result then that action should not be taken.’218 In fact, the 
importance of the good intention can be understood from the Messenger PBUH saying that: 
‘(The value of) an action depends on the intention behind it...’.219 It can be said that, this 
Messenger PBUH statement is comparable to the approach of consequentialism/ 
utilitarianism as the importance is placed on the intention (outcome) regardless of the action 
itself. Despite this, Islamic Sharia does not state that this is the only approach, and this saying 
by the Messenger PBUH must be read and understood in the light of the rules that have been 
stated by the holy Quran and the Messenger PBUH. For example, some actions are wrong 
in themselves, such as stealing, so though the intention of the person to steal is for helping 
others (a good outcome), it does not justify the action. Thus, the Messenger PBUH in another 
saying has stated that: 
 ‘The lawful is clear and the unlawful is clear, and between that are matters that 
are doubtful (not clear); many of the people do not know whether it is lawful or 
unlawful. So whoever leaves it to protect his religion and his honour, then he 
will be safe, and whoever falls into something from them, then he soon will have 
fallen into the unlawful....’220 
This suggests that like deontology, there are good and bad actions which are universal and a 
person can judge their ethical rightness or wrongfulness, and by doing so he/she can make 
his/her decision. 
As the Messenger PBUH has said: ‘Do not let yourselves be yes-men, saying: If the people 
are good then we will be good, and if they are wrong then we will be wrong. Rather, make 
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up your own minds, if the people are good then you are good, and if they are evil, then do 
not behave unjustly.’221 Thus, a Muslim, beside having good intentions, should only and 
independently do what is good and avoid what is bad and not justify doing good or bad by 
what others do. In other words, the Muslim with good intention should follow Islamic Sharia 
rules in doing good and avoiding bad, regardless of other people’s behaviour. 
Based on that, I would argue that showing respect for patients’ autonomy can be regarded 
as ‘good’ as that would make them more independent in making their decisions based on 
Islamic Sharia principles. Thus, it can be said this ‘good’ combines the views of both 
utilitarian (intention) and Kantian (universal law). 
A recognition of the principle of respect for autonomy in the context of Islamic Sharia 
traditions would require doctors to acknowledge patients’ autonomy and provide them with 
information in order for the patient to freely make an informed decision. Thus, respect for 
patient autonomy would not justify doctors’ suggesting that they should act in accordance 
with good intentions and therefore choose to provide or withhold information. As I have 
stated above, it is not only a good intention that justifies the action, but also the action itself 
must be good. Thus, the respect for autonomy would require doctors in addition to their good 
intentions to inform patients, and this is regardless of whether other doctors would disclose 
the information or not. In other words, doctors should fulfil their good intention by providing 
the patient with sufficient information that s/he requires. Nonetheless, it should be 
considered that good intentions would require good action; thus if the information would 
cause the patient serious harm, the doctors’ good intention on that basis can justify their 
actions to withhold distressing information, as I will further discuss below.  
As I have stated above my proposed ethical standard is to place a duty on doctors to disclose 
sufficient and understandable information to enable a competent adult patient to be self-
determining and to respect his/her autonomy. This proposed standard will be examined 
further in this Chapter and Chapter four to demonstrate to what extent it can be achieved 
under Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical law, and whether that would support the 
argument that Saudi Arabia should adopt the prudent patient standard of care.  
A decision that is not in line with Islamic Sharia, because it will cause harm to the person 
him/herself or to others or it is against other Islamic Sharia principles, need not be respected. 
In order to discuss the principle of respect for autonomy in more depth from the Islamic 
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Sharia perspective, the discussion will now be divided into two topics: first, patient consent 
and respect for autonomy and, second, information disclosure and respect for autonomy.  
5.1. Patient consent and respect for autonomy 
Consideration of patients’ autonomy can be understood based on the views of Islamic Sharia 
(and consequently Saudi Arabian legislation) on the purpose of medicine. Medical treatment 
in general, from the Islamic Sharia perspective, should work in a way that preserves and 
promotes a patient’s health and life by using the available treatments and medical 
procedures.222 
As was explained previously in describing Islamic Sharia sources, where there is an issue 
that has no direct reference in the two main Sharia sources, Muslim scholars should consider 
that issue and pronounce their view on it. The notion of respect for the autonomy of patients 
should be treated in the same way, so it should rely on Muslim scholars’ understanding of 
the matter in the light of Islamic Sharia sources.223 It must also be remembered that where a 
new matter is considered there may be more than one view taken, based on the Muslim 
scholars’ understanding, analysis and consideration,224 unless the majority make an Ijma 
(consensus of opinion) on that matter. A question that emerges here is what doctors and 
patients in Saudi Arabia should do if there is more than one view on one matter. In other 
words, can doctors or patients follow whichever scholar’s view they believe is correct? 
In this regard, where a matter is unclear, then the GPRSI’s customary practice would be 
followed, as this has both ethical and legal status. In the case of continued dispute, the matter 
would be referred to the GPRSI to either seek the view of the Mufti (head of Saudi scholars) 
or the GPRSI counsel for the Islamic Sharia on the issue, which is noted throughout this 
Chapter and Chapter four.  
This may include matters of both ethics and law. It is very rare for law courts (SMPs) to be 
involved in developing the law in such disputes, as the court is only involved after the patient 
brings a claim; for example, if damage occurs as a result of an operation and as discussed, 
there is not a tradition of using precedent in Saudi Arabia. Thus, the GPRSI plays a vital role 
in setting ethical and legal medical principles and solving ethical and legal disputes that 
happen before treating the patient. The reason why the GPSRI is involved in such cases will 
be further explored in Chapter four, but, in brief, historically, the Saudi Mufti was the head 
of judges in the country until the beginning of the 1970s which may justify its roles in 
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addressing issues of ethical and legal concern. This shows an opposite stance from English 
law, where the standard of consent and information disclosure is decided by law courts and 
through the doctrine of legal precedent, although professional guidance is also available to 
doctors.  
Unless it is an emergency, legal disputes, such as a patient’s refusal of recommended 
treatment, would be heard by the courts of law in the UK, and it is here that the issue would 
be decided which would give guidance in future cases.  
Additionally, as it was noted earlier, the SCHS issued CEHP2013, which is considered both 
ethically and legally binding. The review that led to this CEHP2013 was undertaken by some 
senior Saudi Arabian scholars and judges and therefore may be taken as representing an 
ethical and legal stance based on Islamic Sharia. When the Saudi Arabian government has 
adopted a GPSRI declaration or other document, whatever the authority of it (Ijma or a single 
fatwa), it becomes legally binding and should be applied. Therefore, as CEHP2013 has been 
issued by a Minster, it is an ethically and legally binding document which must be followed 
and applied by doctors, hospitals and SMPs in Saudi Arabia. It is therefore useful to refer to 
CEHP2013 in order to illustrate the medical ethical principles that are applied in Saudi 
Arabian medical sectors and SMPs. These are also legal principles, but it is the ethical issues 
that are being focused on here. 
The CEHP2013 is the leading guidance on medical ethical issues which is specifically 
addressed to medical practitioners and it has included a broad statement recognising the 
importance of patient consent and respect for autonomy, as it has declared that the person’s 
body and soul must be protected. No one has the authority to deal with a person’s body 
unless permission has been granted by the person him/herself.225 
AlBar and Pasha have argued that the concept of autonomy based on the Western 
understanding should not be considered as a universal principle, as there might be different 
interpretations based, for example, on culture and background. Thus the Western 
interpretation of the principle of respect for autonomy may not easily be transplanted and 
adopted by other countries in the same way.	226 Thus, some characteristics of the concept of 
autonomy can be interpreted and adjusted by the other adopting systems and can be then 
modified in a way that suits the recipient system. 
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Thus, the interpretation by Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian law to some extent will be 
different from the Western understanding and interpretation. Nonetheless, each legal system 
shares the underpinning values of respect for autonomy, even if their translation into practice 
may differ in some ways. However, while it is clear that the concept of individual autonomy 
is recognised in Saudi Arabian medical ethics and this is based on Islamic Sharia, this still 
remains to be examined in the light of the five rulings mentioned above.227 These concerns 
when conduct is considered to be: (1) Wajib (obligatory), (2) Moharm (forbidden), (3) 
Makroh (blameworthy), (4) Mandob (praiseworthy) and (5) Mobah (indifferent). Statements 
contained in CEHP2013 will be used to evaluate the way in which conduct concerning 
consent to medical treatment should be classified according to these five rulings. It should 
be noticed that the use and classification of these five rulings in this thesis is firstly to 
demonstrate the patient’s duty or obligation to seek treatment, and secondly to note that this 
may sometimes include the classification of the treatment itself and whether it is deemed to 
be necessary. In addition, declarations by the GPSRI and IIFA will also be used to examine 
this issue since, as discussed previously, these institutions are considered to be principal 
sources of Ijma (consensus of the majority of qualified Muslim scholars regarding new legal, 
ethical, and other issues) in Saudi Arabia. 
The following discussion will be divided into two main headings concerning respect for 
autonomy: first, where respect for a patient’s autonomy is limited, and, second, where there 
is complete respect for patient autonomy. Under these two headings, there are three main 
issues to be considered: A. The five rulings, B. The justification of the view taken in respect 
of the five rulings and C. The religious and ethical consequences. The consequences of 
conduct being in breach of the rulings that have a legal sanction will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter four but for the moment it is sufficient to bear in mind that where a legal 
principle has not been set out in Saudi Arabian legislation, existing Islamic Sharia principles 
must be followed. 
1) Respect for a patient’s autonomy is limited 
A. The first two rulings 
(i) The treatment is Wajib (obligatory) for patients to seek if it is vital to preserve the patient’s 
life, or to stop health deterioration which may lead to death or damage to an organ or to 
prevent the spread of infectious diseases.228 In such cases (which are not an emergency),229 
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as a general rule a competent adult patient who is conscious and has the ability to understand 
the information given about his condition and treatment should give his consent and his 
refusal of consent ‘can’ be overruled.230 However, there are some situations where treatment 
can be refused and need not be provided (as will be explained in B and C below) 
(ii) The treatment is Mohram (forbidden) for patients to seek if the treatment is prohibited 
by Islamic Sharia. This includes causing harm or damage or death to the person him/herself 
or others. For example, the patient consenting to removal of an organ for no medical 
reason.231 Another example is the patient consenting to euthanasia, as this is also prohibited 
as noted above. Therefore, in those cases or others similar to them, the patient’s consent 
must be ignored and doctors must not respect a patient’s autonomous decision to consent to 
such treatment.232 
B. The Islamic Sharia justification for limiting patient autonomy 
The patient’s right to make an autonomous decision is limited where treatment is considered 
as obligatory to seek or forbidden, as the human body and life are regarded as sacred and to 
be protected.233 This is based on Islamic Sharia because ‘life is sacred: every moment of life 
has great value, even if it is of poor quality. The saving of life is a duty, and the unwarranted 
taking of life a grave sin.’234 This view has its grounds in the holy Quran, which states in 
translation that ‘whosoever saves the life of one, it shall be as if he saved the life of all 
humankind.’235 Based on this holy article, in the medical field patients are expected in 
general to preserve their lives, promote their health and not harm themselves because these 
duties are absolute.236 Thus, when a patient’s life is in danger or a treatment is required, he 
should consent to treatment, as refusing treatment which would lead to death or worsening 
health is forbidden under Islamic Sharia. The holy Quran has given the instruction: ‘…and 
do not cast yourselves into ruin with your own hands’.237 
Similarly, although an individual’s autonomy is respected under Islamic Sharia, this does 
not extend to allowing a person to put him/herself in danger by consenting to treatment that 
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is not permitted by Islamic Sharia or may lead to death, as life is ‘a gift from Allah and is to 
be cherished and protected at all times.’238 Based on this, to keep healthy and to prevent 
harm are basic principles in Islamic healthcare for both the individual and the community.239 
Muslim doctors have religious and ethical duties toward patients, derived from a religious 
basis.240 The holy Quran in translation states that ‘the believers are nothing else than brothers 
(in Islamic religion)’.241 A doctor should behave and act in a way that respects and benefits 
his brother or sister patients and provide them with treatment they need.242 In considering 
respect for patient autonomy, this is also an important principle of Islamic Sharia. 
Presumably the CEHP2013, the GPRSI and IIFA all accept this and take this as their starting 
point when considering consent to and refusal of medical treatment. 
C. The religious and ethical consequences of failing to comply with these rulings 
i. Wajib treatment 
For both doctors’ and patients’ ethical and religious duties to be complied with, it seems that 
there are two distinguishable views: 
1. The case of curable illness 
As I have stated above that for the Wajib treatment, a patient ‘should’, but does not ‘have to’ 
seek it in all cases. It can be argued that, as long as not seeking the treatment would not lead 
to severe harm or death, there might be no ethical or religious duty on patients to consent to 
treatment for curable or treatable illnesses and that doctors can respect patients’ refusal of 
consent.243 
CEHP2013 has straightforwardly dealt with the case of incurable illness, as I will discuss in 
a moment, but it has not clearly dealt with the case of curable illness. CEHP2013 has set a 
general rule for the issue of ‘[d]ealing with patients who refuse a medical procedure.’244 
However, CEHP2013 has stated specific rules to deal with the matter of incurable illness.245 
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By excluding this from the general rule, thus I would argue that the following rules are 
dealing with curable illness only.  
I would argue in such cases CEHP2013 has recognised the general right of a competent adult 
patient to refuse medical treatment, and directed doctors to take the following steps: first, 
doctors must ensure that the patient is ‘…aware of the consequences of his/her decision to 
refuse the medical procedure’.246 Second, doctors must explain in simple and understandable 
words ‘... the importance of the medical procedure, and the consequences of not having the 
procedure honestly and without exaggeration.’247 Third, the doctor has a duty to ‘...do 
whatever is possible to convince the patient as well as make him/her aware of the 
alternatives, and then to make the appropriate decisions after that’.248 Finally, the patient’s 
consent or refusal of consent must be documented in writing.249 Nevertheless, in Saudi 
Arabia Islamic Sharia has supremacy in the country so the interpretation of an Act or code 
must be in the content of Islamic Sharia. Thus, it seems likely that, if refusing necessary 
treatment for curable illness that may lead to severe harm or death, the case would be 
different.  
The GPSRI has considered the matter of refusing necessary treatment of a curable illness 
based on questions from the Head of both the Health Department in the Ministry of the 
National Guard and King Saud University for Health Sciences.250 The first question was: 
where a competent adult patient who is conscious and has the capacity to understand the 
information, is suffering from bowel perforation and he has been clearly informed about the 
seriousness of the case, the medical procedures of the surgery and the consequence (death) 
of refusing the operation, as it is the only option to treat his condition, should doctors respect 
his right to refuse the operation or should they treat him irrespective of his refusal? The 
GPSRI has ruled that ‘if the case was as had been described, the operation has to be 
performed without a patient’s consent, as it would preserve the patient’s life and prevent 
health deterioration.’251 
The second question was about an adult competent pregnant woman in the final stage of her 
pregnancy who is conscious and has the capacity to understand the information. The doctors’ 
view was she could not give birth naturally and she was medically required to have a 
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Caesarean section. The woman refused to have the operation, even though she had been 
informed about the result of her refusal being that the unborn child would die. The GPSRI 
has declared that ‘if the Caesarean section would not cause the mother high risks or death, 
her refusal must be ignored and the Caesarean section has to be conducted to save the unborn 
child’s life, otherwise her refusal must be respected.’252 
Thus, it can be said that while there might be no ethical wrong for patients to refuse treatment 
for curable illness and doctors should respect patients’ wishes as long as those wishes do not 
lead to severe harm or death, if these conditions are not met both doctors and patients would 
be ethically and religiously wrong not to proceed with the treatment.   
2. The case of incurable illness 
The view here is different from above; it seems that in the case of incurable illness patients 
might be free ethically to refuse treatment that they would otherwise be expected to seek.253 
Doctors should not ethically and religiously have a duty to attempt to provide treatment that 
will be ineffective. The difference is that in the previous category there is strong medical 
evidence which states that the illness can be treated, whereas in this category there is strong 
medical evidence that indicates that the illness cannot be cured, such as terminal cancer, 
although the pain and suffering may be reduced and controlled for a period of time.254 
CEHP2013 has considered the issue: ‘[d]oes the patient have the right to refuse treatment in 
incurable conditions?’255 Firstly, CEHP2013 has recognised in the case of incurable illness 
that ‘the general rule is that the patient has the right to make any decision whether to accept 
or refuse therapeutic interventions proposed by a doctor, in part or in whole.’256 He or she 
must have‘... fully understood the medical information related to his/her condition, and the 
consequences of such refusal, benefits of the treatment, and risks associated with his/her 
decisions (to refuse the treatment).257 Thus, ‘...the doctor does not have the right to force the 
patient to accept treatment’.258 Nevertheless, CEHP2013 has placed different ethical duties 
on doctors in some cases of patient refusal for incurable conditions, as the doctor can 
administer treatment ‘...in rare cases where the patient or his/her guardians [in case of 
incapacity] are legally required to seek treatment, like some infectious diseases from which 
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there is fear of spread’.259 Thus, CEHP2013 has recognised that doctors can enforce 
treatment in certain circumstances of incurable illness in the public interest, but, apart from 
this situation, it seems to acknowledge that patients have the right to refuse even Wajib 
treatment based on full knowledge about the case.  
Therefore, Saudi Arabia likely seems to acknowledge that in respect of incurable illness, if 
a doctor has informed the patient in detail and explained the risks, available treatment and 
the consequences of the refusal, the doctor should not be considered ethically and religiously 
wrong for not proceeding with treatment that the patient has refused.260 This is so even if 
refusal of treatment is likely to hasten death, or cause the patient’s condition to deteriorate 
faster than it would otherwise have done. Where the doctor has done what he can to convince 
the patient to consent, the holy Quran states that a person should not go beyond his limit of 
advice and persuasion.261 
ii. Moharam treatment 
Doctors are ethically and religiously accountable; hence if the doctors respect patient consent 
to seek Moharam treatment or any act that is illegal under Islamic Sharia, they are 
committing sin because of their disobedience of Allah’s will to preserve patients’ lives and 
health.262 Thus, doctors should not support or assist patients to do something that may cause 
them harm, as the holy Quran in translation states ‘help one another in acts of righteousness 
and piety, and do not help one another in sin and transgression.’263 It is against Islamic Sharia 
principles, for example, to change gender for no medical reason, as the GPSRI has stated 
that ‘it is not permissible to transform a male or female whose masculine or feminine organs 
are completely developed to the opposite sex…because it is considered changing the creation 
of Allah.’264 If the treatment itself is prohibited by Islamic Sharia, even if it does not cause 
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severe harm or death to the patient, consenting to it or providing it would be ethically and 
religiously wrong. For example, the GPSRI has ruled in regard to the use of alcohol (wine) 
as treatment that: ‘Wine is Haram (prohibited) and it is not permissible to use it as a 
cure...’.265 Further, in relation to Moharam treatment, CEHP2013 has placed ethical duties 
on doctors to not proceed or respect patients’ wishes, for example, in the following: 
‘1. It is not permissible to use or perform any religiously forbidden procedure or 
medication unless in necessary cases. These (procedures/medications) include 
plastic surgeries, treatment of infertility, or use of pork-derived drugs, and other 
forbidden things. 2. Refrain completely from doing hymenorrhaphy or 
hymenoplasty (hymen reconstruction surgery) whether the patient is young or 
old, married or not, unless for religiously permissible conditions. 3. Refrain from 
treating infertility with religiously impermissible methods. 4. Refrain from 
religiously forbidden plastic surgeries.’266 
If a patient consents to Moharam treatment that leads to death or severe harm or to something 
that is against Islamic Sharia principles, he/she has committed a sin, because of his/her 
disobedience of Allah’s will and because he/she is putting him/herself and his/her health in 
a hazardous situation, so he/she is both religiously and ethically wrong.267 Consenting to 
Moharam treatment which results for example in his/her death or severe harm would be 
sometime considered an act of suicide, which is banned by Islamic Sharia: ‘and do not kill 
yourselves [or one another]. Indeed, Allah is to you ever Merciful.’268 Even if there is no 
harm as a result, the patient’s consent is both sinful and unethical and doctors who proceeded 
with such treatment would also be regarded as guilty of a sin and unethical practice.  
After having discussed the issue of limitations on respect for patients’ autonomy in 
accordance with Islamic Sharia principles, the thesis will now move on to discuss the issue 
of where there is complete respect for patients’ autonomy to consent to or refuse treatment. 
2) A complete respect for patient autonomy 
A. The last three rulings 
Under the last three of the five rulings, a competent adult patient who is conscious can 
consent to or refuse medical treatment for any reason or no reason.  
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(i) The treatment is Makroh (blameworthy) for the patients to seek if a treatment may lead 
to some risks that might be more than the suffering of the illness without treatment and it is 
not a case of infectious disease.269 
(ii) The treatment is Mandob (praiseworthy) for patients to seek if the patient refusing it may 
lead to weakness in the patient’s health and body. Here the suffering and harm are less than 
the case when the treatment is Wajib for the patient to seek, and it is not a case of infectious 
disease.270 
 (iii) The treatment is Mobah (indifferent) for patients to seek, where both risks and benefits 
of being treated are equal and do not lead to death, excluding the case of infectious disease.271 
B. The Islamic Sharia justification 
It has been accepted by the majority of Muslim scholars that a competent adult person has 
the right of choice as to what may be done to his /her own body, as long as that treatment or 
operation is not Wajib or Moharam for him/her to seek.272 Thus, a patient can refuse or 
consent to treatment when the treatment is Makroh, Mandob and Mobah for him/her to seek, 
whatever the reason and whatever the consequences, since death or severe harm are not 
expected to result.273 For example, the patient can refuse to seek treatment or be treated for 
a common sore throat. However, it should be noted that if the patient’s health condition has 
worsened, the treatment might become Wajib for the patient to seek, thus the categorisation 
of the obligation to seek treatment depends on the severity of the illness itself.  
This approach is taken because in these three types of seeking treatment, there is no adequate 
evidence to show that treatment will necessarily certainly cure the patient of an illness or 
lead to severe harm or death if it is refused.274 As a result, a competent adult patient’s 
autonomy and autonomous decisions should be respected; the patient is free to consent to or 
refuse medical treatment irrespective of the reasons for, or consequences of, doing so.275 
Thus, it is important to note that ‘Islam encourages medication; but, once medication is 
seemingly futile; refusing, withholding, withdrawing and discontinuing such medication is 
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allowed...’276 In other words, it is not required that treatment be given or taken where it may 
have a low prospect of benefit or where the patient’s health will not be severely harmed or 
there is no definite likelihood of death, or where the attempt at cure is likely to lead to great 
pain or suffering.  
C. The religious and ethical consequences 
In the case of Makroh (blameworthy), Mandob (praiseworthy) and Mobah (indifferent) 
treatment, doctors have an ethical duty to respect patients’ wishes to either consent to or 
refuse medical treatment, so doctors should be considered to be ethically and religiously 
wrong if they do not respect patients’ wishes.277 
Muslim scholars have recognised that a person’s human dignity should be respected in 
Makroh, Mandob and Mobah treatments since there is no evidence that they would result in 
the patient’s death or severe harm.278 Thus, if a competent adult patient refuses medical 
treatment he/she does not commit a sin and he/she should not be ethically wrong.279 
In conclusion, the above discussion shows that while the Islamic Sharia recognises and 
supports respect for the competent adult patient’s autonomy, it is considered in a certain 
way. That is different from the Western view, as Islamic medical ethics is purely based on 
Islamic Sharia traditions.280 Thus, it can be said that what has been considered by Western 
medical ethics to some extent may not be compatible with the Islamic Sharia approach, for 
example the concept of the principle of respect for autonomy, regardless of the outcome 
(although treatment may in some cases be unlawful). Based on the understanding of Islamic 
Sharia of the purpose of medicine, the principle of respect for autonomy can be illustrated 
in the approach to a patient’s consent or refusal of treatment. If this would not lead to death 
or severe harm or commit an act that is against Islamic Sharia principles, the competent adult 
patient can make his/her autonomous decision and enjoy respect for that autonomy. If 
Islamic Sharia principles were breached, then respect for the competent adult patient’s 
autonomy would be limited. Failure to adhere to Islamic Sharia principles would be regarded 
as sinful and in breach of medical ethics in the situations discussed. The legal consequences 
will be considered in Chapter four. This approach of Islamic Sharia has important 
																																								 																				
276	M	Yousuf	and	A	Fauzi	‘Euthanasia	and	Physician-Assisted	Suicide:	A	Review	from	Islamic	Point	of	View’	p.	64-65.	
277	M	AlShanqeeti,	Ahkam	Algerhah	Altibeh	w	Alather	Almotrtbh	Aliha.	(Rulings	of	Medical	Surgeries	and	Their	
Consequences).	p.	368.	
278	E	Anna	et	al.		‘Communicating	with	Muslim	Parents:	‘the	Four	Principles’	are	not	as	Culturally	Neutral	as	Suggested’	
p.	1384-1385.	
279	M	AlShanqeeti,	Ahkam	Algerhah	Altibeh	w	Alather	Almotrtbh	Aliha.	(Rulings	of	Medical	Surgeries	and	Their	
Consequences).	p.	171-172.	
280R	Veatch	A	Theory	of	Medical	Ethics	(1sted	Basic	Book	1981)	p.	56-58.	
Chapter two: Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabia medical ethics and law 
	
	 122	
consequences for the appropriate ethical approach to seeking consent to treatment and to 
information disclosure.     
Therefore, in the following part, this Chapter will examine the principle of respect for 
autonomy in respect to the requirement for information disclosure in accordance with 
Islamic Sharia. As with the discussion of consent, there are few sources that have 
specifically dealt with this issue. However, I have drawn points from those that are available 
and, because of the limited reference to the Islamic Sharia sources and Saudi Arabian 
medical ethics, I will also refer here to commentators’ views, where they have based them 
on their understanding of Islamic Sharia sources.  
5.2. The importance of information disclosure and respect for autonomy 
Since there is no straightforward reference in the Islamic Sharia sources that has specifically 
dealt with the issue of information disclosure, I will refer to a general statement in Islamic 
Sharia sources that can be applied to the issue. 
The Messenger PBUH said: ‘Leave that which makes you doubt for that which does not 
make you doubt.’281 Based on this statement it can be argued that one of the Islamic Sharia 
principles places importance on Yaqin (certainty) when a person is considering making a 
decision.282 Further, an Islamic Legal formula283 states: ‘To imagination without foundation 
in fact, no weight is given.’284 Thus, it can be said that, for autonomy to be respected in terms 
of making a decision, it is fundamental from the Islamic Sharia perspective that the decision 
should be based on knowledge and information.285 For a decision to be respected based on 
the Islamic Sharia understanding, it must be built on clear reasoning and information.286 
Hence, ‘it could be possible to say that absolute knowledge is predominant to individual 
autonomy’.287 Therefore, I would argue that the right of patients to receive information can 
be established in Islamic Sharia medical ethics based on doctors’ duties to respect autonomy, 
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since it must be understood that, under any concept of respecting choice, sufficient 
information is required to make that choice. 
5.2.1. Doctors’ duty to disclose information 
In order to understand the stance of Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical ethics on 
information disclosure, I will quote a statement in CEHP2013 which has recognised an 
ethical duty on doctors to provide information. It should be remembered that CEHP2013 is 
both an ethical and a legal code so I will reconsider the same statements in Chapter four 
when I discuss the topic from a legal angle. Based on this, I will consider the following 
issues: doctors’ duty to inform patients, what kind of information should be given, the issue 
of understanding, the acknowledgment of therapeutic privilege and patients’ right to refuse 
information. In addition to this statement, I will apply Islamic Sharia general principles that 
can be used to refer to this duty.  
CEHP2013 has stated that:  
‘The healthcare practitioner should present enough information in a language that the 
patient can understand about what he/she [the doctor] will do, and what is required 
from the patient, the possible consequences of the patient’s decisions, as well as 
potential complications and risks.’288 
Based on the above statement it is clear that doctors have an ethical duty to inform their 
patients. Islamic Sharia has considered the requirement for information disclosure as a 
means of respecting patient autonomy but it may also be justified by the concept of doctors 
needing to act with truthfulness and to provide appropriate advice.289 The holy Quran in 
translation states in general that: ‘O believers, do not stray from the path of God, and be with 
those who are truthful.’290 From this, it can be understood that, as part of Islamic Sharia 
medical ethics regarding doctors’ characters, doctors should be truthful, kind, modest and 
advisers to their patients.291 Such an acknowledgment by Islamic Sharia and CEHP2013 
shows the recognitions of doctors’ ethical duty to disclose information to patients. Having 
established that, the question which presents itself here is what information should be 
disclosed? 
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5.2.2. What should be disclosed 
CEHP2013 has provided the phrase ‘enough information’292 to state what information 
should be disclosed. I would suggest that this is unhelpful because it may not only cause 
ethical, but also legal, uncertainty as I will discuss in Chapter four. CEHP2013 does not give 
a definition of what is meant by ‘enough’ information although there is some further 
guidance on information disclosure. CEHP2013 states in chapter 2(C)1 that information 
should include what the doctor is proposing to do, his instructions to the patient and ‘the 
possible consequences of the patient’s decisions, as well as potential complications and 
risks.’293 Based on the view of Islamic Sharia medical ethics in respecting patients’ 
autonomy, CEHP2013 has also stated the doctors’ duty to inform the patient as follows: 
‘Tell the patient or whoever is acting on his/her behalf as soon as possible about 
the patient’s health condition, its causes, its possible complications, as well as 
the benefits of the diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. Additionally, introduce 
them to appropriate alternatives in diagnoses and treatment in a clear and honest 
way’.294 (The statement will be further discussed in Chapter four). 
The key factor here is that doctors are under an ethical (and a legal) duty to provide patients 
with ‘enough information’. Nonetheless, there remains a lack of clarity both as to how the 
standard of ‘enough information’ is to be judged and in other specific issues relating to 
information disclosure to the patient. 
In regard to the quality of the provided information, it should be accurate and reflect the state 
of the patient’s condition, as doctors have a duty to tell the truth, which derives from a basic 
principle of Islamic Sharia that not telling the truth is a very serious sin. In one of 
Messenger’s PBUH sayings: ‘...Falsehood leads to vice and vice leads to the Fire (Hell), and 
a person persists on telling lies until he is enrolled as a liar.’295 Hence, Muslim doctors should 
normally provide the patient with correct and accurate information, although there may be 
an exception to that which I will discuss below in regard to the notion of therapeutic 
privilege. In most cases, however, telling the truth would be regarded as essential and, in 
addition to the principles mentioned, it has been claimed that the patient-doctor relationship 
is based on trust.296 The concept of trust also requires doctors to be truthful with patients, 
and not to exaggerate about the case.297 Therefore, in providing patients with information 
that they ask for or need, doctors should tell the patient truthfully information that accurately 
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reflects the nature of the patient’s condition and the course of treatment that should be 
taken.298 
To demonstrate what information should ethically be disclosed, I would argue that it would 
be useful to consider Western medical ethics which were discussed in Chapter one. Full 
disclosure may be proposed as an ethical an ideal, but as I have explained, there are 
difficulties with setting this as a legal/ethical standard for information disclosure. The same 
difficulties would arise if it were considered that Islamic Sharia required full information 
disclosure in order to meet the appropriate standard. However, I would argue that the ethical 
standard of care I have proposed in Chapter one, to provide the patient with sufficient and 
understandable information to enable him/her to be self-determining, is also compatible with 
Islamic Sharia medical ethics. Islamic Sharia general principles focus on providing truthful 
and accurate information in order to assist the patient to make his or her own decision, and 
this is in line with a requirement upon doctors to provide sufficient information. This is also 
supported by CEHP2013 which requires doctors to disclose ‘enough’ information which 
may be regarded as being the same as ‘sufficient’ information. The principal problem 
remaining is in establishing whether the standard has been met, whether doctors or the 
patient’s perspective should be used.  
My argument is that Islamic Sharia principles, while focusing on doctor’s duties of 
truthfulness and emphasising the concept of trust, have at their heart the same reason for 
requiring information to be disclosed as in the Western tradition; namely, to protect patient 
autonomy. While there are more limitations on patient autonomy under Islamic Sharia, the 
need for disclosure of information so that the patient can make an informed decision is the 
same, although the consequences in terms of respecting the decision that has been made may 
differ from those which would be advocated under the approach to individual autonomy in 
Western medical ethics.  
Accordingly, what follows from this in applying Islamic Sharia principles is that the concept 
of respect for autonomy needs to put an ethical duty on doctors to disclose sufficient and 
understandable information to enable a competent adult patient to be self-determining and 
to respect his/her autonomy. The way in which Saudi Arabian medical law has approached 
this issue will be considered in Chapter four. As well as the need for information to be 
sufficient, my proposed ethical standard from Chapter one also requires consideration of the 
issue of patient understanding, which is dealt with next.   
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5.2.3. Doctors’ duty to ensure the patient can understand the information 
CEHP2013 has stated that ‘enough information’ should be provided in an understandable 
language for the patient.299 That may suggest it is not enough just to supply the patient with 
information: that information should also be understandable. However, the phrase ‘...in a 
language that the patient can understand’300 seems to refer only to the language itself being 
understandable, not to a doctors’ duty to ensure the patient can understand the information, 
which is rather different. CEHP2013 has no further explanation of what the doctor’s duty to 
ensure that the patient can understand the given information might be, so the notion of a 
wider duty to seek to ensure that the patient has understood remains unclear. This issue has 
not been addressed in legislation either. This suggests that there is a significant absence of 
recognition of an important aspect of a doctors’ duty in Saudi Arabian medical ethics and 
also in its law. 
However, such a duty can be based on Islamic Sharia general principles. Muslims have a 
duty to give advice to one who seeks or needs it, as Messenger PBUH said that Muslims 
should give counsel to people about what would be of benefit to or suitable for them.301 
Therefore, it can be understood that one of the doctors’ obligations, placed on them as an 
ethical and religious duty, is to give advice to the patient. That advice should be truthful, 
clear, and understandable and relate to the patient’s case,302 because normally a patient is 
not as educated and knowledgeable as their doctors about complex medical terms and 
procedures.303 Additionally, based on doctors’ ethical and religious duty to advise, the 
information that is given to the patient must include a clear explanation of the diagnosis, 
prognosis, proposed treatment, and available and alternative treatments or operations that 
involve lower risks, to allow patients to judge and to make their choices in a properly 
informed way.304 For example, a doctor should not operate on a patient unless there is no 
other suitable way to treat him/her,305 and the doctor should advise the patient about available 
alternative treatments. 
I would argue that the proposed ethical standard I have set in Chapter one can be applied to 
Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical ethics, as the patient should be provided with 
sufficient and understandable information to respect his/her autonomy and to be self-
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determining. Islamic Sharia considers the fundamentality of information and knowledge for 
a decision-making as I have above stated. In Chapter one, based on Western medical ethics 
it has been argued that imparting information to the patient is not enough, as that information 
would be only meaningful if it is understandable.306 Further to that, although it may be 
ethically ideal to ensure that the patient has understood the provided information, it is 
accepted that this will be difficult to achieve in practice, since even providing more 
information to the patient with a very clear explanation does not necessarily mean that the 
patient has in fact understood. Therefore, what should be aimed for as an ethical ideal in 
medical practice is that doctors should seek to ensure that, as far as possible, patients have 
understood the information by communicating with them and involving them in a clear 
discussion and explanation. Accordingly, doctors should have an ethical (and legal) duty to 
provide understandable information. This is compatible with Islamic Sharia principles, but 
at present this wider concept of the need to seek patient understanding of information has 
not been specifically addressed in CEHP2013 or in Saudi Arabian medical law (LPHP2005).   
A final question rises here is that; considering that Islamic Sharia has required that a decision 
should be built on knowledge, whether there are circumstances in which doctors may 
legitimately decide to withhold information. 
5.2.4. The use of the notion of therapeutic privilege 
CEHP2013 recognises that doctors have a duty to disclose to patients whatever information 
they need or ask for, which means that generally information should not be deliberately 
withheld and CEHP2013 has stated that this is the case ‘...even if it [the patient’s condition] 
was a serious and fatal one’.307 
It has been argued that in many respects the same principles of respect for autonomy and the 
need for information disclosure can be justified under both Western medical ethics and 
Islamic Sharia. However, AlBar and Pasha have observed that, although some doctors in 
Islamic countries have attempted to apply the Western concept of ethical standards, 
specifically the notion of respect for autonomy and the need to inform their patients, doctors 
have found difficulties in doing so in particular circumstances because this may appear to 
conflict with Islamic Sharia principles.308 One such situation is in dealing with elderly 
patients who suffer from serious illness as doctors have been said to depart from respecting 
patients’ autonomy by giving them more hope about the seriousness of their illness than is 
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justified, so as not to cause them distress.309 Nonetheless, AlBar and Pasha have argued that: 
‘The norms are changing rapidly and with expansion of education and globalization, the 
Western attitudes toward autonomy, privacy, and personal liberty are going to be more 
acceptable especially to the young educated generation.’310 There is an argument that the 
recognition of the doctors’ duty to provide the patient with whatever information he/she 
wants or asks for, may be more limited under Islamic Sharia principles. It has been narrated 
that the Messenger PBUH has said that: ‘When you enter upon one who is sick, cheer him 
up and give him hope of a long life, for that does not change anything (of the Divine Decree), 
but it will cheer the heart of the one who is sick.’311 Thus, it can be argued that, based on 
this statement, doctors can withhold information that may cause the patient serious harm, as 
the prophetic statement encourages and advises those who visit the patient to comfort 
him/her. Therefore, when the information is distressing or the patient’s case is severe, 
information might be withheld in his/her own interests.312 
In this regard, a question was submitted to the GPSRI asking whether ‘[d]octors may 
sometimes need to lie to their patients concerning the diagnosis of their cases especially as 
the patient may get worse if they know the reality about their case. Is a doctor sinful in such 
a case?’313 The GPSRI has ruled that: ‘It is permissible to lie to the patients if this is in their 
best interest and will have no harmful effects on the patient or anyone else. However, it will 
be more preferable and precautionary on the part of a doctor to intimate instead of explicitly 
lying.’314 
Although the GPSRI ruling seems to allow doctors in some situations to lie to their patients, 
it has indicated that it disapproves of lying. This is because lying, as I have stated above, is 
considered ethically and religiously wrong by Islamic Sharia. Further, lying to the patient 
about the reality of his/her health condition would breach the respect for the patient’s 
autonomy that Islamic Sharia has recognised.315 Doctors generally have a duty to provide 
the patient with truthful information and honest advice for the patient to make his/her 
decision, as that decision should be based on accurate information and knowledge. Lying 
would be in breach of that. 
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I would argue that because the GPSRI was answering a specific question that contained the 
word ‘lie’, this led the GPSRI to use the same word. The GPRSI ruling may implicitly accept 
the notion of therapeutic privilege because the reason for lying to patients is because some 
patients ‘...may get worse if they know the reality about their case’.316 For this reason, I 
would argue that if a question sought the GPSRI’s view regarding withholding information 
that may cause serious harm to patients it is mostly likely that the GPSRI would state a 
similar ruling. This is because the GPSRI has allowed doctors to lie (although Islamic Sharia 
has prohibited lying) in such cases, as doctors are doing that with a good intention: to prevent 
serious harm to the patient. Consequently, it is highly likely that this would lead the GPSRI 
to take a similar view on withholding information, since this is less ethically and religiously 
wrong than lying, and the doctor is doing that with the same good intention not to cause 
serious harm to the patient.  
Thus, with the assumption that the question to GPSRI also sheds light on withholding 
information, the GPSRI ruling has two interesting points. To allow the withholding 
information (therapeutic privilege), that should be based on two conditions (1) it should be 
in the patient’s best interest and (2) such an act should not cause harm to the patient 
him/herself or others (this may be relevant to withholding information about infectious 
diseases).317 Thus, it can be understood that the use of withholding information is limited. 
This view seems to be held by LPHP2005, as I will discuss in Chapter four. 
The recognition of the notion of therapeutic privilege can be illustrated further from the 
instructions that CEHP2013 has set in the event of breaking bad news to the patient: doctors 
should provide the patient with information in simple words and in a very kind and 
comfortable way.318 That is subject to doctors’ discretion, as they should ‘limit the 
information in a way that suits the patient’s knowledge and understanding of his/her health 
condition without the minutiae that would increase his/her worry.’319 
The reason for kindly telling bad news to patients can be seen as a religious duty, so as to 
remind the patient to be patient and comfortably accept his/her destiny,320 but that depends 
on the patient’s personal character. Thus, as long as the patient is a strong person and can 
receive such bad news doctors can inform him/her; otherwise doctors can withhold such 
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distressing information. Furthermore, there is an additional reason why patients should be 
told of their condition, if the illness is terminal, since the patient, according to Islamic Sharia 
teaching, should write his/her will, and prepare to depart from this life to the hereafter by 
doing more good deeds and seeking forgiveness.321 It is therefore only if informing him/her 
may cause serious harm, that doctors may exceptionally use another approach, such as 
informing his/her family in order that they may inform the patient, as the aim is to limit the 
patient’s distress.322 Otherwise, he/she should be given the information in a way that meets 
the patient’s needs, even if there is no cure. 
A final point here is that, if doctors breach their religious and ethical duties to provide 
patients with information that is required and necessary they should be religiously and 
ethically blamed, saving in the case where informing the patient would cause him/her serious 
harm.323 
This view of Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical ethics to recognise the use of 
withholding information in rare cases, when disclosing information causes serious harm to 
the patient, is comparable to the Western medical ethics that have been discussed in Chapter 
one. The emphasis by both Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical ethics is to limit the 
use of the therapeutic privilege to cases where information would cause serious harm to the 
patient. This would suggest, as with Western medical ethics’ view, that the withholding of 
information should not aim to cause the patient to change his/her decision. However, there 
is no clear statement on that point in Saudi Arabian law, and I would suggest that such an 
important issue should be addressed by way of legal reform. 
Having discussed the doctors’ ethical duty to disclose sufficient and understandable 
information, the remaining question here is whether patients have a duty to seek information.  
5.2.5. Patients’ duty to seek information 
It should be noted that CEHP2013 does not consider the issue of patients’ duty to seek 
information nor the case of patients’ refusing or waving their right to information. As there 
is no straightforward reference for that issue in Islamic Sharia medical ethics, in the 
following discussion I will apply the Islamic Sharia general principles and commentators’ 
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views to discuss these issues. Interestingly, LPHP2005 has recognised patients’ right to 
refuse information or waive their right to be informed324 as I will discuss in Chapter four. 
It can be argued that the duty to seek information does exist for patients, as they should ask 
questions about their health conditions in order to make their decisions. The holy Quran 
states in general that a person should ask knowledgeable people if he/she is ignorant about 
something.325 In addition, patients ethically and religiously must be truthful about their 
conditions and should provide doctors with true information and an accurate description of 
their health conditions in order for the doctors to treat them appropriately.326 
Further, as has been discussed above, based on Islamic Sharia, the decision to refuse or 
consent to treatment should be made in the light of information, because for an autonomous 
decision to be respected in Islamic Sharia that decision must be founded on clear 
knowledge.327 Furthermore, without receiving information, the patient’s consent to or refusal 
of treatment may be made on mistaken grounds and this may lead to severe pain or harm or 
even death.328 In other words, patients should know the basics about their case and treatment, 
and doctors should inform them so that proper choices can be made and appropriate 
treatment given.  
If a patient should not make choices unless he/she has sufficient knowledge and information 
about the issue, it can be said that the patient should not refuse to receive such information.329 
Equally, it could be argued that if Muslim doctors do not inform Muslim patients, even at 
the patient’s request, that would be against the Islamic Sharia teaching to give truthful advice 
to patients regarding their health conditions330 except where therapeutic privilege applies.   
However, if a competent adult patient refuses to receive information, there are two 
possibilities; first, if the patient’s refusal is a result of waving his/her religious and ethical 
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right to receive information in order to allow someone who he has appointed to receive that 
information instead.331 
In that case, the competent adult patient should not be religiously and ethically accountable, 
as he/she can in general exercise his/her right of mandate,332 and the one who has been 
appointed by the patient to act on his/her behalf must choose what is best for the patient.333 
The doctor’s duty to provide sufficient and truthful information and advice would then need 
to be discharged toward the representative instead of the patient. The patient could also 
empower doctors to act as their representatives and make choices for them. Nonetheless, 
doctors should, as far as they can, share information with the patient to consider what 
decision should be taken.334 
The second possibility is if the competent adult patient refuses to receive information but 
still wants to make his/her decision, either to consent to or refuse treatment, then the patient 
might be religiously and ethically accountable. This is because an acceptable decision from 
an Islamic Sharia perspective should be based on a clear foundation of knowledge and 
information, not just based on an assumption.335 In such a case, it can be learnt from Western 
medical ethics, as I have discussed in Chapter one that doctors should not force information 
on a patient who has clearly expressed his/her refusal to not be informed but should provide 
basic information to the patient. Accordingly, I would accept that an exceptional approach 
may be used such as trying to persuade patients to receive information to make a decision 
and, in a rare case, doctors might involve the patient’s family to persuade him/her  to receive 
the basic information.336 This needs to be more clearly addressed in Saudi Arabian medical 
ethics and law. If the patient still refuses, then I would argue that Islamic Sharia would not 
hold doctors accountable for not providing the information, as they have done their best to 
advise and may treat in the best interests of the patient. 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this Chapter has addressed the topic of Islamic Sharia sources and its relation 
to the formation of Saudi Arabian laws. It has shown that Islamic Sharia has a major 
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influence on the Saudi Arabian legal system and on forming the law in the country. It has 
shown that the Saudi Arabian legal system in its origin, development and so forth is different 
from the English legal system. However, it has also been argued that there is no barrier to 
Saudi Arabian law absorbing principles from other jurisdictions so long as they are not 
opposed to Sharia principles.   The common law tradition of English law (which, it has been 
suggested is in some ways similar to the tradition of Muslim scholars’ reflections) facilitates 
reasoned consideration of the rationale of legal development, facilitating consideration of 
the extent to which – if at all – Saudi Arabian law could or should adopt a similar approach 
as medical law develops. 
It has further been shown that Islamic Sharia recognises the importance of a general principle 
of respect for individual autonomy and Islamic Sharia jurisprudence has implicitly 
recognised that this requires respect for patients’ autonomous decisions and choices. 
However, this is subject to certain conditions. As Yousuf and Fauzi have argued, ‘[a]utonomy 
is important in the decision-making process if patients are able to understand and make 
intelligent decisions. Further, it must be exercised within certain limits and in conjunction 
with responsibilities towards others.’337 The patient’s decision should be built on a 
foundation of knowledge and awareness.338 Furthermore, Islamic Sharia concentrates on the 
individual’s right to decide or choose, but it also requires this to be exercised in line with 
general principles defining rights and freedoms. Autonomy may therefore be limited, where 
that may result in death or severe harm339 or the action is against Islamic Sharia principles, 
such as when the treatment is Wajib (obligatory) or Mohram (forbidden) for the patient to 
seek. The Messenger PBUH has stated: ‘There is no injury nor return of injury.’340 Therefore, 
a person should not cause severe harm to his/her health or allow him/herself to cause any 
damage to another or cause death; for example, if the doctor accepts the patient’s consent to 
treatment that is Moharm, which would cause the patient harm or if the refusal may lead to 
death. As one of Messenger’s PBUH sayings has indicated, the relationship among Muslims 
is strong like a single wall,341 so each one should respect the other and take proper care and 
responsibility for others. Further, if the treatment or operation (even it is harmless) is against 
Islamic Sharia respect for patients’ autonomy is limited and doctors must not respect such a 
decision or proceed with the treatment. This is because, it is not permissible to use prohibited 
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treatment as the Messenger PBUH has said: ‘Allah has sent down both the disease and the 
cure, and He has appointed a cure for every disease, so treat yourselves medically, but use 
nothing unlawful.’342 However, in other cases, the patient’s decision to consent to or refuse 
medical treatment will be respected – in situations that fit when the treatment is Makroh 
(blameworthy), Mandob (praiseworthy) and Mobah (indifferent) for the patient to seek.343 
I have also discussed the issues that related to the Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical 
ethics’ view in regard to the notion of information disclosure. The thesis has found that, 
although Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical ethics have recognised the doctors’ 
ethical duty to inform patients, the standard of ethical information disclosure has not been 
adequately addressed. The thesis proposed standard, would give respect to patients’ 
autonomy to make their choice and decision in accordance with Islamic Sharia tradition.  
The thesis’s standard of information disclosure will be examined in Chapter three against 
English law, which will show that it seems to some extent at least, to be achievable. This 
Chapter has found that the ethical standard proposed can be adopted under Islamic Sharia 
and Saudi Arabian medical ethics. However, it must be noted that since there are limits on 
patient autonomy, doctors may not have to abide by the decision of the patient, so there must 
be an addition to the ethical principles from Chapter one for Saudi Arabia, so that the 
standard must comply with Islamic Sharia principles. In fact, however, it has been argued in 
this Chapter that this does not affect the standard of information disclosure;  only the need 
to respect a decision about treatment made by a patient should be in accordance with Islamic 
Sharia. 
Therefore, the Western standard of care is not identical to the Islamic Sharia standard of 
care. However, although there may be limits on consent and refusal of consent under Islamic 
Sharia, this may not mean that a different standard needs to apply to information disclosure. 
In other words, a doctor still needs to give sufficient understandable information to enable 
choice in all cases where what the medical treatment that the doctor proposes is lawful and 
available (since the doctor cannot know what decision the patient will reach if properly 
informed), whereas the doctor may not have to act in accordance with the patient’s decision. 
Thus, the doctor, for example, needs to allow the patient to consider and make a choice about 
available and lawful treatment, but need not act in accordance with the choice made, 
depending on what that decision is and what it is about. Bearing that in mind, therefore, the 
ethical standard will be examined against Saudi Arabian medical law in Chapter four so as 
																																								 																				
342S	Abi	Dawud	Sunan	Abi	Dawud	at	http://sunnah.com/abudawud/29/20	(accessed	16/08/2015).	
343	See	the	discussion	above.	
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to examine to what extent this standard has been met by the current Saudi Arabian medical 
law. 
Further, in this Chapter the thesis has discussed the issue of doctors’ ethical duty to ensure 
that the patient can understand the given information, and it has found that such a duty has 
not been stated by CEHP2013. Thus, it can be learned from Western medical ethics that such 
a duty to ask doctors to take all proper steps to ensure that the patient can understand the 
provided information should be adopted by CEHP2013. Further in regard to the notion of 
withholding information, Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical ethics have recognised 
such a notion in rare cases, when that would cause serious harm to the patient. Additionally, 
I have suggested adoption of the Western medical ethics that withholding information should 
not be used as a means to seek to change the patient’s decision, and that this must be stated 
by CEHP2013. Finally, Islamic Sharia medical ethics have recognised patients’ duty to seek 
information, the duty to waive their rights to be informed and the right to refuse information. 
These rights should be adopted by CEHP2013 and clearly instructed doctors on what to do 
in such cases. 
In summary, I have therefore concluded that Islamic Sharia places a religious and a 
professional ethical duty on doctors to disclose sufficient and understandable information to 
competent adult patients to enable them to consent to or refuse treatment. It is necessary to 
respect patient autonomy and self-determination in accordance with Islamic Sharia. 
However, unlike the Western ethical approach to respect for patient autonomy discussed in 
Chapter one, Islamic Sharia places specific requirements on patients and doctors to protect 
and preserve health and life, which may take priority over individual choice. The scope for 
refusing consent and for consenting to what is considered to be harmful treatment is therefore 
more limited under Islamic Sharia. Despite this, there appears to be the same requirement to 
provide sufficient information to patients about their condition and treatment regardless of 
the ultimate decision. There is, however, scope for doctors to withhold information and even 
to ‘lie’ to patients in some circumstances and the level of information that needs to be 
disclosed appears in ethical guidance issues to the medical profession to leave considerable 
discretion to them as to what should be disclosed. 
The consequences of failing to abide by Islamic Sharia in terms of sinfulness and breach of 
ethical standards have been considered in this Chapter. As noted, there is a distinction 
between these kinds of consequences and whether conduct is punishable by law even though 
the sources of the obligation may be the same. Chapter four will go on to examine what 
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standard is currently being used in Saudi Arabian medical law, and how it reflects Islamic 
Sharia ethics in the matter of patients’ consent to treatment and information disclosure. 
Further, the ethical standard to disclose sufficient and understandable information to patients 
to respect their autonomy and to be self-determining will be examined, to suggest that Saudi 
Arabian law should move to adopt the prudent patient standard. 
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Chapter three: English law on consent and information disclosure 
1. Preface 
It has already been seen that the dominant ethical principle in most Western jurisdictions is 
respect for autonomy. While different views exist on how this is to be interpreted, at a 
minimum this principle requires that a competent, adult patient is given sufficient, 
intelligible information on which to base a decision that is right for them, even if it is not 
clinically optimal. In what follows in this Chapter, the English law position will be 
considered from an historical to a contemporary position, in order to evaluate both the 
influence of the principle of respect for autonomy on the current law and to identify in what 
way(s) this principle’s importance has been developed over the years. 
2. An overview of the importance of consent 
A simple definition of consent is a ‘permission for something to happen or agreement to do 
something’.1 Proceeding on the basis of the requirement of consent as a means of respecting 
a person’s autonomy is important from an ethical perspective (as has been discussed in 
Chapter one) and it is also vital from a legal point of view.2 Kennedy and Grubb observed 
that: ‘The ethical principle that each person has a right to self-determination and is entitled 
to have their autonomy protected finds its expression in law through the notion of consent’.3 
It is therefore a basic principle under English law that a competent adult patient has the right 
to consent to or refuse medical treatment.4 The requirement of consent is principally to 
guarantee that there is no unwarranted interference with the bodily integrity of the person 
him/herself.5 This also protects choice, due to the legitimate expectation that a competent 
adult’s permission will be required before physical interaction can take place. As Lord Goff 
stated: ‘every person’s body is inviolate...’6 and this principle means that ‘everybody is 
protected not only against physical injury but against any form of physical molestation.’7 
Accordingly, it has been argued that the competent adult patient’s valid consent to medical 
treatment is what makes doctors touching, performing surgery and dealing with the patient’s 
																																								 																				
1	Oxford	online	dictionaries	at	http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/	(accessed	14/01/2015).	
2M	Jones	Medical	Negligence	(4thed	Sweet	&	Maxwell	2008)	para	6.001	p.	548.	
3	I	Kennedy	and	A	Grubb	Medical	Law	p.	575.	
4	For	example,	Re	F	(Mental	Patient:	Sterilisation)	[1990]	2	AC	1,	also	known	F	v	West	Berkshire	H	A	[1989]	2	All	E.R.	545,	
Re	T	(Adult:	Refusal	of	Medical	Treatment)	[1993]	Fam	95	and	Airedale	NHS	Trust	v	Bland	[1993]	A.C.	789.	See	also,	A	
Grubb	et	al	Principles	of	Medical	Law	(3rded	OUP	2010)	para	8.10	p.	444.		
5S	McLean	and	G	Maher	Medicine,	Morals	and	the	Law	p.	79.	
6Collins	v	Wilcock	[1984]	1	W.L.R.	1172	p.	1177.	
7Ibid.	
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body legal.8 There are some limited exceptions to the need for consent, such as the treatment 
of an incompetent adult in an emergency.9 However, Lord Donaldson clearly stated the 
importance of gaining patients’ consent, as His Lordship declared: 
‘The law requires that an adult patient who is mentally and physically capable of 
exercising a choice must consent if medical treatment of him is to be lawful, 
although the consent need not be in writing and may sometimes be inferred from 
the patient’s conduct in the context of the surrounding circumstances’.10 (His 
Lordship’s emphasis) 
His Lordship’s statement shows that prima facie it is unlawful for doctors to examine or 
conduct a treatment upon a patient without the competent adult patient’s legally valid 
consent. Furthermore, although consent legalises interference with the patient’s body, it 
limits that interference to the scope of that consent, which must not be exceeded.11 
Furthermore, consent to treatment can be withdrawn.12 In this way, consent protects both the 
patient’s freedom of choice and bodily integrity.13  Some of those principles are similar to 
the stances of both Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medial law as will be discussed in 
Chapter four. 
3. Legal consequences of proceeding without a competent adult patient’s 
consent 
Under English law, it has been stated in Airedale that: ‘Any treatment given by a doctor to 
a competent patient which is invasive (i.e. which involves any interference with the physical 
integrity of the patient) is unlawful unless done with the consent of the patient; it constitutes 
the crime of battery and the tort of trespass to the person’.14 Therefore, the legal 
consequences of a treatment or operation on a competent adult patient that has proceeded 
without consent require to be examined further in order to demonstrate the seriousness in 
which violations of respect for autonomy in the sense of bodily integrity and freedom of 
choice are held.15 In the following, the thesis will examine the legal consequences of treating 
competent adult patients without consent.  
																																								 																				
8J	Mason	and	G	Laurie	Mason	and	McCall	Smith’s	Law	and	Medical	Ethics	p.	71.	
9M	Brazier	and	E	Cave	Medicine,	Patients	and	the	Law	(5thed	Penguin	Books	2011)	p.	121.	
10Re	T	(Adult:	Refusal	of	Medical	Treatment)	[1993]	Fam	95	p.	103.	
11For	example,	Devi	v	West	Midlands	RHA	[1980]	C.L.Y.	687	and	Williamson	v	East	London	and	City	HA	[1998]	Lloyd's	
Rep.	Med.	6.	
12	J	Herring	Medical	Law	and	Ethics	p.	165.	
13A	Grubb	et	al.	Principles	of	Medical	Law	para	8.22	and	8.28	p.	449	and	451.	
14Airedale	NHS	Trust	v	Bland	[1993]	A.C.	789	p.	882.	
15	See	for	examples,	J	Herring	Criminal	Law	Text,	Cases,	and	Materials	(5thed	OUP	2012),	A	Simester	et	al.	Simester	and	
Sullivan's	Criminal	Law:	Theory	and	Doctrine	(5thed,	Hart	2013).	
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It will start with a brief discussion of criminal liability since, while it is important to explain 
how the law distinguishes between types of conduct and their consequences, criminal law is 
seldom involved in issues concerning consent to medical treatment.  
3.1. Criminal liability 
For an act to be a crime, two elements: Actus reus and Mens rea must be present. There is a 
Latin maxim, ‘Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’, which can be translated as meaning 
that ‘an act does not make a person guilty unless his mind is guilty.’16 Therefore, the Actus 
reus is the act or conduct or offence that is banned,17 while the Mens rea is the ‘…criminal 
intention, or an intention to do the act which is made penal by statute or by the common 
law.’18 To establish that a doctor’s behaviour amounted to a crime (as with any citizen) both 
elements would need to be established.19 While the contrary could be proved, there is an 
assumption that doctors’ intentions in respect of their patients are benign;  establishing mens 
rea would therefore be extremely difficult.20   
However, there are some actions where a doctor’s behaviour could amount to a crime, such 
as where he/she is involved in euthanasia, which is illegal even at the patient’s own request.21 
This view coincides with both Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian law’s view as will be 
mentioned in Chapter four. There are other circumstances in which the infliction of grievous 
bodily harm to patients will be regarded as illegal, for example, female genital mutilation.22  
However, given the rarity of criminal prosecutions in the routine practice of medicine in both 
English and Saudi Arabian laws, criminal liability will not be further considered in this 
Chapter. Of greater significance to this thesis, therefore, is civil liability. 
																																								 																				
16	J	Gray	Lawyers’	Latin	Avad-Mecum	(New	ed,	Robert	Hale	2006)	p.	23,	see	also,	Haughton	v	Smith	[1975]	A.C.	476	p.	
491.	
17M	Allan	Textbook	on	Criminal	Law	(13thed	OUP	2013)	p.	18,	Fagan	v	Metropolitan	Police	Commissioner	[1969]	1	Q.B.	
439	and	D	Ormerod	and	K	Laird	Smith	and	Hogan’s	Text,	Cases	and	Materials	on	Criminal	Law	(11thed	OUP	2014)	p.	642-
643.	
18Allard	v	Selfridge	&	Co	Ltd	[1925]	1	K.B.	129	p.	137,	R	v	Venna	[1976]	Q.B.	421	p.	428	and	R	v	Savage	(Susan)	[1992]	
1AC	699	p.	740.	
19	For	example,	J	Herring	Medical	Law	and	Ethics	p.	103-104	and	O	Quick	‘Prosecuting	‘Gross’	Medical	Negligence:	
Manslaughter,	Discretion,	and	the	Crown	Prosecution	Service’	(2006)	33(3)	Journal	of	Law	and	Society	421–450.	
20	Nonetheless,	doctors	would	rarely	cause	deliberate	harm	or	death	to	their	patients,	there	have	been	some	famous	
cases	which	were	tragedy	and	shocking	to	the	British	public	such	as,	doctor	Harold	Shipmen	who	killed	some	of	his	
patients	during	the	1980s	and	1990s.).	Other	form	of	doctors’	criminal	liabilities	may	include	the	action	of	the	gross	
negligence	of	manslaughter,	where	there	is	no	need	to	prove	that	there	was	intention	to	harm	patients,	nonetheless	it	
is	very	rare	to	be	committed	by	medical	staffs.	For	example,	R	v	Adomako	[1994]	1	A.C.	171	[1994]	3	All	E.R.	79.			
21Suicide	Act	1961	(SA1961)	(as	amended)	section	2.	See	Chapter	one	for	further	discussion.			
22Female	Genital	Mutilation	Act	2003,	section	1	(1)	and	section	2.	
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3.2. Civil liability 
There are two main types of civil action that can be brought where the adequacy of consent 
by a patient is at issue: battery (trespass to the person) and negligence.23 Both are actions in 
tort, the former being a species of intentional tort, the latter being an unintentional tort.24 
For a claim in the tort of battery to succeed, there are two main elements that must be 
established. They will be discussed further under the related areas but they are: 1. Intention 
of the defendant. 2. Direct infliction of force by the defendant on another. Usually there will 
also be a third element: damage which occurred as a result of the defendant’s action.25 This 
can be physical or non-physical. However, it should be noted that establishing that damage 
has resulted from the contact is not a fundamental requirement for the tort of battery because 
battery itself is actionable. It will however affect the level of compensation recoverable.26 
By contrast, for a claim for the tort of negligence to succeed there are three major elements 
to be established, which will be discussed below in depth; 1. Duty of care owed by the 
defendant to the claimant 2. Breach of the duty of care by the defendant. 3. Causation, as the 
breach of the duty by the defendant must cause damage to the person.27 
While both kinds of claim can arise as a result of inadequate information disclosure, the two 
types of action differ in important respects and it is therefore necessary to consider them 
separately. I will start by briefly considering the action of battery as most of claims in regard 
to the failure to adequately inform the patients are brought under negligence. Then the action 
in negligence will be discussed. 
3.2.1. Battery 
As noted above, for the tort of battery to be established, the defendant must intend to direct 
force against another, though he/she need not intend the harm that resulted. It has been 
argued that intention might be difficult to establish,28 but in some cases it can be obvious; 
for example if the defendant aimed an object at another person and then the defendant hit 
																																								 																				
23	S	McLean	Autonomy,	Consent	and	the	Law	p.	70-73.	
24	M	Lunney	and	K	Oliphant	Tort	Law	Text	and	Masteries	p.	52.	
25	F	Trindade	‘Intentional	Torts:	Some	Thoughts	on	Assault	and	Battery’	(1982)	2(2)	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	211-
237	p.	219	and	W	Landes	and	R	Posner	‘An	Economic	Theory	of	Intentional	Torts’	(1981)	1	International	Review	of	Law	
and	Economics	127-154	p.	140.	
26M	Jones	Medical	Negligence	para	6.004	p.	549-550.	
27D	Owen	‘The	Five	Elements	of	Negligence’	(2006)	35(4)	Hofstra	Law	Review	1671-1686	p.	1674.	
28	M	Lunney	and	K	Oliphant	Tort	Law	Text	and	Masteries	p.	52.	
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the person with that object, the intention is clear.29 In other situations, the defendant’s 
intention can be inferred from the circumstances.30 
In regard to the second element, the need for direct contact, or what it called ‘unlawful force’ 
should be considered.31 The term unlawful force has raised some issues as to what is meant 
by it. A possible answer might be that as Holt CJ held ‘[t]he least touching of another in 
anger is a battery.’32 However, it has been suggested that touching in anger or using force is 
not required since the focus of the legal action is protecting bodily integrity so that even 
touching a person while they were sleeping might amount to a battery.33 Nevertheless, the 
concept of battery is more than simply touching without explicit consent. As Lord Goff in 
Collins v Wilcock34 recognised, there was a general exception ‘embracing all physical 
contact which is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life.’35 As an example, 
His Lordship considered the action of ‘jostling’ like in ordinary events where the touching 
between people is unavoidable.36 Lord Goff additionally recognised the lawfulness of 
touching someone to draw and engage his attention ‘though of course using no greater degree 
of physical contact than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances for that purpose.’37  
However, in a subsequent House of Lords case, Lord Goff in Re F38 disapproved of the use 
of hostility as an element of the action for battery as the requirement of hostility was ‘difficult 
to reconcile with the principle that any touching of another’s body is, in the absence of lawful 
excuse, capable of amounting to a battery and a trespass.’39 Lord Goff’s view is preferable, 
because hostility is an unclear and ambiguous concept, and does not sufficiently pay regard 
to respect for the individual’s bodily integrity.40 In medical cases, conduct complained of by 
patients is unlikely to amount to what could be described as hostile in intent, but it may well 
go beyond the bounds of everyday touching and for which consent would be expected to 
avoid liability in battery.  
																																								 																				
29	Ibid.	
30	F	Trindade	‘Intentional	Torts:	Some	Thoughts	on	Assault	and	Battery’	p.	215-220.	
31Collins	v	Wilcock	[1984]	1	WLR	1172	p.	1177.	
32Cole	v	Turner	(1704)	6	Mod	194	per	Holt	C.J.	
33	M	Lunney	and	K	Oliphant	Tort	Law	Text	and	Masteries	p.	60-61.	
34Collins	v	Wilcock	[1984]	1	W.L.R.	1172.	
35Ibid.	p.	1177.	
36Ibid.	
37Ibid.	
38Re	F	(Mental	Patient:	Sterilisation)	[1990]	2	AC	1.	
39Ibid.	p.	73.	
40S	Pattinson	Medical	Law	and	Ethics	p.	116-117.	
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In addition to this, it has been argued that an element of direct contact is a vital requirement 
for an action of battery.41 In many medical treatment situations, this is likely to be easy to 
establish, because doctors need to touch the patient to examine him/her or operate on 
him/her. In line with what has been discussed, this would amount to battery if there was no 
consent from a competent adult patient.42 On the other hand, if the doctor just prescribed a 
medication to the patient and the patient took that medication, such conduct would not be 
actionable as a battery, as there is no direct bodily contact.43 
Finally, as noted above, the occurrences of damage in the sense of physical or psychological 
injury is not necessary, because battery itself is actionable so there is no need to prove there 
is additional harm.44  
Hence, for patients to succeed in a claim of battery the patient would need to establish that 
either no consent at all was given or that his/her consent was not legally valid (as it was put 
in Chatterton v Gerson, consent was not ‘real’).45 As I will go on to discuss next, there are 
a number of ways in which a patient may seek to establish that a purported consent was not 
legally valid.  
One would be where the patient claims that he/she was not competent to give a legally valid 
consent to treatment. Competence can be defined as the ability of a person to consent to or 
refuse something.46 It should be remembered that the scope of this thesis is limited to 
competent adult patients and as a general principle, under English law, a competent patient 
is considered to be in full charge of his/her own will to consent to or refuse medical 
treatment.47 The issue of competence, therefore, will be dealt with only briefly. 
A ‘person of full age’ in England and Wales is one of or over the age of 18.48 At this age it 
is recognised that a person has full legal capacity, although legal capacity may be acquired 
for certain purposes below this age; for example, the Family Law Reform Act 1969 permits 
people of the age of 16 or above to provide a legally valid consent to treatment.49 Though 
																																								 																				
41A	MacLean	Autonomy,	Informed	Consent	and	Medical	Law	a	Relational	Challenge	p.	150.	
42For	example,	R	v	Brown	[1994]	1	A.C.	212	and	Airedale	NHS	Trust	v	Bland	[1993]	A.C.	789.	
43S	McLean	Autonomy,	Consent	and	the	Law	p.	71.	
44M	Jones	Medical	Negligence	para	6.004	p.	549-550.		
45Chatterton	v	Gerson	[1981]	Q.B.	432	p.	443.	
46Ibid.	p.	290-291.	
47Re	T	(Adult:	Refusal	of	Medical	Treatment)	[1993]	Fam	95	p.	120-121.	Per	Lord	Reid	in	S	v	McC:	W	v	W	[1972]	A.C.	24	
p.	43.	
48Family	Law	Reform	Act	1969,	section	1	(1).	
49Ibid.	section	8	(1).	
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the ability of people under the age of 16 is an interesting and controversial issue, it will not 
be considered further.50 However, it is undoubtedly the case that people who have reached 
the age of 18 years have the legal status to consent to medical treatment or refuse it and they 
are presumed to be competent to do so, unless proven otherwise.51 Currently, the definition 
of competence seems to be settled in England and Wales by the Mental Capacity Act 2005.52  
Another possible route may be to claim that the patient’s consent was not given voluntarily. 
It has been said that to describe a person as ‘willing’ is to say that person is in a position that 
he/she can make a free choice without overwhelming interference with his/her will.53 Putting 
this into a legal framework, it has been observed that, for a patient’s consent to be legally 
valid, it is required to be given voluntarily and freely without duress or coercion.54 Therefore, 
if there is any kind of coercion55 or undue influence56 on the patient or if the patient’s consent 
was based on a legally significant mistake57 this would make the consent legally invalid.  
Finally, there is the more significant issue for this thesis, that the patient has not been 
adequately informed about the nature of the treatment or procedure. As discussed in Chapter 
one, requiring consent to be obtained before medical treatment is provided is believed to be 
a way to allow a person to control important aspects of his/her life. Respect for patients’ 
autonomy both in terms of their bodily integrity and self-determination is recognised through 
the legal doctrine of consent.58 Hence, as a general rule a treatment cannot be administered 
to an adult competent patient without his/her consent, even if treatment is painless or for the 
patient’s benefit.59 The question here is what amounts to sufficient information disclosure to 
provide a legally valid consent?  
																																								 																				
50	For	further	information,	see	for	example,	Gillick	v	West	Norfolk	and	Wisbech	Area	Health	Authority	and	Another	
[1986]	AC	112.	S	Elliston	‘If	You	Know	What’s	Good	for	You:	A	Consideration	of	Refusal	of	Consent	to	Medical	Treatment	
by	Children’	in	S	McLean	(ed.)	Contemporary	Issues	in	Law,	Medicine	and	Ethics	(Dartmouth	1996)	29-55.	
51Re	MB	[1997]	2	FLR	426.	See	now	the	MCA2005.	
52	See	Mental	Capacity	Act	2005	section	1(2),	section	2(1	and	3)	and	section	3(1)	(a,	b,	c	and	d).	
53	Per	Scott	LJ	in	Bowater	v	Rowley	Regis	Corporation	[1944]	K.B.	475	p.	479.	See	also,	L	Roberts	‘Informed	Consent	and	
the	Capacity	of	Voluntarism’	(2002)	159	Am	J	Psychiatry	705-712	p.	709.	
54Latter	v	Braddell	[1881]	50	LJQB	448	CA.	
55	See	for	example,	Latter	v	Braddell	[1881]	50	L.J.	Q.B	448	CA,	Freeman	v	Home	Office	[1984]	Q.B.	524,	Re	T	(Adult:	
Refusal	of	Medical	Treatment)	[1993]	Fam	95,	Airedale	NHS	Trust	v	Bland	[1993]	A.C.	789,	L	Curzon	and	P	Richards	The	
Longman	Dictionary	of	Law.	p.	102,	R	Faden	and	T	Beauchamp	A	History	and	Theory	of	Informed	Consent	p.	339	and	P	
Bean	Mental	Disorder	and	Legal	Control	(1sted	CUP	1986)	p.	139.		
56	See	for	example,	Re	T	(Adult:	Refusal	of	Medical	Treatment)	[1993]	Fam	95,	Mrs	U	v	Centre	for	Reproductive	Medicine	
[2002]	EWCA	Civ	565	para	15	and	S	Pattinson	'Undue	Influence	in	the	Context	of	Medical	Treatment’	(2005)	5(4)	
Medical	Law	International	305-317	p.	305.		
57	See	for	example,	Appleton	v	Garrett	[1996]	P.I.Q.R.	P1,	R	v	Richardson	(Diane)	[1999]	Q.B.	444,	R	v	Naveed	Tabassum	
[2000]	2	Cr.	App.	R.	328	and	E	Jackson	Medical	Law	Text,	Cases	and	Materials	p.	283.	
58A	Grubb	et	al	Principles	of	Medical	Law	para	8.01	p.	439-440.	
59Re	F	(Mental	Patient:	Sterilisation)	[1990]	2	A.C.1.	
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The approach of English law to considering whether a competent adult patient’s consent 
furnishes a defence to battery is to require what is called a ‘real consent’, as Bristow J stated 
in Chatterton.60  The case was the first under English law to consider the concept of battery 
in medical cases.61 It is significant because it sought to draw a distinction between failures 
of information disclosure that would invalidate consent, and hence lead to an action in 
battery, and failures which would not invalidate consent but which should be dealt with 
instead by an action in negligence. It involved a patient who was in need of an operation to 
remove the pain associated with the scar of a previous hernia operation. The doctor was a 
specialist in this kind of pain treatment and the operation relieved the pain but only 
temporarily. The doctor gave the patient an injection, which was unsuccessful in removing 
the pain and caused the patient to lose the sensation in her right leg, which affected her 
mobility.62 The patient claimed that her consent was not legally valid as the doctor did not 
inform her about the risks.63 The case failed in battery, because the patient had understood 
the general nature of the operation and ‘…she was under no illusion…’64 about it so her 
consent was real.  
Bristow J established that: 
‘It is clear law that in any context in which the consent of the injured party is a 
defence to what would otherwise be a crime or civil wrong, the consent must be 
real....In my judgment once the patient is informed in broad terms of the nature 
of the procedure which is intended and gives her consent, that consent is real...’65 
Bristow J held that ‘...the cause of the action on which to base a claim for failure to go into 
risks and implications is negligence, not trespass’.66 He justified his judgment not to consider 
the action as battery because: ‘...it would be very much against the interests of justice if 
actions which are really based on a failure by the doctor to perform his duty adequately to 
inform were pleaded in trespass’.67 Therefore, Bristow J’s judgment importantly established 
that a consent deemed to be ‘real’ in the sense described can be a defence for doctors against 
the claim of battery.68 Therefore, it seems likely that a consent that includes two elements – 
provision by the doctor of broad information of the nature of the treatment or medical 
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procedure and consent by the patient to that treatment or procedure – would prevent a doctor 
from accountability in battery.69 
However, from the case law derived from Chatterton it seems now that an action based on 
the tort of battery can only be raised where the competent adult patient has been treated with 
no consent at all or where he/she has refused consent.70 It appears that the courts have 
restricted the application of the tort of battery in cases of the failure to disclose adequate 
information and prefer the matter to be brought on the grounds of negligence.71 Jackson 
argued that medical treatment that could be dealt with through the tort of battery has become 
rare, as it may be difficult for patients to convince the court that their consent was not legally 
valid as a result of inadequate information disclosure due to the way in which the courts have 
approached these issues.72 As a result, most cases where it has been alleged that there has 
been a failure to disclose to adequate information to the patient will be dealt with under the 
tort of negligence. This preference of English law to consider most failures to provide 
adequate information to patients as negligence claims will be seen to be similar to that of 
Saudi Arabian medical law. This will be discussed further in Chapter four. 
Having therefore examined the action of battery, the legal requirements for a valid consent 
and the way that the courts have distinguished between claims that can be heard in battery 
and those that must be heard in negligence it is now time to turn to this second civil action 
to examine it in greater detail. 
3.2.2. Negligence 
Under this topic, the thesis will examine the failure to provide competent adult patients with 
adequate information that they require to make a decision regarding proposed treatment, and 
how that failure would be considered under the legal action of negligence. This will include 
discussions of the duty of care and the breach of the duty of care, with reference to three 
different standards of care. It will explore the development of the standard of care in the UK 
in relation to the issues the thesis has highlighted in the beginning of this Chapter. The issue 
of causation will be discussed as the final element.  
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3.2.2.1. Information disclosure and negligence 
Information is one of the vital elements to a patient being able to consider whether to give 
consent to medical treatment. However, as has been discussed, the consequences of failing 
to obtain a legally valid consent from a competent patient differ from those where a legally 
valid consent has been obtained but without the provision of adequate information about risks 
and alternatives to treatment. The former results in either civil or criminal actions in battery, 
trespass to the person or assault; the latter are dealt with by the civil tort concept of 
negligence.73 Hence, ‘[a] claim based on negligence is apt when the claimant has given his 
consent to an act of the general nature of that which is performed by the defendant but there 
is a flaw in this consent and, as a result, there has been no consent to certain concomitant 
features of the act of which he was unaware’.74 
Broadly, as noted previously, there are three factors that must be established in order for a 
patient to succeed in a case of alleged negligence in information disclosure, and these will 
now be discussed in turn. 
A. The Duty of Care 
The concept of the duty of care has been recognised by English law for a long time.75 It has 
been said that ‘a duty of care is an obligation on one party to take care to prevent harm being 
suffered by another’.76 It applies ‘whenever one person can reasonably foresee that his 
conduct may cause harm to another’.77 In Donoghue v Stevenson78 Lord Atkin recognised 
what is called the ‘neighbour principle’.79 As His Lordship observed: ‘in English law there 
must be, and is, some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which 
the particular cases found in the books are but instances’.80 Hence, Lord Atkin asserted that: 
‘You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can 
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law 
is my neighbour? The answer seems to be - persons who are so closely and 
directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation 
as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which 
are called in question.’81 
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From Lord Atkin’s statement of the law it can be understood that the idea of a person’s duty 
to others is based on the responsibility to avoid foreseeable harms to them. Therefore, a 
person is under a duty to avoid causing harm to another person ‘…who could reasonably be 
foreseen to be affected by our activities. Such a person is described in law as our 
neighbour’.82 Therefore, it can be argued A owes B a duty of care if A ought to take care of 
B’s interests.83 This approach is used to identify circumstances and relationships where our 
negligent behaviour should have legal consequences. 
In terms of doctors and patients, the nature of their relationship easily gives rise to the 
imposition of a duty of care owed by the doctor to the patient, and it has been observed that 
the ‘…relationship itself is a source of obligations and responsibilities’.84 Brazier and Cave 
state that ‘[a] patient claiming against his doctor, or a hospital, generally has little difficulty 
in establishing that the defendant owes him a duty of care’.85 That ‘little difficulty’ to 
establish the doctor’s duty of care towards a patient can be understood as only likely to arise 
if there is a question as to when the doctor-patient relationship came into being. Thus, for 
example, it has been said that a doctor is not under an obligation to treat anyone who is not 
his patient.86 Further, it has been argued that under English law there is no legal obligation 
that requires doctors to immediately provide medical care to anyone who seeks it,87 thus a 
doctor need not to say he is a doctor if a request has been made for medical assistance to a 
passenger in an airplane.88 In similar situations in Saudi Arabia, Islamic Sharia and Saudi 
Arabian laws do seem to place a duty on doctors to provide medical assistance to any patient 
in need of treatment, as long as the patient’s case is an emergency and the doctor can provide 
appropriate treatment. Failure to do so may attract civil or criminal liability as will be 
discussed in Chapter four. 
However, in the case of General Practitioners (GPs) only,89 it seems that English law under 
the National Health Service (General Medical Services Contracts) Regulations 2004, has 
imposed a duty of care on GPs toward not only to patients who are in the GPs lists,90 but 
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also temporary residents.91 These regulations have also extended a duty of care on GPs to 
attend cases outside their zone area of practice clinic,92 new registered patients,93 patient 
who have not been seen for three years94 and patients aged 75 years and over.95 Hospitals 
that have an accident and emergency department owe a duty to all patients that attend 
irrespective if they have been hospital patients or not. When the hospitals offer emergency 
services it means that they are offering a public service to meet a public need, so they must 
accept anyone who attends.96 It should be noted that the duty of care in the National Health 
Service is derived from the law of tort, because the patient does not become involved in a 
contractual relationship with the doctors who treat him/her.97 In private hospitals, however, 
the duty of care may also be established by the contract between the parties, as either an 
explicit or an implied term.98 Nevertheless, this is usually the most straightforward of the 
elements of a medical negligence claim as the necessary relationship for a duty of care is 
established in most cases when the doctor agrees to treat the patient.99 By way of comparison, 
Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian laws both acknowledge that the patient doctor relationship 
can be considered under the law of tort or contract, as will be discussed in Chapter four.  
B. Breach of the duty of care. 
Doctors’ duties of care in the medical field involve a number of different aspects, which 
include providing diagnosis, prognosis and treatment, obtaining consent; providing 
information to the patients and so forth.100 However, as the thesis is primarily concerned 
with information disclosure as part of obtaining consent to treatment for competent adult 
patients, the discussion will be focused on that component.  
In respect of information disclosure, it has been argued that ‘…it is now widely accepted 
that one aspect of the duty of care which doctors owe to their patients is to provide them 
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with information’.101 However, a significant problem is the amount and type of information 
that is required to be disclosed to meet the legal duty of care and the courts have adopted 
different approaches.102 A number of models have been proposed that seek to describe the 
nature of information that could be required to be disclosed. In doing so, they attempt to 
consider the circumstances in which a failure to provide information should result in legal 
liability in negligence. They provide a way of evaluating different standards of care adopted 
by the courts in determining whether there has been a breach of the duty of care.   
Establishing what the standard of care is has importance in deciding an individual doctors’ 
or healthcare provider’s liability in negligence.103 The patient has the burden of proof to 
establish that the doctor has failed to meet the standard of care that is required by the law.104 
Furthermore, the standard of care is vital to the law as it is applied and used by courts to 
examine the facts in individual cases.105 As noted in Chapter one, English common law is 
based on a system of precedent so, in the absence of legislation which is on point, the 
development of law rests upon the judiciary, based on the analysis of legal principles adopted 
in previous case law.106 An important facet of the development of the standard of care is to 
verify when conduct has failed to meet an appropriate standard that may enable claimants to 
be compensated for acts of negligence.107 However, it may be argued that it is also important 
for the courts to determine the standard of care so it can become the accepted professional 
practice that doctors must follow.108 
In what follows the thesis will discuss three standards for information disclosure: 1. The 
subjective patient standard, 2. The professional (reasonable doctor) standard and 3. The 
prudent patient standard.109 The thesis considers these three standards for the following 
reasons: Firstly, to show the alternative positions that might be taken toward a legal standard 
of care in information disclosure and the implications of these different approaches. 
Secondly, to provide a basis to compare the standard of care in terms of information 
disclosure in both English and Saudi Arabian medical laws. In both legal systems the 
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professional standard of care has historically been used, but with different considerations 
and interpretations. Thirdly, to provide a context for evaluating the significant changes that 
it will be argued have been made to the standard of care in England: from an approach that 
provides greater protection of medical practitioners from liability to the one that shifts more 
emphasis to the protection of patient autonomy.110 Last, to examine in particular the prudent 
patient standard that has been considered by Lord Scarman in English law in the landmark 
case of Sidaway111 and which more recent cases appear to have moved towards, culminating 
in the UK Supreme Court case of Montgomery.112 The scope for adoption of this standard in 
Saudi Arabia will be discussed in later Chapters. Therefore, the focus will be on these three 
standards, which will be vital to the considerations of this thesis.   
The subjective (patient) standard 
The subjective patient standard is a standard that requires doctors to disclose whatever 
material information is necessary – according to that individual patient’s circumstances, 
conditions, beliefs, historical family health and so forth – for the patient to be able to properly 
make a decision.113 It is therefore based on the subjective (individual) needs of that patient 
for information to be sufficiently self-determining. The subjective standard recognises that 
one individual patient may have a different need for information to another and places a duty 
on doctors to provide information based on a single patient’s priorities, interests and 
needs.114 It has been argued that the importance of a subjective standard based on the 
materiality of information to an individual patient is that it enables the patient to give a 
properly informed consent.115 It permits the individual patient to decide what he/she wants 
to know rather than information disclosure being determined by what others, such as doctors, 
or even by what a ‘reasonable patient’116 might want. It would arguably most serve respect 
for individual autonomy to consider each patient’s values and needs instead of having a 
standard of care which is determined by the needs or views of others. As Chapter one has 
shown, there are some arguments which hold that respect for patients’ autonomy would put 
an ethical duty on doctors to disclose exactly what information each patient needs.117 Hence, 
the subjective standard would require a doctor to disclose all relevant facts and information 
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not from the perspective of the doctor’s judgement of what is best for the patient, but based 
on what the individual patient wants to receive.118 
Nevertheless, the subjective patient standard has been subject to significant criticism, which 
explains why it is rarely advocated as a legal standard of information disclosure. It has been 
said that it is not logical and practical to expect that doctors would know in detail what a 
particular patient’s background, interests, beliefs and needs are,119 and then be able to tailor 
information specifically and accurately in complete accordance with the patient’s needs and 
in relation to his or her case.120 It has already been argued, in Chapter one, that it is not 
appropriate to give patients all possible information since providing too much information 
to a patient can hinder their decision making as much as not providing enough. Deciding 
accurately exactly how much information an individual patient wants, based on their 
individual values, aspirations and preferences, is a very difficult judgment to make. At the 
least, it would require the doctor to spend a huge amount of time and effort to find out about 
each patient’s background, values, wishes and so forth, which is likely to be unachievable in 
practice.  
There is also the danger that if injury occurred to patients as a result of an inherent risk in 
the treatment of which they were not warned, that they would be able to succeed in 
establishing a breach of the duty of care if they simply said that this information was 
necessary to their decision, no matter how unlikely or small the risk was. This suggests it 
would be difficult for the law to apply the subjective standard of care, as it would open the 
door wide for undeserving medical claims because, with the benefit of hindsight, patients 
may not tell the truth about what they needed to know to make a decision.121 While this 
raises issues of causation and the credibility of the patient in saying what they would have 
done if given additional information, it is also relevant to what standard of information 
should be disclosed and whether there has been a breach of the duty of care. The subjective 
patient standard of information disclosure relies entirely on the patient’s evidence of what 
was important for them to know. Arguably, it would not be fair to hold doctors liable for 
negligence based on the subjective patient standard, because they could not be expected to 
know precisely what each particular patient’s desires, wishes, fears and so forth are.122 It has 
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therefore been said that the subjective standard is inappropriate as a legal test as it would put 
‘…an unfair legal burden on physicians to intuit the idiosyncratic values and interests of 
their patients and then leaves physicians at the mercy of their patients’ self-serving hindsight 
in court’.123 Certainly, in terms of establishing doctors’ legal liability in negligence, it would 
be difficult to rely on it.124 
Nonetheless, I would agree with Jackson’s position that, although there have been criticisms 
of the subjective standard of care, that does not necessarily mean that the subjective standard 
should be entirely ‘dismissed as an impractical ideal’ at all.125 Indeed, the subjective standard 
does seem to meet the thesis proposed standard of care to provide the patient with sufficient 
information that enables him/her to be self-determining to make his/her decision. However, 
it is important to recognise that this ethical ideal may not be one which can be translated 
entirely into a legal standard of care for the above reasons. The interests of fairness to both 
parties require that the standard of care set in negligence is not unachievable. Negligence 
does not require that the highest possible standard is reached, only that a defendant has not 
fallen below an appropriate minimum standard. Reasonableness is an inherent part of 
establishing an appropriate minimum standard of care in negligence.126 Therefore, although 
I have proposed that as an ethical ideal the patient would have sufficient information to be 
self-determining (and this would entail him/her receiving only and all of the information that 
is relevant to his/her choice), there must be some recognition in law of what it is reasonable 
that a doctor might expect the patient to need to know, rather than the legal test being based 
solely on the patient’s evidence of what they wanted to know. As will be seen, this kind of 
approach is one that has come to be taken in English law in recent cases, such as 
Montgomery. This case, as will be discussed, has been regarded as significant in establishing 
a prudent patient test in English law and, as such, moving away from a professional standard. 
This shift will provide the basis for considering the current position adopted in Saudi Arabian 
law and to propose reforms, which will be discussed in Chapter four and the Concluding 
Chapter.  
The professional and prudent patient standards are the final two of the three standards of 
care to be discussed and they are the ones that have been more commonly applied in practice. 
It can be argued that throughout the development of English law in dealing with information 
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disclosure cases, there have been two	distinguishable stages; first, the doctor-centred stage 
where by applying the professional standard of care doctors’ views were given more priority. 
Second the patient-centred stage, where courts give more consideration to patients’ 
autonomy and rights.  
The Doctor-centred stage (the professional standard)  
The professional standard can be described as a standard that places a duty on doctors to 
disclose information to patients that reasonably prudent doctors would have disclosed to 
patients in the same situation.127   
In Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co128 Alderson LJ stated that ‘negligence is the omission 
to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily 
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and 
reasonable man would not do’.129 A reasonable person has been described colourfully as ‘the 
man in the Clapham omnibus’.	130  
This test of reasonableness can also be applied to professional practice such as medicine.131 
However, this test has been modified to take account of the fact that when a person is acting 
in the exercise of professional skills, it would not be appropriate to judge them simply against 
the standard of the average reasonable person. In the case of doctors, therefore, a professional 
practice standard was developed, initially in the leading Scottish case of Hunter v Hanley.132 
The case involved a patient who was given an injection, but suffered an injury as a result of 
the breaking of hypodermic needle. She claimed that the injury was caused by the defender’s 
negligence as he failed to exercise a proper standard of care and competence.133 The pursuer 
was successful at trial, which was heard by jury, but the case was remitted to the Court of 
Session to consider whether the jury had been misdirected on the test for negligence. Lord 
President Clyde observed that:  
‘To establish liability by a doctor where deviation from normal practice is 
alleged, three facts require to be established. First of all, it must be proved that 
there is a usual and normal practice. Secondly it must be proved that the defender 
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has not adopted that practice, and thirdly (and this is of crucial importance) it 
must be established that the course the doctor adopted is one which no 
professional man of ordinary skill would have taken if he had been acting with 
ordinary care.’134 
Accordingly, it was the practice of the profession, or a ‘custom test’ that was set which 
examines a doctor’s conduct against the normal conduct of his profession or craft.135 This 
test is applied in other areas of professional negligence.136 In regard to the medical 
profession, Lord President Clyde concluded that ‘the true test for establishing negligence in 
diagnosis or treatment on the part of a doctor is whether he has been proved to be guilty of 
such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be guilty of if acting with ordinary care’.137 
The defender’s motion was upheld and a new trial was ordered on the basis that there had 
been a misdirection on the law. 
The test in Hunter was upheld in the later English case of Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee.138 These cases therefore have formed the foundation of the 
establishment of the professional standard that came to be adopted by English law.139 In 
Bolam, Bolam voluntarily agreed to be treated, as a result of the treatment, he suffered from 
injuries. Nonetheless, although he had consented to the treatment he claimed that (1) he was 
not informed about the risks associated with the treatment undertaken (negligence in 
information disclosure) and (2) he was not given the appropriate relaxation drug or 
physically restrained (negligence in treatment).140 Based on the expert witnesses’ opinions 
as to what should have been considered in Bolam’s course of treatment, there were different 
views on how to proceed. 
First, in terms of the alleged negligent treatment,141 expert witnesses agreed that there was a 
respected body of medical opinion that was in opposition to the use of relaxation drugs and 
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considered that less use of restraint would result in fewer injuries.142 McNair J gave his 
assessment of the legal standard to be met as follows: 
‘He [a doctor] is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a 
practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that 
particular art. Putting it the other way round, a doctor is not negligent, if he is 
acting in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of 
opinion that takes a contrary view.’143 
McNair J believed that doctors ‘…cannot obstinately and pig-headedly’144 apply an old 
method to treat a patient ‘if it has been proved to be contrary to what is really substantially 
the whole of informed medical opinion’.145 Therefore, for a doctor to say he would not use 
anaesthetics, for example, and that he would still use discredited methods to treat ‘clearly 
would be wrong’.146 Thus, it can be said that in terms of negligence in treatment by doctors, 
the professional standard was applied, which places heavy reliance on expert medical 
evidence about practice accepted as proper by the profession.  
Second, in terms of warning of risks of treatment (the alleged negligence in information 
disclosure), according to expert witnesses’ opinions in Bolam on behalf of the defendants, 
the practice at that time was not to warn patients about the risks of a medical treatment if 
doctors believed these were small, unless the patient asked.147 On the other hand, Bolam’s 
expert witness claimed that ‘it would not be right not to warn a patient of the risks of the 
treatment’.148 McNair J found the amount of information that was given to Bolam was in 
accordance with an accepted responsible body of medical opinion at that time; therefore, the 
doctor should not be considered negligent.149  
In other words, it appeared that the same approach was taken toward alleged negligent 
treatment and alleged negligence in disclosing information about risk. Since Bolam this 
approach to establishing whether there has been a breach of the duty of care has been cited 
in many different aspects of medical treatment case law.150 The applicability of Bolam 
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became central to the important case of Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors.151 
This case is of particular interest for the extensive discussion of the appropriate standard of 
care and the variety of approaches taken by the judges. 
The professional standard based on Sidaway 
Sidaway suffered from a trapped nerve and consented to an operation to be relieved of the 
pain this caused. Unfortunately, as a result of the operation, she was left paralysed. Sidaway 
raised an action claiming that her doctor had been negligent, both in terms of the conduct of 
the treatment and, more importantly for this thesis, in that the doctor had not given her the 
necessary information about the risks (less than 1 per cent risk of paraplegia) involved in the 
surgery before she consented to it.152 In Sidaway, the court found that at the time of the 
operation some, but not all, doctors would find it acceptable not to inform Sidaway about 
the risks of paralysis.153 In reaching their decision that Sidaway’s action should fail, as she 
could not prove that the doctor breached the duty of care, the Law Lords (in the House of 
Lords)154 presented a variety of reasons to support their judgments. Kennedy commenting 
on Sidaway that: 
‘It is a fair summary to say that the House was divided three ways. Lord Scarman 
opted for a radical shift. Lord Diplock adopted a decidedly conservative view of 
the law. Lord Bridge, with whom Lord Keith concurred, and Lord Templeman 
chose what may be described as middle way, in what may be said to be the true 
tradition of the pragmatism of English law.’155  
Adopting Kennedy’s observation, the importance of the Sidaway case depends on an 
examination of their Lordships’ views regarding what standard should be applied to 
determine legal liability for negligent information disclosure. His approach to the 
categorisation of the strands of judgment is adopted below. 
A decidedly conservative approach to the law (Unmodified Bolam) 
Miola wrote that Lord Diplock in Sidaway treated the issue in this case as a purely legal 
matter, not an ethical one which involved consideration of respect for patient autonomy,156 
since His Lordship stated that it was ‘…a naked question of legal principle.’157 Lord Diplock 
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held that a doctor’s duty of care was inseparable into different aspects depending on the type 
of conduct under consideration. Accordingly, it would be wrong to apply different standards 
to different duties: it should be one standard for all doctors’ duties regarding their patients.158 
His Lordship stated that: 
‘In modern medicine and surgery such dissection of the various things a doctor 
had to do in the exercise of his whole duty of care owed to his patient is neither 
legally meaningful nor medically practicable.’159 
Therefore, in terms of examining doctors’ liability in the provision of information about the 
proposed treatment to patients, Lord Diplock strongly argued that the Bolam test was merely 
a modern interpretation of the ancient rule of common law.160 Thus, His Lordship was 
convinced that the Bolam test’s role was clear in ‘...laying down a principle of English law 
that is comprehensive and applicable to every aspect of the duty of care owed by a doctor to 
his patient in the exercise of his healing functions as respects that patient’.161 Lord Diplock 
argued that ‘in matters of diagnosis and the carrying out of treatment the court is not tempted 
to put itself in the surgeon’s shoes; it has to rely upon and evaluate expert evidence.’162 
However, he also observed that it would not be enough for one school of thought in medical 
practice to be against the doctor to establish liability,163 as he then set out the view that it 
was not for the court ‘...to give effect to any preference it may have for one responsible body 
of professional opinion over another, provided it is satisfied by the expert evidence that both 
qualify as responsible bodies of medical opinion’.164 Furthermore, it seems that Lord 
Diplock’s approach was far away from being based on patient self-determination165 as His 
Lordship was clearly in favour of supporting doctors’ professional judgement about 
disclosing information rather than supporting the patient’s right to information he would find 
relevant to making a decision about treatment. This may therefore be seen as a doctor-centred 
approach with a limited role for the court in evaluating the professional expertise and 
integrity of the expert witnesses, not in judging the correctness of their conclusion on what 
information should in fact have been disclosed. However, even on this approach a doctor 
must apply ‘...diligence, care, knowledge, skill and caution...’166 to treat the patient. As 
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Kennedy and Grubb stated, the duty imposed by law is to exercise reasonable care to treat, 
diagnose and give information.167 However, for Lord Diplock, that duty is ‘…as [a] single 
comprehensive duty covering all the ways in which a doctor is called upon to exercise his 
skill and judgment’.168 Therefore, Lord Diplock dismissed the appeal, since applying a 
professional practice standard in this way he concluded there had been no breach of this duty 
and the patient had been sufficiently informed.169 I will argue that the formulation of the 
Bolam test by Lord Diplock so as to assert that the professional standard is applicable to all 
medical cases, including the failure to warn the patient about risk, is similar to the way the 
duty to disclose is approached in Saudi Arabian medical law. 
Middle way (Modified Bolam) 
Although Lords Bridge, Keith and Templeman raised a number of issues relating to patients’ 
need for information, they took the view that the duty of care should be based on what a 
responsible professional would disclose (the professional standard), albeit that they 
suggested some modification of this standard. 
Both Lords Bridge (with whom Lord Keith agreed) held that the starting point was that the 
Bolam test should be applied: 
‘[A] particular treatment must primarily be a matter of clinical judgment. It 
would follow from this that the issue whether non-disclosure in a particular case 
should be condemned as a breach of the doctor’s duty of care is an issue to be 
decided primarily on the basis of expert medical evidence, applying the Bolam 
test.170 
However, Lord Bridge seems to have adopted a modified Bolam test171 as His Lordship 
proceeded on the basis of the patients’ right to receive information,172 although that should 
be subject to ‘clinical judgement’ in disclosing medical information to a patient.173 Thus, in 
the first place, whether a doctor has failed to disclose adequate information to the patient 
relies on the judgement of a responsible body of medical opinion.174 Nonetheless, Lord 
Bridge believed that the court should have the last word on what standard of care should be 
set, as he noted that ‘I do not see that this [the Bolam] approach involves the necessity to 
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hand over to the medical profession the entire question of the scope of the duty of 
disclosure’.175 Importantly, His Lordship indicated that ‘...if there is a conflict of evidence 
as to whether a responsible body of medical opinion approves of non-disclosure in a 
particular case, the judge will have to resolve that conflict’.176 Based on Lord Bridge’s views 
it appears that the court should play a role in judging expert evidence, which seems a 
departure from Lord Diplock’s view, which sought to avoid this.177 Lord Bridge seems to go 
further than this and recognises that the court may have the final say by declaring that the 
doctor was negligent, even though there were doctors who would accept that the action of a 
doctor to not disclose risks was defendable and proper.178 According to Lord Bridge’s view, 
judges may be able to prefer one school of thought over another;179 consequently, the court 
can decide whether a school of thought’s view is unreasonable.180 In Lord Bridge’s words: 
‘But even in a case where, as here, no expert witness in the relevant medical field 
condemns the non-disclosure as being in conflict with accepted and responsible 
medical practice, I am of the opinion that the judge might in certain 
circumstances come to the conclusion that disclosure of a particular risk was so 
obviously necessary to an informed choice on the part of the patient that no 
reasonably prudent medical man would fail to make it.’181 
Lord Bridge suggested that information that ought to be disclosed was that ‘…involving a 
substantial risk of grave adverse consequences’.182 His Lordship then illustrated that risk by 
giving the example of ‘…the ten per cent risk of a stroke from the operation’,183 which His 
Lordship drew from the Canadian case of Reibl v Hughes.184 Lord Bridge averred that, in a 
similar case, such a risk should be disclosed in the absence of a convincing reason ‘why the 
patient should not be informed.’185 Furthermore, His Lordship insisted that ‘…a doctor, 
recognising and respecting his patient’s right of decision, could hardly fail to appreciate the 
necessity for an appropriate warning’.186 Nonetheless, with Lord Bridge’s example of a 10% 
risk of stroke as a basis for deciding the significant risk of adverse consequences that no 
prudent medical man would fail to disclose, it has been said that Lord Bridge’s view could 
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generate more legal dispute and that it would be ‘dangerous’ to depend on ‘statistical 
probability’.187 The terms ‘substantial’ and ‘grave’ risk have been criticised, as they raise 
issues of who should decide what they mean and who should judge them.188 Further, the 
reliance on the notion of percentage risk would create problems for the law as that would 
suggest that the law’s role would be ‘a simplistic and arithmetical one, merely concerned 
with expert evidence on percentages’.189 Further, the use of percentages would move 
experts’ evidence to focus to the percentage risk involved in a treatment rather than on what 
information doctors should disclose to patients.190 Despite concerns that Lord Bridge’s view 
regarding the assessment of risks that should be disclosed was not a sufficient clarification 
of Bolam, His Lordship’s view has been cited with approval in subsequent cases, such as in 
Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS trust.191 Lord Bridge also considered whether 
doctors should clearly answer the questions their patients ask, and indicated that ‘the doctor’s 
duty must, in my opinion, be to answer both truthfully and as fully as the questioner 
requires’.192 
Despite this, based on the facts, the appeal was dismissed by Lords Bridge and Keith, as the 
information given to the patient was in accordance with a responsible body of medical 
opinion and the level of risk was not sufficient to require a departure from that.193 
Lord Templeman did not refer to the Bolam test, or specifically state which test should be 
applied to what information should be disclosed.194 However, arguably, Lord Templeman’s 
view was closer to Lord Bridge’s view than the other Law Lords.195 Thus His Lordship’s 
view can also be considered as in favour of a modified Bolam test. Lord Templeman 
supported patients’ self-determination and their right ‘…to decide whether or not to submit 
to treatment recommended by the doctor.’196 Nevertheless, he declared that ‘I do not 
subscribe to the theory that the patient is entitled to know everything nor to the theory that 
the doctor is entitled to decide everything’.197 For Lord Templeman, the reason for disclosing 
information is to enable the patient to make a balanced decision; hence, the doctor should 
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provide the patient with ‘sufficient information’ to do so.198 The doctor should tell the patient 
about the diagnosis and the recommended treatment and the doctor must do that in 
accordance with his training and knowledge about what to say, which allows the patient to 
make the final choice.199 Although Lord Templeman recognised that the patient should be 
provided with ‘sufficient information’,200 His Lordship also seems to have considered the 
notion of therapeutic privilege. In His Lordship’s words  
‘the doctor impliedly contracts to provide information which is adequate to 
enable the patient to reach a balanced judgment, subject always to the doctor’s 
own obligation to say and do nothing which the doctor is satisfied will be 
harmful to the patient.’201 
This however appears to be a restricted view of the application of therapeutic privilege, as 
discussed earlier and the starting point is that the patient is entitled to decide for him/herself. 
Lord Templeman also held that in order for the patient to make a ‘balanced judgment if he 
chooses to do so, the patient needs to be aware of the general dangers and of any special 
dangers in each case without exaggeration or concealment’.202 Notably here, Lord 
Templeman attempted to distinguish between ‘general’ and ‘special’ risks of treatment. The 
precise meaning of these terms is a matter of debate which will be considered later, but for 
the moment what is important to note is that categorising a risk as either ‘general’ or ‘special’ 
had a bearing for Lord Templeman on the duty to disclose it. For general risks, if patients 
have been made aware ‘that a major operation may entail serious consequences’, they cannot 
complain about insufficient information disclosure.203 Further, in the case of general risks, 
doctors should wait for patients to ask specifically for more information.204 For a special risk 
Lord Templeman held that doctors should voluntarily inform patients if ‘...there is some 
danger which by its nature or magnitude or for some other reason requires to be separately 
taken into account by the patient in order to reach a balanced judgment in deciding whether 
or not to submit to the operation’.205 
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In fact, Kennedy and Grubb argued that Lord Templeman’s categorisation of risks is just a 
‘distinction without a difference’.206 They came to that conclusion as they tried to evaluate 
what Lord Templeman meant by his distinction by examining the terms ‘general’ and 
‘special’ risks in the light of Canadian common law, as they argued that in his judgment His 
Lordship seemed to reinterpret the position of the law in Reibl v Hughes207 and White v 
Turner208 and read them in a way that other have not.209 In those cases, a general risk was 
said to be one that attends to all medical treatments or procedures,210 whereas a special risk 
is the inherent risk in a particular procedure that may occur because of either the ‘nature of 
the procedure itself’ or because of a particular circumstance that is related to a patient.211 
However, what Kennedy and Grubb suggested is that Lord Templeman does not appear to 
have adopted this distinction in using these terms and they further argued that His Lordship’s 
statements were not consistent.212 His Lordship seemed firstly to hold that a general risk that 
the patient needs to know about is a risk which has ‘serious consequences.’213 Later on His 
Lordship stated that: ‘In the case of a general danger the court must decide whether the 
information afforded to the patient was sufficient to alert the patient to the possibility of 
serious harm of the kind in fact suffered.’214 (Emphasis added). Thus, this later statement 
from Lord Templeman is contradictory with the first one, ‘since to be aware of the kind of 
harm requires information of a different order to that needed to know that serious 
consequences might follow.’215 (Emphasis added).	Neither of His Lordship statements seems 
to use general risks in the sense used by the Canadian courts.  
Kennedy and Grubb also argued that despite the lack of clarity of Lord Templeman in 
distinguishing between general and special risks, he sought to impose a stronger duty on 
doctors to disclose a special risk.216 That can be understood from Lord Templeman’s 
assertion that: ‘There is no doubt that a doctor ought to draw the attention of a patient to a 
danger which may be special in kind or magnitude or special to the patient.’217 Kennedy and 
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Grubb argued that the phrase ‘special to the patient’ can only be determined by the particular 
patient, but the words ‘kind’ or ‘magnitude’ do not add any additional explanation if the 
judge of what is a special risk is the patient himself.218 Thus, they claim that Lord 
Templeman’s view may suggest that doctors ‘must disclose that which the specific patient 
would need to know’219 but as they point out, this was ‘of course, rejected elsewhere in the 
speech of Lord Templeman himself.’220 
I would agree with Kennedy and Grubb’s conclusions that Lord Templeman’s speech  
suffers from ‘a degree of internal inconsistency.’221 In places it ‘embraces a test based upon 
what the particular patient would wish to know’222 but His Lordship seems for the most part 
to have rejected this. It seems more likely that His Lordship’s speech should be treated as a 
guideline based on the reasonable doctor standard of care, subject to some modification. 
Kennedy and Gubb concluded that Lord Templeman’s view was that ‘...medical opinion 
whilst relevant, was not conclusive, as in other areas of life, the court ultimately set the 
standard. In this, he has much in common with [L]ord Bridge.’223 
A related matter on which Lord Templeman focused was the role of the courts in evaluating 
expert evidence to determine whether the standard of care had been met. In His Lordship’s 
speech in Sidaway, Lord Templeman considered that ‘it is for the court to decide, after 
hearing the doctor’s explanation, whether the doctor has in fact been guilty of a breach of 
duty with regard to information’.224 Therefore, a court could find doctors negligent if the 
‘…court is satisfied that the doctor blundered and that the patient was deprived of 
information which was necessary for the purpose’.225 In other words, although the evidence 
of expert witnesses is important and the Bolam test is relevant, the courts retain a final 
supervisory power to determine whether or not medical opinion about the appropriateness 
of disclosing information meets the required legal threshold.226 Despite this, as with Lord 
Diplock, based on the facts, Lord Templeman held that the appeal should be dismissed, as 
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His Lordship was ‘...satisfied that adequate information was made available to Mrs 
Sidaway.’227 
To sum up what has been discussed so far on the professional standard endorsed in Sidaway, 
Lord Diplock was the only Law Lord who clearly considered the Bolam test to be applicable 
with no restriction at all on applying it in either the performance of treatment or the context 
of consent. As His Lordship asserted: 
‘To decide what risks the existence of which a patient should be voluntarily 
warned and the terms in which such warning, if any, should be given, having 
regard to the effect that the warning may have, is as much an exercise of 
professional skill and judgment as any other part of the doctor’s comprehensive 
duty of care to the individual patient, and expert medical evidence on this matter 
should be treated in just the same way.’228 
Lords Bridge, Keith and Templeman had concerns regarding how the Bolam test should be 
applied, as they felt that doctors should not be the only determiners of how much information 
patients should be given, and accordingly suggested some modification of it.229 However, 
Lord Templeman also seems to have given some scope for the use of therapeutic privilege 
to allow doctors to withhold information when disclosing such information would harm the 
patients.230 Indeed, Grubb observed that: ‘The need for a therapeutic privilege to withhold 
information that might harm the patient is at the heart of the majority view in Sidaway that, 
at least prima facie, Bolam should apply.’231 (His emphasis). However, the views of the 
majority endorsed the Bolam test to a greater or lesser extent;232 and in so doing, the 
professional standard. As will be discussed, this standard and how it should be interpreted 
has formed the basis of the development of English law until comparatively recently. 
The case of Sidaway, however, also highlighted an alternative approach to information 
disclosure to the professional standard (with or without modification) in the judgment of 
Lord Scarman: the prudent patient standard. This is the last of the three standards of 
information disclosure to be considered. 
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The patient-centred stage (the prudent patient standard) 
It can be argued that Lord Scarman’s judgement in Sidaway was the first step in placing 
more emphasis on patients’ wishes and respecting their rights and autonomy. 	
The prudent patient standard requires doctors to disclose information more closely in 
accordance with patients’ need for information to arrive at a choice than the professional 
standard. According to this approach, doctors must disclose relevant and material 
information about treatment and its risks that reasonable patients233 would want to know in 
order to make their decision to accept or refuse medical treatment.234 It is based on 
considering the reasonable or prudent patients’ needs and wishes for information rather than 
relying simply on doctors’ judgements about the benefits or risks of treatment. Accordingly, 
doctors should assess the information that needs to be given to patients based on prudent 
patient values.235 It has been argued that the prudent patient standard is a more appropriate 
means of protecting patients’ interests and self-determination in decision-making than a 
professional standard.236 This is because the disclosure of information is focused on patients’ 
needs, which gives them more weight in determining what is deemed to be appropriate 
information disclosure.237 For Kennedy, this represents a radical shift in the direction of the 
standard of care from that of the other Law Lords.238 
Lord Scarman in Sidaway (a radical shift) 
Lord Scarman based his approach on the American case of Canterbury v Spence.239 In 
Canterbury the court considered that the disclosure of risk is vital for patients to make their 
own decisions about medical treatment, stating that: 
‘[T]o bind the disclosure obligation to medical usage is to arrogate the decision 
on revelation to the physician alone. Respect for the patient’s right of self-
determination on particular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians 
rather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves’.240 
This statement in Canterbury shows not only the role of the law in setting the standard of 
care, but also the court’s recognition of the importance of respecting patient self-
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determination. In fact, the court in Canterbury placed a great emphasis on the patient’s right 
to be informed which can be fulfilled by placing a duty on the doctor to disclose information 
that a prudent patient would require.241 In other words, ‘to safeguard the patient’s interest in 
achieving his own determination on treatment,’242 the court in Canterbury considered that it 
is for the law, not the medical professional, to set ‘...the standard for adequate disclosure’.243 
This recognition of the respect due to patient autonomy and self-determination by the court 
in Canterbury was not surprising. Many decades prior to Canterbury, Cardozo J asserted in 
the famous case of Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital244 that: ‘Every human being 
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what should be done with his own 
body.’245 This classic statement demonstrates the American courts’ interest in protecting 
patient autonomy.246 Thus, it can be argued that the approach shown in Schloendorff can be 
seen as the foundation of the Canterbury decision that has become most commonly known 
as the prudent patient standard.247 The court concluded that ‘the test for determining whether 
a particular peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient’s decision: all risks that 
might potentially affect the decision must be unmasked.’248 
However, it is important to note that although the court referred to ‘all risks’ material to the 
patient’s decision being unmasked, it did not in fact adopt a subjective patient test. Instead, 
the material risks that doctors must disclose are ‘…when a reasonable person, in what the 
physician knows or should know to be the patient’s position, would be likely to attach 
significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed 
therapy’.249(Emphasis added). Therefore, doctors must provide patients with any 
information that reasonable people would regard as significant about what is involved in 
their treatment.250 Lord Scarman in Sidaway expressed approval of the Canterbury approach, 
stating that ‘I think the Canterbury propositions reflect a legal truth which too much judicial 
reliance on medical judgement tends to obscure.’251 Therefore, His Lordship held that a 
patient’s right to be informed must be protected, as he stated that: 
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 ‘[I]t would be a strange conclusion if the courts should be led to conclude that 
our law, which undoubtedly recognises a right in the patient to decide whether 
he will accept or reject the treatment proposed, should permit the doctors to 
determine whether and in what circumstances a duty arises requiring the doctor 
to warn his patient of the risks inherent in the treatment which he proposes.’252 
Commentators such as Kennedy and Grubb and Miola observed that Lord Scarman also 
specifically considered the principles of respect for autonomy and self-determination.253 His 
Lordship argued that ‘…a doctor’s duty of care extends not only to the health and well-being 
of his patient but also to a proper respect for his patient’s rights, the duty to warn can be seen 
to be a part of the doctor’s duty of care’.254 Lord Scarman recognised that the doctors’ duty 
of care requires them both to ‘advise’ and ‘provide’ patients with information that they need 
as that would allow patients to ‘consider and balance the medical advantages and risks’ to 
make their decisions.255 
However, Lord Scarman also limited doctors’ duty to disclose information to that which 
contains ‘material risk’.256 Following the approach in Canterbury, he set out the test of 
material risk as follows:  
‘The test of materiality is whether in the circumstances of the particular case the 
court is satisfied that a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be 
likely to attach significance to the risk’.257 (Emphasis added).  
Although Lord Scarman averred that material risks should be disclosed, His Lordship 
narrowed the duty to disclose so that it did not require full disclosure even of material risks 
in all circumstances.258 Lord Scarman recognised an ‘exception’ to allow a doctor to omit 
some risks from his disclosure to a patient.259 His Lordship therefore seems to consider that 
the prudent patient standard should be subject to therapeutic privilege, as he argued that:  
‘...it is plainly right that a doctor may avoid liability for failure to warn of a 
material risk if he can show that he reasonably believed that communication to 
the patient of the existence of the risk would be detrimental to the health 
(including, of course, the mental health) of his patient.’260 
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Consequently, ‘even if the risk be material, the doctor will not be liable if upon a reasonable 
assessment of his patient’s condition he takes the view that a warning would be detrimental 
to his patient’s health’.261 On the other hand, doctors would be liable if they omitted to 
inform a patient about a risk if the court decided that the prudent patient would hold it to be 
significant.262 A therapeutic privilege as the starting point for deciding what information 
should be disclosed was not however advocated. Neither was Lord Scarman requiring a legal 
standard of full disclosure of information according to a subjective patient model. Although 
he clearly saw this as an ideal, it was one that he regarded as impracticable. This can be 
understood clearly from Lord Scarman’s words: ‘Ideally, the court should ask itself whether 
in the particular circumstances the risk was such that this particular patient would think it 
significant if he was told it existed.’263 He considered the standard of such disclosure ‘...as a 
matter of ethics....’264 and came to the conclusion that: ‘The law, however, operates not in 
Utopia but in the world as it is: and such an inquiry would prove in practice to be frustrated 
by the subjectivity of its aim and purpose.’265 Lord Scarman’s view, has thus drawn an 
important distinction between an ethical ideal of respect for autonomy discussed in Chapter 
one, which is focused entirely on the individual patient’s exact needs for information to make 
a sufficiently informed decision, and a standard that can and should be imposed in law. While 
dismissing a subjective standard as impracticable for the law to impose, Lord Scarman held 
that ‘the law can, however, do the next best thing, and require the court to answer the 
question, what would a reasonably prudent patient think significant if in the situation of this 
patient’.266 In doing so, His Lordship acknowledged that the setting of the standard of care 
is a legal not medical matter; therefore, he rejected the professional standard inherent in the 
Bolam test and instead adopted a prudent patient standard.267 His Lordship concluded that 
‘to the extent that I have indicated I think that English law must recognise a duty of the 
doctor to warn his patient of risk inherent in the treatment which he is proposing…’268 Lord 
Scarman applied his finding of the prudent patient standard to the case, but nevertheless he 
also dismissed the appeal because in his view the risk that was not disclosed was not material 
and there was no breach of the duty to warn.269 As mentioned above, Lord Scarman referred 
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to the notion of therapeutic privilege in his judgement; thus the prudent patient standard is 
subject to it. Therapeutic privilege is considered to be an exception to the general rules of 
disclosure and permits withholding of information based on the judgement of the individual 
healthcare professional acting in what he/she considers to be in the best interests of the 
patient.270 Where a therapeutic privilege approach is adopted it has been said that a doctor 
might make the decision to withhold information ‘...during the consent process in the belief 
that disclosure of this information would lead to harm to or suffering of the patient.’271 Harm 
or suffering could arise in different ways, such as where the information is itself distressing 
and causes the patient to suffer as a result of hearing it or where the patient refuses 
appropriate medical treatment, resulting in harm to health. Harms of providing information 
may therefore include ‘...psychological and emotional harm which affects the patient’s 
physical condition and ability to make decisions’.272 According to this approach, ‘…a 
decision to be selective with information may well be taken in order to respect the right of 
the patient to make an informed choice later on’.273 Therefore, based on the individual 
doctor’s specialist knowledge and medical experience, a therapeutic privilege approach 
suggests that the doctor can act paternalistically to serve the patients’ best interests and to 
protect them from harm that could arise because of their lack of understanding of medical 
terminology and procedures.274 
With the modern recognition in medical practice of the need to respect patients’ choices and 
rights, it might be thought that defending the notion of therapeutic privilege no longer has a 
place in a medical law context either.275 The signs were evident in England; the courts in 
Sidaway and more recently in Montgomery, have recognised therapeutic privilege but with 
limitations. They have emphasised that the application of therapeutic privilege should not be 
abused and not prevent the patient from making an informed choice.276 Furthermore, 
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Sidaway and Montgomery have recognised that the patients’ questions must be answered 
truthfully and fully.277 This will be considered in detail later in this Chapter. 
Accordingly, it has been suggested that therapeutic privilege ‘...permits physicians to tailor 
(and even withhold) information when, but only when, its disclosure would so upset a patient 
that he or she could not rationally engage in a conversation about therapeutic options and 
consequences’.278 The GMC guideline appears to have acknowledged this when in guidance 
to doctors it stated that: 
‘You [doctors] should not withhold information necessary for making decisions 
for any other reason, including when a relative, partner, friend or carer asks you 
to, unless you believe that giving it would cause the patient serious harm. In this 
context ‘serious harm’ means more than that the patient might become upset or 
decide to refuse treatment.’279 
Thus, this narrow formulation in the GMC guideline does not allow doctors to adopt a 
therapeutic privilege approach simply where it is feared that giving information would lead 
patients to refuse the treatment in question. Withholding information should not affect the 
ability of the patient to make an informed decision.280 In fact, the GMC guideline has been 
very cautious about the use of the therapeutic privilege for withholding information, it 
emphasised that: ‘If you [doctors] withhold information from the patient you must record 
your reason for doing so in the patient’s medical records, and you must be prepared to 
explain and justify your decision.’281 
It is clear that the scope for applying therapeutic privilege to be used now is narrow and even 
where it is applicable the GMC guideline advises that doctors ‘should regularly review 
[their] decision, and consider whether [they] could give information to the patient later, 
without causing them serious harm.’282 In conclusion, I would agree with Kennedy that Lord 
Scarman’s view in Sidaway was a radical shift in the UK legal approach to the standard of 
care in information disclosure since it focused on the issue of respect for patient autonomy 
and self-determination.283 Although Lord Scarman’s view was in the minority and it was not 
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taken up immediately by subsequent case law,284 it can be argued that it did become 
influential in later cases, most significantly in the recent case of Montgomery. The scope for 
the common law to change its approach was noted by Lord Scarman himself: 
‘The common law is adaptable: it would not otherwise have survived over the 
centuries of its existence. The concept of negligence itself is a development of 
the law by the judges over the last hundred years or so....It would be irony indeed 
if a judicial development for which the opportunity was the presence in the law 
of a flexible remedy should result now in rigidly confining the law’s remedy to 
situations and relationships already ruled upon by the judges.’285 
It is also worth mentioning that Teff stated at the time of the judgment in Sidaway that the 
case ‘provides some basis for further development’.286 Since Sidaway was decided, the case 
has not been explicitly overruled as a whole, but it has been interpreted in different ways.287 
The development of English law since Sidaway will be considered in the next section. 
4. The development of English law on information disclosure since Sidaway 
It is important to trace the development of the courts’ approach to information disclosure 
from Sidaway to Montgomery in order to demonstrate how English law has moved towards 
a prudent patient standard and the implications of that in protecting patient autonomy. In 
doing so, it is also important to examine the extent to which English law has taken into 
account ethical arguments regarding respect for patient autonomy. As pointed out earlier, 
ethical principles may require more than the law can reasonably impose. The focus in what 
follows will therefore be on the major legal cases that have considered the standard of care 
for information disclosure and which consider the kinds of issues that will be seen to be 
problematic in Saudi Arabia. Considering these issues will provide the basis for arguing how 
Saudi Arabian medical law can learn some of English law experiences on these matters and 
reform its own system to more adequately protect patient autonomy. 
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4.1. After Sidaway a gradual change 
In some cases following Sidaway, it would seem that Lord Diplock’s view was supported.288 
However, the application of his judgement was not always consistent289 and some movement 
towards a more patient-centred approach can be detected.290  
Lord Bridge’s ‘modified Bolam’ judgement in Sidaway was adopted in the case of Smith v 
Tunbridge Wells HA291 where a claim was brought to the court stating that if the patient had 
been warned of the risks of impotence inherent in a rectal operation, he would have not 
consented to the surgery.292 Morland J acknowledged the ‘inherent ethical content in the 
case…’.293 He quoted from a number of their Lordships’ speeches in Sidaway but made 
particular reference to Lord Bridge’s approach.294 
Based on Smith, there are two interesting issues. The first relates to the court’s role in judging 
the evidence given by medical experts. The case succeeded, although there was a body of 
competent medical opinion which accepted that in such a case a doctor need not have 
informed the patient about that risk. That omission was, according to Morland J, ‘neither 
reasonable nor responsible...’.295 Thus, the court held that the only reasonable action in the 
case was to disclose the risk to the patient.296 Smith arguably, shows an example of a court 
being prepared to decide that, even if it is in accordance with accepted medical practice, 
failure to disclose information about risk can be deemed to have been negligent, because the 
court believes that risk ought to have been disclosed.297 
The second interesting issue in Smith was in respect of whether a doctor’s duty of care is 
simply to provide relevant information or to ensure that patients understand it. Morland J 
held that: 
‘[T]he doctor, when warning of the risks, must take reasonable care to ensure 
that his explanation of the risks is intelligible to his particular patient. The doctor 
should use language, [that is] simple but not misleading, which the doctor 
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perceives....will be understood by the patient so that the patient can make an 
informed decision as to whether or not to consent to the recommended surgery 
or treatment.’298 
It has been suggested that this approach would place a huge burden on doctors to find out if 
the patient has understood what he/she has been told.299 On the other hand, it has been said 
that it is axiomatic that just providing the patient with information is not sufficient; the 
patient must also be able to understand it and doctors must take this into consideration.300  
Clearly, ensuring that the information that has been provided is in fact completely 
understood is difficult.301 I would agree with McLean that although we assume that 
understanding is vital for the legal validity of the patient’s decision, ‘it is less than clear how 
we can either ensure it, or even identify its presence or absence.’302 Faden and Beauchamp 
suggest that demonstrating that the patient has understood the provided information ‘may 
ultimately depend both on the adequacy of the person’s understanding of disclosed 
information and on the adequacy of the professional’s grasp of the person’s questions and 
responses.’303 I would agree with McLean’s response that patient understanding and 
professional skill in assessing this as endorsed by Faden and Beauchamp is ‘desirable’, but 
that would be difficult to be translated into a legal principle, as assessing the authenticity of 
the person’s understanding would not be ‘straightforward.’304	
The duty to take reasonable care to ensure the patient has understood the information was 
discussed further in AlHamwi v Johnston.305 This case drew a distinction between a legal 
duty to take reasonable steps to seek to ensure that a patient has understood information and 
a legal duty to take reasonable steps to seek to ensure that a patient can understand. 
AlHamwi’s lawyer argued that the clinic’s duty of care included the duty to ensure that the 
information that had been given to the patient was understood by her. The case was 
dismissed, Simon J holding that doctors have no obligation to ensure that patients have 
understood the information that has been given to them.306 In his view this would place a 
heavy burden on them and ‘[i]t is difficult to see what steps could be devised to ensure that 
																																								 																				
298Smith	v	Tunbridge	Wells	HA[1994]	5	Med	LR	334	p.	339.	
299M	Jones	Medical	Negligence	para	7.036-7.038	p.	678-679.	
300M	Mayberry	and	J	Mayberry	‘Consent	with	Understanding:	A	Movement	towards	Informed	Decisions’	(2002)	2(6)	Clin	
Med	JRCPL	523–526	p.	524-525.	
301J	Hutton	and	R	Ashcroft	‘Some	Popular	Versions	of	Uninformed	Consent’	p.	45.	
302S	McLean	Autonomy,	Consent	and	the	Law.	p.	50.	
303R	Faden	and	T	Beauchamp	A	History	and	Theory	of	Informed	Consent.	p.	316.	
304	S	McLean	Autonomy,	Consent	and	the	Law	p.	50.	
305AlHamwi	v	Johnston	[2005]	EWHC	206	(QB).	
306Ibid.	para	69	and	E	Jackson	Medical	Law	Text,	Cases	and	Materials	p.190.	
Chapter three: English law on consent and information disclosure 
	
	 174	
a patient has understood, short of a vigorous and inappropriate cross-examination’.307 I 
would agree with Simon J’s suggestion that ‘[c]linicians should take reasonable and 
appropriate steps to satisfy themselves that the patient has understood the information which 
has been provided.’308 For Simon J, giving the patient a leaflet which clearly contains the 
information can be sufficient to amount to taking reasonable steps.309 
Nonetheless, the decision in AlHamwi has been criticised on the basis that such an approach 
does not sufficiently protect the patient’s autonomy, if a patient such as AlHamwi in fact 
misunderstands of the information.310 Disclosing information with no requirement to ensure 
patient understanding may be viewed as meaningless. As has been stated in Chapter one, if 
providing information is vital to the patient’s ability to exercise autonomy, it would not be 
effective in achieving this unless it is understood.311 Thus, it has been said that the decision 
in AlHamwi failed to recognise this, as it seems to be more focused on the issue of providing 
information without emphasising the need for effective communication to ensure that the 
patient has understood the information.312 Arguably, if the aim of law in such matters is to 
protect patient autonomy, the decision in AlHamwi seems to marginalise the notion of doing 
so.313 
With all due respect to the views of those who considered that the decision in AlHamwi 
undermined respect for the patient’s autonomy, I would argue that AlHamwi is another 
example where legal and ethical principles may differ. Ethical principles can be seen as 
ideals to be considered and would achieve the highest level of protecting the individual’s 
autonomy but those ideals may be difficult to translate into legal rules that can be fairly and 
effectively applied.314 I would agree with Simon J’s comment that: ‘A patient may say she 
understands although she has not in fact done so, or has understood part of what has been 
said, or has a clear understanding of something other than what has been imparted.’315 Hence, 
if the person him/herself may not know whether he/she has understood the provided 
information or not it would be even more difficult for another to be certain that the person 
has understood, especially since ‘[i]t is common experience that misunderstandings can arise 
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despite reasonable steps to avoid them.’316 This is a position which English law has now 
appeared to recognise by endorsing the doctors’ legal duty to take reasonable steps to seek 
to ensure that patients can understand the information provided, which was affirmed in the 
subsequent case of Montgomery as I will discuss later on in this Chapter. 
Despite the legal developments that have been discussed above, it can be said that these cases 
were still considered within the framework of the professional standard, albeit with different 
references to the various Law Lords’ views in Sidaway. However, a particularly significant 
development in the proper interpretation of Bolam was the case of Bolitho v City and 
Hackney Health Authority.317 The case was not concerned with information disclosure318 but 
with an alleged negligent omission to treat.319 Nonetheless, although in the case itself it was 
said not to be concerned with information disclosure, it has since been deemed to be 
applicable to such cases.320 Bolitho was described as ‘a significant nail in Bolam’s coffin’.321 
It has been argued that in Bolitho Lord Browne-Wilkinson made it clear that the courts are 
to set what is to be considered reasonable care, not the medical profession.322 In Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson’s words, in relation to where there is a difference of opinion of medical 
expert witnesses as to whether the standard of care has been breached:  
‘..the court is not bound to held that a defendant doctor escapes liability for 
negligent treatment or diagnosis just because he leads evidence from a number 
of medical experts who are genuinely of the opinion that the defendant’s 
treatment or diagnosis accorded with sound medical practice’.323 
Clearly, Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s argument is in favour of holding the courts’ role to be in 
charge of critically analysing the medical experts’ opinions to verify both the credibility of 
medical expert witnesses and whether their opinions are reasonable. This seems to take a 
similar approach to that of Morland J in Smith discussed previously. Therefore, even where 
there is a body of opinion by suitably qualified medical experts that what has been done is 
in accordance with the accepted practice, the defendant doctor can be held to have been 
negligent, as ‘…the court has to be satisfied that the exponents of the body of opinion relied 
upon can demonstrate that such opinion has a logical basis’.324 For the court to override the 
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views of expert witnesses that the approach adopted by the defendant was reasonable, it had 
to consider the following: 
‘In particular in cases involving, as they so often do, the weighing of risks against 
benefits, the judge before accepting a body of opinion as being responsible, 
reasonable or respectable, will need to be satisfied that, in forming their views, 
the experts have directed their minds to the question of comparative risks and 
benefits and have reached a defensible conclusion on the matter.’325 
The court, therefore, added a condition to the Bolam test by requiring that the opinion on the 
defendant doctors’ action must be ‘capable of withstanding logical analysis’326 alongside the 
doctors’ action ‘being in accordance with responsible medical opinion’.327 Furthermore, 
according to the Bolitho amendment, the court may, after assessing whether the justification 
of the defendant’s medical opinion is based on logical analysis, judge this opinion against 
other expert views.328 Despite this, in Bolitho Lord Browne-Wilkinson recognised that it 
would be difficult for the court to reach a judgment that what medical experts concluded was 
acceptable practice was illogical. Thus, His Lordship emphasised that ‘in my view it will 
very seldom be right for a judge to reach the conclusion that views genuinely held by a 
competent medical expert are unreasonable’.329 He justified this view because to assess and 
examine medical risks and benefits is ordinarily a matter of clinical judgement; therefore, 
judges may not have the knowledge and ability to make a finding on this without expert 
evidence. Therefore, ‘it is only where a judge can be satisfied that the body of expert opinion 
cannot be logically supported at all that such opinion will not provide the benchmark by 
reference to which the defendant’s conduct falls to be assessed’.330 
The amendment to the Bolam test by Bolitho still acknowledges the importance of medical 
expert evidence, as it is the primary basis for the court to make its judgment.331 However, it 
has been argued that, in light of the Bolitho amendment, ‘it may no longer be sufficient for 
practitioner’s actions to be Bolam-defensible. The court would seek to determine whether 
such action is Bolitho-justifiable’.332 
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The effect of Bolitho can only be understood by examining the subsequent case law.333 The 
application of Bolitho can be seen from two angles in relation to information disclosure; first 
as a general matter, in the way medical expert’s opinion is judged (whether it is Bolitho 
justifiable) and second the way that this duty has been seen to allow for a different approach 
to the standard of care in information disclosure. The Bolitho modification came to be 
applied to information disclosure as well as to diagnosis and treatment, where courts need to 
determine whether the non-disclosure of risks that has been approved by a body of medical 
opinion might nevertheless be considered as negligent.334 The scope for the courts to come 
to a different view of what was appropriate from those of medical professionals became an 
important matter to consider. 
First, medical expert opinion: whether it is Bolitho justifiable 
This significance of this issue can be seen in the case of Marriott v West Midlands RHA.335 
Here, there were two conflicting bodies of medical opinion. Thus, the court had to make the 
decision on the basis of whether the medical expert’s opinion had a logical support, (Bolitho 
justifiable).336 The judge in the trial had held that, although there was a body of medical 
expert opinion that supported the GP’s action to leave the patient at his home, it was not a 
‘reasonably prudent course.’337 The decision was in favour of the patient and the decision 
was upheld at the appeal.338 
However, where there are a number of responsible and prudent courses of action, Lord 
Scarman in Maynard v West Midlands RHA339 made the important point that: 
‘….that a judge’s preference for one body of distinguished professional opinion 
to another also professionally distinguished is not sufficient to establish 
negligence in a practitioner whose actions have received the seal of approval of 
those whose opinions, truthfully expressed, honestly held, were not 
preferred...For in the realm of diagnosis and treatment negligence is not 
established by preferring one respectable body of professional opinion to 
another.’340 
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Arguably, the above statement seems to focus on the courts role in examining the credibility 
of witnesses instead of the content of their evidence,341 allowing doctors to easily escape 
liability so long as they found one or more respectable expert witnesses that are ready to 
affirm that the doctor’s action was in accordance with respected medical opinion.342 To some 
extent, the approach in Maynard seems to be comparable to Islamic Sharia and Saudi 
Arabian medical law with its concentration on examining the credibility of witnesses rather 
than the reasonableness of the views they put forward, as will be discussed in Chapter four. 
This movement by English courts343 has also been reflected in the issue of information 
disclosure, despite some inconsistency in approach. The trend towards greater court 
involvement in assessing medical evidence, not just the credibility of witnesses, is especially 
important in information disclosure cases because these are concerned with respecting the 
autonomy of patients, which is less of a matter of medical expertise than methods of 
diagnosis and treatment, as it rests on the information needs of patients. 
Second, information disclosure: the application of the Bolitho modification to this aspect of 
medical care.  
The reassessment of the professional standard seemed to continue in subsequent case law344 
as further support was given to Bolitho by its application to information disclosure in Pearce 
v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust.345 In this case, the issue of the doctor’s duty to warn 
about the risk of a stillbirth was the crux of the matter.346 The doctor had explained to the 
patient certain risks of both procedures, but failed to tell her that there was a 0.1% to 0.2% 
risk of a stillbirth. The woman agreed with the advice not to have a Caesarean section but 
her baby then died in the womb. The case was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.347 
There are three interesting issues in Pearce that are worth mentioning: first, Lord Woolf MR 
in Pearce ‘had no doubts that Bolitho applied to claims concerning information 
disclosure...’348 He held that a decision not to disclose information should be reasonable and 
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responsible.349 Hence, Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s view in Bolitho is applicable in matters of 
information disclosure. 
Second, the discussion in Pearce supported Lord Bridge’s approach in Sidaway, as Lord 
Woolf MR acknowledged that providing information might not only be a matter for 
professional judgement.350 Lord Woolf MR’s referred to Lord Bridge’s suggestion 
concerning the degree and severity of risk that ought to be disclosed, irrespective of the 
existence of a body of medical opinion on behalf of the defendant.351 It will be remembered 
that Lord Bridge had given the example of a 10% risk of stroke as being such a risk. Lord 
Woolf MR formulated his view as follows: 
‘If there is a significant risk which would affect the judgment of a reasonable 
patient, then in the normal course it is the responsibility of a doctor to inform the 
patient of that significant risk, if the information in needed so that the patient can 
determine for him or herself as to what course he or she should adopt.’352 
(Emphasis added). 
However, it has been argued that Lord Woolf MR seemed ‘…to reject any reliance on 
‘precise percentages’ and he re-interpreted Lord Bridge’s approach’.353 This argument seems 
defensible, because His Lordship did not provide a clear explanation of what he meant by 
‘significant risk’.354 His Lordship considered that when the doctor seeks to provide the 
patient with information about risks the doctor ‘...has to take into account... the ability of the 
patient to comprehend what he has to say to him or her.’355 Despite this, ‘where there is what 
can realistically be called a significant risk’356 Lord Woolf MR held that ‘...in the ordinary 
event,...the patient is entitled to be informed of that risk’.357 That risk must be one that a 
‘reasonable patient’ would regard as relevant to make his or her decision.358 
In applying his formulation of a relevant ‘significant risk’ to a ‘reasonable patient’, Lord 
Woolf MR argued that the ‘very, very small additional risk of stillbirth [0.1% to 0.2%]’359 
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was not a ‘significant risk’ that ought to have been disclosed.360 In addition His Lordship 
accepted the expert evidence on behalf of the defendants that ‘the baby was not large, which 
would also mean that the risk would be reduced’.361 Therefore, His Lordship concluded that 
‘[t]his is a case where, in my judgment, it would not be proper for the courts to interfere with 
the clinical opinion of the expert medical man responsible for treating Mrs Pearce’.362 
Nonetheless, Mason and Brodie observed that: ‘For the first time, therefore, Lord Woolf 
introduced the reasonable patient standard of information disclosure as an acceptable part of 
English medical jurisprudence, and we suggest that this has been of considerable 
importance.’363 It has been argued that the judgment in Pearce was not ‘wholly consistent 
or coherent and leaves the standard open to divergent interpretations’.364 Jackson, for 
example, contended that Lord Woolf MR’s judgment has some ‘ambiguity’.365 On one hand, 
Lord Woolf MR recognised the idea that a significant risk which would affect a ‘reasonable 
patient’ should be disclosed.366 That would seem to enhance the prioritisation of a prudent 
patient test. On the other hand, Lord Woolf MR relied on doctors’ opinions to verify whether 
a risk should be regarded as significant. His Lordship stated that ‘turning to the facts of this 
case, the next question is, therefore, [w]as there a significant risk? …Even looked at 
comprehensively it comes to something like 0.1 to 0.2 per cent. The doctors called on behalf 
of the defendants did not regard that risk as significant, nor do I’.367 
In other words, it appears that Lord Woolf MR combined the standards of both the reasonable 
doctor and reasonable patient. McLean argued that, even if the Bolam test may have been 
weakened by the judgment in Pearce, it was not straightforward to draw conclusions about 
its significance. She has said that ‘Pearce might seem to add an additional caveat to the 
routine acceptance of the Bolam test, namely the need to disclose risks that are ‘significant’ 
to the patients, its actual impact is not clear.’368 She went on to say that: ‘It does, however, 
entail some consideration of the patient’s interests, which the Bolam test does not do.’369 
MacLean perhaps expressed slightly more optimism about the potential impact of Pearce: 
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‘[i]n theory it has inched towards a standard marginally more respectful of patient autonomy 
than Bolam simpliciter.’370(His emphasis). Further, notwithstanding that the Pearce case was 
decided in favour of the defendant (the doctor), Miola also concluded that there was cause 
for optimism for patients as he argued that ‘Lord Woolf identified the principle of self-
determination then, in upholding it, sought to protect the patient from the medical 
profession’.371 
Third, although Lord Woolf MR did not refer to Lord Bridge’s view in Sidaway that doctors 
must respond truthfully and fully to patients’ questions, His Lordship said that ‘...it is clear 
that if a patient asks a doctor about the risk, then the doctor is required to give an honest 
answer.’372 This principle is supported by the view taken in Montgomery where the duty of 
answering the patient’s question has been acknowledged as will be turned to shortly. 
Lord Woolf MR’s view in Pearce regarding the duty to inform the patient was interpreted 
further in Wyatt v Curtis.373 Sedley LJ held that Lord Woolf MR’s formulation in Pearce 
refined Lord Bridge’s view in Sidaway.374 Accordingly, a risk that might not be significant 
to doctors might be relevant to the patient; hence doctors should disclose that risk.375 This 
judgement can be said to be a further refinement of the applicable test in English law as it 
reinforces the position that doctors and patients may differ in their assessment of risk, with 
the ultimate decision as to its importance and/or relevance resting with the patient and not 
the clinician.  
Based on what has been so far discussed above, it is clear since the decision was handed 
down in Sidaway in 1985 the English courts have interpreted the standard of care in 
information disclosure in a number of different ways. However, it is contended that there 
has been a clear movement away from the acceptance of a professional standard relying on 
what reasonable doctors would disclose toward greater acknowledgment of respecting 
patient autonomy through the development of a more patient-centred standard. 
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4.2. Chester and beyond 
Chester v Afshar376 has added a further development to the standard of care in information 
disclosure in English law. The Chester case is significant also in respect of the issue of 
causation,377 which will be returned to in more detail later in this Chapter. Chester was 
suffering from back pain, so her doctor, Afshar, recommended that she have an operation to 
remove three spinal disks. Chester agreed to undergo the operation, but as a result of the 
operation she was partly paralysed due to nerve damage.378 Although the operation was 
conducted properly, the doctor failed to warn Chester of the 1% -2% risk of nerve damage.379 
Chester claimed that, if she had been informed about the risks of the operation, she would 
not have consented to the operation immediately; rather, she would have sought other 
doctors’ views.380 Both parties relied on expert medical evidence about what should have 
been disclosed as well as their own testimony.381Afshar claimed that he had adequately 
warned her about the risks and that even if this was not accepted, the claim should fail as she 
was not claiming that she would never have undertaken the operation. The case was finally 
decided by the House of Lords, which upheld the decision in favour of the claimant. 
In her commentary on Chester Devaney, argued that ‘the primary concern of the majority of 
the House of Lords...was to ensure that patient autonomy is respected.’382 Indeed, respect for 
the patient’s autonomy seems to play an essential role in Law Lords’ views regarding both 
causation and information disclosure.383 The emphasis on recognising the ethical aspects of 
information disclosure in consent to treatment led the majority in Chester to consider what 
has been viewed as a shift in emphasis in the law of information disclosure,384 to apply the 
reasonable patient standard. For a minority of the court (Lords Bingham and Hoffman) 
Chester failed to establish causation. Nevertheless, both recognised that doctors have a duty 
to warn their patients and give them information regarding inherent risks in the treatment, 
Lord Bingham arguing that this is ‘…to enable adult patients of sound mind to make for 
themselves decisions intimately affecting their own lives and bodies’.385 Lord Hoffman also 
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recognised that the failure to warn the patient about the risk ‘was an affront to her personality 
and leaves her feeling aggrieved.’386 
Lord Bingham held that Afshar was under a duty to warn and inform Chester ‘...of a small 
(1%-2%) but unavoidable risk that the proposed operation, however expertly performed, 
might lead to a seriously adverse result,...The existence of such a duty [to warn] is not in 
doubt.’387 In fact this acknowledgment by Lord Bingham of doctors’ duty to warn the patient 
about small risks was no surprise as His Lordship had affirmed that: ‘The patient’s right to 
be appropriately warned is an important right, which few doctors in the current legal and 
social climate would consciously or deliberately violate’.388 
Lord Steyn (who was in the majority) emphasised that ‘...a patient’s right to an appropriate 
warning from a surgeon when faced with surgery ought normatively to be regarded as an 
important right which must be given effective protection whenever possible’.389 The 
importance of the case can be understood from Lord Steyn’s speech. He approved Lord 
Woolf MR’s reformation and interpretation of Sidaway’s (Lord Bridge’s) disclosure 
principle in Pearce.390 However, he went on to state that ‘[i]n modern law medical 
paternalism no longer rules and a patient has a prima face right to be informed by a surgeon 
of a small, but well established, risk of serious injury as a result of the surgery’.391 He also 
separately referred to the need to warn about ‘serious risks’.392 Meyers argued that Lord 
Steyn (with Lords Hope’s and Walker’s agreement) has moved the English law standard to 
disclose risks from the professional standard (Bolam test) of care to a reasonable patient 
standard.393 
However, despite Lord Steyn’s clear emphasis on respect for the patient’s autonomy being 
the basis for His Lordship’s decision, it has been said that the decision in Chester is ‘startling’ 
in the ‘lack of clarity’ regarding what is meant by serious risks.394 This is because the 
reference to the term ‘serious risks’ may have two different interpretations: either ‘any risks 
of serious consequences, or significant risks (in the sense of the risk being high in percentage 
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terms) of any undesired, but nevertheless minor, consequences’.395 Even more importantly, 
there was a further lack of clarity because Lord Steyn did not state whether the seriousness 
of the risks would be judged based on a patient’s view or a doctor’s view. In this regard, I 
would agree with what Jackson suggested: because Lord Steyn obviously stated his rejection 
of the rule of paternalism, this would suggest the result of his view is to test ‘serious risks’ 
based on the reasonable patient standard.396 
Lord Hope also recognised that ‘[i]t was not in dispute’397 that the patient should be informed 
and warned about the known and small risk of nerve damage. His Lordship believed that the 
reason for considering such a duty to warn the patient arose because ‘the right to make the 
final decision and the duty of the doctor to inform the patient if the treatment may have 
special disadvantages or dangers go hand in hand.’398 Therefore, Afshar owed a duty to warn 
Chester about ‘the risks that were inherent in the proposed surgery, including the risk of 
paralysis.’ 399 Lord Hope emphasised that the duty to inform is important to ensure that  the 
patient can make the final decision either to consent to or not to undergo the operation that 
was proposed.400 The issue of respect for patient autonomy was considered further in Lord 
Walker’s judgment. His Lordship first asserted that ‘[t]he surgeon’s duty to advise his patient 
(and in particular, to warn of unavoidable risks of surgery) is a very important part of his 
professional duty.’401 His Lordship seems to distance himself from Sidaway and the 
professional standard of care. Lord Walker affirmed that ‘...during the 20 years which have 
elapsed since Sidaway’s case the importance of personal autonomy has been more and more 
widely recognised.’402 The stance taken in Chester appears to abandon the majority views in 
Sidaway (professional standard) by acknowledging the reasonable patient standard. Chester 
has ‘marginalised’ the majority’s decision in Sidaway and endorsed/moved on the reasonable 
patient standard that Pearce had approved.403 
Lord Walker in regard to the duty of informing and disclosing the risk to patients has stated 
that: ‘The surgeon’s duty to advise and warn his patient is closely connected with the need 
for the patient’s consent...The advice is the foundation of the consent. That is why it is so 
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important.’404 However, it should be noted that the concept of therapeutic privilege also 
remains, as the court held that ‘[t]he only qualification [to not warn] is that there may be 
wholly exceptional cases where objectively in the best interests of the patient the surgeon 
may be excused from giving a warning.’405 Thus, as it was accepted in Pearce, there are some 
exceptional circumstances that may justify doctors withholding information from patients, 
although it would ultimately be for the court to decide whether the law should hold that the 
information should have been provided.406 
Due to the significance of Chester with regard to the change of the standard of information 
disclosure and doctors’ duty to disclose risks by adopting the standard in Pearce I would 
agree with Meyers’s conclusion that 
‘it may be that Chester will prove to be more noteworthy for defining the scope 
of the doctor’s duty to warn his or her patient of the risks inherent or special in 
the treatment being proposed... No longer can the reasonable doctor standard of 
Bolam, as applied in the disclosure of risk context by Sidaway, be said to be the 
law.’407 (Emphasis added). 
In fact, this recognition of the reasonable patient standard of care seems to be clearly held 
and supported in the recent decision in Montgomery but before turning to that decision it is 
worth considering two other significant cases: Birch v UCL Hospital408 and Jones v North 
West SHA.409 In these cases, the issue of the doctors’ duty to inform the patient about 
alternative available treatment(s) was considered. This approach is recognised by 
Montgomery as the thesis will discuss in a moment.  
Birch was the first English law case which discussed the doctor’s duty to provide the patient 
with information regarding alternative treatments.410 Cranston J relied on both Pearce and 
Chester in reaching his judgment, he recognised that: ‘If patients must be informed of 
significant risks it is necessary to spell out what, in practice, that encompasses’.411 Cranston 
J then asked ‘was it necessary for the defendant to go further and to inform Mrs Birch of 
comparative risk, how this risk [of cerebral catheter angiography] compared with that 
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associated with other imaging procedures, in particular MRI?’412 He answered that by 
rephrasing Lord Woolf MR’s view in Pearce that ‘...unless the patient is informed of the 
comparative risks of different procedures she will not be in a position to give her fully 
informed consent to one procedure rather than another’.413 It can be said that Birch has 
recognised a legal duty on doctors to not only inform the patient about the significant risks, 
but also inform him/her about the available alternative treatments. Thus the result of the 
decision in Birch is to endorse the reasonable patient standard and to take it a stage further 
in applying it to information about alternative treatments.414 
In the same way, the subsequent case of Jones has recognised the same legal duty as outlined 
in Birch.415 Nicol J based on his reading of Lord Woolf MR’s view in Pearce, stated that 
‘[a]t least where there was a viable medical alternative to the natural route, the patient was 
entitled to be told of any significant risk that attached to either course.’416 Arguably, Nicol J 
in his judgment seems to go beyond the professional standard of care as he concluded that: 
‘Whether or not a risk is ‘significant’ is ultimately for the Court to decide.’417 This statement 
is a departure from the Bolam test, where the disclosure of risks was determined by prudent 
medical profession. It also goes further than the Bolitho modification, where the medical 
evidence can only be challenged if, in a rare case, it is not ‘logical’. It even seems to go 
further than Pearce, by placing even less weight on whether the medical profession considers 
that a risk is ‘significant’. This suggests that Nicol J’s view is ‘closer to the spirit of the 
prudent patient test than is evidenced in the way Lord Woolf applied the test in practice’,418 
where greater reliance appeared to have been placed on whether doctors viewed the risk as 
significant or not.419 
In conclusion, in considering these cases, Jackson observed that ‘while Sidaway itself has 
not been overruled, it seems clear that English law has been moving away from the strict 
application of Bolam adopted by Lord Diplock….towards a more patient-central 
approach’.420 McLean also has concluded that the test of English law regarding the 
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information disclosure standard seems to have moved away from a prudent doctor standard 
to a prudent patient standard with the doctor’s duty to disclose information emerging from 
the patient’s right to respect for autonomy.421 Hoppe and Miola have taken this view too and 
stated that the courts since Chester had ‘prioritised’ the principle of respect for autonomy 
which allowed them to redefine what is meant by a significant risk.422 
Nonetheless, before the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Montgomery it was still 
unclear whether English law would unequivocally adopt a ‘prudent patient’ rather than 
‘prudent doctor’ standard for information disclosure.423 I would also agree with MacLean 
that, as long as the question of how to decide what is meant by a significant risk had not been 
fully addressed by the law, the standard of care for information disclosure in English law 
would remain uncertain.424 It can be argued that this confusion has been now cleared up by 
the recent decision of the UK Supreme Court in Montgomery as will be discussed in the 
following section.  
4.3. Montgomery, a new dawn? 
4.3.1. The case facts and legal background 
On 1 October 1999, Montgomery gave birth by vaginal delivery to a baby boy. Due to a 
complication during her delivery, shoulder dystocia, the baby was born with severe 
disabilities. Montgomery was a diabetic and therefore more likely to have a larger baby and 
there was a 9-10% risk of shoulder dystocia during vaginal delivery, because the baby’s 
shoulders cannot easily pass through the mother’s pelvis. Montgomery brought a claim in 
negligence for damages on behalf of her child. She argued that (1) although she had 
expressed her concern to the doctor about whether she could safely deliver the baby 
vaginally, Dr. McLellan had failed to inform her about the risk (9-10%) of severe damage 
from shoulder dystocia and (2) she had had not been offered the optional Caesarean section, 
which would have prevented the damage to the baby.425 
The case was first heard in Scotland, by Lord Bannatyne (the Lord Ordinary) in the Outer 
House of the Court of Session.426 The Lord Ordinary first applied the principle that was set 
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out in the Bolitho modification to examine whether the medical evidence that supported the 
defender had been reached on a logical basis.427 His Lordship, in considering the defendant’s 
medical evidence, argued that: ‘It could not be said that their views on the interpretation 
lacked reasoning, rationality or logic.’428 Thus, for the Lord Ordinary the case could not be 
one of the rare cases where the judge was entitled to reject a body of expert evidence that 
was supporting the doctor’s action.429 Accordingly, His Lordship stated ‘in those 
circumstances, it cannot be established that there was a failure in the care at this point by Dr 
McLellan not intervening.’430 
He then went on to apply the principle of Lord Bridge in Sidaway that it was necessary to 
inform the patient about ‘a substantial risk of grave consequences’431 and in Pearce that it 
was necessary to inform of ‘a substantial risk which would affect the judgement of a 
reasonable person.’432 For the Lord Ordinary the risk of shoulder dystocia was significant, 
but that did not require the doctor to warn the patient because ‘in the vast majority of 
shoulder dystocia cases the shoulder dystocia was dealt with by simple procedures and the 
chance of a severe injury to the baby was tiny.’433 (Emphasis added). In other words, the risk 
of shoulder dystocia occurring was high, but the risk of a severe injury was not. His Lordship 
therefore concluded that this did not meet the requirements of a substantial risk of grave 
consequences.434 The decision to withhold this information therefore withstood logical 
analysis and thus Montgomery failed to establish that there was a breach of the duty to inform 
her about the risks, and as a result the Lord Ordinary dismissed the case.435 
Montgomery’s case was then heard by three judges in the Inner House of the Court of 
Session.436 The appellant argued that English law had moved on to require warnings to be 
given to the patient about a significant risk, as in Pearce by Lord Woolf and that Scottish 
law should also do so.437 Therefore, as the risk of shoulder dystocia was a significant risk, it 
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should attract the duty to inform. It was further contended that she should have been given 
advice about optional Caesarean section on the basis of Jones.438 It will be remembered that 
Jones had held that patients should be given information about available alternative 
treatment options and their comparative risks. The Inner House of the Court of Session on 
the same basis as the Outer House refused the reclaiming motion and upheld the Lord 
Ordinary’s decision.439 The case then went to the UK Supreme Court, where the Supreme 
Court re-examined the application of the standard of care in respect of information 
disclosure. It also dealt with the issue of causation (which will be discussed at the end of this 
Chapter). 
4.3.2. Sidaway set aside 
The decision by the Supreme Court was taken unanimously to allow the patient’s appeal. 
Lords Kerr and Reed provided the leading judgments with which Lady Hale, Lords 
Neuberger, Clarke, Wilson and Hodge agreed. Lady Hale also delivered a concurring 
judgment.440 
The Supreme Court in Montgomery was ‘invited to depart from the decision of the House of 
Lords in Sidaway and to re-consider the duty of a doctor towards a patient in relation to 
advice about treatment.’441 The Supreme Court stated that ‘...the analysis of the law by the 
majority in Sidaway is unsatisfactory, in so far as it treated the doctor’s duty to advise her 
patient of the risks of proposed treatment as falling within the scope of the Bolam test, subject 
to two qualifications of that general principle, neither of which is fundamentally consistent 
with that test.’442 The Supreme Court held that:  
‘It is unsurprising that courts have found difficulty in the subsequent application 
of Sidaway, and that the courts in England and Wales have in reality departed 
from it; a position which was effectively endorsed, particularly by Lord Steyn, 
in Chester v Afshar. There is no reason to perpetuate the application of the Bolam 
test in this context any longer.’443 (Original emphases) 
Based on the previous discussion of the development of the English law standard of care, I 
would argue that the Supreme Court’s decision is correct in its view that the decision in 
Sidaway no longer represents the current approach in medical practice to patient centered 
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treatment. It is also correct in deciding to depart from the professional standard of care 
which, despite attempts in some cases to ameliorate its effects, failed to sufficiently respect 
patient autonomy and self-determination as well as representing a paternalistic approach 
which is no longer accepted in the medical context.444 
McGrath has observed two reasons that led the Supreme Court to depart from the 
professional standard derived from Sidaway; first ‘Sidaway had been misunderstood in 
practice.’445 McGrath has argued that the Justices in the Supreme Court have re-read 
Sidaway, thus the Supreme Court ‘took Lord Scarman’s opinion as the ratio, reading Lords 
Bridge, Keith, and Templeman as joining him in placing the patient first.’446 Based on that, 
the Supreme Court  stated that the decision in Pearce correctly interpreted Lord Bridge’s 
view in Sidaway.447 A substantial risk which it is necessary for the patient to know in order 
to make an informed choice should be disclosed.448 The second reason McGrath observed 
for the Supreme Court to depart from the professional standard in Sidaway is that, ‘the 
paternalistic model of the doctor–patient relationship on which it was based had ceased to 
reflect reality.’449 As the Supreme Court noted, since the decision in Sidaway was taken, 
there has been an obvious shift towards more recognition of the importance of respect for 
patients’ autonomy and the value of their self-determination.450 Therefore, it can be argued 
that the decision of the Supreme Court has effectively overruled Sidaway, though it did not 
expressly do so, and pronounced a new standard of care for the UK that more properly 
respects patient autonomy. This will be considered further below.  
4.3.3. The prudent patient standard of care as the current approach to 
information disclosure in England 
By allowing the appeal in Montgomery, the Supreme Court has now clearly accepted the 
patient prudent test into the law of consent in the UK.451 The Supreme Court reached its 
decision on the matter by placing more emphasis on respect for patient self-determination 
and rights. As it was said, ‘...patients are now widely regarded as persons holding rights, 
rather than as the passive recipients of the care of the medical profession.’452 This shows that 
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the Supreme Court has departed from the approach of professional practice in setting an 
appropriate standard of care with its overtones of paternalism and considered the ethical 
issues of respecting and protecting patients’ autonomy in the medical care context as taking 
priority.453 The Supreme Court’s position shows, as Farrell and Brazier have observed, that 
the era of accepting that doctors know best about what information should be given to the 
patient is ended.454 The Supreme Court recognised that this is in part because now it easier 
for the patient to gain medical information from a different variety of sources such as the 
internet, medicine labelling and so forth. Hence:   
‘It would therefore be a mistake to view patients as uninformed, incapable of 
understanding medical matters, or wholly dependent upon a flow of information 
from doctors. The idea that patients were medically uninformed and incapable 
of understanding medical matters was always a questionable 
generalisation.....To make it the default assumption on which the law is to be 
based is now manifestly untenable.’455 
This view advances the idea of not seeing the patients just as passive recipients of the 
information that doctors give to them. Instead the new understanding of medical practice 
and law is to recognise the idea of dealing with patients ‘...so far as possible as adults who 
are capable of understanding that medical treatment is uncertain of success and may involve 
risks, accepting responsibility for the taking of risks affecting their own lives, and living 
with the consequences of their choices.’456 
Interestingly, what followed from that is that the Supreme Court confirmed that the patient 
can decide whether she wants to receive information about the risk or not, so if the patient 
has made that clear to the doctor, then there is no obligation on the doctor to discuss the 
risk.457 However, it was cautioned that the matter of ‘[d]eciding whether a person is so 
disinclined may involve the doctor making a judgment; but it is not a judgment which is 
dependent on medical expertise.’458 Here too, the doctor’s obligation in deciding whether to 
discuss with the patient the risk or not is a matter of respecting patient autonomy and in the 
final analysis this would fall to be determined by the courts not the medical profession.459 It 
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remains the case, as the Supreme Court has affirmed, that: ‘An adult person of sound mind 
is entitled to decide which, if any, of the available forms of treatment to undergo, and her 
consent must be obtained before treatment interfering with her bodily integrity is 
undertaken.’460 
Based on these considerations and the recognition by the Supreme Court of the importance 
of respecting patient rights and autonomy, the Supreme Court outlined the appropriate 
standard of care as follows:  
‘The doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the 
patient is aware of any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, 
and of any reasonable alternative or variant treatments.’461 (Emphasis added).  
The question arises as to whether this is in fact simply a prudent patient test or whether it 
has gone some way toward a more subjective patient test. Noticeably, the Supreme Court 
has referred to testing the risks’ materiality against whether ‘the particular patient would be 
likely to attach significance to it.’462 Heywood argues that the Supreme Court’s reference to 
the decision of the Australian High Court in Rogers v Whitaker,463 has introduced the Rogers 
approach into English law in Montgomery.464 In Heywood’s words, ‘[t]he test of materiality 
is no longer restricted just to what the reasonable person in the patient’s position would 
consider significant.’465 It will be remembered that Lord Scarman in Sidaway had adopted 
the Canterbury test: 
‘The test of materiality is whether in the circumstances of the particular case the 
court is satisfied that a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be 
likely to attach significance to the risk.’466 (Emphasis added). 
Instead the Supreme Court has stated that a material risk 
‘..is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in 
the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, or the 
doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be 
likely to attach significance to it.’467 (Emphasis added).  
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Therefore, while the first part reflects exactly the Canterbury test, the second part is a new 
addition.  
While the Supreme Court referred to ‘a reasonable person in the patient's position’, some 
concern has been expressed about what this means in practice. Reid has described this as an 
‘..uncomfortable issue..’, left open as how this legal duty can be determined.468 The concern 
arises because the Supreme Court took notice of the fact that Montgomery was a ‘clearly 
highly intelligent person’,469 who obtained her degree in molecular biology and was a 
specialist in the pharmaceutical field; additionally, her mother and sister were both general 
medical practitioners. 470  
This may suggest that Montgomery had a higher than usual ability to understand the medical 
risks and might, by implication, be entitled to receive more information than others.  If this 
is the case, then that would suggest the court may have two standards of a reasonable patient; 
one with high level of medical knowledge and the other with lower level of medical 
knowledge,471 leaving uncomfortably open the question of how to define the ‘prudent 
patient’.472 
The Supreme Court has recognised that ‘circumstances of an individual patient may affect 
their attitude towards a proposed form of treatment and the reasonable alternatives.’473 
Heywood has argued that considering the position of the particular patient ‘is sensible and 
serves to underscore why it is so important for the law of negligence to include some 
reference to the individual patient.’474 He notes that in most cases there would be little 
difference in the outcomes; thus the specific inclusion of the particular patient, ‘could be 
regarded as superfluous.’475 It should also be noted that even where the particular patient 
would attach significance to the risk, when a reasonable person in the patient’s position 
would not, it is only required that the doctor disclose this information if the doctor is or 
should reasonably be aware of this.476 This additional test therefore is not an entirely 
subjective one since there is still a determination of reasonableness to be made.  
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The Supreme Court also dismissed the use of a percentage test, as was suggested by Lord 
Bridge in Sidaway, to assess if the risk is material or not.477 The Supreme Court stated that 
whether a risk is deemed to be significant ‘...is likely to reflect a variety of factors besides 
its magnitude.’478 The Supreme Court then included some examples of what kinds of factors 
must be considered when evaluating whether there was a significant risk; ‘..the nature of the 
risk, the effect which its occurrence would have upon the life of the patient, the importance 
to the patient of the benefits sought to be achieved by the treatment, the alternatives 
available, and the risks involved in those alternatives.’479 
Further, the use of the phrase ‘any reasonable alternative or variant treatments’480 by the 
Supreme Court suggests that it has accepted the approach taken in Birch that it is necessary 
to inform the patient about them. However, it has been said that the issue of how to identify 
when alternative treatments should be disclosed remains to be considered by subsequent case 
law because the Supreme Court has not set out further guidance on this.481 Heywood has 
argued that the test of reasonableness of the doctors’ duty to disclose the alternative 
treatment would be considered in the light of the test of negligence as Montgomery suggests 
that ‘...negligence is still only a standard of reasonableness, and it would transcend that to 
expect doctors to disclose every conceivable course of action available.’482 In this sense it 
will be difficult to consider doctors’ duty to be widely extended so as disclose all possible 
alternatives, since these may not be available as viable treatment options and this might 
undermine ‘the effective provision of health care.’483 Furthermore, such an interpretation of 
the duty ‘would be destructive to the exercise of clinical discretion’, as it is still a vital 
element in the doctor–patient relationship, which may still be recognised even though the 
decision in Montgomery may marginalise it from the central place it formerly held.484  
In the recent guidelines issued by the Royal College of Surgeons (RCS), which followed the 
principles outlined in Montgomery,485 doctors are subject to a general duty to provide the 
patient with information and ‘..ensure that the patient is provided with the information they 
need to make an informed decision about treatment. It may be appropriate, in order to 
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facilitate discussion, to send information to the patient in advance.’486 Further, the guidelines 
explain that: ‘In practice, this means that surgeons should provide information about:… 
Alternative options for treatment, including non-operative care and no treatment…. The 
material risks inherent in the procedure and in the alternative options discussed..’487  
It should be remembered that courts have the final say on how to discharge doctors from 
their duties. Thus I would agree with Heywood that it will be ‘fascinating...to see in the 
future whether or not litigation converges on this aspect of the duty and, if so, the parameters 
that judges will place on it in order to limit the legal exposure of doctors.’488 
The test outlined in Montgomery interestingly retains something of the therapeutic 
exception, since it retained the possibility of allowing the doctor to withhold information in 
some, albeit rare, circumstances where disclosure would be ‘...seriously detrimental to the 
patient’s health.’489 The Supreme Court, however, clearly asserted that the ‘therapeutic 
exception should not be abused.’490 It has stated: 
‘It is a limited exception to the general principle that the patient should make the 
decision whether to undergo a proposed course of treatment: it is not intended to 
subvert that principle by enabling the doctor to prevent the patient from making 
an informed choice where she is liable to make a choice which the doctor 
considers to be contrary to her best interests.’491 
Accordingly, the therapeutic exception should not be used in a way that unjustifiably 
interferes with patient autonomy, such as where the doctor simply fears that the patient will 
make an unwise choice. The Supreme Court dismissed the doctor’s submission in 
Montgomery that she chose to ‘withhold information about the risk of shoulder dystocia from 
her patients because they would otherwise request caesarean sections.’492 The Supreme 
Court has responded that ‘the therapeutic exception is not intended to enable doctors to 
prevent their patients from taking an informed decision.’493 Therefore, ‘…it is the doctor’s 
responsibility to explain to her patient why she considers that one of the available treatment 
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options is medically preferable to the others, having taken care to ensure that her patient is 
aware of the considerations for and against each of them.’494 
I would argue that Montgomery can be used to contend that the professional/prudent doctor 
standard of providing patients with information is no longer the position to be taken by the 
law of the UK.495 Further, I would argue that English law (in the first part of Montgomery 
test) now provides a legal test that is able, to a large extent, to satisfy the ethical standard 
proposed in this thesis.   
Based on Montgomery I would argue that the first criterion, that of the sufficiency of 
information disclosure, can be adequately achieved by applying the test adopted in 
Montgomery of whether a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to 
attach significance to the risk. The choice whether to consent to treatment or which option 
from those available to choose, remains with the competent adult patient regardless of the 
doctor’s views on whether it is one which is in the patient’s best interests. The means of 
safeguarding this choice is ordinarily to provide the patient with information on material 
risks and viable alternative treatment options. This retreat from a professional standard has 
not been adopted by Saudi Arabian law and it is an area in which reform will be proposed to 
protect patient autonomy more appropriately. 
The sufficiency of information disclosure can also be achieved by recognising doctors’ duty 
to answer the patient’s questions fully and truthfully. The Supreme Court in Montgomery 
quoted with approval Lord Bridge’s view in Sidaway that the duty is to answer the patient’s 
questions fully and truthfully.496 Montgomery has therefore reinforced the legal position on 
this point and shows respect for patients’ autonomy. The law is thereby brought into line 
with GMC guidelines which recognise that doctors ‘must answer patients’ questions 
honestly and, as far as practicable, answer as fully as they wish.’497  
The second criterion of the proposed ethical ideal is that information should be 
understandable. As noted above, the decision taken in AlHamwi seemed not to place a duty 
on doctors to ensure that the patient had understood the information that had been provided 
to him, but it placed a duty on doctors to take reasonable steps to seek to ensure that patients 
can understand the information. Such a conclusion seems to be supported by the Supreme 
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Court in Montgomery, as the Supreme Court has asserted that a ‘dialogue’ between the 
doctor and the patient is necessary ‘...to ensure that the patient understands the seriousness 
of her condition, and the anticipated benefits and risks of the proposed treatment and any 
reasonable alternatives..’.498 That has as its aim to ensure that the patient can ‘make an 
informed decision.’499 This statement seems to suggest that information must not just be 
given to the patient, but to emphasise its purpose in enabling the patient to come to a 
sufficiently informed decision. The doctor must enter into a dialogue with the patient as part 
of providing advice and information. The RCS guidelines consider the matter of how to 
communicate the information to the patient: ‘Surgeons and other members of the healthcare 
team must ensure that any information is suitable for the individual patient and takes into 
account any issues that may impair effective communication, such as patients’ eyesight or 
hearing, English-language ability and literacy levels.’500 
This duty to provide understandable information ‘cannot be demonstrated simply with a 
signed consent form. It is submitted that this will also require information to be given in a 
timely fashion so that it can be properly digested.’501 It was further said that ‘[t]he doctor’s 
duty is not therefore fulfilled by bombarding the patient with technical information which 
she cannot reasonably be expected to grasp, let alone by routinely demanding her signature 
on a consent form.’502 The RCS guidelines state that doctors’ require ‘…..to take time to 
explore the patient’s values and wishes about their care and to have sufficient experience to 
fully understand the risks and benefits that are material to the patient.’ 503 That duty falls on 
the doctor in charge of the patient’s case, or in some cases ‘..with an experienced member 
of the surgical team who has the time and skill to gain sufficient understanding of the 
patient’s views and wishes.’504 Additionally that individual must have ‘…sufficient 
knowledge of the associated risks and complications, as well as any alternative treatments 
available for the patient’s condition.’505 
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The above recognition by the Supreme Court of the need for doctors to seek to ensure that 
patients can understand the provided information is vital. This point is reiterated in the RCS 
guidelines which state:  
‘Surgeons must be satisfied that their patient has received and understood 
sufficient information about their diagnosis – as well as the proposed 
treatment and its implications – to allow them to make a decision they deem 
to be in line with their own values and wishes. Different options for treatment, 
including the option of no treatment, should be presented side by side and the 
benefits and material risks should be given objectively.’506 
Despite the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the issue of understanding and the importance of 
communicating with the patient, Heywood has argued that ‘the judgment stopped short of 
providing examples of precisely what a doctor will be expected to do in order to discharge 
her duty in this regard.’507 Heywood has expressed concern because the concept of 
‘understanding’ is ‘fluid’ and it would be naturally different among patients.508 Thus, for 
Heywood 
 ‘...this is surely the most curious and equivocal segment of the doctor’s duty. It 
is difficult for a doctor to gauge a patient’s understanding and equally 
challenging for a judge to articulate what reasonable steps have to be taken to 
ensure that there has been at least some attempt by the clinician to ascertain the 
level of patient comprehension.’509 
I would agree with Heywood’s conclusion that the clarification of what approach doctors 
should take to explain and communicate risk to the patient will rely on how the decision in 
Montgomery is interpreted in subsequent case law.510  
What the judgment does seem to do is to move the law’s position closer to that outlined in 
the GMC guideline ‘Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together’ which has 
advised doctors to:  
‘…check whether the patient needs any additional support to understand information, 
to communicate their wishes, or to make a decision. You should bear in mind that 
some barriers to understanding and communication may not be obvious; for example, 
a patient may have unspoken anxieties, or may be affected by pain or other 
underlying problems. You must make sure, wherever practical, that arrangements are 
made to give the patient any necessary support. This might include, for example: 
using an advocate or interpreter; asking those close to the patient about the patient’s 
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communication needs; or giving the patient a written or audio record of the 
discussion and any decisions that were made.’511  
In conclusion, I would agree with Heywood that ‘[i]t is not just the language of rights that 
has changed over time. It is also the substance of those rights, the importance that is attached 
to them, and, critically, what the law should demand of doctors to ensure that those rights 
are being adequately protected.’512 The Supreme Court has now affirmed that: 
‘Responsibility for determining the nature and extent of a person’s rights rests with the 
courts, not with the medical professions.’513 Therefore, the decision in Montgomery arguably 
has recognised the need to protect patients’ autonomy and has gone further than ever before 
to shield patients’ rights. In this sense, the age of paternalism has been rejected and patients 
are expected to be in charge of their decisions and choices. In other words, patient consent 
should be regarded as a process where patients are now the ‘central figure.’514	
Thus, for the reasons I have above stated, although there remain issues to be resolved, I 
conclude that the development of the law culminating in Montgomery is capable of meeting 
the thesis’s proposed ethical standard, as it can provide a legal basis for providing patients 
with sufficient and understandable information to respect their autonomy. As I have argued 
in Chapter two and for the reasons I have stated there and in the thesis Introduction, it is 
clear that there is no huge controversy for Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabia to learn some 
lessons from other the legal systems. Thus, I will take forward the approach taken in 
Montgomery (the first part the prudent patient standard) in proposing reform to the current 
professional standard of care under Saudi Arabian medical law. 
The above discussion of Montgomery shows how English law by adopting the prudent 
standard of care has dealt with issues that the current Saudi Arabian medical law has so far 
failed to adequately address. In Chapter four, I will demonstrate and explain these legal 
deficiencies and, in the Concluding Chapter, I will suggest proposals for reform based on 
that discussion. 
So far, what has been discussed is the first two legal requirements to establish a negligence 
claim: (A) the duty of care and (B) a breach of that duty. It is also essential for a successful 
negligence claim that the patient can establish the third element: (C) causation. This is 
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another area where legal principles have made it difficult for patients to succeed in 
information disclosure cases. As the thesis focuses on the standard of care in information 
disclosure, the topic of causation will be addressed briefly, but with specific consideration 
of the issue of establishing causation in terms of information disclosure. 
C. Causation 
Kennedy and Grubb stated that ‘causation is the legal concept by which the defendant is held 
responsible for his conduct, which in this context means his negligence’.515 The role of 
causation is to show the material connection between the defendants’ negligent action (or, 
more rarely, inaction) and the claimants’ damage.516 
Factual causation is the idea that the claimant must show a historical connection between the 
negligent action of the defendant and the injury or damage that happened.517 The tool to 
establish that connection of causation is through the ‘but for’ test.518 The ‘but for’ test was 
described by Lord Denning as follows: 
‘[C]ausation is, I think, a question of fact. If you can say that the damage would 
not have happened but for a particular fault, then that fault is in fact a cause of 
the damage; but if you can say that the damage would have happened just the 
same, fault or no fault, then the fault is not a cause of the damage.’519 
The ‘but for’ test in action can be seen in the case of Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington 
Hospital Management Committee.520 Here three men in a hospital emergency department 
were asked to leave the hospital and see their own doctors by a nurse who received that 
instruction via a phone call from the doctor on duty. Barnett died later of arsenic poisoning 
and his widow sued the hospital for negligence.521  
The court held that neither hospital nor doctor were liable for the death. There had been no 
breach of the duty of care since even if the patient had been admitted to hospital there was 
no effective treatment and the claimant’s husband would still have died.522 Hence, if the 
injury or damage would have happened regardless of the defendant’s negligence, negligence 
is not ‘causative of the claimant’s loss’.523 Based on the ‘but for’ test, in the case where the 
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patient claims he has been injured because he had not received adequate information, the 
patient has to establish that the proper disclosure of information would have meant that he 
would not have consented to the treatment, and, as a result, that he would not have suffered 
the injury.524 In other words, ‘but for the defendant’s negligence the patient would have 
suffered an injury’.525 Thus, it is not sufficient to just establish that doctors are negligent526 
but also the negligence must cause damage to the claimant as a result of not having been 
given the relevant information.527 However, as with the standard of care, there are different 
approaches to determining whether the failure to disclose information has in fact been the 
cause of the patient’s injury. A distinction can be drawn between a subjective test of 
causation and an objective test.  
The subjective test of causation relies on a particular patient’s evidence as to what s/he would 
have done if given the information, so to establish his case s/he would simply need to give 
evidence that s/he would not have consented to the treatment. It has been argued that the test 
of causation in information disclosure cases was considered by McNair J in Bolam as a 
subjective one:528 Here he held that ‘... you might well take the view that unless the plaintiff 
[the patient] has satisfied you that he would not have taken the treatment if he had been 
warned, there is really nothing in this point’.529 Further, it has been argued that in Chatterton 
Bristow J also adopted a subjective test of causation as he held that ‘[w]hen the claim is 
based on negligence the plaintiff [the patient] must prove not only the breach of duty to 
inform, but that had the duty not been broken she would not have chosen to have the 
operation’.530 However, Bristow J appeared to acknowledge a different test, a more objective 
one.531 The objective test of causation relies on deciding what a reasonable patient would 
have chosen to do if given the information.532 In Chatterton, Bristow J held that ‘I would not 
have been satisfied that if properly informed the plaintiff [the patient] would have chosen 
not to have it [the operation]. The whole picture on the evidence is of a lady desperate for 
pain relief…’533 In other words, a reasonable patient in the circumstances of the patient 
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would be expected to have consented to the treatment. This arguably shows that the outcome 
of Chatterton is to have a ‘hybrid test of causation’ that would require the patients to ‘show 
what they would actually have done had they been properly informed, but this subjective 
claim is the subjected to an objective test of credibility’.534 The credibility of the patient is 
tested against what it is considered a reasonable patient would have done in order to avoid 
the problem of the patient’s response being affected by the benefit of hindsight, whether 
deliberately or unconsciously. This kind of difficulty was discussed earlier in relation to the 
subjective and objective test for the standard of care. 
Although it has been argued that ‘the subjective test is the most respecting of the patient’s 
self-determination, it may be difficult to apply it in practice without allowing the concept of 
reasonableness to creep in.’535 Nevertheless, ‘[t]he postcedent requirement for reasons, 
whether subjective, credible or wholly objective, undermines the antecedent right to decide 
irrespective of having a reason for the decision.’536 
However, the mixture of a subjective/objective test of causation was adopted in Smith v 
Barking, Havering and Brentwood HA.537 The patient was required to provide evidence of 
what he would have decided if properly informed (subjective test). However, it was held that 
even if the witness was thought to be expressing their honest belief now about what they 
would have done, the court could conclude that a reasonable patient in the patient’s position 
would still have consented (objective test).538 Hence, if a reasonable patient would have 
agreed to a treatment that has been proposed to him even if he had been informed about the 
risk, the patient would carry the burden to bring evidence to support his allegation that he 
would have not consented to the treatment.539 However, the situation remains unclear and 
some English law cases seem to have continued to consider the subjective test of causation 
as a means for judges to assess ‘witness credibility’.540 For example, in O’Keefe v Harvey-
Kemble,541 the patient claimed that if she had been properly informed about the risks, she 
would not have consented to the surgery. The court held that,  
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‘there were weighty arguments for the defendant...as to why the defendant’s 
version of events should have been preferred; alternatively, that... [the patient] 
would have been likely to proceed with the operation whatever warnings she 
received from the defendant. However, in the event, the recorder preferred the 
recollection of... [the patient] and accepted her evidence as to whether she would 
have proceeded is she had been fully and properly advised of the attendant risks. 
Those were essentially findings of fact based on the recorder’s assessment of the 
witnesses, of a kind with which this court will only interfere in rare cases.’542  
Despite the success for the patient in this case, it has been argued that in addition to the 
problems with establishing breach of the duty of care, ‘...until the judgment in Chester v 
Afshar, causation also remained a very significant obstacle to patient success’.543 (Her 
emphasis). However, in Chester the court has relaxed the test of causation in an effort to 
give more respect for patient autonomy.544 As I have stated above, Chester is an important 
decision for both the development of the standard of information disclosure which has been 
discussed and for the issue of causation. In Chester, Chester was claiming that ‘if she had 
been told of the risks as she now knew them to be she would not have had the operation...’.545 
Notably, Chester did not argue that she would not ever have consented to such an operation, 
but only that she would not have consented immediately to the operation until she had ‘...at 
least two further opinions as to whether an operation was necessary’.546 In Chester the 
majority of the Lordships (Lords Hope, Steyn and Walker) were in favour of Chester on 
causation as she lost the chance to have the operation on another day when it was suggested 
that, due to the low risk, it was unlikely she would have suffered paralysis.547 In terms of the 
test of causation, the majority of the Law Lords held that it is not necessary for the patient 
to prove she would never have consented to the operation for the rest for her life if she had 
been properly informed.548 Lord Hope stated that:  
‘The function of law is to protect the patient right’s to choose. If it is to fulfil 
that function it must ensure that the duty to inform is respected by the doctor. It 
will fail to do this if an appropriate remedy cannot be given if the duty is 
breached and the very risk that patient should have been told about occurs and 
she suffers injury.’549 
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This approach can be understood to respect patients’ self-determination as Lord Hope in the 
House of Lords cited with approval the decision of the Court of Appeal: 
‘The object is to enable the patient to decide whether or not to run the risks of 
having that operation at that time. If the doctor’s failure to take that care results 
in her consenting to an operation to which she would not otherwise have given 
her consent, the purpose of that rule would be thwarted if he were not to be held 
responsible when the very risk about which he failed to warn her materialises 
and causes her an injury which she would not have suffered then and there.’550 
The majority in the House of Lords in Chester can be said to have agreed to give ‘proper 
legal force to patients’ right to autonomy and dignity’.551 Lord Steyn justified making what 
he referred to as ‘a narrow and modest departure from traditional causation principles.’552 
The doctor has a duty to inform and failure to do so would result in negligence which should 
be compensated, even where there might have been considered to be difficulties in 
establishing causation.553 Therefore, Chester in relation to causation can be suggested to 
focus on the notion that the patient should be warned about risks as otherwise she would not 
have been given the opportunity to weigh the risks to make her choice.554 As Lord Hope 
argued: ‘For some [patients] the choice may be easy—simply to agree to or to decline the 
operation. But for many the choice will be a difficult one, requiring time to think, to take 
advice and to weigh up the alternatives’.555 Therefore, ‘[t]he duty is owed as much to the 
patient who, if warned, would find the decision difficult as to the patient who would find it 
simple and could give a clear answer to the doctor one way or the other immediately’.556 
Although both Lords Bingham and Hoffman recognised the important of the patient’s right 
to be informed, they dissented from this approach to causation. Instead they opted for the 
conventional principle of causation provided by the ‘but for’ test, saying that the patient had 
failed it, because the stated time of performing the operation did not affect the risk of her 
injury.557 It has been argued that there would be a difficulty if a patient was asked to establish 
that ‘she would not have consented to have this particular treatment at this time if she had 
been properly informed, but cannot prove that she would never have undergone the 
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procedure in the future.’558 This difficulty arises because it does not seem to fall clearly 
within the ‘but for’ test explained earlier.559 In a situation like this, if the risk is inherent in 
treatment, it seems hard to say how she would have avoided the same injury if she would 
still have undertaken the same treatment at a future time. The argument would be that any 
time that the operation was performed would subject her to the same level of risk. Deferring 
the operation would only delay the injury occurring. This is because in actions based on 
negligent information disclosure it is not contended that the doctor could or should have 
performed the treatment differently, so that the only way the patient could avoid injury would 
be to not have the treatment.560 
In this regard, I would agree with Pattinson that the test of establishing causation in failing 
to disclose risks based on the majority in Chester can be formulated as the following: ‘A 
doctor who fails to disclose sufficient information thereby triggers potential liability even if 
that failure does not actually cause the patient any physical harm.’561 This in fact only 
requires the patient to show that the disclosure of risk would have deprived him from making 
a choice, thus the patient needs to prove that he would not have consented to the medical 
treatment or operation at that time.562 It has been argued that Chester has shown that the law 
of negligence is capable of protecting patient autonomy, because negligence is ‘actionable 
upon proof of damage, rather than actionable per se.’563 The ‘damage’ here is being regarded 
as the violation of patient autonomy. However, this is a significant departure from the 
traditional ‘but for’ test and is controversial since, as the minority argued, it could be 
regarded as being illogical. 
According to Montgomery, the traditional ‘but for’ test was applied so that the patient must 
show that she would have taken a different decision, had she been properly informed.564 This 
was because it was not alleged that she would have sought further opinions and delayed the 
treatment, but might have opted for the same treatment at some later date. It was quite clear 
that her argument was based on which treatment she would have opted for at the time. In the 
Outer House of the Court of Session, the judge, by applying the subjective test of causation, 
																																								 																				
558	E	Jackson	Medical	Law	Text,	Cases	and	Materials	p.	197.	
559	Ibid.	
560	For	example,	L	Khoury	‘Chester	v	Afshar:	Stepping	Further	Away	from	Causation?’	(2005)	Singapore	Journal	of	Legal	
Studies	246–260.	
561S	Pattinson	Medical	Law	and	Ethics	p.	133.	
562	J	Mason	The	Troubled	Pregnancy:	Legal	Wrongs	and	Rights	in	Reproduction	(1sted	CUP	2007)	p.	76-77.	
563S	Pattinson	Medical	Law	and	Ethics	p.	134.	
564Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11	para	104	and	N	Khalique	‘Informed	Consent:	The	Dawning	
of	a	New	Era’	(2015)	53(6)	British	Journal	of	Oral	and	Maxillofacial	Surgery	479-484.	
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came to the conclusion that, even if Montgomery had been given full advice about the risks 
of the shoulder dystocia, she would not have selected the alternative of a Caesarean section. 
That conclusion was approved by the Inner House of the Court of Session.565 Nevertheless, 
the Scottish courts’ conclusion regarding causation contained two errors, as the Supreme 
Court has observed. First, the courts focussed on the very small risk of a severe result of the 
shoulder dystocia (‘1/500 approximately for a brachial plexus injury and of that 1/500 
approximately 1–2% of those would suffer cerebral palsy.’),566 instead of the significant 
risks of shoulder dystocia itself (9% to 10%).567 Second, the courts excluded a vital piece of 
evidence which was submitted by Dr  McLellan herself, when she explained that she did not 
warn about shoulder dystocia, because based on her view that ‘most women will actually 
say, ‘I’d rather have a caesarean section.’568 She then explained that if she mentioned such 
risks to diabetic patients, most of the women would opt for a Caesarean section, which in 
her view was ‘...not in the maternal interests..’ for them.569 The Supreme Court concluded 
that had Dr McLellan 
 ‘...advised Mrs Montgomery of the risk of shoulder dystocia and discussed with 
her dispassionately the potential consequences, and the alternative of an elective 
caesarean section, Mrs Montgomery would probably have elected to be 
delivered of her baby by caesarean section. It is not in dispute that the baby 
would then have been born unharmed.’570 
The evidence thus has appeared to show that even the defender believed that giving such 
information was likely to change the patient’s mind about treatment and accordingly the 
Supreme Court held that the causation point was established in the patient’s favour.571 It 
should also be noted that Dr McLellan’s view is reminiscent of the now discredited approach 
that it is appropriate to withhold information if it is believed that this is in the patient’s best 
medical interests. This paternalistic approach is no longer accepted, save for rare cases where 
therapeutic exception can be invoked. It can be argued that the element of causation in 
Montgomery was straightforward. Therefore,‘[a]s such causation was satisfied in the 
ordinary fashion, discussion of Chester v Afshar was unnecessary.’572 (Original emphasis) 
																																								 																				
565Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11	para	96.			
566Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2010]	CSOH	104	para	229.			
567Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11	para	99-100.	
568Ibid.	para	13.	
569Ibid.	
570Ibid.	para	104.	
571Ibid.	para	103.	
572	C	McGrath	‘Trust	me,	I’m	a	Patient’:	Disclosure	Standards	and	the	Patient’s	Right	to	Decide’	p.	214.		
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In conclusion, since the decision in Chester has been handed down English law has become 
more willing to protect patients’ autonomy. It seems that by relaxing the conditions of 
causation for the patient to establish his claim English law is giving more support to patients 
to prove their claims. The issue of causation is very interesting and shows another aspect of 
how the law considers the protection of the patient’s autonomy.573 Nonetheless, as the major 
focus in this thesis is on the issue of the standard of care in relation to information disclosure, 
I have limited the discussion of the issue of causation and I will not further consider it in this 
Chapter.  
5. Conclusion 
This Chapter has discussed English law with regard to consent and information disclosure, 
and has has focused on the issue of how English law has interpreted the principle of respect 
for autonomy in terms of adult competent patients’ consent and information disclosure. I 
would agree that consent to medical treatment ‘is much more than a medico-legal concept, 
as it encompasses a number of moral precepts relating to freedom of choice and the right to 
decide whether or not to accept advice and treatment’.574 As a result, it has been said that 
‘the doctor’s legal duty to obtain consent for treatment is based on the fundamental principle 
of respect for the individual’s right to self-determination and autonomy’.575 Hence, Lord 
Donaldson demonstrated a strong view regarding respect for autonomy when His Lordship 
affirmed that: ‘An adult patient who...suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute right 
to choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to choose one rather than 
another of the treatment being offered...’576 His Lordship then has added: ‘This right of 
choice is not limited to decisions which others might regard as sensible. It exists 
notwithstanding that the reasons for making the choice are rational, irrational, unknown or 
even nonexistent’.577 Lord Donaldson stated that ‘[t]he patient’s interest consists of his right 
to self-determination - his right to live his own life how he wishes, even if it will damage his 
health ...’.578 
																																								 																				
573	A	MacLean	‘From	Sidaway	to	Pearce	and	Beyond:	Is	the	Legal	Regulation	of	Consent	any	Better	Following	a	Quarter	
of	a	Century	of	Judicial	Scrutiny?’	p.	126.		
574	H	Cheung	‘Consent	to	Medical	Procedures-Principles	and	Practice’	(1995)	5	Hong	Kong	Journal	of	Psychiatry	5-17	p.	
8.	
575	A	Plomer	The	Law	and	Ethics	of	Medical	Research:	International	Bioethics	and	Human	Rights	(Cavendish	Publishing	
limited	2005)	p.	49.	
576Re	T(Adult:	Refusal	of	Medical	Treatment)	[1993]	Fam	95	p.	102.		
577Ibid.	
578Ibid.	p.	112.	
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It is clear that when the law considers consent under battery it is to protect patients’ bodily 
integrity from unwanted touching579 and a legally valid consent requires the patient to be 
competent and free from undue influence or coercion.580 It also requires a certain amount of 
information disclosure. However, once consent based on a broad understanding of the nature 
of the treatment has been obtained, any failure in provision of adequate information is dealt 
with by the civil tort of negligence. Adequate information disclosure is undoubtedly required 
by the law but the precise scope of information to be disclosed has undergone changes 
culminating in the case of Montgomery.581 
The increased emphasis on respect for patient autonomy discussed in Chapter one has also 
been seen in the development of English law to acknowledge this principle, as can be seen 
most strongly in Montgomery, with its formulation of the prudent patient standard of care in 
actions for negligence based on inadequate information disclosure.582 In Lady Hale’s words 
in this case:  
‘It is now well recognised that the interest which the law of negligence protects 
is a person’s interest in their own physical and psychiatric integrity, an important 
feature of which is their autonomy, their freedom to decide what shall and shall 
not be done with their body...’583 
Therefore, for Lady Hale the patient is entitled to make her decision freely and that decision 
must be respected as long as the patient is ‘a competent adult’ and the patient is ‘entitled to 
the information which will enable her to take a proper part in that decision.’584 
The acknowledgment of the need for the law to protect patient autonomy in the earlier cases 
of Chester and Pearce has been described by Hoppe and Miola as ‘stark.’585 That has led 
them to express their strong belief that, in less than twenty years, English law has moved 
from Lord Diplock’s view to purely applying the Bolam test where there is no mention of 
respect for patient autonomy, through Lord Bridge’s modified view, then more recently to 
the protection of patient autonomy in much the way that Lord Scarman in Sidaway 
proposed.586 
																																								 																				
579For	example,	Re	W	(A	Minor)	(Medical	Treatment)	[1992]	4	All	ER	627	and	Freeman	v	Home	Office	[1984]	QB	524.	
580	For	example,	Re	T	(Adult:	Refusal	of	Medical	Treatment)	[1993]	Fam	95.	
581Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11	para	87.	
582		C	Foster	‘Montgomery	Is	the	Belated	Obituary,	Not	the	Death	Knell,	of	Medical	Paternalism,	says	Charles	Foster’	at	
http://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/nlj/content/last-word-consent	(accessed	29/05/2015).	
583Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11	para	108.	
584Ibid.	para	115.	
585	N	Hoppe	and	J	Miola	Medical	Law	and	Medical	Ethics	p.	88.	
586Ibid.	p.	88-89.	
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I would agree with Miola’s observation that English judicial view on the standard of care 
has been gradually changed as follows:  
‘The judicial attitude gradually changed, and the focus of the law shifted from 
doctors to patients. The legal test for what a doctor must tell a patient…moved… 
to what the reasonable doctor would inform a patient subject to judicial control, 
[Smith v Tunbridge Wells HA] and then to what the reasonable patient would 
want to be told [Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust]. This provided 
limits to the use of medical conscience, as the law came to prioritise what the 
patient wanted rather than what the doctor thought best for the patient. But the 
courts have gone further, and the law now openly and explicitly looks only at 
patient autonomy. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently delivered a judgment 
that cements this view in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board.’587 (Original 
emphasis). 
However, English law still acknowledges the therapeutic privilege concept,588 so as to allow 
doctors in some exceptional circumstances to withhold information from their patients, 
based on their medical judgement.589 Nevertheless, the scope for this has become very 
limited.590 
In Chapter one, this thesis discussed the Western ethical views on the principle of respect 
for autonomy and trust in a medical context. It was proposed that patients should be provided 
with sufficient and understandable information to be self-determining. For the reasons I have 
stated throughout this Chapter modern English law (the prudent patient standard) seems to 
be able to satisfy the thesis’s proposed ethical standard. There do remain issues to be resolved 
such as the issue of what is meant by informing the patient about a reasonable alternative 
treatment and how doctors should fulfil their duties to seek to ensure that the patient can 
understand the information. Clarification of these remaining questions will doubtless emerge 
from future case law. 
The next Chapter will examine the Saudi Arabian current professional standard of care in 
order to make recommendations for reform. Therefore, in the following Chapter, the thesis 
will move its focus to consider the same issues as discussed in this Chapter but based on the 
Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian laws. Then, in the Concluding Chapter, the thesis will 
present the lesson that can be learnt from English law experience based on the conclusions 
of the previous Chapters. 
																																								 																				
587	J	Miola	‘Making	Decisions	about	Decision-Making:	Conscience,	Regulation	and	the	Law’	p.	277.	
588Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11	and	Chester	v	Afshar	[2004]	UKHL	41.	
589Ibid.	
590Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11	para	95	and	Chester	v	Afshar	[2004]	UKHL	41.	
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Chapter four: Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian law on consent and information 
disclosure 
1. Preface 
The standard of care that has been applied by Saudi Arabia’s SMPs1 and hospitals is the 
professional standard of care. The Saudi Arabian professional standard is based on the 
perspective of Muslim scholars, which is that doctors’ civil liabilities should be determined 
by the relevant profession, not by the courts reaching an independent judgment on 
appropriate conduct. In this sense the standard, as Yacoub has noted, can be considered to 
take the same approach as that adopted in the English case of  Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee2, by using a professional standard.3 Furthermore, I will argue that 
the Saudi Arabian professional standard in its current form and application is in fact in 
accordance with Lord Diplock’s version of the standard of care in Sidaway v Bethlem Royal 
Hospital Governors4 and it has been applied to all aspects of doctors’ duties of care, 
including information disclosure.  
Chapter two of the thesis discussed the notion of the principle of respect for autonomy based 
on Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical ethics. The Chapter concluded that both 
Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical ethics have recognised the principle of respect 
for autonomy, albeit with some reservations concerning permissible decisions. Respect for 
autonomy should not lead to severe harm or death or an action that is against Islamic Sharia 
principles, even that action is harmless.5 However, having discussed the standard of 
information disclosure in Chapter two, it seems that there is no clear reference by either 
Islamic Sharia or Saudi Arabian medical ethics to such an issue nor other matters arising 
from information disclosure. Nevertheless, I have argued that the proposed ethical standard 
I have adopted can be applied in Saudi Arabia, with the addition that consent to or refusal of 
treatment must be in accordance with Islamic Sharia principles. I have concluded that the 
available materials in Saudi Arabian medical ethics, set out in CEHP2013, are not 
sufficiently developed in the light of the proposed ethical standard. 
																																								 																				
1	See	their	role	below	in	this	Chapter.		
2Bolam	v	Friern	Hospital	Management	Committee	[1957]	1	W.L.R.	582.	
3	A	Yacoub	The	Fiqh	of	Medicine	Responses	in	Islamic	Jurisprudence	to	Developments	in	Medical	
Science	p.	111-112	
4Sidaway	v	Bethlem	Royal	Hospital	Governors	[1985]	1	A.C.	871	
5	See	Chapter	two	for	further	discussion.	
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The recognition by Islamic Sharia of respect for patients’ autonomy would support the 
thesis’s argument that Saudi Arabian medical law should provide protection for patient 
autonomy. It will be argued in this Chapter that LPHP2005 does not provide adequate 
protection of patients’ autonomy, because of its use of the professional standard for 
information disclosure and its failure to address certain key issues. As noted in Chapter two, 
reforming the current deficiency and uncertainty in the standard of care for information 
disclosure in Saudi Arabia would need to be undertaken by the legislative bodies in the 
country, rather than relying on legal development through case law. It is also important to 
note that unless Islamic Sharia primary sources have given a view on an issue which is 
considered to be a legal ruling, whatever Islamic Sharia medical ethics says about an issue 
cannot be legally binding until that view is adopted by the State.6 Although there have been 
some statements made by the GPSRI which are legally enforceable, there remain gaps and 
deficiencies. This will be explored further in this Chapter. Since there are sufficient 
similarities in Western medical ethics and Islamic Sharia, and Montgomery v Lanarkshire 
Health Board7 has developed English law toward what I contend meets an acceptable ethical 
standard. I would argue that it would be appropriate for Saudi Arabia to consider the 
experience that has been developed in the UK regarding the legal standard of care in 
information disclosure and, where appropriate and in accordance with Islamic Sharia 
principles, learn some lessons from it. However, as has been stated in Chapter two that there 
are some differences between the approaches to respect for autonomy that would need to be 
taken into account by any legislation in Saudi Arabia. The novelty of this thesis is to 
recommend that LPHP2005 introduces the prudent patient standard of care because 
respecting patients’ autonomy in a way that is consistent with Islamic Sharia is not 
sufficiently provided for in specific laws. 
I would argue that there is some evidence that supports the introduction and adoption of the 
prudent patient standard in Saudi Arabia. For example, in Chapter two I have argued that 
Islamic Sharia medical ethics and general principles can recognise the prudent patient 
standard. Additionally, the attitudes of patients and medical professionals are changing in 
Saudi Arabia and there seems to be more awareness of the need for more protection of 
respect for patients’ autonomy, as AlBar and Pasha have argued.8 In this Chapter, I will 
																																								 																				
6	For	further	discussion,	M	Asad	The	Principles	of	State	and	Government	in	Islam	(Literary	Licensing	2011).	
7	Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11	
8	M	AlBar	and	H	Pasha	Contemporary	Bioethics	Islamic	Perspective	p.	111	
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discuss some recent surveys and studies that show the current attitudes of patients and 
doctors in Saudi Arabia regarding autonomy and informed consent. 
In regard to the discussion in this Chapter, as for any country in the world, for Saudi Arabia 
to enforce the sovereignty of its laws, the law should be applicable to all residents in the 
country.9 Thus, medical staff who work in Saudi Arabian hospitals, irrespective of their 
backgrounds, should follow the medical regulations of the country.10 The existing 
LPHP2005 has no reference to a specific patient faith or background or schools of thought: 
its principles have been set for all patients. Taking into consideration that the country is an 
Islamic country, it is clear that the principles are set based on Islamic Sharia and for Muslims 
but LPHP2005 is applicable to all patients who are receiving healthcare in the country and 
all doctors providing it. The BLG1992 has declared that the government of Saudi Arabia 
shall protect human rights in accordance with Islamic Sharia.11 Furthermore, LPHP2005 has 
stated that: ‘Healthcare professionals shall serve the best interest of individuals and society 
within the framework of respecting human right to life, safety and dignity and shall observe 
customs and traditions prevailing in the Kingdom, and eschew exploitation.’12 Therefore, it 
might be possible for doctors to respect patients’ views from other backgrounds as long as 
that does not require them to breach Islamic Sharia or Saudi Arabian law.13 For example, a 
doctor cannot assist the patient to die even at the patient’s own request: ‘[u]nder no 
circumstances may the life of a terminally ill patient be terminated even if so requested by 
the patient or his family.’14 In this example, the stance of Saudi Arabian law is similar to 
English law, as it is still illegal to recognise the patient’s right to die by the active assistance 
of another,15 regardless of the patient’s nationality, religion or background. Thus, in Saudi 
Arabia non-Muslim patients’ views can and should be respected as long as that is not in 
breach of Islamic Sharia, and this should also be taken into account in any proposed legal 
reform. The objectives of this Chapter are: first, to examine the development of the law of 
consent under Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical law. Second, to present the current 
way in which the law is applied and to demonstrate where there are gaps in medical law in 
																																								 																				
9		There	are	very	limited	reservations	such	as	to	allow	non-Muslims	in	private	to	drink	alcohol	or	celebrate	their	festivals	
or	practice	their	religions.	For	example,	‘Foreign	travel	advice	Saudi	Arabia’	by	The	UK	government	at	
https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/saudi-arabia/local-laws-and-customs	(accessed	01/07/2015).	
10	LPHP2005	articles	1	and	5.	
11	BLG1992	article	26.	
12	LPHP2005	article	5.	
13	Ibid.	article	5	section	1	in	the	executive	regulation	has	stated	that:	‘Healthcare	professionals	must	respect	patients’	
choices	in	accordance	with	Islamic	Sharia	and	law’	(Arabic).	
14	Ibid.	article	19.	
15	See	Chapter	one	for	further	discussion.		
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relation to how much information should be given. Third, it will examine whether the Saudi 
Arabian legal standard of information disclosure respects the competent adult patient’s 
autonomy in way that is in accordance with Islamic Sharia. Fourthly, it will examine the 
legal consequences of doctors’ liability for failure to obtain patients’ consent or disclose 
information or risks to them. For each matter that has a deficiency, it will be compared to 
the English law experience so as to explore whether some lessons can be learnt. Finally, in 
the Concluding Chapter the thesis will present its recommendation to Saudi Arabian medical 
law to adopt the prudent patient standard of care. 
The discussion and analysis in this Chapter will rely on LPHP2005, medical declarations 
from the GPSRI16 and CEHP2013.17 
2. Patients’ consent (AlEden) and Saudi Arabian medical law 
Consent normally means what the patient permits to be done to his/her body and which kind 
of medical procedure he/she agrees should be conducted.18 The thesis will now discuss how 
the law of consent has been developed in Saudi Arabia, until it reached its final formulation 
in LPHP2005 and CEHP2013. It will do so first through a brief consideration of the Islamic 
Sharia legal perspective. As discussed in Chapter two, Islamic Sharia legal principles are 
based on the same sources as religious and ethical principles, but the consequences of 
breaching them differ.  
2.1. Islamic Sharia legal perspective 
Muslim scholars have considered the law of consent by grounding their analysis and 
understanding on the primary sources of Islamic Sharia. The holy Quran in translation 
states: ‘O you who believe, do not enter other houses except yours without first asking 
permission and saluting the inmates. This is better for you: you may haply take heed.’19 
Muslim scholars understood from this holy verse that the holy Quran grants people’s homes 
privacy and protection to not be entered unless permission has been granted.20 Based on this, 
Muslim scholars have stated their views regarding dealing with one’s property in Islamic 
Sharia legal formulae: ‘The dealing by one person with the property of another, without his 
																																								 																				
16	Its	role	is	described	in	Chapter	two.		
17	See	Chapter	two	for	its	legal	binding.	
18	M	AlShanqeeti,	Ahkam	Algerhah	Altibeh	wAlather	Almotrtbh	Aliha.	(Rulings	of	Medical	Surgeries	and	Their	
Consequences).	p.	160.	
19	The	holy	Quran	in	translation	(CH24:27).	
20I	Ibn	Kathir	Tafsir	ibn	Kathir	(The	Interpretation	of	the	Holy	Quran)	(1sted	Dar	ibn	Hazm	2000)	p.	1324.	
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leave, is not lawful’.21 If this protection is given to people’s homes then it is considered that 
an individual’s rights to privacy and bodily integrity are even more valuable and to be 
protected, since the holy Quran in translation describes the human body as follows: ‘We 
[Allah] have indeed created man in the best shape.’22 Islamic Sharia has recognised the 
protection of the sanctity of human life and respect for the human body, as the Messenger 
PBUH declared in the holy place of Makkah23 during his pilgrimage: ‘verily your blood, 
your property are as sacred and inviolable as the sacredness of this day of yours, in this 
month of yours, in this town of yours’.24 
It is therefore clear that the human body and life are sacred and to be protected from any 
violence or other action that threatens them.25 It follows that each individual must be 
protected from any unwanted touching – reckless, well meaning or malicious. It is a breach 
of bodily integrity if one deals with a person’s body without a person giving permission or 
consent in a way that is in accordance with Islamic Sharia teachings.26 
Muslims are encouraged to preserve, promote and enjoy their lives in a good way; the holy 
Quran in translation states:  
‘But seek, with that (wealth) which Allah has bestowed on you, the home of the 
Hereafter, and forget not your portion of legal enjoyment in this world, and do 
good as Allah has been good to you, and seek not mischief in the land. Verily, 
Allah likes not the Mufsidun (those who commit great crimes and sins, 
oppressors, tyrants, mischief-makers, corrupters).’27 
Therefore, based on what has been said, it can be argued that first, an individual is in control 
of his/her own body, and second, that body may not be violated by any means unless the 
person has consented to something that benefits him/her or prevents severe harm or death 
and is not against Islamic Sharia principles. There have been some references to the law of 
patients’ consent to or refusal of medical treatment in Islamic Sharia traditions, perhaps not 
to a degree that would satisfy the current formulation of consent laws, but advanced concepts 
																																								 																				
21The	Mejelle	Being	an	English	Translation	of	Majallah	El-Ahakam-I-Adliya	and	a	Complete	Code	on	Islamic	Civil	Law.	
Article	96.	
22	The	holy	Quran	in	translation	(CH95:4).	
23	This	declaration	was	made	by	Messenger	Mohammad	PBUH	in	the	performance	of	Hajj	(pilgrimage)	in	Makkah	in	
631.	
24M	AlHajja	Sahih	Muslim	and	M	AlBukhari	Al-Bukhari	at	http://sunnah.com/riyadussaliheen/18/14	(accessed	
10/12/2014).	
25	A	Badwi	The	Concise	Presentation	of	the	Fiqh	of	the	Sunnah	and	the	Noble	Book	translated	by	J	Zarabozo	(2nded	IIPH	
2007)	p.	505-506		
26	M	Abdulfattah	Simplified	Islamic	Jurisprudence	Based	on	the	Quran	and	the	Sunnah	(Dar	AlManarah	2004)	Vol	2	p.	
1009	
27	The	holy	Quran	in	translation	(CH28:77).	
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for their time. There was a specific reference that bears directly upon consent to treatment 
in one of Islamic Sharia’s primary sources, Sunnah, when the Messenger PBUH was ill28 
and in need of treatment, as those who were surrounding him PBUH thought. His wife 
Aisha29 told the story: 
‘We poured medicine30 into the mouth of Allah’s Messenger during his illness, 
and he pointed out to us intending to say, ‘Do not pour medicine into my mouth.’ 
We thought that his refusal was out of the aversion a patient usually has for 
medicine. When he improved and felt a bit better, he said (to us.) ‘Did not I 
forbid you to pour medicine into my mouth?’ We said, ‘we thought (you did so) 
because of the aversion, one usually has for medicine.’ Allah’s Messenger said, 
‘There is none of you but will be forced to drink [the same] medicine, and I will 
watch you, except Al-‘Abbas [his uncle], for he did not witness this act of 
yours.’31 
From this prophetic statement, Muslim scholars have elicited some legal principles in 
relation to patients’ consent to or refusal of medical treatment. 
First, this prophetic statement by the Messenger PBUH has been believed to be the 
foundation of the Islamic Sharia law of consent to or refusal of medical treatment.32 
Therefore, a competent adult patient is the only person legally entitled to consent to or refuse 
medical treatment. This principle has been recognised by the GPSRI, LPHP2005 and 
CEHP2013, as will be discussed in this Chapter. 
Second, Muslim scholars from the prophetic statement above have agreed that it is not 
normally permitted to consent to or refuse treatment on behalf of competent adult patients.33 
There are some limited exceptions, for example, in an emergency where it is difficult and 
impractical to obtain or wait for consent and the treatment is required to save patients’ lives 
or prevent them from severe harm or damage to their health, based on the Islamic Sharia 
																																								 																				
28	The	story	took	place	a	few	weeks	before	the	Messenger	PBUH	died	in	631.	
29	For	her	biography,	S	Aleem	Prophet	Muhammad	(S)	and	His	Family:	A	Sociological	Perspective	(1sted	Author	House	
2011)	p.	96-105	
30	The	medicine	was	‘Indian	wood,	Warss	(the	Ceylon	Cornel	tree)	and	drops	of	olive	oil’	M	Ibn	Qayyim	alJawziyyah,	
Healing	with	the	Medicine	of	the	Messenger	p.	81-	83	
31M	AlBkhari	Sahih	AlBukhari	at	http://sunnah.com/bukhari/64/474	(accessed	10/12/2014).	
32M	Ibn	Qayyim	alJawziyyah,	Healing	with	the	Medicine	of	the	Messenger	p.	83.	
33	See	for	example	GPSRI	declaration	which	stated	that:	‘Patients,	who	are	adult	and	of	sound	mind,	are	more	entitled	
than	anybody	regarding	taking	a	decision	about	whether	or	not	they	should	undergo	a	surgical	operation,	under	such	
circumstances	no	one,	can	claim	the	right	of	Wilayah	(guardianship)	over	them.’	No	date	or	number.	GPSRI	at	
http://www.alifta.net/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?View=Page&PageID=170&PageNo=1&BookID=17	(accessed	
05/12/2014).	
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principle of necessity.34 This principle has been recognised by the GPSRI, LPHP2005 and 
CEHP2013, as will be discussed in this Chapter. 
Third, Muslim scholars have understood from the prophetic action when the Messenger 
PBUH gestured to those who surrounded him to not give him PBUH the treatment, rather 
than telling them not to, that consent to or refusal of medical treatment can be expressed 
either implicitly or explicitly.35 LPHP2005 and CEHP2013 have not provided instructions 
on how the patient’s consent should be obtained, expect for specific cases mentioned in 
CEHP2013. I will revisit this issue later on in this Chapter. 
Fourth, there is a prohibition on treatment decisions that would result in severe harm or death 
or be against Islamic Sharia. The holy Quran in translation states that: ‘And do not kill 
yourselves (nor kill one another). Surely, Allah is Most Merciful to you.’36 This means that 
if refusal or consent to treatment would lead to death (such as a patient consenting to take a 
fatal poison), the patient’s decision would not be valid and he/she must be treated, because 
suicide and intentional homicide are legally prohibited according to Islamic Sharia, as the 
thesis has discussed in Chapter two.  
The permissibility of actions under Islamic Sharia has also been discussed in Chapter two. 
The same five rulings are also relevant to a consideration of legal principles. Thus, it follows 
that the competent adult patient’s obligation to seek treatment is divided by the use of the 
five rulings as follows:37		
(A) When the patient’s obligation is Makroh (blameworthy) or Mandob (praiseworthy) or 
Mobah (indifferent) to consent to or refuse treatment, based on available knowledge, his/her 
consent or refusal should be respected,38 such as normal flu or toothache or headaches and 
so forth. Thus, treating a competent adult patient without his/her consent in these cases is 
not only unethical, it is illegal, because the Messenger PBUH ordered the penalty of those 
who treated him PBUH without consent.39 The holy Quran states in translation ‘and if you 
punish [those who violated your rights], then punish them with the like of that with which 
																																								 																				
34	H	Alzohaele	Nadareit	AlDroerah	Alshriaeih	(The	Principle	of	Islamic	Sharia	Necessity)	(7thed	Dar	Alfiker	2007)	p.	212-
214	(Arabic).	
35	M	AlShanqeeti,	Ahkam	Algerhah	Altibeh	wAlather	Almotrtbh	Aliha.	(Rulings	of	Medical	Surgeries	and	Their	
Consequences).	p.	168.	
36	The	holy	Quran	in	translation	(CH29:4).	
37A	ibn	Taymiyyah	Majmoo'	al-Fatawa	(Compilation	of	Fatawa)	(Maktabt	Almaraf	1981)	Vol	18	p.	12.	(Arabic).	
38M	AlBar	and	H	Pasha	Contemporary	Bioethics	Islamic	Perspective	p.	89-91.	
39M	Ibn	Qayyim	alJawziyyah,	Healing	with	the	Medicine	of	the	Messenger	p.	83.	
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you were afflicted…’40 Accordingly, when the Messenger PBUH ordered that each should 
be punished by the same action they had committed, this showed that failure to treat without 
consent can be in general considered as a criminal offence, so that it is appropriate to punish 
those who deliberately treat a patient without valid consent under criminal law.41 
Additionally, a civil remedy (compensation) must be paid to the patient for the damage that 
has been occurred. I will further discuss this issue under Saudi Arabian law later in this 
Chapter.   
(B)When patients’ obligation to seek treatment is Wajib (obligatory) and hence consent is 
obligatory (such as refusing a lifesaving blood transfusion),42 the patient’s refusal of consent 
should be disregarded and the treatment should be administered.43 The holy Quran has 
prohibited suicide,44 and refusing treatment for a life-threatening curable illness can be 
considered to be an action of suicide, thus a penalty should be ordered.45 The patient’s failure 
to consent may lead a judge to order a discretionary penalty if the patient is still alive. For 
the same reason, since suicide and killing others is prohibited, if doctors respect the refusal 
of consent or fail to administer treatment they may also face a discretionary penalty based 
on their intentions and the circumstances. 
(C) When patients’ obligation to seek treatment is Moharm (forbidden) as the treatment 
cannot be consented to, consent must be disregarded, for example, the patient’s consent to 
an illegal abortion.46 In this case, both the patient and her doctor have committed a crime 
and they must face a criminal trial for breaching the law.47 
I will discuss further the legal consequences based on LPHP2005 in this Chapter, specifically 
in regard to information disclosure.  
																																								 																				
40The	holy	Quran	in	translation	(CH16:126).	
41M	Ibn	Qayyim	alJawziyyah,	Healing	with	the	Medicine	of	the	Messenger	p.	83.	
42	M	AlShanqeeti,	Ahkam	Algerhah	Altibeh	wAlather	Almotrtbh	Aliha.	(Rulings	of	Medical	Surgeries	and	Their	
Consequences).	p.	170-171.	
43	See	Chapter	two	for	further	discussion.		
44	The	holy	Quran	in	translation	(CH29:4).	
45	The	Saudi	Arabian	has	no	written	Criminal	Code	so	it	is	left	for	the	judge	to	order	a	discretionary	penalty	based	on	the	
action	itself.	
46LPHP2005	stated	in	article	22	that	‘[a]	physician	may	not	perform	abortion	on	a	pregnant	woman	unless	necessary	for	
saving	her	life.	However,	abortion	may	be	performed	if	pregnancy	has	not	completed	four	months	and	it	is	conclusively	
established	that	the	continuation	of	such	pregnancy	will	have	serious	consequences	on	the	mother’s	health,	based	on	a	
decision	by	a	medical	committee	formed	in	accordance	with	terms	and	conditions’.	
47	The	judge	may	order	discretionary	penalty	for	the	mother.	On	the	other	hand,	the	doctor	will	be	fined	(no	more	than	
SR100,000	or	imprisoned	(no	more	than	6	months)	or	both.	LPHP2005	article	28.		
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Thus, from what has been discussed, it can be argued that Islamic Sharia jurisprudence has 
recognised the need to respect patients’ autonomous decisions as a legal principle in relation 
to healthcare. Thus, consent to medical treatment in a basic form was considered to be a 
legal requirement many centuries ago by Islamic Sharia.48 Having explained the basis of the 
legal principle, I will now turn to how that principle came to be enacted in modern times in 
regulation directed at medical professionals.  
2.2. The development of consent law in Saudi Arabian medical laws 
Saudi Arabian medical law has developed rapidly, especially in the last three decades, with 
increased attention being paid to health sectors.49 Any Saudi Arabian regulations should be 
based on Islamic Sharia, should be interpreted in accordance with it and must not conflict 
with it.50 I have explained elsewhere51 that, from the beginning of the 1910s to the middle 
of 1920s, Arabic traditional medicine prevailed and there was no statutory regulation of 
hospitals or clinics or medical professions until the License to Practice Medicine and 
Pharmacy 1928 addressed this.52 However, this Act did not address the issue of consent law 
and as a result of poor and unclear medical regulations, guidelines, and instructions, medical 
staff found themselves in a situation where they had to try to follow and apply Islamic Sharia 
law and Saudi Arabian traditions and customs and be sensitive to public attitudes in relation 
to the practice of medicine.53 
It has been explained that Islamic Sharia does contain reference to legal principles 
concerning consent to treatment. However, those principles need to be formed in a very clear 
code of law to be applied consistently in practice. As the thesis has also explained, the Saudi 
Arabian legal system has not considered precedent as a form of legal development.54 
However, until the beginning of the 1970s the Mufti was both the Head of Saudi scholars 
and also of Saudi judges.55 The views of the Mufti before that time can be considered as 
amounting to statements of legal principle because of his dual power.56 It can therefore be 
																																								 																				
48For	example,	S	Selek,	‘A	Written	Consent	Five	Centuries	Ago’	(2010)	36	Journal	of	Medical	Ethics	639	and	K	Aljlouni	
‘History	of	Informed	Medical	Consent’	(1995)	346	Lancet	980.	
49	M	Alhajjaj	‘Medical	Practice	in	Saudi	Arabia	the	Medico-Legal	Aspect’	(1996)	17(1)	Saudi	Medical	Journal	1-4	p.	1.	
50A	Ansary	‘A	Brief	Overview	of	the	Saudi	Arabian	Legal	System’	at	
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Saudi_Arabia.htm#_edn118	(accessed	20/12/2014).	
51	K	Alghamdi	‘Tatowr	Tanzim	Mahnat	Altab	wa	Alsidalh	be	AlMammlakh	Alarabeih	AlSuaudih’	‘The	Development	of	
Saudi	Arabian	Medical	and	Pharmaceutical	Professions’	Regulations’	(2011)	2	Alqadaeya	68-96.	(Arabic).	
52	Ibid.	p.	70-72.		
53O	Alrabeeh	and	F	Alfaleh	Alnadam	Alshee	AlSaudi	(the	Saudi	Health	System)	(1sted	Dar	Alolom	2010)	p.	37-39.	(Arabic).	
54	See	Chapter	two	for	further	discussion.		
55	M	Hatina	Guardians	of	Faith	in	Modern	Times:	ʿUlamaʾ	in	the	Middle	East	p.	211-230	and	see	also	M	Watson	Prophets	
and	Princes:	Saudi	Arabia	from	Muhammad	to	the	Present.	p.	331-395.	
56	S	Shamma	‘Law	and	Lawyers	in	Saudi	Arabia’	p.	1086	
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argued that there was a significant ruling on the law of consent by the Saudi Arabian legal 
system in the early 1960s, since an appeal was reviewed by the Mufti. The case involved a 
patient who died as a result of a cauterisation procedure performed by a doctor who was an 
expert in Arabic traditional medicine. The judge in the first degree court held that the doctor 
should not be charged for the death of the patient, because (1) the doctor is expert in the craft 
of practicing Arabic traditional medicine;(2) the doctor was not negligent, because he made 
an effort to treat the patient (confirmed by medical expert evidence); (3) the doctor treated 
the patient ‘…after taking his [the patient’s] permission.’57 The Mufti (the Head of judges) 
upheld the judge’s decision and dismissed the appeal.58 
The case presents a variety of legal aspects which were considered, such as doctors’ 
liabilities in terms of the standard of treatment but the most important issue for this thesis is 
the mention of consent. The Practicing Medicine 1935 (the Act in force at that time)59 did 
not provide any reference to obtaining patients’ consent, it only focused on the qualifications 
of the medical profession, doctors’ licences and so forth.60 However, the judge in the first 
degree court and the Head of Judges (the Mufti) considered it relevant to refer to consent as 
a part of the proper practice of medicine at that time. Hence, it can be assumed that the judges 
considered that obtaining the patient’s consent was an important matter, but they did not 
address it in any detail, such as what needed to be disclosed in order for the consent to be 
considered valid. 
In addition to the general uncertainty about what was required regarding obtaining patients’ 
consent to medical treatment where the patient was a competent adult male,61 there was 
another issue regarding a competent adult female’s consent to medical treatment.62 This 
generated particular problems in the area of the validity of her consent to medical treatment, 
as there was uncertainty about whether there was a need to seek a competent male guardian’s 
																																								 																				
57	Case	number	444	dated	28/3/1382	A.H.	[29/08/1962],	at	
http://www.alifta.net/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&PageID=161&PageNo=1&BookID=
17		(accessed	20/12/2014).		
58	Ibid.	
59	K	Alghamdi	‘Tatowr	Tanzim	Mehnat	Altab	wa	Alsidalh	be	AlMammlakh	Alarabeih	AlSuaudih’	‘The	Development	of	
Saudi	Arabian	Medical	and	Pharmaceutical	Professions’	Regulations’	p.	74-78.	
60	Ibid.	p.	74-78.	
61	M	AlBar	and	H	Pasha	Contemporary	Bioethics	Islamic	Perspective	p.	112-113.	
62	D	Atighetchi	Islamic	Bioethics:	Problems	and	Perspectives	p.	52.	
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consent instead of her consent or if the decision should only be made by the woman herself.63 
Abu-Aisha has argued that until the middle of the 1980s in Saudi Arabia: 
‘There (was) a general misconception amongst the medical professional that a 
mature mentally sound woman (had) no right to give consent for medical 
procedures necessary for her in Saudi Arabia. Usually when invasive medical 
procedures (were) necessary for the management of diseases affecting a woman, 
a male guardian (was) sought to sign the consent form.’64 
The author suggests that there was a misunderstanding and misrepresentation among medical 
staff who, generally, did not accept the idea of adult competent women’s rights to consent to 
medical treatment which seems, in some cases at least, to have been based on the view that 
there was no clear legal principle to support that. Hence, as a result of the prevailing 
confusion and disputes regarding the requirements for both male and female patients’ 
consent, the Minister of Health (MoH) in 198365 submitted the legal question to the King’s 
office in order for the GPSRI66 to study the matter based on Islamic Sharia’s sources. The 
GRPSI was asked to establish a legal principle regarding competent adult male or female 
patient consent in relation the issue that ‘...doctors face when patients or those in charge of 
them refuse to have certain surgeries performed on them and the consequences of that.’67 The 
GPSRI had to set a legal principle; so, it considered the legal question as follows:  
‘The Council, having studied the matter through consultation and exchange of 
opinions, unanimously decided that it is not permissible to operate on patients 
without their permission provided that the patient is pubescent [adult] and sane 
[competent], whether this patient is a male or a female. If the patient is not of age 
[not adult] or insane [incompetent], then the permission of his/her…guardian 
must be obtained.’68 
As has been mentioned in Chapter two, although GPSRI is not a regular part of the Saudi 
Arabian legislative bodies, it is always involved in medical issues such as this one about 
patients’ consent. This GPSRI declaration established the legal principle for obtaining a 
																																								 																				
63	P	Halligan	‘Caring	for	Patients	of	Islamic	Denomination:	Critical	Care	Nurses’	Experiences	in	Saudi	Arabia’	(2006)	15	
Journal	of	Clinical	Nursing	1565-1573	p.	1571.	
64	H	Abu-Aisha	‘Women	in	Saudi	Arabia:	Do	they	not	have	the	Right	to	Give	Their	Own	Consent	for	Medical	
Procedures?’	(1985)	5	Saudi	Medical	Journal	74-77	p.	75	
65	That	was	in	14/3/1404	A.H.	[19/12/1983].	GPSRI	declaration	no	119	in	1984	at	
http://www.alifta.net/Fatawa/FatawaChapters.aspx?languagename=en&View=Page&PageID=175&PageNo=1&BookID=
17	(accessed	01/07/2015).	
66	See	GPSRI	role	for	setting	law	in	Saudi	Arabia	discussed	in	Chapter	two.	
67GPSRI	declaration	no.	119	in	1984.	
68Ibid.	
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patient’s consent, which was adopted in 1984 by the MoH as the legal approach to obtain 
consent to treatment.69 
The GPSRI declaration has therefore been legally binding since that time70 and this approach 
is now a part of LPHP2005 and CEHP2013. LPHP2005 has declared that ‘[n]o medical 
intervention may be performed except with the consent of the patient, his representative or 
guardian if the patient is legally incompetent.’71 LPHP2005 has recognised as an exception 
to the general legal requirement for obtaining a patient’s consent   
‘…in cases of accidents, emergencies or critical cases requiring immediate or urgent 
medical intervention to save the patient’s life or an organ thereof or to avert severe 
damage that might result from delay, where the timely consent of the patient, his 
representative or guardian is unattainable.’72 
In those cases, doctors should intervene immediately and there is no need to obtain consent. 
Further, doctors in such cases are not allowed by the law to decline intervening or treating.73 
CEHP2013 in terms of recognising patients’ rights to consent has considered the issue in 
more detail and contains additional requirements that LPHP2005 did not mention. 
CEHP2013 has stated that:  
‘The adult conscious patient’s permission (consent) should be sought (whether the 
patient is male or female), or from his/her representative in case the patient is not 
competent to decide, before any medical or surgical intervention.’74 
Moreover, CEHP2013 has indicated that the consent must be in written form, if the medical 
procedure ‘...includes possible risks, like surgical operations, biopsy, or similar procedure’.75 
It is important to remember that CEHP2013 is not only an ethical guideline, but is also 
legally binding.76 
																																								 																				
69	H	Abu-Aisha	‘Women	in	Saudi	Arabia:	Do	They	not	Have	the	Right	to	Give	Their	Own	Consent	for	Medical	
Procedures?’	p.	75	
70	The	same	statement	was	part	of	the	Law	of	Practicing	Medicine	and	Dentistry	Professions	1989.	This	Law	was	
cancelled	by	LPHP2005	in	2005.	
71	LPHP2006	article	19.		
72	Ibid.	See	also	CEHP2013	chapter	14	(5)	at	47	which	ordered	a	doctor	to	‘[s]tart	of	medical	intervention	without	
waiting	for	permission	of	the	patient	or	guardian;	this	is	conditional	that	the	patient	may	be	exposed	to	imminent	death	
or	severe	harm,	or	there	is	high	probability	for	such	harm.’		
73	LPHP2005	article	16.	
74CEHP2013	chapter	2(C)	p.	17.	
75	Ibid.	chapter	2(C)4	p.	17.	
76	LPHP2005	article	5,	section,	2	in	the	executive	regulation.	
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In terms of respecting patients’ choices, LPHP2005 has placed legal duties on doctors to 
respect patients’ choices.77 However, it has included some limitations on patients’ rights to 
choose, since choices should be respected only as long as they are not in conflict with either 
Islamic Sharia or Saudi Arabian laws.78 CEHP2013 has also recognised patients’ right to 
consent,79 but it has said nothing about  respect for their choices. However, as LPHP2005 
has superior legal status to CEHP2013, it can be said that the same limitations to patients’ 
choices are applicable. Therefore, in terms of respecting patients’ consent and choices, it is 
clear that the Saudi Arabian medical regulations have to some extent already adopted a legal 
standard based on Islamic Sharia’s religious and ethical principles, which were explored in 
the Chapter two. 
It should also be noted that, nonetheless, neither LPHP2005 or CEHP2013 mention that 
doctors should not exceed the patient’s consent by performing other treatment that is beyond 
what the patient has consented to, or whether the patient can withdraw his/her consent 
(saving the case of Wajib treatment). Muslim scholars agree that doctors should not exceed 
the limit of consent except under the principle of necessity, and that the patient can withdraw 
his/her consent.80 This view is applicable in Saudi Arabian medical law because, if there is 
no reference in Saudi Arabian written law to a matter, Islamic Sharia general principles are 
applicable. This view by Islamic Sharia is similar to the English law view discussed in 
Chapter three. However, I would argue that such issues should be addressed by LPHP2005 
to give more protection to patient consent and autonomy. As this thesis is limited to the issue 
of information disclosure standard, it will not further discuss these issues.  
Having set out the legal principles of consent law in Saudi Arabia, what follows will discuss 
the protection of patients based on criminal and civil laws.  
3. Legal consequences of proceeding without a competent adult patient’s consent 
Consent to or refusal of medical treatment is fundamental to the law regulating medical 
treatment and doctors’ professional conduct in Saudi Arabia.81 Muslim scholars have 
appreciated the need for consent as its existence not only protects competent adult patients 
																																								 																				
77	Ibid.	article	5	section,	1	in	the	executive	regulation	executive	stated	that:	‘Healthcare	professionals	must	respect	
patients’	choices	in	accordance	with	Islamic	Sharia	and	law.’	
78	Ibid.	
79CEHP2013	chapter	2(C)	p.	17.	
80M	AlShanqeeti,	Ahkam	Algerhah	Altibeh	wAlather	Almotrtbh	Aliha.	(Rulings	of	Medical	Surgeries	and	Their	
Consequences).	p.	167.	
81	LPHP2006	article	19.	
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from offences and reckless acts against them by others, reserving the right to decide for the 
patient alone, but it also enables doctors to practise their profession legally, as valid consent 
may render them immune from legal liability for their actions.82 The legal consequences of 
doctors breaching their obligations will be considered in more detail. Generally, in the case 
of emergencies doctors are not liable for treating patients without consent and their actions 
are justified based on the principle of necessity, as one of Islamic Sharia’s principles has 
recognised that ‘[n]ecessities make forbidden things canonically harmless’.83 This was 
enacted in LPHP2005, which allowed doctors to treat or intervene with no consent in the 
kinds of cases mentioned earlier.84 However, apart from such cases, dealing with a person’s 
body requires a valid consent. Treating patients without a valid consent may attract either 
the application of the crime of assault or civil liability as will be discussed below. As criminal 
liability and prosecution are rare in the case of doctors, in the following (as in Chapter three) 
I will only briefly discuss this, before considering civil liability in more detail.  
3.1. Criminal liability 
According to Islamic Sharia, for an action to be considered as a crime, three conditions must 
be met. These conditions in brief are; (1) the defendant must be alive with full mental 
capacity, (2) the defendant must have voluntarily intended the action and the result and there 
must be a causal link between them, and (3) the action must be criminalised under Islamic 
Sharia.85 
Under Islamic Sharia criminal law, there are three types of crimes and punishments: (1) 
Hudod (capital offences or crimes against Allah). These are fixed crimes and punishments 
that have been stated by primary sources of Islamic Sharia, so neither the punishments nor 
the crimes are able to be dropped or waived if the defendant’s action has been proved with 
sufficient certainty.86 Hudod (Hadd singular, Hudod plural) include only seven crimes and 
punishments; adultery, apostasy, drinking alcohol, slander, theft, highway robbery, and 
sedition.87 As Hudod crimes and punishments are not related to the thesis’s issues and are 
rarely likely to be committed in the medical context, they will not be further discussed. 
																																								 																				
82	Q	AlMubarak	AlTadawi	wa	AlMasoelih	AlTabieh	fa	Alshria	Alislamia	(Treatment	and	medical	liability	based	on	Islamic	
Sharia)	p.	197.	
83The	Mejelle	Being	an	English	Translation	of	Majhallah	el-Ahkam-i-Adliya	and	a	Complete	Code	on	Islamic	Civil	Law.	
article	21.	
84	LPHP2005	article	19.	
85	A	Bahnassi	‘Criminal	Responsibility	in	Islamic	law’	in	C	Bassiouni	(ed.)	The	Islamic	Criminal	Justice	System	(Oceana	
Publication	INC	1982)	171-191	p.171-172.	
86	A	Badawi	The	Concise	Presentation	of	the	Fiqh	of	the	Sunnah	and	the	Noble	Book	p.	575-604	
87	M	Abdulfattah	Simplified	Islamic	Jurisprudence	Based	on	the	Quran	and	the	Sunnah	Vol	2	p.	970-986	
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(2) Qisas and Diyyah (crimes against a person) are offences where the punishment should 
fit the crime and the defendant has the intention to act. There are specific types of 
punishments that are regarded as appropriate for particular kinds of acts. Examples would 
be the crime of murder, which has the death penalty as punishment, and the crime of 
intentional injury or damages to a person and which requires Qisas or the payment of Diyyh 
blood money (the amount is set by the law).88 However, in  
Qisas and Diyyah crimes, the victim or his/her family (not the government or the court) have 
the right to decide whether the offender should be charged or not. After the case is brought 
to the court by the Public Prosecutor, if the victim is still alive then he/she can abolish the 
charge (courts cannot do that without the victim’s approval) for the offence and forgive the 
offender either in return for the payment of compensation or without seeking compensation; 
if the victim has died, the family has the same right to do so.89 Thus, the charge of the main 
crime can be abolished by the victim, but the courts have to hand down a discretionary 
penalty for the defendant in the public interest, because the defendant breached the law. On 
the other hand, if the victim (or his/her family, if the victim had murdered) pursue the case, 
the case will be brought to a criminal court by the Public Prosecutor. If after the trial the 
defendant is found guilty, the sentence will be imposed by the authority.90 If the defendant 
is innocent, the case will be closed. 
 (3) Tazir (discretionary punishments). For such crimes, punishments are left to the 
legislative authorities or judges to decide what is suitable depending on the crime’s severity 
and the criminal’s actions and past behaviour. Tazir includes some crimes like bribery and 
there are different kinds of punishment, such as imprisonment, fines, verbal warning and so 
forth.91 Courts can waive the charge, with the victim or his/her family’s approval, because 
these crimes are regarded as being more than Qisas and Diyyah crimes against the public 
interest.92 To establish a doctors’ criminal liability, the Public Prosecutor has to prove that 
the doctor had criminal intention. The case will be heard by a criminal court not SMPs 
																																								 																				
88M	Lippman,	S	McConville	and	M	Yerushalmi	Islamic	Criminal	Law	and	Procedure	p.	38-39	
89	M	Abdulfattah	Simplified	Islamic	Jurisprudence	Based	on	the	Quran	and	the	Sunnah	Vol	2	p.	956-957	
90LCP2013	stated	that	‘1.	Judgments	imposing	death,	stoning,	amputation	qisaas	for	murder	or	other	than	death,	shall	
only	be	executed	pursuant	to	a	Royal	Order	to	be	issued	by	the	King	or	his	authorized	representative.	2.	
Representatives	of	the	Administrative	Governor,	the	Court,	the	Bureau	of	the	Promotion	of	Virtue	and	Prevention	of	
Vice,	and	the	police	shall	witness	the	execution	of	the	judgment	involving	death,	stoning,	amputation,	flogging	or	qisaas	
for	murder	or	other	than	murder.	The	executive	regulations	of	this	law	shall	determine	the	procedures	of	their	work.’	
Article	227	sections	1	and	2.	
91	M	Abdulfattah	Simplified	Islamic	Jurisprudence	Based	on	the	Quran	and	the	Sunnah	Vol	2	p.	958-259.	
92M	Lippman,	S	McConville	and	M	Yerushalmi	Islamic	Criminal	Law	and	Procedure	p.	52-53.	
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because that is out of their jurisdiction.93 It is rare for the required criminal intent to be 
established, because the doctor is usually seeking to provide treatment to improve patient 
health not to cause him/her injury, nor to do something against his/her faith.94 
To conclude the discussion, it seems that both Islamic Sharia principles and Saudi Arabian 
law have agreed that it is very rare for a doctor to have a criminal motive, because doctors 
aim to treat patients and promote their health, not the opposite.95 Thus criminal prosecution 
is difficult as doctors normally will not treat without any consent at all or intend to cause 
bodily harm.96 Thus, similar to English law, criminal prosecutions of doctors in Saudi Arabia 
are extremely rare. Finally, it should be noted that LPHP2005 does not consider doctors’ 
breaching of consent law as a crime of assault. Thus if doctors do not obtain the patient’s 
consent, or treat where there has been a refusal of consent, they either will be fined or 
imprisoned or both for breaching LPHP2005.97 
3.2. Civil liability (AlDaman) 
According to Islamic Sharia, there are three conditions that must be met to succeed in an 
action under civil law. These conditions in brief are: (1) Altaadi (breach of the duty) which 
means the person’s action is not in accordance with what has been stated by the Islamic 
Sharia as appropriate, the custom or the standard practice, (2) AlDarar (injury or damage) 
which means causing damage to another as a result of the action and (3) Alifdha (causal link) 
which means that the result occurred as a result of the action.98 I will consider these 
conditions in more detail later in this Chapter when I discuss the issue of the consequences 
of the failure to disclose information to the patient.  
Islamic Sharia considers the profession of practicing medicine as a noble occupation, 
because doctors are providing comfort and help to reduce patients’ suffering and pain by 
treating them.99 This is the kind of humanitarian service that society in general and patients 
																																								 																				
93	LPHP2005	articles	34	sections	1	and	2.	
94	A	Oudah	Altashree	Aljanei	Alislami	(Criminal	Law	of	Islam)	(Dar	Alhadith,	2009)		Vol	1	p.	332-333	and	M	Abo	Zhrah	
Aljeremah	wa	Aloqobah	fe	Alfeqh	AlIslami	-Alaqobah-		Crimes	and	Punishments	in	Islam	–	Crimes-	(Dar	Alfaker	Alarabei	
1998)	p.	323	(Arabic).	
95M	AlShanqeeti,	Ahkam	Algerhah	Altibeh	w	Alather	Almotrtbh	Aliha.	(Rulings	of	Medical	Surgeries	and	Their	
Consequences).	p.365.	
96	Q	AlMubarak	AlTadawi	wa	AlMasoelih	AlTabieh	fa	Alshria	Alislamia	(Treatment	and	Medical	Liability	Based	on	Islamic	
Sharia)	p.	150-152.	See	also,	M	Hanna	AlNadrieh	AlAlamh	La	alMasowlirh	alTabieh	(the	General	Theory	of	Medical	
Liability)	(1sted	Dar	Alfiker	AlJamee	2011)	p.	93.	(Arabic).	
97	LPHP2005	article	28	section	7.	
98	A	Masry	Jrageem	Alataba	wa	Almsoelih	Aljenaeeih	wa	Almadneeih	en	Alakta	Altabeih	beain	AlShraia	wa	Alqaon	
(Doctors’	Crimes	and	the	Criminal	and	Civil	Liabilities	for	Medical	Negligence	between	Sharia	and	Law)	(1sted	
DarAlaloom	2011)	p.	195	(Arabic).	
99For	example,	CEHP2013	p.	10-12.	
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in particular appreciate. However, this is not to say that doctors should be absolved from 
civil liability when damage occurs as a result of their actions. Thus, it is important to consider 
whether, where injury is sustained by a patient as a result of medical care, any civil liability 
is incurred, for which patients should be awarded damages.  
It should be noted that, in the context of civil liability, Islamic Sharia and LPHP2005 have 
considered the total absence of consent or invalid consent (information or risk has not been 
disclosed) as the same. However, LPHP2005 considers that failing to obtain consent or 
treating without consent is against the law as it is contrary to Islamic Sharia and therefore 
against standard practice. However, in civil liability, a doctor does not have the criminal 
motive to intend the action and the result, but the action is due to the doctor’s mistake or 
negligence, so the case here will be heard by SMPs. Thus, the following discussion will deal 
with the issue of civil liability for an injury to the patient regardless of the amount or type of 
information provided before consent was given.    
3.2.1. Proficient doctors who treat the patient with consent 
Under this category, the proficient doctor is treating in accordance with the acceptable 
standard of professional practice and has obtained the competent adult patient’s consent. 
There are two possibilities under Islamic Sharia law and LPHP2005:  
(1) If there was injury, but this was not a result of the doctor’s error or negligence, the doctor 
should not be held liable because a valid consent had been obtained; the doctor made an 
effort to treat the patient and the doctor has not exceeded the acceptable practice of the 
profession.100 As the holy Quran states in translation that: ‘There is no way to blame those 
who are doers of good, for God is forgiving and kind.’101 Therefore, what the doctor is doing 
is undertaking humanitarian behaviour and thus he should not be blamed for damage that 
was beyond his/her control;102 as a result, the patient should not be compensated.103 
(2) If the injury was a result of the doctor’s error, the doctor should be held liable in civil 
law (Daman) for the injury and he/she has to pay compensation to the patient or his/her 
inheritors if the patient died.104 This is regardless of whether the doctor has obtained consent 
																																								 																				
100	M	Ibn	Qayyim	Aljauziyah,	Healing	with	the	Medicine	of	the	Prophet	p.	125.	
101	The	holy	Quran	in	translation	(CH9:91)	
102P	Kassim	‘Medical	Negligence	in	Islamic	Law’	(2006)	20(4)	Arab	Law	Quarterly	400-410	p.	405.	
103	LPHP2005	article	27.	
104	Ibid.	
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and acted in accordance with the standards of the profession – the doctor has caused harm 
and should be liable to pay compensation.105 
3.2.2. Proficient doctors who treat the patient without consent 
Under this category, proficient doctors are treating in accordance with the acceptable 
standard of professional practice, but without having obtained the competent adult patient’s 
consent and the case is not an emergency.106 In this case, there are two views: 
(1) The less common view holds that a doctor should not be held liable for civil liability 
(Daman), because although he/she treated without consent or in the face of the patient’s 
refusal, he/she was acting as a responsible professional and in a good faith to treat and cure 
the patient’s illness. As his/her intention was to cure the patient not to cause him/her an 
injury, the doctor should not be liable.107 
(2) The most common view, which is adopted by LPHP2005 is to hold the doctor liable for 
negligence, because the doctor has no authority to treat a competent adult patient without 
his/her consent, regardless of what professional practice on the matter is.108 Further, the 
doctor by treating the patient has caused him/him pain and injury which he/she did not 
consent to or want, and the patient’s bodily integrity has been breached. Thus, the doctor 
should be held liable in civil law (Daman), and pay compensation (civil remedy) to the 
patient for the injury, or his/her family if he/she died.109 
For the public interest which arises as an additional issue in the context of a civil action to 
treat the patient without consent or with the patient’s refusal,110 the doctor in question can 
be fined (to be paid to the treasury) or imprisoned or both by SMPs for breaching 
LPHP2005.111 Additionally, SMPs can issue a warning or fine or suspend the doctor’s 
licence for the disciplinary liability.112 This would be the case unless the doctor was required 
																																								 																				
105M	Ibn	Qayyim	Aljauziyah,	Healing	with	the	Medicine	of	the	Prophet	p.	125.	
106	Doctors	can	treat	in	emergency	case	without	consent	under	the	principle	of	necessity.	
107	M	Ibn	Qayyim	Aljauziyah,	Healing	with	the	Medicine	of	the	Prophet	p.	125	
108M	AlShanqeeti,	Ahkam	Algerhah	Altibeh	w	Alather	Almotrtbh	Aliha.	(Rulings	of	Medical	Surgeries	and	Their	
Consequences).	p.	362.	
109Ibid.		p.	368.	
110	When	the	patient’s	obligation	is	Makroh	(blameworthy)	or	Mandob	(praiseworthy)	or	Mobah	(indifferent)	to	consent	
to	or	refuse	treatment.	
111	LPHP2005	articles	19	and	28	section	7.	
112	Ibid.	articles	31	and	32	sections	1,2	and	3.		
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not to respect the patient’s wishes because they would be in breach of the regulations and/or 
Islamic Sharia.  
I have discussed in Chapter three in relation to seeking valid consent under English law the 
distinction between different types of civil action for inadequate information disclosure: 
battery and negligence. Although Saudi Arabian law would deal with both of these situations 
as Daman. I would argue that under Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical law there 
would also be different ways for the patient to establish that the consent was not legally 
valid. These would include the claim that the patient was not competent to consent. Another 
possible approach for the patient is to claim that he/she was coerced or under undue influence 
to accept the treatment. Lastly, there is the more significant issue for this thesis, which is the 
issue that the patient has not been given adequate information regarding the nature of the 
treatment or procedure. As discussed, in Saudi Arabian law the same action would be used 
to seek damages whether there was no consent at all or the failure to provide information 
related to risks, benefits and alternatives. Thus, in the following the thesis will discuss the 
requirements of a valid consent.    
3.2.3. Requirements for a legally valid consent 
Similar to what has been discussed regarding valid consent in English law in Chapter three, 
for consent to be legally valid in Saudi Arabia it must have three main elements, namely: 1. 
Competence and capacity, 2. Voluntariness, and 3. Information, as CEHP2013 has 
considered all these points, although surprisingly LPHP2005 does not mention these 
issues.113 Therefore, to consider a competent adult patient’s consent to be legally valid it 
must meet the following conditions:  
A. Competence and capacity (AlAhleiah) 
As set out in the Introduction, the thesis’s scope is limited to competent adult patients. 
However, it is useful to explain what that concept means in Saudi Arabia. Based on Islamic 
Sharia, the age of adulthood can be identified by either the physiological signs (pubic hair in 
both sexes, wet dreams for boys, periods for girls),114 or reaching a specific age, which differs 
from one school of thought to another,115 but the majority of Muslim scholars have agreed 
																																								 																				
113	CEHP2013	chapter	2(C)	1,2	and	3	p.	17.	
114The	Mejelle	Being	an	English	Translation	of	Majhallah	el-Ahkam-i-Adliya	and	a	Complete	Code	on	Islamic	Civil	Law.	
article	985.	
115M	Almodfar	Nadreiet	AlAqed	and	Aleradh	AlMonfradh	Dersah	Qnownieh	Moqarnh	be	Ahkam	Alshria	Alslamieh	(the	
Theory	of	Contract	and	Individual’s	Will	based	on	Comparative	Laws	and	Islamic	Sharia)	(Dar	Hafad,	2002)	p.	166-
167(Arabic).	
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that the age should be no less than 15 years, based on the Islamic calendar,116 unless one of 
the physiological signs has appeared before the completion of the 15 years.  
However, Islamic Sharia assesses competence by two conditions; that the person must have: 
(1) reached the age of marriage (adulthood) and (2) proper judgement, as interpreted from 
the holy Quran,117 which declares in translation, ‘and try orphans (as regards their 
intelligence) until they reach the age of marriage; if then you find sound judgement in them, 
release their property to them...’.118 Saudi Arabian law applies the same method to assess 
capacity, with the two elements (adult age and soundness of judgement) presumed for 
everyone 18 years or over in the absence of proof of incapacity.119 Apart from this general 
legal presumption about capacity, CEHP2013 has stated clearly that: ‘The patient should be 
able to understand and appreciate the information that he/she has been provided so that he/she 
decides with full consciousness, awareness and conviction.’120 This shows the recognition 
that a valid consent to treatment requires that the patient should have the capacity to 
understand and where the patient is not deemed to have adequate capacity, others may be 
authorised to make a decision for them. 
B. Voluntariness (AlEradah) 
Again, what has been discussed about the importance of voluntariness121 under English law 
seems to be similar to Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian law. As a general principle, a person 
must be free to choose and decide, and his/her right to do so must be protected in accordance 
with Islamic Sharia.122 Accordingly, for a patient’s consent to be legally valid, it is essential 
that it is given voluntarily and freely. This is referred to in CEHP2013, which states that ‘the 
patient’s consent should be made voluntarily without pressure or coercion.’123 There are a 
number of issues that are relevant to this issue. 
Coercion (AlIkrah) 
Coercion (AlIkrah), based on Islamic Sharia, ‘... is without right to compel a person to do a 
thing without his consent, by fear.’124 Therefore, when a person is under a realistic grave 
																																								 																				
116	Ibid.	p.167.	
117	I	Ibn	Kathir	Tafsir	Ibn	Kathir	(The	Interpretation	of	the	Holy	Quran)	p.	443.	
118	The	holy	Quran	(CH4:6).	
119	The	Saudi	Arabia	Nationality	Law	1954	article	1(C)	in	the	Executive	Regulation	2005.	(Arabic).	
120CEHP2013	chapter	2(C)	3	p.	17.	
121	The	discussion	is	for	a	competent	adult	patient	only	as	the	thesis	is	only	limited	to	that	category.		
122	M	AlShanqeeti,	Ahkam	Algerhah	Altibeh	w	Alather	Almotrtbh	Aliha.	(Rulings	of	Medical	Surgeries	and	Their	
Consequences).	p.	167.	
123CEHP	2013	chapter	2(C)	2	p.	17.	
124The	Mejelle	Being	an	English	Translation	of	Majhallah	el-Ahkam-i-Adliya	and	a	Complete	Code	on	Islamic	Civil	Law.	
article	984.	
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threat of harm or loss of life, in that state his/her free will to choose to do or say something 
is controlled.125 However, for coercion to be realistic there are four conditions that should 
be met:(1) the person making the threat must be able to fulfil his/her threat,126 (2) the 
compelled person must be afraid and believe that the threatener will fulfil his/her threat,127 
(3) the compelled person must do what he/she has been ordered to do in the presence of the 
threatener128 and (4) the tool or the degree of threat must be so great that the person is 
compelled to do or say something that he/she does not want to.129 
Hence, it can be argued that coercion is an action by another that would affect a competent 
adult patient’s free choice to consent to or refuse treatment.130 So, if there is a piece of 
evidence which demonstrates that he/she has been forced to give his/her consent, the consent 
can no longer be accepted as legally valid.131  
Abuse or influence (AlIstglal) 
AlIstglal is the act of abusing a weakness in person’s character or his/her need to obtain 
something to get him/her to perform an action that he/she does not want to do, or to illegally 
obtain a benefit from him/her.132 The abuse may take different forms such as to abuse the 
patient’s need for care or treatment. LPHP2005 has stated that a doctor ‘...may not request, 
accept or take a commission or reward; nor may he receive any benefit in return for 
promoting or strictly prescribing certain medications, or equipment or directing patients to a 
particular pharmacy, hospital, laboratory or the like.’133 Other forms of abusing the patient’s 
need to be treated might be to ask him/her to consent to participate in medical research, that 
he/she does not want to be in, but because he/she will be paid or treated for free. CEHP2013 
states that: ‘It is not permissible to...[obtain]…consent by using pressure, coercion, or by 
abusing their [patients] need of money or treatment.’134 
																																								 																				
125M	Almodfar	Nadreiet	AlAqed	and	Aleradh	AlMonfradh	Dersah	Qnownieh	Moqarnh	be	Ahkam	Alshria	Alslamieh	(the	
Theory	of	Contract	and	Individual	Will	based	on	Comparative	Laws	and	Islamic	Sharia)	p.	132.	
126The	Mejelle	Being	an	English	Translation	of	Majhallah	el-Ahkam-i-Adliya	and	a	Complete	Code	on	Islamic	Civil	Law.	
article	1003.	
127Ibid.	article	1004.	
128Ibid.	article	1005.	
129	M	Almodfar	Nadreiet	AlAqed	and	Aleradh	AlMonfradh	Dersah	Qnownieh	Moqarnh	be	Ahkam	Alshria	Alslamieh	(the	
Theory	of	Contract	and	Individual	Will	based	on	Comparative	Laws	and	Islamic	Sharia)	p.	134.	
130	M	AlShanqeeti,	Ahkam	Algerhah	Altibeh	w	Alather	Almotrtbh	Aliha.	(Rulings	of	Medical	Surgeries	and	Their	
Consequences).	p.	167.	
131M	Albar	and	H	Pasha	Masoleet	ATabeeb	bein	AlFqih	wa	AlCanoon	(The	Doctor’s	Liability	Between	Fiqh	and	Law)	p.	34		
132	M	Almodfar	Nadreiet	AlAqed	and	Aleradh	AlMonfradh	Dersah	Qnownieh	Moqarnh	be	Ahkam	Alshria	Alslamieh	(The	
Theory	of	Contract	and	Individual	Will	based	on	Comparative	Laws	and	Islamic	Sharia)	p.	148.	
133LPHP2005	article	12.		
134CEHP2013	chapter	11(A)	9(d).	p.	43.	
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Another example of abuse recognised by CEHP2013 is that the doctor should never put ‘any 
pressure on the patient to have such photograph[ic] (imaging) or recording [made] and never 
coerce the patient to accept [that].’135 CEHP2013 has also recognised that a doctor should 
not refuse to treat or influence a patient to do something that he/she does not want to do as 
a result of a ‘...previous professional relationship [that] has become an emotional affair with 
either a current/past patient or one of the patient’s family members.’136 
Another interesting facet of abuse for this thesis is that relating to knowledge and 
information disclosure. CEHP2013 has recognised that in terms of medical information and 
knowledge patients may be ignorant about the benefits and risks of medical treatment. Thus, 
patient’s ignorance can be abused by ‘...misleading them by claiming the ability to perform 
diagnostic or therapeutic procedures which have no scientific evidence basis.’137 Hence, 
because of doctors’ medical knowledge, they must refrain from abusing the ignorance of 
their patients and they should provide them with the right and relevant information they need 
or require.138 Abusing the patient’s lack of knowledge and not providing sufficient 
information or misleading them might affect their ability to give their consent voluntarily.139 
Mistake (AlKhata) 
AlKhata, simply, is the state of an erroneous belief that some facts are true and, based on 
that misunderstanding, a person makes or refuses to make an agreement. Accordingly, a 
person’s choice cannot be considered to be effective or true as his/her consent or refusal is 
based on non-genuine facts.140 For a patient’s consent to be legally valid, it must reflect 
his/her will, and to achieve that CEHP2013 has stated that a patient should be able to 
acknowledge and understand the information given in order to make his/her decision.141 A 
patient’s decision should be built on true information about his/her health conditions or the 
course of the treatment and medication that his/her case requires, so doctors must avoid 
gaining patients’ consent by misinforming them about the reality of the treatment’s 
efficiency or that the illness can be cured.142 
																																								 																				
135Ibid.	chapter	2(F)	3.p.	21.	
136Ibid.	chapter	7(C)	3	p.	31.	
137Ibid.	chapter	10(C)	5	p.	39.	
138Ibid.	chapter	2(C)	1	p.	17.	
139	Ibid.	chapter	10(C)	5	p.	39	and	chapter	2(C)	1	p.	17.	
140	M	Almodfar	Nadreiet	AlAqed	and	Aleradh	AlMonfradh	Dersah	Qnownieh	Moqarnh	be	Ahkam	Alshria	Alslamieh	(the	
Theory	of	Contract	and	Individual’s	Will	based	on	Comparative	Laws	and	Islamic	Sharia)	p.	117.	
141CEHP2013	chapter	2(C)	2	p.	17.	
142Ibid.	chapter	10	(C)	5	p.	39.	
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A form of mistake is regarding the doctor’s qualification and licence, so if the patient thought 
that the doctor who will treat him/her is qualified and licensed but he/she is not, then his/her 
consent to treatment is not legally valid, because LPHP2005 banned the practice of medicine 
for those who are unqualified or unlicensed or both.143 LPHP2005 further has put a legal 
duty on doctors and forbids them to ‘...employ unlicensed healthcare professionals or 
provide assistance to any person illegally practicing a healthcare profession...’144 Therefore, 
if the patient consents because he/she mistakenly thought that the doctor still holds a valid 
qualification or licence, that consent is vitiated and invalid and the doctor should be held 
liable both criminally and civilly.145 On the other hand, if the patient knows that the doctor 
is unqualified or unlicensed, but nonetheless he/she consented, the patient’s consent can be 
regarded as a valid consent; consequently, the doctor should not be held civilly liable, as 
he/she did not deceive the patient about his/her current qualification or licensing.146 The 
views of Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian law consider the patient’s consent as a defence 
to civil action if the patient consented knowing that the doctor was unlicensed or unqualified, 
although the doctor may still be subject to disciplinary liability for unlawful conduct.147 
To conclude the discussion of this element of consent, it can be said that voluntary consent 
must be free from coercion, abuse and mistake. Although the legal systems of England and 
Saudi Arabia derive from different backgrounds, they do share much common ground. 
The last element of a valid consent is of course the one of greatest significance to this thesis 
so it will be discussed below in depth. 
C. Adequate information disclosure (AlTabsser) 
The element of a decision being based on sufficient information to a valid consent is 
obviously important. 
C.1. Information disclosure and the current practice under Saudi Arabian medical 
law 
The main issue of this thesis is to investigate the current practice regarding the standard of 
care in information disclosure in respect of medical treatment in Saudi Arabia. In addition, 
it is to argue that this is inadequate in terms of protecting patient autonomy, in terms of gaps 
in the current law and the adequacy of the standard of care. It is therefore necessary to 
																																								 																				
143	LPHP2005	article	28	sections	1	and	2.	
144Ibid.	article	14	section	A.	
145	See	the	discussion	above.		
146	M	Ibn	Qayyim	Aljauziyah,	Healing	with	the	Medicine	of	the	Prophetp.	126.	
147	LPHP2005	article	28,	sections	1,2,	and	4.	
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examine further what that law is. The Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian legal principles have 
been set out in this Chapter, as have the present medical laws on the general principles of 
consent to medical treatment as stated in LPHP2005 and CEHP2013, though this is perhaps 
not as clear as it might be. In the following discussion, I will start by presenting the current 
application of Saudi Arabian medical law in the civil law context. Then I will discuss the 
conditions for establishing doctors’ liability in negligence, including the current standard of 
care in information disclosure. Based on this discussion, I will conclude that there is both 
some lack of legal coverage of specific issues and that the standard of care should be 
addressed more clearly in order to better protect patient autonomy. As noted, this would 
require legislation. Thus, I will propose recommendations as to how Saudi Arabian medical 
law can learn from the English law experience in developing better legal recognition of 
respect for patients’ autonomy and develop this without creating conflict with Islamic 
Sharia. My view, suggestions and recommendations will be presented in the Concluding 
Chapter. 
In order to understand how SMPs have interpreted and applied the laws, it is worth 
considering SMPs’ role and formation first. LPHP2005 has established special medical 
courts of law named SMPs.148 Their jurisdiction is limited to medical law litigation, 
specifically any case that is related to the violation of LPHP2005 or CEHP2013 or any 
‘...cases of medical malpractice leading to death, damage of an organ or loss of total or partial 
use thereof...’.149 
SMPs are the current first-instance medical courts of law and there are many SMPs around 
the country.150 Each SMP is comprised of a judge from the Sharia Court of Appeal as the 
head of the panel, a counsellor (lawyer) from the Ministry of Health, a professor from a 
medical school and two expert doctors.151 However, if the case involves a pharmacy error or 
if the defendant is a pharmacist, two additional members must join the SMP – a professor 
from a pharmacy school and an expert pharmacist.152 Further, the SMP has the right to 
appoint additional experts if that is needed.153 The decision in SMPs is taken ‘...by a majority 
vote, provided the majority includes the judge…’.154 The parties can appeal to the regional 
																																								 																				
148	Ibid.	article	33	section	A.	
149	Ibid.	article	34	sections	1	and	2.		
150	There	are	more	than	13	SMPs	in	the	country.		
151	LPHP2005	article	33	section	A	(1,2,3	and	5).	
152Ibid.	sections	A	(4	and	6)	and	B.	
153	Ibid.	section	E.	
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Administrative Court of Appeal in the Board of Grievance within sixty days of being 
officially informed about the judgment.155 
C.2. An overview 
Based on Islamic Sharia, in order for patients to give valid consent they should receive 
adequate information to enable them to make a clear decision to consent to or refuse medical 
treatment, and must not be forced or misled in any way, as otherwise consent is invalid.156 
Although the general principles of consent to medical treatment in Saudi Arabian law have 
been discussed, and it is clear that civil liability can result from a failure to comply with the 
requirements to obtain a valid consent, the particular issue of information disclosure that is 
required for a consent to be valid has not yet been addressed. I would argue that there is 
currently confusion regarding the principle of law that governs the matter of information 
disclosure and the standard of how much information or risks should be disclosed to patients 
in both LPHP2005 and CEHP2013. Some ideas about how to provide medical information 
to patients or warn them about risks can be gleaned from consideration of LPHP2005, but 
they are presented in a way that does not provide plain rules on these issues. Furthermore, I 
would argue that SMPs have not examined the subject in detail, so there is little guidance to 
be obtained from them or information about how these issues will be interpreted to influence 
future conduct, whether that is of doctors in seeking consent, patients pursuing litigation or 
SMPs in imposing penalties. It should be remembered that the doctrine of precedent is not 
applicable in Saudi Arabia, but nevertheless it must be considered important that there is 
consistency and clarity in the law in this area. I would suggest that the areas of both 
information and risk disclosure standards and doctors’ liability remain unclear and in need 
of reconsidering to fill the legal vacuum, as until now there has been insufficient discussion 
of the subject.  
In the following discussion, the thesis will present and discuss the consideration that has 
been given and deficiencies in relation to information disclosure in the current Saudi Arabian 
medical laws. After the thesis has highlighted them in this Chapter, in the Concluding 
Chapter the thesis will present the possible solutions as proposals for law reform.  
																																								 																				
155	Ibid.	
156H	Hassan	An	Introduction	to	the	Study	of	Islamic	Law	(Adam	publisher	2007)	p.	344.		
Chapter four: Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian law on consent and information disclosure 
	
	 235	
C.3. Information disclosure in current Saudi Arabian medical law 
I would argue that there is a single article in LPHP2005 that considers the issue of providing 
patients with information, warning them about risks, the issue of therapeutic privilege and 
patients’ right to not be informed or to waive that right. However, there are several 
statements by CEHP2013 in relation to information disclosure which I will consider.  
In the beginning, I would argue that the duty of doctors to provide patients with health 
services in general and information disclosure specifically can be understood to be based on 
the professional standard (prudent doctor standard). LPHP2005 in article 26 has declared 
that:  
‘A healthcare professional governed by this Law [LPHP2005] shall exert due 
care in line with commonly established professional standards’.157 (Emphasis 
added).  
This application is arguably based on the views of Muslim scholars that have set the basic 
principle of doctors’ potential liability as being that a doctor should not be liable for 
negligence if he/she has acted in accordance with the reasonable practice of a reasonable 
medical body of opinion in his/her craft.158 This view seems similar to what has been 
discussed in Chapter three, regarding the overruled English law standard of care called the 
Bolam test, which stated that:  
‘He [a doctor] is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a 
practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that 
particular art.’159 
Thus, it would appear under this view that in Saudi Arabia a doctor should not be held liable 
where some doctors would not agree with the approach that he/she applied to treat the 
patient, as long as the approach is accepted by a body of medical opinion in the craft of 
medicine.160 
However, as there is no direct reference to the standard of care in medical treatment in the 
main sources of Islamic Sharia, it is then left to Muslim scholars to search for and set one. 
Thus, some scholars have established the principle of a professional standard based on their 
																																								 																				
157	LPHP2006	article	26.	
158	M	Ibn	Qayyim	Aljauziyah,	Healing	with	the	Medicine	of	the	Prophet,	p.125-126,	A	Yacoub	The	Fiqh	of	Medicine	
Responses	in	Islamic	Jurisprudence	to	Developments	in	Medical	Science	p.	112-113,	P	Kassim	‘Medical	Negligence	in	
Islamic	Law’	p.	401	and	S	AlGhazal	‘The	Origin	of	Bimaristans	(Hospitals)	in	Islamic	Medical	History’	at	
http://www.islamicmedicine.org/bimaristan.htm	(accessed	20/12/2014).			
159Bolam	v	Friern	Hospital	Management	Committee	[1957]	1	W.L.R.	582	p.	587.	
160	A	Yacoub	The	Fiqh	of	Medicine	Responses	in	Islamic	Jurisprudence	to	Developments	in	Medical	Science	p.	112-113.	
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understanding and interpretation of the holy Quran, which considers in general that if 
someone is not knowledgeable about a specific skill, he must ask the expert in that field who 
possess the experience and the qualification to demonstrate what is the proper and acceptable 
practice.161 Another foundation of the professional standard is based on one of the Islamic 
Sharia legal principles which declared that ‘[c]ustom is of force’,162 which means that in any 
argument about the standard of crafts or skills or knowledge, the way to verify that argument 
is by applying the acceptable custom or method to investigate the case.  
I would argue that this view does not mean that there is no room in Islamic Sharia and Saudi 
Arabian medical law to change the standard of care. As I have argued in Chapter two, Islamic 
Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical ethics have acknowledged respect for patient autonomy 
in their accordance. Thus, the thesis’s argument is to say that both the professional standard 
and the prudent patient standard can be founded in Islamic Sharia, but the prudent patient 
standard can be applied by the law and would give more protection and consideration for 
respecting and thus protecting patient autonomy. Thus, the thesis recommends Saudi 
Arabian medical law to adopt it. I will revisit these issues at the end of this Chapter and in 
the Concluding Chapter. 
Despite the current application of the professional standard, based on the conclusion of 
Chapter two, both Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical ethics seem to accept the 
thesis’s proposed ethical standard of care that requires doctors to provide patients with 
sufficient and understandable information to respect their autonomy and be self-determining 
in accordance with Islamic Sharia. This standard will be examined against the current 
practice under Saudi Arabian medical law in the following discussion. 
Considering LPHP2005 may appear to recognise the professional standard for all doctors’ 
duties, it is important to consider whether it in fact does apply equally to information 
disclosure. I would argue article 18 in LPHP2005 is significant here. It has stated that: 
‘A healthcare professional shall, after explaining the treatment or surgery 
involved and outcome thereof, alert the patient or his family to the necessity of 
following the instructions provided and warn them of the consequences of failing 
to follow said instructions. A physician may, in cases of incurable or life 
threatening diseases, decide, at his own discretion, whether it is appropriate to 
inform the patient or his family of the nature of his disease, unless [the doctor 
																																								 																				
161	R	Shaham	The	Expert	Witness	in	Islamic	Courts:	Medicine	and	Crafts	in	Service	of	Law.	(UCP	2001)	p.	28.	
162The	Mejelle	Being	an	English	Translation	of	Majhallah	el-Ahkam-i-Adliya	and	a	Complete	Code	on	Islamic	Civil	Law.	
article	36.	
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was] prohibited to do so by the patient or if the patient designates a person to be 
exclusively informed.’163 
Article 19 concerns the necessity of obtaining patients’ consent before any medical treatment 
or operation.164 Thus, the order position of these articles suggests that article 18 is referring 
to the idea of providing patients with information and warning them about risks before 
obtaining their consent. If so, article 18 tackles three main issues in relation to information 
disclosure: first the doctors’ duty to inform the patient, second the notion of therapeutic 
privilege, and third where the patient does not wish to receive information. 
C.3.1. The doctor’s duty to inform 
Based on article 18, LPHP2005 seems to recognise doctors’ legal duty to provide 
information and warn patients of the consequences of not considering it, as it has stated: ‘A 
healthcare professional shall, after explaining the treatment or surgery involved and outcome 
thereof, alert the patient or his family [in case of incapacity] to the necessity of following 
the instructions provided and warn them of the consequences of failing to follow said 
instructions.’165 
I would argue that article 18 may be interpreted as placing a legal duty on doctors to provide 
patients with information about their health conditions based on the ‘commonly established 
professional standards’ set out in article 26 since article 26 appears to apply to all duties 
owed by the doctor to the patient, as it does not distinguish between diagnosis and treatment 
and information disclosure.166 Accordingly, it can be argued that LPHP2005 has recognised 
the professional standard and that the information that should be given to the patient should 
be based on what a prudent doctor in the same circumstances would disclose to the patient. 
In fact, I would argue that, while this is an interpretation of article 26 of LPHP2005, it 
conflicts with the need to respect patient autonomy which is also contained in LPHP2005 in 
article 19, for example. Therefore, to leave the determination of the standard of care to the 
professionals would undermine the respect for patient autonomy that is recognised by 
Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical ethics.167 Therefore, the general professional 
standard is not suitable for information disclosure and the prudent patient standard is needed 
instead to properly protect patient autonomy. This will require the standard to be set out 
																																								 																				
163	LPHP2005	article	18.	
164	Ibid.	article	19.		
165	Ibid.	article	18.	
166	Ibid.	article	26.	
167	See	Chapter	two	for	further	discussion.		
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clearly in legislation so that the professional standard does not apply to information 
disclosure, as I will suggest in the Concluding Chapter. 
Furthermore, I would argue that neither in article 18 nor elsewhere in LPHP2005 are there 
given clear statements about other legal aspects of information disclosure including risks 
that should be disclosed; whether the patient should be told about available alterative 
treatment; whether the doctor has a duty to seek to ensure that the patient can understand the 
provided information; how to answer patients’ questions. It seems that the doctors’ duty to 
inform based on article 18 is just to impart information, even if that might be with complex 
medical terms. This, I would argue, shows no consideration or respect for patient autonomy. 
Therefore, LPHP2005 should be clear and respect the patient’s autonomy to be informed in 
accordance with Islamic Sharia. However, article 18 is an obvious example of the lack of 
clarity from which LPHP2005 suffers as it contains no clear standard of information 
disclosure and it does not have an answer for the issues I have raised. 
Having considered LPHP2005 I will now turn to CEHP2013. As I have stated in Chapter 
two besides being an ethical guideline for doctors CEHP2013 is legally binding. In fact, it 
might be considered that CEHP2013 was intended to fill some of the legal vacuums and to 
clear the confusion that exists in LPHP2005. This is because it is easier to revise CEHP2013 
than reforming LPHP2005, as it only needs approval by a governmental Minster. However, 
as LPHP2005 surpasses CEHP2013, therefore CEHP2013 should be interpreted and 
understood in the context of the legal duties which LPHP2005 has recognised.168 
It should be noted that in relation to doctors’ duty to inform patients, CEHP2013 has not 
stated what standard of care should be followed. It therefore does not clarify the issue of 
whether it is appropriate that the standard of information disclosure should be the 
professional standard as in article 26 of LPHP2005 or whether a different standard should 
apply that is more protective of patient autonomy. Nonetheless, I would suggest that, as 
CEHP2013 should be read and interpreted in the context of LPHP2005, thus article 26 of 
applying the professional standard would be applicable. Thus, I would argue that CEHP2013 
has also failed to consider that respect for patient autonomy has its place in Islamic Sharia. 
In this sense, I would argue that clearing LPHP2005 by adopting the prudent patient standard 
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of care would give more protection to patient autonomy. Such an adoption by LPHP2005 of 
the prudent standard of care would require CEHP2013 to be in harmony with it. 
In response to the issues, I have raised regarding article 18 and the doctor’s duty to inform 
the patient, the thesis will consider to what extent CEHP2013 has clarified some of these 
questions. CEHP2013 has recognised in Chapter 2(C) 1, that for a patient’s consent to be 
valid,  
‘[t]he healthcare practitioner should present enough information in a language 
that the patient can understand about what he/she [the doctor] will do, and what 
is required from the patient, the possible consequences of the patient’s decisions, 
as well as potential complications and risks.’169 
Therefore, it seems that CEHP2013 has considered information disclosure in more detail 
than the LPHP2005. From the above statement by CEHP2013, there are several issues to 
discuss. 
C.3.1.1. The amount of information that doctors should disclose 
Chapter 2(C)1 in CEHP2013 has stated that doctors should provide ‘enough information’. 
This is not stated in LPHP2005. Additionally, CEHP2013 has provided some elements of 
what ‘enough information’ should include. It should include information about the course 
and plan of what the doctor is going to perform and instruct the patient to ‘what is required 
from’ him/her. Further to that the ‘enough information’ should include ‘the possible 
consequences of the patient’s decisions,’ and finally the ‘potential complications and risks’. 
These last two elements I will discuss under the issues of patient understanding and risk 
disclosure.  
Although CEHP2013 seems to recognise different elements to be included in providing 
patients with ‘enough information’, I would argue that using the phrase ‘enough information’ 
can lead to different conclusions. Does ‘enough information’ include only the relevant 
information a patient needs? Does ‘enough information’ require all information to be 
disclosed? Who can determine that the information that has been disclosed is ‘enough’? If 
the LPHP 2005 professional standard in article 26 is applied, then the doctor’s failure to 
provide ‘enough information’ would seem to be judged by the accepted standard of medical 
practice.   
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Nonetheless, CEHP2013 seems to attempt to clarify the amount of information that should 
be disclosed, by using the word ‘enough’ and stating what may be included. However, I 
would argue that CEHP2013 has not cleared up the confusion and the professional standard 
of care remains applicable; this, I would argue, has led to the same failure by LPHP2005 to 
give more protection to respect for patient autonomy. Additionally, this conflicts with duties 
to protect patient autonomy which are also under LPHP2005 and CEHP2013 – and the 
reform is necessary to give more priority to patient autonomy. This necessary reform for 
LPHP2005 to depart from the professional standard and adopt the prudent patient standard 
would provide more recognition of the respect for patient autonomy that is in accordance 
with Islamic Sharia, which seems now to be clearly marginalised by Saudi Arabian medical 
law. 
A further avenue for confusion is created in connection with the CEHP2013 statement 
regarding the doctors’ duty to reassure patients.170 CEHP2013 has advised doctors to 
reassure the patient by providing him/her ‘...with sufficient clear information about his/her 
condition, which would help to reassure and eliminate his/her fears.’171 (Emphasis added).  
This statement comes after the statement about obtaining the patient’s consent.172 Thus, 
‘sufficient clear information’ may then refer to additional information that is given to the 
patient after consent has been obtained, which may refer simply to the doctors’ usual duty 
to relieve patients’ fears. However, I would argue that CEHP2013 in this respect is 
ambiguous, because to obtain consent a patient should be provided with ‘enough 
information’,173 whereas to reassure him/her ‘sufficient clear information’ should be given. 
It seems odd that the requirement for information to reassure the patient seems to be greater 
than that which is required to obtain his/her consent.  
Thus, I would argue that CEHP2013 also has ambiguity and it has not solved the problem of 
the conflict between imposing a professional standard of care in information disclosure and 
the need to protect patient autonomy. Both LPHP2005 and CEHP2013 seem to have left the 
authority to set the standard for informing patients to the professionals regardless of what 
patients want to know. Therefore, this shows that the current practice by Saudi Arabian 
medical law is in need of reform both to clarify the legal vacuum and to give more respect 
																																								 																				
170Ibid.	chapter	2(D)	p.	18.	
171	Ibid.	chapter	2(D)2	p.	18.	
172	Obtaining	consent	with	enough	information	is	stated	at	CEHP2013	chapter	2	(C)1	p.	17	and	reassuring	patients	with	
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to patient autonomy by making it clear that a more patient centred standard should apply to 
the legal duty to disclose information. It will therefore be recommended that a clear 
statement imposing a prudent patient standard should be adopted, in line with the approach 
that has been taken in the first part of the Montgomery test in the UK. 
C.3.1.2. Doctors’ duty to ensure that the patient can understand the information 
The duty of doctors to ensure that the patient can understand the information provided is also 
unclear in both LPHP2005 and CEHP2013. CEHP2013 has introduced the phrases that 
information must be provided ‘in a language that the patient can understand’174 and warn of 
‘the possible consequences of the patient’s decisions’175 which are not especially helpful. 
The first phrase seems to be more concerned about the description of the provided 
information itself and the language that is used. However, it does not require doctors to seek 
to ensure that the patient can understand the information. However, the second phrase 
provides a little more basis for a duty to seek to ensure that the patient can understand the 
provided information. Telling the patient about the consequences of his/her decision is an 
indication of doctors’ duty to ensure that the patient can understand what he/she is going to 
consent to (or refuse).  
Nonetheless, I would argue that the duty to seek to ensure that the patient can understand the 
information given is inadequately recognised in LPHP2005 and CEHP2013. So, in this area 
it can be learnt from the English law experience by placing a legal duty on doctors to take 
all proper steps to seek to ensure that the patient can understand the information given, as I 
will suggest in the Concluding Chapter. This is because it would be in compliance with 
Islamic Sharia general principles, as I have argued in Chapter two that Islamic Sharia 
requires those who provide advice to seek to ensure that the advice is clear, understandable 
and truthful. 
C.3.1.3. Risk disclosure 
Unlike LPHP2005, CEHP2013 seems to recognise that the doctors’ duty to provide ‘enough 
information’ to the patient should include the ‘potential complications and risks’.176 
However, I would argue that this phrase is not specific or clear in its meaning or scope. In 
particular, CEHP2013 does not provide further examples or explanations for what ‘potential’ 
risks may include – whether this is all potential risks, only significant ones and significant 
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from whose perspective. Thus, I would argue such a lack of clarity should be addressed and 
the Saudi Arabian medical law can learn from the English law experience in doing so, by 
considering more respect for patient autonomy.   
C.3.1.4. Doctors’ duty to inform the patient about available alternative 
treatments 
Unlike LPHP2005, CEHP2013 has advised doctors under the doctors’ duty for ‘achieving 
patient’s interest and guarding his/her right’177 to ‘...introduce them [the patients] to 
appropriate alternatives in diagnoses and treatment in a clear and honest way.’178 This may 
suggest that CEHP2013 has recognised doctors’ duty to inform patients about the available 
alternative treatments. Again, however, the CEHP2013 statement has not specified what 
kind of alternative treatments should be disclosed. Is it all available alternative treatments or 
just what may suit the patient’s case? Should doctors inform the patient about the available 
alternative treatment voluntarily or just when the patient asks about the alternatives or 
refuses the offered treatment? From what has been said before, I would assume that because 
the professional standard is applicable, the doctors’ failure to fulfil such a duty would be 
judged on that basis. This appears unsatisfactory in protecting the right of the patient to make 
a sufficiently informed decision so, I would argue that the current stance of the duty to inform 
the patient about available alternative treatments has to be clarified and this could be 
achieved by adopting the approach taken in English law.  
C.3.1.5. Doctors’ duty to answer patients’ questions 
The CEHP2013 under the matter of breaking bad news to the patient has recognised that: ‘It 
is the right of the patient to know his/her health condition, illness, symptoms, and prognosis 
in general terms. If the patient requires more details, he/she should be answered with that 
[information]. Informing the patient is the duty of the treating doctor...’.179 (Emphases 
added). This statement is made in relation to breaking bad news and further it might be 
suggested that providing further details at the patient’s request is because the above 
statement has advised doctors to only inform the patient in general terms about his/her case. 
However, this does not deal with the general issue of needing to answer the patient’s 
questions when seeking consent to treatment.  
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Neither LPHP2005 nor CEHP2013 have dealt adequately with the issue of the doctors’ duty 
to answer the patients’ questions. Thus, this issue in its current stance generates a legal 
vacuum that need to be addressed. Again, it is suggested that this can be achieved by 
reforming the law in line with the duty in English law to answer patient’s questions fully and 
truthfully, and this would be in line with Islamic Sharia to provide more respect for patient 
autonomy.   
Having considered the standard of information disclosure and what ought to be disclosed to 
the patient, the final issues to be considered are those of deliberately withholding information 
from the patient: therapeutic privilege and where the patient does not wish to receive 
information. 
C.3.2. Therapeutic privilege 
LPHP2005 has recognised the notion of therapeutic privilege, as article18 has allowed a 
doctor  
‘...in cases of incurable or life threatening diseases to decide, at his own 
discretion, whether it is appropriate to inform the patient or his family of the 
nature of his disease, unless [the doctor was] prohibited to do so by the patient 
or if the patient designates a person to be exclusively informed.’180 (Emphasis 
added). 
I would argue that, although article 18 has recognised the notion of therapeutic privilege so 
as to authorise the doctor to withhold information, it is limited that to cases of ‘incurable or 
life threatening diseases’,181 as CEHP2013 also states that in the event of breaking bad news 
to the patient, doctors should ‘limit the information [to] that suits the patient’s knowledge 
and understanding of his/her health condition without the minutiae that would increase 
his/her worry.’182 
Although article 18 has limited the use of the therapeutic exception to only some cases, it is 
still suffering from a lack of clarity. I would argue that, although article 18 has authorised 
doctors to estimate use of discretion in how to inform or not inform the patient, or his/her 
appointed deputy, LPHP2005 does not clearly state that withholding information should not 
take place simply because it is feared that the information may cause the patient to withhold 
consent, as that would deprive the patient of the opportunity to make his/her own decision 
in accordance with Islamic Sharia. Thus, leaving the estimation to the doctor would 
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undermine the respect for patient autonomy, as the patient’s wishes and priorities would be 
different from the doctor’s. Thus, LPHP2005, by leaving the use of therapeutic exception 
without limitation, would deny the patient the right to make his/her free and own decision in 
accordance with Islamic Sharia. Thus, I would argue that, although English law has stated 
that the therapeutic exception should not be used to prevent the patient from making an 
informed decision or changing his/her decision, this issue has not been directly addressed in 
LPHP2005 and I will in the Concluding Chapter suggest that the application of therapeutic 
privilege should be similarly limited in Saudi Arabia. 
C.3.3. Where the patient refuses information 
Another interesting aspect of LPHP2005 in article 18 is to recognise patients’ rights not to 
be informed and to transfer their rights to be informed to a person(s) that they have 
appointed.183 However, I would argue that although article 18 seems to recognise the 
patient’s right to refuse to be informed, that acknowledgement is subject only to cases of 
‘incurable or life threatening diseases’.184 This may suggest that refusing information in such 
cases might be legally accepted in that case only, but otherwise not. Furthermore, I would 
argue that, according to CEHP2013, even where the patient is able to waive or transfer 
his/her right to information, the doctor still has a legal duty to tell the patient basic 
information and about the consequences of his decision.185 Arguably, as such duty is not 
stated clearly in LPHP2005, I will suggest in the Concluding Chapter how that should be 
addressed by learning from English law experience. 
In summary, based on what has been above discussed, the rules concerning the above issues 
remain vague among medical staff, patients, lawyers and even SMPs as, to-date, no clear 
structure exists for the amount of information or risks that should be disclosed to patients.186 
Having therefore examined the legal requirements for a valid consent and the current practice 
and deficiencies in Saudi Arabian medical law, in the following, the thesis will discuss the 
establishment of a doctor’s civil liability for the failure to disclose information or risk to the 
patient based on Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian law.  
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3.2.4. Consequences of failing to meet the standard of information disclosure and 
negligence 
In the following, the thesis will briefly discuss the issue of establishing a doctor’s civil 
liability for not informing the patient.  
LPHP2005, in addition to recognising the patient’s right to a civil remedy for an injury, 
considers the public interest which arises as an additional issue in the context of a civil 
action. That is, the doctor’s action in breaching article 18 (inform the patient) should result 
in a fine (to be paid to the treasury),187 whether there was an injury or not. Furthermore, 
SMPs can issue a warning or fine or suspend the doctor’s licence for disciplinary liability.188 
Further, the patient should be compensated if the injury occurred as a result of the doctor’s 
failure to inform the patient; SMPs will estimate the compensation amount.189 However, it 
should be noted that, as the professional standard is currently applied in Saudi Arabian 
medical law, so the discussion will refer to it.  
In what follows, the thesis will examine the doctors’ failure to provide competent adult 
patients with information that they need to make a decision concerning proposed treatment, 
and how that failure would be considered by the law. 
3.2.4.1. The duty of care 
Generally, the duty of care as a legal concept has been recognised by Islamic Sharia for a 
long time, as the holy Quran recognises that a Muslim owns a duty to take care of his/her 
parents.190 Further, Muslim scholars have agreed that learning medicine and treating patients 
is a collective obligation; thus it becomes a duty of one or a number of people to learn 
medicine and provide treatment to the community.191 Therefore, a doctor owes a duty to 
serve his/her community by preventing suffering or harm and promoting healthcare by 
providing treatment.192 
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Nonetheless, there are different views regarding the basis of the doctor-patient legal 
relationship regarding whether it is contractual (Ijareh) or tortious.193 Thus, if the patient has 
been treated by a private hospital or doctor in this case the legal relationship is a contractual 
as the patient and hospital/doctor has involved in a contract.194 On the other hand, in public 
hospitals it can be said that the legal relationship is under tort law.195 However, it can be 
argued that, regardless of the basis of the legal relationship, an agreement to treat establishes 
a duty of care; hence, it is not usually difficult to establish that a duty of care exists between 
a doctor and patient.196 For example, LPHP2005, irrespective of the basis of the legal 
relationship, states that for an injury that has occurred as a result of medical malpractice the 
patient is entitled to be compensated.197 
A doctor is not always under an obligation to treat unless the case is an emergency and the 
doctor can provide treatment. In such emergency cases, doctors are under a legal duty to 
treat patients.198 However, this duty is not just to provide appropriate treatment. It has been 
argued that another of the doctors’ duties under Islamic Sharia is to provide patients with 
information.199 Therefore, under a contractual relationship as well as under a wider concept 
of a duty of care, doctors should fulfil their obligations by providing the patient with 
information and performing the required and appropriate treatment or operation only after 
obtaining the patient’s valid consent. It can be said that in this respect it is similar to English 
law. 
3.2.4.2. Breach of the duty of care (AlTaadi) 
As I have argued above, LPHP2005 in article 26 has only stated a general principle that 
doctors should conduct their duty in accordance with the common medical practice (the 
																																								 																				
193	M	Almaaitah	AlMasoawlih	AlMadneeih	wa	AlJnaeeih	fe	AlAKhtaa	AlTbeeih	(The	Civil	and	Criminal	Liability	for	
Medical	Error)	(1sted	NAUSS	2004)	p.	39	(Arabic).	
194	B	AlShik	AlMasoelih	AlQanonieh	LAlTabib.	(Doctors’	Legal	Liabilities)	(1sted	Dar	AlHamad	2002)	p.166-168	(Arabic).	
195M	Hanna	AlNadrieh	AlAlamh	La	alMasowlih	alTabieh	(the	General	Theory	of	a	Medical	Liability)	p.	38.		
196	M	Almaaitah	AlMasoawlih	AlMadneeih	wa	AlJnaeeih	fe	AlAKhtaa	AlTbeeih	(The	Civil	and	Criminal	Liability	for	
Medical	Error)	p.36-37.	
197	LPHP2005	article	27.	
198	Ibid.	article	8	stated	that:	‘A	healthcare	professional	who	witnesses	or	becomes	aware	of	a	patient	critically	ill	or	
injured	shall	provide	all	possible	assistance	or	ensure	that	he	receives	required	care.’	article	16	LPHP2005	stated	that:	‘A	
healthcare	professional	may,	in	other	than	critical	or	emergency	cases,	decline	from	treating	patients	for	professional	or	
acceptable	personal	reasons.’	CEHP2013	chapter	2(H)	p.	21	stated	that:	‘The	healthcare	practitioner	can	-	in	a	non-
emergency	situation,	refrain	from	treating	a	patient	for	personal	or	professional	reasons	that	would	jeopardize	the	
quality	of	care	provided	by	the	healthcare	practitioner	to	the	patient,	on	condition	that	this	[refrain]	does	not	harm	the	
patient’s	health,	and	that	there	is	another	practitioner	who	is	capable	of	treating	the	patient	instead	of	him/her.’		
199M	AlBar	and	H	Pasha,	Masoleet	ATabeeb	bein	AlFqih	wa	AlCanoon	(The	Doctor’s	Liability	Between	Fiqh	and	Law)	p.30-
31.	
Chapter four: Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian law on consent and information disclosure 
	
	 247	
professional standard).200 However, LPHP2005 does not state whether SMPs should apply 
the professional standard to establish the doctor’s civil liability for the failure to inform the 
patient. 	
Thus, I contacted201 Counsellor Saeed Alghamdi, a current member of Jeddah SMP,202 to 
find out what standard of care SMPs apply to examine doctors’ civil liability in failing to 
disclose information or risks to patients as that is not clear in LPHP2005. Counsellor 
Alghamdi stated that: generally, to examine and establish doctors’ liability in all medical 
cases including doctors’ failure to disclose information or inform patients about risks 
involved in the treatment or operation, the SMP simply applies the professional standard of 
care as has been generally stated in article 26 in LPHP2005. This, I would argue, shows that 
LPHP2005 seems to some extent to consider the protection of patient autonomy, such as the 
emphasis in article 19 that no medical treatment should be provided unless a valid consent 
has been obtained.203 The LPHP2005 acknowledgement of the professional standard seems 
to marginalise that respect, as SMPs, by applying the professional standard, appear to leave 
the determination of doctors’ civil liability to the professionals. 
I would argue that this marginalisation by SMPs to consider the respect for patient autonomy 
seems to conflict with Islamic Sharia recognition of the principle of autonomy as the patient 
should be adequately informed, as I have discussed in Chapter two. Thus, SMPs seem to 
clearly deny respect for patient autonomy by applying the professional standard. I would 
argue the reason for that is because SMPs are just applying LPHP2005 as precedent law is 
not applicable in the country;204 thus, SMPs cannot go beyond what LPHP2005 has stated. 
Therefore, they cannot, for example, apply any other standard of care, unless LPHP2005 has 
stated what should be applied. In this regard, I would argue that replacing the current 
standard of care by the prudent patient standard of care must be conducted through 
legislation. Accordingly, by adopting the prudent patient standard of care that would give 
more protection to patient autonomy in accordance with Islamic Sharia can be achieved by 
learning from English law experience, as I will discuss later in this Chapter and the 
Concluding Chapter.  
																																								 																				
200	LPHP2005	article	26.	The	article	has	stated	that:	‘A	healthcare	professional	governed	by	this	Law	[LPHP2005]	shall	
exert	due	care	in	line	with	commonly	established	professional	standards.’	
201	A	personal	communication	on	25/12/2014	via	e-mail.	
202	Counsellor	Saeed	Alghamdi	has	been	appointed	as	a	member	of	Jeddah	SMP	since	2009	as	the	Ministry	of	Health	
Counsellor	representative.	
203	See	the	discussion	above.		
204	See	Chapter	two	for	further	discussion.	
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In the meantime, I would argue that the SMPs’ application, consideration and interpretation 
of the professional standard is seemingly similar to that was held by Lord Diplock in Sidaway 
as I have discussed in Chapter three. His Lordship believed that the Bolam test’s role was 
clear: 
‘To decide what risks the existence of which a patient should be voluntarily 
warned and the terms in which such warning, if any, should be given, having 
regard to the effect that the warning may have, is as much an exercise of 
professional skill and judgment as any other part of the doctor’s comprehensive 
duty of care to the individual patient, and expert medical evidence on this matter 
should be treated in just the same way.’205 
However, a patient’s claim should be submitted to a regional SMP. The basis for the patient’s 
claim is based on the Messenger’s PBUH general saying: ‘Were people to be given what 
they claim, men would claim fortunes and blood [lives] of people, but the onus of proof is 
on the claimant and the taking of the oath is incumbent upon the one who denies it [the 
allegation].’206 From this statement, it is clear that the burden of proof is always upon the 
claimant (the patient) because the defendant (the doctor) is presumed not liable according to 
the basic principle that ‘all people are innocent.’207 This approach of Islamic Sharia to put 
the burden of proof upon the patient is similar to English law. Thus, the patient must support 
his/her claim by bringing sufficient evidence which shows that the claim is valid as the holy 
Quran in translation states ‘...produce your proof if you are truthful.’208 
LPHP2005 has instructed patients to support their claims with medical reports and the report 
that has been produced by the investigation committee in the hospital or clinic where the 
action has taken place.209 Those reports will be subjected to scrutiny by the SMP members 
and the parties’ lawyers.210 LPHP2005 has granted SMPs the right to appoint one or more 
external additional expert(s)211 to provide evidence in the courtroom and to provide a written 
medical opinion. SMPs may also do so at the patient’s or the defendant’s request. The expert 
evidence will be questioned in SMP hearings and sessions.212 
																																								 																				
205Sidaway	v	Bethlem	Royal	Hospital	Governors	[1985]	1	A.C.	871	p.	895.	
206Ibn	Rajab	Alhanbli	A	Collection	of	Knowledge	and	Wisdom,	translated	by	M	Fadel	(Umm	Alqura	publisher	2002)	p.	
423.	
207Ibid.	p.	425	compare	to	‘you	are	assumed	innocent	until	you	are	proved	guilty’	
208	The	holy	Quran	in	translation	(CH2:111).	
209	LPHP2005	article	35,	section	3	in	the	executive	regulation.	(Arabic).	
210	Ibid.	
211Ibid.	article	33	section	2.	
212	Ibid.	article	33,	section	3	in	the	executive	regulation.	
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The expert evidence will be examined against the conduct of the doctor in question on the 
professional standard. It is considered preferable to have two just, trusted, skilled and 
qualified experts in the same craft.213 However, in some circumstances the view of a single 
just, trusted, skilled and qualified expert, is acceptable, for instance in cases where two 
experts in a particular field cannot be found.214 To this extent, the view of Islamic Sharia 
and Saudi Arabian medical law seem to be similar to English law’s view in Maynard.215 
SMPs have the authority to examine the content, credibility and reasonableness of the 
evidence, thus SMPs can accept or dismiss it,216 but in the event of the dismissal, by law 
SMPs must give clear reasons for the rejection.217 
However, Saudi Arabian medical law appears to concentrate more on examining the 
credibility of the experts than the reasonableness of the evidence itself. As there is no written 
material on how the SMPs approach medical expert opinion in any medical case including 
information disclosure, I again asked Counsellor Alghamdi,218 about that. He stated that the 
customary procedure of SMPs in considering the patient’s claim (including the failure to 
disclose information) is that after receiving the claim, the case will be referred to one of the 
two expert doctors and a medical professor member of the SMP219 to study the case and the 
evidence of the parties. If these members clearly consider that the doctor’s action based on 
the case fact and the expert evidence was negligent, regardless of the defendant’s expert 
views, the SMP will hand down its decision on that basis.220 
On the other hand, Counsellor Alghamdi stated that if there is no clear evidence that the 
action was negligent or there is a doubt about the action or if the defendant’s and the patient’s 
experts’ evidence is not credible, the SMP will then refer the case to external experts 
(appointed by SMP not the parties) in the same field for further study and consideration. 
Those external experts have to submit their opinions to the SMP and they will be summoned 
to discuss their opinions by the SMP members.221 Hence, Counsellor Alghamdi indicated 
that if the majority of the SMP members are satisfied that the external medical experts’ views 
																																								 																				
213R	Shaham	The	Expert	Witness	in	Islamic	Courts:	Medicine	and	Crafts	in	Service	of	Law.	p.	66-75.	
214Anwraullah	The	Islamic	Law	of	Evidence	(2nded	Kitabbhavan	2006)	p.	81.	
215See	also	Defreitas	v	O'Brien	[1995]	P.I.Q.R.	P281.	For	further	discussion,	see	Chapter	three.		
216LPSC2013	article	138	stated	that	‘The	experts’	opinion	is	not	binding	on	the	court,	which	merely	uses	it	as	a	guide’	
217LPHP2005	article	35	section	4	in	the	executive	regulation.	(Arabic).	
218A	personal	communication	on	25/12/2014	via	e-mail.	
219However,	if	the	case	involves	a	pharmacy	error	or	if	the	defendant	is	a	pharmacist,	two	additional	members	must	join	
the	SMP	a	professor	from	a	pharmacy	school	and	an	expert	pharmacist,	so	the	case	will	be	referred	to	one	of	them.	
LPHP2005	article	33	section	B.	See	the	discussion	above	about	the	formation	of	SMPs.	
220LPHP2005	article	35	section	4	in	the	executive	regulation.	
221Ibid.	article	35	section	2	in	the	executive	regulation.	
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are credible and in line with the professional standard then the SMP will base its judgment 
on that view, either to hold the doctor liable or not. However, if the majority of the SMP 
members are not satisfied, the case will be referred to other external experts (appointed by 
SMP not the parties). The SMP will follow the same procedure, and then at the end the SMP 
will decide by a majority which opinion is credible and which the SMP can ground its 
judgment on.222		
I would argue that, because SMPs include medical professionals and lawyers, this may make 
the job of examining the credibility and reasonableness of the medical expert opinion easy 
and effective, compared with English law where judges are not expected to have medical 
knowledge, although this does still beg the question whether doctors are judging other 
doctors, even though they are doing so in a judicial role. Therefore, whether there is an 
element of judicial bias toward the defendant is questionable. I will propose some reforms 
to SMPs in the concluding remarks of this Chapter and the Concluding Chapter.  
Additionally, I would argue that SMPs, by applying the professional standard to determine 
a doctor’s liability including the failure to disclose adequate information, are undermining 
the respect for patient autonomy and empowering the professionals to determine the standard 
of care. Accordingly, I would argue that there are many questions that must be addressed in 
terms of applying the professional standard: how can it be stated that a patient had been 
sufficiently and properly informed? A deeper question exists here, however: who should 
decide what kinds of risks the doctor should disclose to the patient? Finally, who should set 
the standard of information disclosure – the professionals or the law – and why? It might be 
possible that, as both LPHP2005 and CEHP2013 are devoted and loyal to the professional 
standard, the answers to these questions I have asked are that it is the medical professionals 
not the law who can and should decide.  
3.2.4.3. Damage/injury (AlDarar) 
When establishing the doctor’s civil liability, judges must be satisfied that physical or 
emotional damage or injury to patients was the result of the doctors’ action.223 The 
damage/injury the patient suffered as a result of the doctor’s action should be 
compensated.224 Accordingly, it can be said that where the doctor’s failure to disclose 
																																								 																				
222	A	personal	communication	on	25/12/2014	via	e-mail.	
223	W	ALZuhayli	Nadrait	AlDaman	‘Ahkam	AlMsoelih	AlMadneeih	wa	Aljenaeih	fe	AlFiqh	AlIslami’	(the	theory	of	Islamic	
Civil	and	Criminal	Liability)	(9thed	AlFikr	2012)	p.	29	(Arabic).	
224	LPHP	2005	article	27.	
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information or risks to the patient resulted in damage/injury, the doctor should be held liable 
for that damage/injury.225 Further, the patient has a civil remedy for compensation that is 
based on the Islamic Sharia system of compensation,226 as the amount will be decided by 
SMPs.227 
3.2.4.4. Causation (Alifdha) 
Similar to the definition of causation under English law, Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian 
law define causation as a causal connection or link between the claimant’s damage and the 
defendant’s negligent action.228  
In general, a defendant should not be held liable for his/her action unless there is a direct or 
indirect link to the damage/injury, so if there is no such link there is no liability. The 
examination and establishment of causation relies on several methods which include; expert 
evidence, the proof provided by the claimant or derived from the circumstances of the case 
etc.  All of these will be considered and examined by judges to decide whether or not the 
defendant’s action was the direct or indirect cause of the damage/injury.229  
Thus, for judges to establish causation they will require evidence of the following: 
1. There is no other cause for the damage/injury except the current defendant’s direct or 
indirect behaviour.  
2. There was no action by the claimant which increased the damage/injury or any agreement 
by him/her to the damage/injury.230 
Based on Muslim scholars’ understanding of Islamic Sharia, there are two types of 
causation: the first is the direct (Mubshar) cause.231 This means that there is a direct 
connection between a person’s action and the damage/injury that occurs.232 The direct cause 
is considered by scholars and courts as the most clear contributor to the result. For a cause 
to be considered direct, there must be no other causes leading to damage/injury. Thus, 
																																								 																				
225M	Albar	and	H	Pasha	Masoleet	ATabeeb	bein	AlFqih	wa	AlCanoon	(The	Doctor’s	Liability	Between	Fiqh	and	Law)	p.	75.	
226P	Kassim	‘Medical	Negligence	in	Islamic	Law’	p.	409-410.	
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Medical	Error)	(1sted	NAUSS	2004).	P	61	
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Civil	and	Criminal	Liability)	p.	31.	
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compensation must be paid as long as the direct cause is established. Moreover there is no 
requirement to establish that the defendant was intentionally intending the damage/injury; 
the only requirement is that the defendant’s action was the direct result of the 
damage/injury.233 For example, say a person accidentally dropped a brick from his/her 
house’s roof hitting a person on the street, causing him/her injury. Even although there was 
no intention by the defendant to drop the brick, his/her action was nonetheless the direct 
cause of the claimant’s damage/injury and so the defendant should be held liable. 
Second is the indirect (Tasabbub) cause, which means that the damage to the preson was an 
indirect effect of the defendant’s action.234 An indirect cause is considered as a ‘second 
degree’ cause that should be considered as the reason for the damage/injury, with the 
following conditions; namely, the defendant’s  action must be intentional, that action must 
be clearly the indirect cause of the damage/injury and there is no other cause that led to the 
damage/injury.235 
So, scholars have agreed that the direct cause must be the main cause of any resulting harm, 
and the person whose action was the direct cause of the damage/injury should be liable to 
pay compensation. On the other hand, the indirect cause will be only considered as the main 
cause if it was the core cause of the result.236  
For example, if false testimonies were given to the court that the defendant stole money and 
based on those untrue testimonies the judge ordered the appropriate penalty (in this case 
amputation) the testimonies were the indirect cause of the result as the witnesses did not cut 
off the defendant hand. The judge’s order was the direct cause of the result, but because the 
result was the consequence of the false testimonies, those who provided them would be liable 
to pay compensation as they were the indirect cause of the harm. On the other hand, the 
judge should not be liable, because he merely applied and enforced the law based on the 
evidence presented to him. In this case, the indirect cause is significant in terms of 
compensation, while the direct cause is not. 
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Based on that, Muslim scholars have established the general rules for direct and indirect 
causes as follows:  
The direct cause is always the most relevant, except in the following situations:  
1. The indirect cause will be considered the main cause if it is the primary reason for the 
damage/injury.237 For example, say a driver stopped his/her car for a red light and a driver 
from behind failed to stop in time and hit the first car, forcing it forward, hitting and injuring 
a pedestrian. The cause of the pedestrian’s damage was not the direct hit by the front car; 
rather, it was the result of the second car’s hitting the first car (indirect cause). Or the direct 
cause may be a direct result of the indirect cause.238 For example, if someone clearly coerced 
and forced another person to set fire to the claimant’s house, while the damage to the house 
was the direct result of the arsonist’s action, that direct cause would not have happened 
without the coercion of the first person (indirect cause). 
2. The direct and indirect causes are equal, in this case both persons who caused the 
damage/injury are equal in liability to pay compensations. 239 For example, if a person digs a 
hole in the ground without protecting passers-by by warning them, and another person 
pushes the claimant into it causing injury, both are liable, because both defendants share the 
blame.  
In the case of healthcare delivery, unlike English law, Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian law 
apply an objective causation standard, which relies on deciding what a reasonable doctor 
would have disclosed to the patient.240 LPHP2005 has stated clearly that ‘[a]ny healthcare 
professional who commits malpractice causing harm to a patient shall be liable for 
indemnification’.241 Based on this article it can be understood that there must be a causal 
connection between the doctor’s treatment or intervention and the damage/injury that 
occurred.242 
In applying an objective causation standard, LPHP2005 focuses on the occurrence of the 
damage/injury, and so as long as there is a (physical or non-economic) damage/injury as a 
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result of a breach of the duty of care, the doctor should be held liable for that damage/injury. 
In fact, LPHP2005 does not deal with the issue of information disclosure differentially or 
separately; it considers it in the same way as any other medical negligence allegation. Thus, 
if the patient suffers damage/injury as result of the doctor’s failure to provide him/her with 
the required information, or if the information that was disclosed to the patient was not true 
or was misleading and the patient suffers damage/injury as result of that, SMPs will examine 
whether there is a causal link (direct or indirect) between the doctors’ failure to inform the 
patient and the damage/injury.243  
In order for SMPs to investigate and establish doctors’ civil liability, they rely on medical 
experts’ evidence, because doctors’ failure to inform the patients about risks or the required 
information needs to be examined against what would or would not a reasonable doctor in 
the same circumstances disclose (based on the professional standard of care).244  
Thus, for SMPs to establish causation, they apply an objective standard. Hence, in all the 
cases where the doctors failed to provide the patient with the required information or provide 
him/her with wrong or misleading information, SMP members apply Muslim scholars’ 
interpretations. It should be remembered that Muslim scholars consider all causes (not only 
the most effective causes) that lead to a damage/injury, so whether the cause is direct or 
indirect and whether they have occurred separately or cooperated with each other, they will 
be examined in order to evaluate each one’s relationship to the damage/injury.245 This 
method is also applied to doctors’ actions in allegedly failing to inform the patient.246  
In order to identify and declare who is responsible for the patients’ damage/injury and 
apportion responsibility for it, Muslim scholars have instructed judges to examine each 
action or inaction that was involved in the claimant’s damage/injury and, based on each 
person’s participation in causing the damage/injury, both the responsibility and amount of 
compensation will be set and identified.247  
So, SMPs based on the medical experts’ opinion (and evidence provided by the claimant) 
and by applying the professional standard of care examine and consider all causes that 
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resulted in the damage/injury, then identify and link each cause to the result. Thus each 
person involved in causing the patient’s damage/injury should be held liable based on the 
contribution of his/her action to the result and the amount of compensation will be set 
accordingly.  
Bear in mind that the establishment of causation will be examined against whether there is 
an external factor which cut the causal link or not, such as the patient’s refusal to follow the 
doctor’s instructions which then leads to the damage/injury.248 Consequently, the doctor 
should not be held liable because there is no causal link between his/her action and the 
damage/injury.249  
For example, a patient underwent an eye operation (laser) to correct his vision in both eyes. 
The ophthalmologist informed the patient about the risks and consequence that could 
possibly happen in such an operation and the ophthalmologist correctly preformed and 
operated on the patient’s eyes. After few months the patient started to suffer some pain in 
both eyes and his vision deteriorated. The patient brought a claim arguing that the 
deterioration of his vision was caused by the negligent performance of the operation.250  
The SMP in Ash-Sharqiyyah examined the cause of the deterioration of the patient’s eyes 
and, based on medical experts’ view, which stated that: 
 ‘..the patient eyes have devolved a rare condition (Keratoconus) which was 
caused by the nature of the patient’s eyes not by the operation..., it is very 
rare in practice for such an operation to lead to the similar outcome, thus the 
damage to the patient’s eyes was directly caused by the nature of the patient’s 
eyes and not by the operation.’251  
In terms of information and risk disclosure, the medical experts’ view was that: ‘It is an 
acceptable and a usual practice for the ophthalmologist in the same situation to not inform 
the patient about the rare risk of Keratoconus…’.252 Therefore, medical experts’ came to the 
conclusion that 
 ‘…there was no direct or indirect causal link between the operation and the 
damage to the patient’s eyes, the damage was a direct result of the nature of 
the patient’s eyes. Further, the ophthalmologist’s action to not inform his 
																																								 																				
248	M	Mansor	ALMosoleeih	Altabieh	(Medical	Responsibly)	(1sted	Monshat	AlMaareef)	p169	
249Ibid.	
250	The	Administrative	Court	of	Appeal	case	no	(890/1/A)	in	2003.	p1-3.	
251	Ibid.	p10.	
252	Ibid.	p11.	
Chapter four: Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian law on consent and information disclosure 
	
	 256	
patient about the rare risk involved is in accordance with acceptable medical 
practice in his field.’253  
The SMP in Ash-Sharqiyyah adopted the medical experts’ conclusion and dismissed the 
case. The decision was upheld by the Administrative Court of Appeal.  
Here the SMP merely relied on the medical experts’ views to examine the ophthalmologist, 
based on the professional standard of care. As there was no causal link between the 
ophthalmologist’s action and the damage, the case was dismissed. 
In another case, a patient was admitted to the emergency department in a private hospital, 
complaining about a pain in his lower right abdomen. The doctor who diagnosed him, 
believed that the patient’s pain was caused by inflammation of the appendix and she strongly 
advised him to have his appendix removed immediately without any delay. The patient 
consented and was transferred to the operating theatre where the operation was conducted.254 
A few days after his discharge from the hospital, the patient was complaining of severe pain 
in the area of the operation, and swelling. He was taken to another hospital where he was 
informed that his case had not required an instant removal of the appendix, because the 
condition was not severe and he could be treated without surgery. In addition, the operation 
to remove the appendix had not been performed correctly. Consequently, the patient needed 
another operation to relieve him from the pain and correct the previous operation.255 
The patient brought a claim to the SMP in Riyadh, arguing that he was given misleading 
information about his condition and further that the doctor who operated was negligent, 
because he was not a specialist in this kind of operation. 
Medical experts’ opinion was sought, which confirmed that first, in terms of informing the 
patient ‘…the doctor was not acting in accordance with an acceptable practice by misleading 
the patient about the urgency of his case which was not urgent.’256 Second the doctor who 
operated was not a specialist so he was ignorant about the operation. The medical experts 
then concluded that the patient’s damage was a result of both doctors’ actions.257 
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The SMP in Riyadh, based on the medical experts’ view, concluded that both doctors were 
liable for the patient’s damage. The SMP in Riyadh established causation, and consequent 
liability, by dividing their responsibilities as follows:  
‘…. based on the medical expert’ opinion…… doctor A shared a third of the 
causation to the damage because, she gave misleading information to the 
patient and urged him to have the operation which was not urgently required, 
so the patient missed other chances for example, to be treated by other ways 
or to have another opinion regarding his case or to have the operation in 
another day etc. so, the patient was deprived from taken a proper decision. 
On the other hand, the surgeon shared two-thirds of the causation to the 
damage, because firstly he was not a specialist to perform the operation and 
secondly he operated erroneously. Further, the surgeon is liable for breaching 
the prevision of articles 27 and 28 from LPHP2005 by exceeding his 
specialty……. Therefore, doctor A has to pay third of the compensation and 
the surgeon has to pay two-thirds of the compensation beside that he has to 
pay fine to the treasury for his breach…’258  
The decision was upheld by the Administrative Court of Appeal.  
This case shows how link of causation can be divided and how SMPs identified each parson 
relation to the cause. In doing that, SMPs relied on medical experts’ view which applied the 
professional standard of care to establish the doctors’ lability. 
So, whether the cause is direct or indirect a doctor should be liable if his/her action caused 
the damage/injury. Thus, in the following the thesis will present the examination of direct 
and indirect causation applying to information disclosure and the SMPs’ role in establishing 
causation. It should be remembered that the objective standard of causation is applied based 
on the professional standard of care. 
1. If doctors’ failure to inform the patient about the risks was the direct cause of the patient’s 
damage/injury they should be liable;259 for example, when the doctor directly provides the 
patient with misleading information or withholds significant risks.  
2. If doctors’ failure to inform the patient was the indirect cause of the patient’s 
damage/injury, the doctor should be liable;260 for example, when the doctor provides the 
wrong information to a nurse, who then passes it on to the patient. Here, although the nurse 
was the one who directly informed the patient, the damage/injury was linked to the action of 
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the doctor who provided the false information in the first place. Thus it is the doctor, not the 
nurse, who should be held liable.  
3. If the direct and indirect cause of the patient’s damage/injury are equal, those who caused 
the damage/injury should all be liable.261 For example, when the doctor and nurse knew that 
they were withholding significant risks from the patient (not under the application of 
therapeutic privilege), both should be liable: the doctor, for his/her indirect causation (as 
he/she did not directly inform the patient) to not disclose significant risks and the nurse for 
his/her indirect causation (as he/she provided inadequate information).  
To sum up, to establish causation in all medical cases, the objective causation standard will 
be applied to judge doctors’ behaviour based on what a reasonable doctor would or would 
not do in the same circumstances. Obviously, that is because LPHP2005 adopts the 
professional standard of care.262  
Therefore, replacing the professional standard of care in relation to information disclosure 
with the prudent patient standard in LPHP2005 would change the approach that SMPs apply 
to establish causation in cases where a doctor fails adequately to inform the patient. So, the 
test of causation would be an objective test relying on what a reasonable patient would have 
decided if he/she had been given the information. Thus the question SMPs should ask is 
whether: If the patient had been advised of the risk of the medical treatment, would he/she 
have consented (or not) to treatment or chosen other available options or sought other views 
or advice and that would be judged from a reasonable patient perspective. 
So, applying the prudent patient standard of care would only require the patient to 
demonstrate that the disclosure of risk would have meant that they would not have consented 
to the medical treatment or operation at that time. As both Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian 
medical ethics recognise respect for autonomy,263 the move to the prudent patient standard 
would be consistent with their underpinning principles and would provide more protection 
to patient autonomy. This would also change the way(s) in which causation is established 
and liability apportioned. 
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3.3. Summary 
Although both LPHP2005 and CEHP2013 have recognised patients’ right to be provided 
with ‘enough information’ I would argue that neither of these documents have mentioned or 
considered a number of key issues. I have argued that there is room for the notion of 
respecting the patient’s autonomy in Saudi Arabian medical law. Islamic Sharia supports 
this, as long as that respect is not given to acts that are against its tradition. However, Saudi 
Arabian medical law does not seem to sufficiently protect patients’ autonomy, as LPHP2005 
has not specifically addressed the issue of the appropriate standard of information disclosure. 
In the absence of such a specific provision, the general standard of care in article 26 appears 
to have been adopted. In article 26 LPHP2005 has recognised that doctors should generally 
perform and conduct their duties to patients in accordance with the professional standard. 
This approach has not been disputed in CEHP2013 and it has been adopted in practice by 
SMPs.  
Therefore, I would argue that the current practice by Saudi Arabian medical law and its 
devotion to the professional standard of care has evidently failed to meet the thesis’s 
proposed standard of care, since it relies on a professional standard and does not address 
important issues that affect patient decision-making in a way that sufficiently protects their 
autonomy. Thus, I would argue that Saudi Arabian medical law needs to be reformed and 
that reformation should start by giving more respect for patients’ autonomy in accordance 
with Islamic Sharia as I have discussed in Chapter two.264 Such recognition, I would argue, 
would support a departure from applying the professional standard of care to information 
disclosure, as this undermines the notion of respecting patients’ autonomy. So, can the 
professional standard of care be replaced by a standard that gives more protection to patients’ 
autonomy? 
4.The new proposal to depart from the professional standard of care 
4.1. The proposal 
I have argued in Chapter two that Islamic Sharia medical ethics seem to recognise the notion 
of the respect for patients’ autonomy in accordance with its tradition. Further to that, I have 
above discussed that LPHP2005 holds the strong view that a treatment or operation should 
not be performed until a consent has been granted.265 In fact, LPHP2005 does not stop there; 
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it also, as I have above stated, considers the violation of article 19 in LPHP2005 to not obtain 
consent as an offence of breaching the law; thus, doctors should be penalised for that 
breach.266 In addition, the patient is entitled to a civil remedy for the damage/injury that 
occurred.267 Further to that, LPHP2005 has stated that the patient’s choices and wishes 
should be respected as long as they are in harmony with Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian 
law;268 failure to do so would hold doctors liable for breaching LPHP2005.269 Additionally, 
doctors’ who fail to comply with article 18 (to inform the patient) should be fined,270 and the 
patient who suffered damage/injury should be compensated.271 
I would argue that, based on the above articles, LPHP 2005 appears to some extent to protect 
and consider the respect for patient autonomy, although, article 26 in LPHP2005, as I have 
argued above, seems to acknowledge that doctors should conduct their duties based on the 
professional standard. Thus, there is a potential conflict between the need to protect health 
(paternalism) and the need to respect autonomy, and, so far LPHP2005 may be read, and has 
been interpreted, as placing greater emphasis on the former. That, I would argue can be 
understood clearly from the application of the professional standard by SMPs, as they apply 
the professional standard for all medical cases and the professionals have the power to 
determine the standard of care, and consequently doctors’ civil liability. Therefore, it can be 
said that both the principle of respect for autonomy and the principle of respecting the 
judgment of doctors and their role in protecting the health interests of the patient are 
contained in LPHP2005, but greater priority seems to have been given to the latter.  
In fact, I would argue that there has been insufficient consideration of the issue of respect 
for autonomy in LPHP2005 and that it would be compatible with Islamic Sharia to address 
this by introducing reforms to give greater protection in respect of the patient’s right to 
information. However, it should be remembered that, if there is no clear statement by the 
main sources of Islamic Sharia on a specific matter, the door is opened for debate to arrive 
at a view on which there is consensus. This therefore includes information disclosure to 
patients. Thus, like the professional standard of care, the prudent patient standard of care 
seems to have a place and support in Islamic Sharia. I have argued in Chapter two that 
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Islamic Sharia to some extent has recognised the principle of respect for autonomy, 
consequently patients should be informed and their choices and wishes should be respected 
as long as they in compliance with Islamic Sharia. Thus, if the question is ‘Which standards 
of care (the professional or prudent patient) seem to be more protective for patient autonomy 
based on to the Islamic Sharia’s view?’, I would argue that the prudent patient standard 
seems to be the standard that protects patient autonomy and can be imposed by the law, as 
the comparative English law recent experience tells us.  
I would argue that there has been comparatively little scholarly debate over the discussion 
of the prudent patient standard in Saudi Arabia so far, compared with that in English law. In 
fact, I would argue that this thesis would provide a basis for debating the issue to replace the 
current Saudi Arabian medical law standard of care by one that considers patient autonomy 
in accordance with Islamic Sharia. Thus, as I have argued in Chapter two that Islamic Sharia 
and Saudi Arabian medical ethics have recognised an ethical duty on the patient to be 
provided with information, nonetheless they have not set a standard of what should be 
disclosed. This view by Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical ethics seem to be 
considered by LPHP2005 and CEHP2013, as both, as I have discussed above, have 
recognised that doctors have a legal duty to inform patients. Nonetheless, LPHP2005 seems 
to acknowledge the professional standard; thus, doctors’ failure to fulfil such duty should be 
examined based on that basis.  
In fact, Islamic Sharia seems to have no objection to considering and accepting a standard 
of care that gives more protection to patient autonomy and to form that in a legal duty as 
long as that does not conflict with its traditions. Additionally, as I have argued above that 
LPHP2005 seems to hold some recognition of the respect for patient autonomy, but that is 
not demonstrated clearly, thus the professional standard seems to be more appreciated even 
by SMPs. However, I would argue that LPHP2005 should be formulated based on Islamic 
Sharia as any law in the country should be passed accordingly,272 but it seems that 
LPHP2005 gives more protection to the professionals and profession of medicine. I would 
assume that recognition by LPHP2005 may only reflect the policy of the government to give 
more protection to the medical professional rather than to the patients. As Islamic Sharia has 
no reference to a specific standard of care, in such cases the government can decide what 
standard should be adopted.  
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The important point is that there are no philosophical or theoretical problems in adopting the 
proposed new standard. With very limited exceptions, arguably the proposed standard sits 
comfortably with the traditions of Saudi Arabian and Islamic Sharia laws. From a practical 
point of view, translation of the new standard into law is more complex since Saudi Arabian 
law is not judge made, but rather relies on the legislature. The Saudi Arabian legal system is 
based on Islamic and written law so to change the standard of care may take some time, as 
the proposal for change either has to be proposed by the government or by the Shura 
Council.273 
Nonetheless, the prudent patient standard of care has been under consideration by researches, 
a major conference274 and writers recognising the desire to move towards a standard of care 
that is more protective of patients’ autonomy and rights. This would suggest that there is 
already movement to accept the prudent patient standard of care and this may convince the 
legislative bodies in Saudi Arabia to replace the current professional standard of care.  
This movement can be seen in the work of scholar Dr. Qais Almubarak who is a senior Saudi 
Arabian scholar and member in the GPSRI, and one of his interests is medical law.275 He has 
studied the issue of medical law from a comparative legal perspective and Islamic Sharia. 
He has published two books on medical law based on Islamic Sharia - one of them is	
AlTadawi wa AlMasoelih AlTabieh fa Alshria Alislamia (Treatment and Medical Liability 
based on Islamic Sharia) (cited in this thesis) the other is AlAaqad AlTabbi (Medical 
Contract).276 In the latter, scholar Almubarak discussed the issue of doctors’ legal duty to 
inform the patient (AlTabsser) he stated that this duty is established ethically based on 
respect for the person’s bodily integrity and right not to have his/her body violated. Thus not 
to inform the patient is disregarding of these rights.277 The duty to inform the patient is 
legally based on the doctor and patient contractual relationship (in private healthcare) or on 
tort law (in public healthcare).278 Thus providing patients with information is a basic ethical 
and legal right that must be protected and respected based on Islamic Sharia traditions. 
Then scholar Almubarak has argued that doctors have a legal duty to provide the patient with 
sufficient and understandable information which gives the patient a clear picture about 
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his/her condition so as to enable the patient to make a free decision.279 Scholar Almubarak 
then believes that this duty includes informing the patient about the risk(s) involved in the 
treatment and inform him/her about any available alternative treatment.280 He then extended 
that duty to the legal requirement for doctors to take all steps to ensure that the patient can 
understand the provided information. Thus, for doctors to fulfil that duty they should provide 
information in a simple and understandable way using language which allows the patient to 
understand and utilise it. Further, doctors should be sure to use a good manner and be 
sympathetic in informing the patient, taking into account the seriousness of the patient’s 
condition and his/her psychological state and disclosing the information gradually to the 
patient so as not to cause him/her stress or anxiety. Thus, it is possible under some 
circumstances to withhold information that would cause deterioration in the patient’s health, 
but that should not deprive the patient from making a free decision.281 
Scholar Almubarak then asked how that duty can be performed? In other words, what is the 
standard of care to inform competent adult patients? He has stated that ‘doctors must disclose 
relevant and material information regarding treatment and its risks that a reasonable person 
in the patient’s position would want to know in order for him/her to decide to accept or refuse 
medical treatment.’282 This view by Scholar Almubarak essentially endorses the prudent 
patient standard which has been argued for here. I would agree with his justifications that 
this standard is accommodated by Islamic Sharia because: 
1. Islamic Sharia recognises that competent adult patients have the right to consent to or 
refuse medical treatment and no one can touch them without their valid consent.283 Thus for 
that right to be protected and for consent to be legally valid, patients must be informed about 
their health conditions, any material risks, alternative available treatment and the 
consequence of the treatment as that would allow the patient to make a free decision.284 
2. This standard can be fulfilled by doctors and the law can ensure that the patient’s right to 
be informed is protected. Thus, this standard on the one hand would not require doctors to 
disclose every single piece of information that a particular patient wants (subjective patient 
standard); instead it is based on what a reasonable patient wants or needs to know which 
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would not put a huge burden on the doctor to spend too much time informing the patient 
about all available information and risks. On the other hand, this standard can be applied by 
the law which then can examine doctors’ failure to provide the patient with the required 
information based on what a reasonable patient wants to know.285 Thus this standard would 
seek a balance between patients’ right to be informed and doctors’ duty to provide 
information and would represent the justice balance that Islamic Sharia acknowledges. The 
holy Quran states: ‘Verily God has enjoined justice, the doing of good, and the giving of 
gifts to your relatives; and forbidden indecency, impropriety and oppression. He warns you 
so that you may remember.’286 
It should be remembered that, as I have argued in Chapter three, the standard in Montgomery 
is beyond the prudent patient standard, although it seems to suffer from some uncertainties. 
For example, although Montgomery has recognised doctors’ legal duty to inform patients 
about the available alterative treatment, the Supreme Court does not attempt to identify or 
set a guidance regarding when alternative treatments should be disclosed, so that would be 
a subject for lower courts to consider.287 Further, although the issue of understanding was 
considered by the Supreme Court as generally doctors should take all reasonable steps to 
seek to ensure that the information given can be understood by the patient, the Supreme 
Court has not stated how this duty should be conducted.288 This as well will be subject to the 
interpretation of the lower courts. Therefore, the thesis will be aware of these concerns when 
suggesting that Saudi Arabian medical law can learn a lesson from English law to adopt the 
prudent patient standard. 
However, English law has taken more than 30 years to replace the professional standard by 
a standard that is beyond the prudent patient standard, but has the element of the prudent 
patient standard. This replacement has not occurred instantly, as during these 30 years 
considerable and rich legal and academic literature to critically evaluate, discuss and develop 
the standard, has been produced. Additionally, English courts took considerable time to 
interpret the standard since it was set in Sidaway. Thus, the recent decision arrived at in 
Montgomery has been reached through a gradual and progressive 30-year journey, as I have 
discussed in Chapter three. However, as the decision in Montgomery has just arrived, thus it 
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should be carefully considered and interpreted. Therefore, I would argue that Saudi Arabian 
medical law, which has been using the professional standard for many years, should first 
move to the prudent patient standard, as that would be the starting point to make a 
considerable change in LPHP2005. Then the standard should be subjected to critical 
discussion and observation by legal and academic literature, and doctors and patients’ views 
must be considered. 
Further, Saudi Arabian medical law appears to place more emphasis on the protection of the 
profession of medicine and doctors; thus the adoption of the prudent patient standard of care 
would reduce doctors’ power to determine the standard of care and would also provide more 
protection to patient autonomy.   
Therefore, I would argue that the prudent patient standard would be for Saudi Arabian 
medical law the best thing that the law can do (as Lord Scarman in Sidaway said). That is 
because Islamic Sharia has recognised the respect for patient autonomy within its context 
and the prudent patient standard can be imposed by the law, as English law experience 
shows.  
Additionally, I would argue that the acceptance of the prudent patient standard by Saudi 
Arabian medical law as a starting point for further development can be supported by the 
current attitudes among doctors and patients in the country. In their book Contemporary 
Bioethics Islamic Perspective, AlBar and Pasha have argued that patients’ views in some 
Islamic countries regarding the notion of autonomy have been changing as patients become 
more attracted to the concept of respect for individual autonomy as a result of greater 
education and knowing about their rights.289 This appears to be supported by journal articles 
in the last four years although there are a few older sources that also comment on this 
phenomenon.290 As it seems that some patients in some of Saudi Arabian hospitals have 
become aware of the need for respect of their autonomy and their decision to be respected,291 
thus I would argue that Saudi Arabian medical law should clearly consider the protection of 
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the notion of the respect for patient autonomy as that would give patients more confidence 
that they were being respected.292 
A very recent study published in 2014 was interesting even in its title: ‘Patients’ perceived 
purpose of clinical informed consent: Mill’s individual autonomy model is preferred’.293 
From the first instant, the study’s title shows its conclusion, and its reference to Mill is 
significant in terms of the arguments made in Chapter one of this thesis and in terms of the 
thesis’s arguments that it is appropriate to consider the development of English law based 
on Western ethics when proposing legal reform for Saudi Arabia. The study’s researchers 
observed that: ‘According to [a] Millian account of autonomy, it is important to promote 
patient’s self-reflection and enable patients to decide for themselves.’294 The study held that 
the Millian concept of autonomy considers it as personal control,295 thus: 
‘Patients cannot simply trust the clinician to take good care of them; they cannot 
freely decide to live in an obedient way, ignore information, or let others decide. 
They [patients] should control their course of treatment according to their point 
of view, a complex and dynamic outcome of not only judgments but also 
emotions, beliefs, desires, and habits.’296 
The authors, based on their understanding of Mill’s concept of autonomy in regard to 
informed consent, designed a study which included a sample of 488 adult patients. The main 
aim of the study  
‘was to explore how the purpose of the informed consent process is 
conceptualized [sic] by patients who are planning to undergo or who had recently 
undergone a written informed consent-requiring procedure in a tertiary care 
center [sic] in Saudi Arabia.’297 
The findings of the study are very interesting, as it found that the choice of the statement that 
the purpose of informed consent was to 
‘help patient decide’ was the best overall result, as it ‘was ranked 1–3 (out of 10) 
by 65% of respondents, and was ranked significantly different from the 
competing statements, indicating that the dominant patients’ view of informed 
consent’s purpose is enabling patients’ self decision-making.’298	
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This finding by the study is an example that shows the awareness among medical staff of the 
notion of informed consent as well as its importance to respect for patients’ autonomy. In 
addition, the outcome of the study would suggest that many of the patients involved believed 
that informed consent would be a means to enable them to make their decisions.299 The study 
concluded that the notion of informed consent is vital for patients. Thus, to provide patients 
with information would enable them to be self-determining, allowing the provision (or 
withholding) of an informed consent.300 
4.2. Concluding remarks 
Based on what has been discussed, it seems that the thesis proposal to recommend Saudi 
Arabian medical law to depart from the professional standard of care and adopt the prudent 
patient standard of care is a defendable proposal. I would argue that it seems clear that the 
acceptance then the adoption of the prudent patient standard of care would not be a 
controversial issue in Saudi Arabia.  
First, because, as I have argued in Chapter two, Islamic Sharia has recognised the principle 
of respect for autonomy based on its principles, and an adoption by Saudi Arabian medical 
law of the prudent patient standard would provide more protection to patient autonomy. 
Second, the discussion in Chapters two, three and four has shown that the prudent patient 
standard can be regarded as consistent with Islamic Sharia principles, and it is not necessary 
to take a professional practice approach only.  
Third, LPHP2005 seems to acknowledge the principle of respect for patient autonomy, as 
that can be understood from the emphasis on obtaining patients’ consent and respecting their 
choices in accordance with Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian law.301 LPHP2005 has also 
recognised a legal duty on doctors to inform the patient and failure to fulfil that duty would 
hold doctors negligent.302 This shows that LPHP2005 contains potential acknowledgment of 
the respect for patients’ autonomy, but the significant matter with LPHP2005 is its 
affirmation of the professional standard of care, which seems clearly to exhaust and 
undermine the respect for patient autonomy.303 A clear example is the SMPs’ 
acknowledgment and reliance on the professional standard to determine the standard, and 
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consequently doctors’ civil liability. Therefore, I would argue that, as LPHP2005 potentially 
has a place for respecting patients’ autonomy in accordance with Islamic Sharia, LPHP2005 
can therefore adopt the prudent standard of care, as that would provide protection to patients’ 
autonomy and that can be imposed by the law, as English law experience has shown. Thus, 
the adoption of the prudent patient standard by LPHP2005 is possible and practical.  
Fourth, based on the surveys, studies and the current view by scholar Almubarak above it is 
evidently that an increasing number of patients and medical professionals are already aware 
and accepting the notion of informed consent and support its use as a means of enabling 
patients to make medical decisions.304 Thus, it can be argued that there is some support and 
acceptance in medical practice for a different approach to the professional standard so that 
legal reform may not be considered to be wholly controversial. Therefore, I would argue that 
it is an appropriate time to recommend Saudi Arabian medical law to move towards the 
prudent standard of care.   
Having stated that, the prudent patient standard is an appropriate standard to be adopted by 
Saudi Arabian medical law, to avoid confusion and uncertainty, and this is most likely to be 
achieved by making changes in medical law regulation that will apply to all medical 
practitioners. In the Concluding Chapter, I will present the proposed standard of care and 
solutions to the current legal deficiencies of Saudi Arabian medical law by learning from 
English law experience. 
Fifth, changing the standard of care would affect the role of SMPs. Courts in Saudi Arabia 
simply apply the law and do not go beyond what the law has stated.305 Thus in terms of 
information disclosure for the moment SMPs are bound to apply the professional standard 
of care as that is what LPHP2005 has stated and recognised.306 Therefore, any change would 
need to come from the law itself. If LPHP2005 adopts the prudent patient standard, SMPs 
will examine, consider and establish doctors’ liability for the failure to provide the patient 
with the required information based on what a reasonable person in the patient’s position 
would want to know. SMPs would therefore be more involved in judging medical evidence 
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and establishing doctors’ liability, rather than being so reliant on expert views to establish 
the standard of care. SMPs could judge the evidence more form the patient’s perspective.  
Generally, judges in Saudi Arabia do not have the power to establish precedents; rather, their 
role is to apply laws that are issued by the government.307 Their role in Saudi Arabian courts 
generally and in SMPs specifically in evaluating the expert evidence has been set by the 
law. LPSC2013 stated that: ‘The experts’ opinion is not binding on the court, which merely 
uses it as a guide’308 nonetheless, if judges do not accept the experts’ evidence they must 
justified their rejections.309 
Therefore, judges in Saudi Arabia have the power and authority to examine and investigate 
the expert evidence and either accept or reject it after providing reasons where it is rejected. 
At present, judges cannot ask or instruct medical experts to examine doctors’ behaviours or 
duties of care from the point of view of the prudent patient standard of care, because that 
would go against what LPHP2005 has laid down. SMPs can reject medical evidence, but 
only if this can be clearly justified.310 Even then, if SMPs reject the medical experts’ 
evidence that decision can be overruled by the Administrative Court of Appeal311 if there is, 
for example, an accepted body of opinion which supports the defendant. Thus, if there is no 
robust and defensible reasoning for the rejection, the SMPs decision not to accept the 
medical experts view is invalid.312 Specifically, in relation to medical cases the issues 
become more complex, especially since most cases involve very sensitive and complicated 
matters and practical and professional matters that cannot be easily identified by an average 
person. Thus the role of the medical experts’ evidence becomes more important as judges 
may not have the qualification to investigate and examine the reason behind the medical 
behaviour in question.313  
There are therefore two major problems with the current system in Saudi Arabia. First, the 
SMPs’ makeup is such that decisions are taken with input from other healthcare 
professionals and are not solely reliant on the disinterested decision-making that can be 
expected of the judiciary, even in cases where the issues are complex and will certainly be 
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informed by medical evidence.  Second, as the law currently stands, SMPs have no option 
but to apply the professional standard. While the latter problem would be alleviated by law 
reform in this area, the former problem will remain unless the responsibility for adjudication 
is transferred to a judicial rather than a quasi-judicial forum.  
The fact that doctors sit as judges in SMPs raises a question mark as to the objectivity of 
SMPs. As I have argued elsewhere,314 SMPs jurisdiction should be moved to specialist courts 
of law and judges with Sharia and legal qualifications should lead the courts, not medical 
professionals.315 Therefore, the Saudi Arabian government, in order to achieve objectivity 
and to protect patients’ rights and autonomy, should abolish SMPs and move their 
jurisdiction to specialist courts. LJ2007 has authorised the Supreme Judicial Council to 
establish a specialist circuit or panel (consisting of a judge or three) in any General Courts 
around the country for a specific matter.316 For example, there are several Traffic Circuits in 
the General Courts around the country to apply the Traffic Law 2007.317 Thus. I would 
strongly recommend that the Saudi Arabian government considers abolishing SMPs in 
reforming LPHP2005 as patients’ rights and autonomy should be more protected.  
5. Conclusion 
While there seems to be some acknowledgment by the current Saudi Arabian medical law 
of respect for patient autonomy, that seems to be undermined by the emphasis on the 
professional standard of care. This, I would argue seems not to reflect Islamic Sharia’s 
recognition of respect for patients’ autonomy and choices as long as they are in accordance 
with its traditions.318 Hence, the current stance by Saudi Arabian medical law does not give 
sufficient weight to Islamic Sharia’s aim to provide protection for patient autonomy. 
Changing to a prudent patient standard would both offer that protection and be in harmony 
with Islamic Sharia’s requirements to respect patients’ autonomy and should be imposed by 
the law. Further, in this Chapter the other main focus was on the matter of the legal 
deficiencies of Saudi Arabian medical law, as a result of applying the professional standard 
of care to information disclosure.319 I have closely considered the current Saudi Arabian 
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professional standard of care and its application, and it is clear that neither LPHP2005 nor 
CEHP2013 have adequately considered a number of issues which included the amount of 
information and the of type risks that should be disclosed to competent adult patients; the 
doctors’ legal duties to inform the patient about the available alternative treatments; the legal 
duty to answer the patients’ questions and how they should be answered; whether doctors 
have a legal duty to ensure that the patient can understand the information provided and the 
application of therapeutic privilege. 
These deficiencies lead to confusion and uncertainty, as the thesis has above discussed. By 
examining the current practice of the professional standard of care under Saudi Arabian 
medical law against the thesis proposed ethical standard developed in Chapter two for Saudi 
Arabia, it is clear that the current practice fails to meet this standard.  
I have argued that Saudi Arabian medical law should depart from the professional standard 
of care because the current legal deficiencies undermine respect for the patient’s autonomy 
which is required in accordance with Islamic Sharia. I have concluded in Chapter two that 
Islamic Sharia has accepted to some extent the notion of the principle of respect for the 
patient’s autonomy. I have supported my argument to do so by the understanding of Islamic 
Sharia medical ethics and general principles. Additionally, I have supported my argument 
by presenting some of the current studies which show that both medical professionals and 
patients in Saudi Arabia have acknowledged the notion of informed consent and the need for 
respect for the person’s autonomy. 
Thus, for these reasons in the Concluding Chapter I will suggest that Saudi Arabian medical 
law adopt the prudent patient standard of care based on the English law experience. That I 
believe would help Saudi Arabian medical law to clarify the current legal deficiencies that I 
have discussed in this Chapter, by learning from English law experience. English law used 
to adopt the professional standard of care, which is still applicable by Saudi Arabian medical 
law. Thus, English law’s move to the prudent patient standard may be used to recommend 
that Saudi Arabia can do the same. This would require not only an adoption of the new 
standard but also a recasting of the judicial decision-making constitution and process. 
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The Concluding Chapter 
1. A summary of the thesis 
This thesis has undertaken a comparative study from an ethical and a legal perspective of 
the appropriate standard of information disclosure by doctors to competent adult patients. It 
has considered the approaches that have been developed in Saudi Arabia and in England, 
with the aim of proposing reforms to the current legal approach in Saudi Arabia. It has been 
contended that the legal standard of care that applies in Saudi Arabia is currently a 
professional based standard and that there are critical legal deficiencies in the way that the 
law currently approaches disclosure of information to patients. These include a lack of clarity 
about the role of expert evidence and the courts in establishing a breach of the duty of care; 
the extent to which risks and alternative treatments need to be disclosed; the duty to answer 
patients’ questions; the need to ensure patients’ understand the information given and 
whether there is a therapeutic exception to withhold information. In addition, as a more 
fundamental issue, this thesis has examined the underlying ethical values that the legal 
approach ought to be seeking to protect in order to propose reforms. Saudi Arabia is 
governed by Islamic Sharia and its laws must be consistent with these principles. However, 
Islamic Sharia allows the experiences of other jurisdictions to be considered and adopted if 
they are in accordance with its own principles or do not conflict with them. I have therefore 
undertaken a comparative study in order to learn from the experiences of England which has 
given detailed consideration to the kinds of issues raised by this thesis. 
It was necessary to discuss in Chapter one the Western perspective on ethical principles, 
mainly the principle of respect for autonomy and the notion of trust. The reason for this 
discussion was to examine what values underpin seeking consent to treatment and 
information disclosure and to provide a basis for considering how well English law has 
protected these values. Chapter one studied the philosophical basis for the principle of 
respect for autonomy, particularly the work of Mill and Kant. It also discussed how the 
principle has been applied and developed in medical practice. The essential elements for a 
decision to be considered to be autonomous were considered, namely: competence, 
voluntariness and, most importantly, information disclosure. The role of consent as an 
expression of the individual’s will was established. 
Chapter one also considered the notion of trust as another approach that might place an 
ethical duty on doctors to inform their patients. The Chapter concluded that the notion of 
trust would not adequately protect the patient’s need for information, because it depends on 
an imbalance of power between doctors and their patients. It might justify doctors deciding 
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what to disclose to patients regardless of the patient’s values and wishes, based on the 
doctors’ own views of what was best for them. Thus, this imbalance of power, which is at 
the heart of the concept of trust, would retain the idea of paternalism which it has been argued 
no longer has a central place in the current climate of respecting patient autonomy and 
choices. While doctors undoubtedly have an ethical duty to act in their patient’s best interests 
and to avoid harming them, ethical medical practice is not confined to securing, so far as 
possible a ‘good’ medical outcome. It is now regarded as an essential part of ethical medical 
practice to respect competent adult patient’s choices even if this may result in harm to the 
patient’s health or even death. Although Chapter one has observed that the concept of 
autonomy is still subject to different interpretations and understandings, it has become an 
essential concern in Western medical ethics in regard to patients’ consent and information 
disclosure.  
The principle of respect for autonomy imposes an ethical duty on doctors to respect patient 
choices and to supply patients with adequate information. As an ethical ideal, since the 
principle is concerned with the protection of individual patient autonomy, it could be 
suggested that a patient should be given all information that enables that patient to be self-
determining and make a decision that is in accordance with his/her own values, goals and 
beliefs. Too little information and patients are not adequately informed; however, too much 
and it may be difficult to understand or to determine what is relevant to their decision. 
Therefore, the thesis proposed an ethical standard based on the principle of respect for 
autonomy which requires doctors to disclose sufficient and understandable information to 
enable competent adult patients to be self-determining. It does not therefore propose that all 
available information should be disclosed but it does require that the patient understands the 
information given.  
Having set out this as the appropriate ethical standard to apply to information disclosure, 
Chapter three went on to look at the extent to which English law meets this standard. I first 
sought to examine the ethical principles that have contributed to the development of English 
law on information disclosure. This examination highlighted the significance of the principle 
of respect for autonomy and how this has come to assume dominance in Western philosophy 
and Western medical ethics, largely replacing a paternalistic approach to the practice of 
medicine. I also considered the concept of trust and discussed its difficulties as a basis for 
founding a legal duty to disclose information. Following on from this, I concluded that the 
ethical approach that appears to be most appropriate to adopt is that: 
The Concluding Chapter 
	 274	
Competent adult patients have a right to respect for their autonomy. Respect for 
their autonomy requires that their consent is needed in order for medical 
treatment to be given. In order for them to properly give consent, they need to 
be given sufficient information relevant to their decision and that they can 
understand. 
Putting this another way, the thesis has proposed that patients should be provided with 
sufficient and understandable information to enable them to be self-determining. This 
conclusion was examined against English law in the Chapter three.    
Chapter two explained the fundamental importance of Islamic Sharia to all aspects of life 
in Islamic countries and in order to assist understanding of this, the sources of Islamic law 
and different traditions of interpreting it were considered. The Chapter also argued that both 
Islamic Sharia and English law can learn some lessons from each other as there has been 
some evidence which shows some adoptions of some Islamic Sharia principles by English 
common law. Equally, Islamic Sharia can learn some lessons from English law experiences 
with some adjustments to be consistent with its basic principles. 
It was noted that Saudi Arabia follows a Sunni School of thought and the different 
approaches of some of the major Sunni scholars were outlined. It was also crucial to explain 
the relationship between Islamic Sharia and the legal system of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. From its inception as a sovereign state, it was declared that the Kingdom would be 
driven by, and would conduct itself according to, the teachings of Islamic Sharia. Thus, a 
law in the country should comply or not in conflict with Islamic Sharia traditions. 
The influence of Islamic Sharia sources and scholars on the legislative process in Saudi 
Arabia was examined, as was their influence on medical ethics. Islamic Sharia sources have 
been and remain central to the understanding of religious, ethical and legal principles in 
Islamic countries, specifically Saudi Arabia. This Chapter, however, concentrated on the 
religious and ethical principles and the consequences of their breach. 
Chapter two argued that Islamic Sharia has implicitly recognised the need for respect for 
autonomy and that decisions should be based on knowledge. This clearly indicates much that 
is in common with the ethical principles discussed in Chapter one and it can be used to assert 
that patients have a right to respect for their autonomous decisions about treatment and to be 
provided with information in order to make them. In addition to Islamic Sharia, there is a 
Saudi Arabian medical ethics guidance which has both an ethical and a legal status in 
CEHP2013. It is regarded as an important regulation and a source of guidance on the 
translation of some Islamic Sharia principles into medical practice in Saudi Arabia. It also 
supports respect for patients’ autonomy. 
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However, respect for autonomy under Islamic Sharia and CEHP2013 is limited by other 
central principles, including the need to preserve and protect human life and health. There 
are five rulings or values concerning the degree or scale of permissibility of an action in 
Islamic Sharia which are: Wajib (obligatory), Moharm (forbidden), Makroh (blameworthy), 
Mandob (praiseworthy) and Mobah (indifferent).1 
The discussion in this Chapter showed that recognition of respect for the adult competent 
patient’s autonomy is considered in a certain way in Islamic Sharia medical ethics. It has 
been argued that Islamic Sharia principles permit a competent adult patient the right of choice 
as to what may be done to his/her own body, as long as that treatment or operation is not 
otherwise forbidden or where refusal would lead to death or severe harm.2 If Islamic Sharia 
principles would be breached, then respect for the competent adult patient’s autonomy would 
be limited. This has consequences for the appropriate approach to seeking consent and for 
information disclosure 
The need for a decision to be based on sufficient knowledge has been mentioned. In addition, 
in Islamic Sharia, the requirement for information disclosure as a means of respecting patient 
autonomy may also be justified by the concept of doctors needing to act with truthfulness 
and to provide appropriate and honest advice. In Chapter two I also examined the place of 
trust in Islamic Sharia and noted that it is regarded as significant, but that it should not be 
used to override the ethical importance of patients being enabled to make their own decisions 
and to be provided with information that they need to do so. 
However, Chapter two has found that, although Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical 
ethics have placed an ethical duty on doctors to provide patients with information, they do 
not explicitly state an ethical standard of information disclosure. To this extent, I would 
suggest that reform is needed to address this. While the thesis is focused on legal reform, 
since CEHP2013 has both an ethical and legal role in regulating medical practice, reform of 
LPHP2005 would also need to include reform of this document. I have put forward an ethical 
standard that places a duty on doctors to provide patients with sufficient and understandable 
information to respect their autonomy and to enable them to be self-determining. So far, it 
has been argued that the approach taken in this standard is in line with Islamic Sharia, but in 
addition, all actions must be in harmony with Islamic Sharia. There may therefore be some 
greater limits on what can be consented to and what can be refused under Islamic Sharia 
principles. Unlike Western medical ethics, from which the thesis’s proposed ethical standard 
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was derived, Islamic Sharia has limited the protection given to patients’ consent and refusal 
which is against its principles because it will cause death or severe harm to the person 
him/herself (except in incurable illness) or others, or where (even if the result is harmless in 
itself) it conflicts with Islamic Sharia teaching.3 Given that the reasons for requiring consent 
to treatment are so similar, it can be suggested that the legal standard of care that has been 
judged sufficient to meet the ethical standard in English law would also be appropriate to 
meet the ethical standard in Saudi Arabia, provided that any issues where there might be a 
conflict with Islamic Sharia are considered. As I have argued, even if Islamic Sharia takes a 
different view from Western ethics and English law on the issue of whether a patient’s 
decision must be respected, this does not alter the need to provide patients with sufficient 
information in a way that they can understand in order to make a decision. Therefore, in 
respect of information disclosure, requiring that the laws in Saudi Arabia could be reformed 
in line with English law and still be in accordance with Islamic Sharia.  
It was argued that according to Islamic Sharia principles, information that should be 
disclosed would include information about alternative available treatments, since without 
this the patient’s decision would be based on ignorance. Another area the thesis has discussed 
in Chapter two was doctors’ ethical duty under Islamic Sharia to seek to ensure that the 
patient can understand the information that has been provided. It was contended that 
CEHP2013 does not address either of these issues adequately. 
Regarding the notion of withholding information, Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical 
ethics have recognised such a notion in rare cases, when that would cause serious harm to 
the patient. This is also consistent with the approach taken to justifying withholding treatment 
information in Chapter one.   
Finally, I have argued that Islamic Sharia medical ethics recognise that a patient has an 
ethical duty to seek information which would include asking questions of the doctor. Further, 
it has recognised that the patient has the right to waive information and can refuse 
information.  
As noted, the ethical standard in Islamic Sharia is surely not identical with the Western one 
as there are more limitations. For example, Islamic Sharia does not recognise or support full 
respect for autonomy to consent to or refuse treatment that is against its principles or would 
lead to death or severe harm (expect the case of incurable illness). On the other hand, it can 
be said that many aspects are the same – respect for autonomy, the need for sufficient 
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information to be a self-determining, the need for patients to understand the provided 
information, the rare exceptions to withhold information and the duty to response to questions 
fully and truthfully. Considering that, the thesis proposed ethical standard developed in this 
Chapter as follows: 
Competent adult patients have a right to respect for their autonomy as long as 
this is not in conflict with Islamic Sharia. Respect for patient autonomy requires 
that their consent is normally needed in order for medical treatment to be given. 
In order for them to properly give consent, they need to be given information 
relevant to their decision and that they can understand. 
This standard was examined against Saudi Arabian medical law in Chapter four to explore 
whether the current practice of Saudi Arabian medical law meets it. It is proposed that the 
law should be reformed in Saudi Arabian to move to adopt the first part of Montgomery 
standard; essentially, the prudent patient standard. It should be remembered that the standard 
that Saudi Arabian medical law adopts should be adjusted to be in a compliance with Islamic 
Sharia. 
In Chapter three, the thesis discussed how English law has approached the need for a 
competent adult patients’ consent to treatment and the consequences that follow from failing 
to meet the requirements for a legally valid consent. It also considered how English law has 
addressed the principle of respect for autonomy in terms of the legal requirements.  
English law has recently paid considerable attention to the importance of respecting patients’ 
autonomy. It provides protection both through criminal and civil law. Criminal law is less 
important to this thesis but the role of consent as a defence in some circumstances was 
considered. More focus was placed on civil law and the elements for a legally valid consent 
were outlined. These mirror the kinds of concerns that were addressed in Chapter one, such 
as the need for competence, voluntariness and adequate information disclosure. It has been 
clearly asserted that a competent adult patient has the full right to consent to medical 
treatment or refuse it for whatever reason the patient considers fit and it has even been said 
that a patient need not give a reason for refusing treatment.4 However, it was noted that 
English law has drawn a distinction between the kinds of information cases that will be dealt 
with in battery and those that will be dealt with in negligence. It was explained that if the 
patient was informed of the broad nature of the intended intervention, this was considered 
adequate to amount to sufficient information to avoid liable for battery on this ground. In 
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most cases, failure to provide adequate information does not fall below this level and most 
cases will proceed in negligence.  
Negligence claims have a number of essential elements that the claimant must prove on the 
balance of probabilities: a duty of care, a breach of that duty and that damage was caused as 
a result of that breach. It was explained that this is not as protective of patient autonomy as 
a battery action could potentially have been but it was recognised that this distinction now 
appears settled. 
A number of different models of possible legal standards of information disclosure were 
reviewed as part of an examination of the development of the standard in English law. These 
standards were: subjective patient; professional (reasonable doctor) and prudent patient. 
It has been argued that the increased affirmation of the importance of respect for patients’ 
autonomy as an ethical principle in medical practice can also be seen in the development of 
English law. The acknowledgement of this principle can be noted strongly in the recent 
Supreme Court case of Montgomery.5 This case made it clear that competent adult patients 
are expected to be enabled to make their own decisions about whether to accept proposed 
medical treatment and are entitled to be provided with information which will enable them 
to take those decisions.6 Information should be provided based on whether  
‘a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach 
significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the 
particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it.’7 
There are only limited exceptions where doctors are entitled to withhold information that 
would otherwise be considered necessary to the patient: when the information would lead to 
serious harm to the patient.8 The fact that the patient might refuse treatment is not in itself a 
reason to withhold information. 
The thesis has argued that the English law experience has demonstrated a similar move away 
from a standard of care based on professional expertise and judgement as has been the case 
in medical ethics, and that it has developed an approach which more appropriately protects 
the principle of respect for patient autonomy: a prudent patient standard. 	
Since the case of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee9 set out the test for 
professional negligence the approach to the standard of information disclosure has been 
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developed toward a more patient-based standard, to reflect the increased importance of the 
ethical principle of respect for autonomy. This development can be illustrated in the 
following stages:  
The commencement stage was set by the so-called Bolam test in its basic form: ‘He [a doctor] 
is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper 
by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art.’10 
The stage of interpreting Bolam. In Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors11 the issue 
of information disclosure was the central issue in the case. Although the Law Lords had 
different justifications for their views in reaching their judgments, the majority agreed to 
apply the Bolam test.12 Lords Bridge, Keith and Templeman applied a modified Bolam test,13 
whilst Lord Diplock advocated the Bolam test for all medical matters.14 Lord Scarman alone 
applied the prudent patient standard.15 
The stage of the significant development to Bolam. In Bolitho v	City and Hackney Health 
Authority16 the court added a condition to the Bolam test by requiring that the medical 
opinion which is presented to establish appropriate professional practice must be able to 
withstand ‘logical analysis’.17 
The stage of moving to what a ‘reasonable patient’ wants to be told and the duty to disclose 
a ‘significant risk’ that was reintroduced by Pearce	v	Untied Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust.18 
The stage of the patient-oriented standard. In this stage, more recognition has been given to 
respect for patient autonomy, as in Chester	v Afshar19 where it became clear that patients 
should be warned about significant adverse outcomes or risks or the complexity of 
procedures based on a reasonable patient standard.20 
In the final stage, in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board,21 the Supreme Court has 
moved explicitly to consider patients’ autonomy in its decision to move away from applying 
the professional standard of care and move towards a standard that is beyond the prudent 
																																								 																				
10Ibid.	p.	587.	
11Sidaway	v	Bethlem	Royal	Hospital	Governors	[1985]	1	A.C.	871.	
12Ibid.	
13For	example,	Pearce	v	Untied	Bristol	Healthcare	NHS	Trust	[1999]	E.C.C.	167,	where	Lord	Bridge’s	view	was	applied.	
14	For	example,	Gold	v	Haringey	Health	Authority	[1988]	Q.B.	481	and	Blyth	v	Bloomsbury	HA	[1993]	4	Med.	L.R.	151,	
where	Lord	Diplock’s	view	was	strictly	applied.		
15	See	Chapter	three	for	further	discussion.	
16	Bolitho	v	City	and	Hackney	Health	Authority	[1998]	A.C.	232	
17Ibid.	p.	241-242.	
18Pearce	v	Untied	Bristol	Healthcare	NHS	Trust	[1999]	E.C.C.	167.	
19	Chester	v	Afshar	[2004]	UKHL	41	
20Ibid.	para	16.	
21	Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11.	
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patient standard of care,22 although it should be remembered that, for the reasons I have 
stated in Chapter four, the thesis will only recommend the first part of the Montgomery’s 
standard (the prudent patient standard). 
It should be noted that, as the thesis has argued in Chapter three, Montgomery seems to set 
out two tests; first the traditional prudent patient test that is in line with Lord Scarman’s view 
in Sidaway23 when His Lordship adopted the view in the American case of Canterbury v 
Spence.24 The Supreme Court has stated that for examining the materiality of a risk this is 
stated to be:‘... whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in 
the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the risk...’25 (Emphasis added). 
Second, it also seems to have adopted the Australian High Court’s test in Rogers	 v 
Whitaker,26 as the Supreme Court additionally added to the traditional prudent patient test 
that a material risk may also be what ‘...the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the 
particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it.’27 (Emphasis added). 
Thus, based on the second part of the Supreme Court’s view, it can be understood that, in 
the case where the particular patient would attach significance to the risk, but a reasonable 
person in the patient’s position might not, a doctor in this case is required to disclose that 
risk to the particular patient if the doctor ‘is or should reasonably be aware’ of its relevance. 
This shows that the test of material risk in this second part is not a subjective test, as it is 
subject to the doctor’s reasonableness in not being aware about the significance of the risks 
to that patient. The test in Montgomery seems to go beyond a simple prudent patient standard 
to examine the risk’s materiality.28 
It must be borne in mind that there are still some uncertainties after the decision in 
Montgomery in regard to the issue of who is the reasonable person, disclosing alternative 
treatment and patient understanding of information.  Regarding the uncertainty of the issue 
of disclosing alternative treatment, it seems that the English law model recognises a legal 
duty on doctors to inform the patients about available alternative treatments, although 
Montgomery has not attempted to identify or state guidance as when alternative treatments 
should be disclosed.29 But as I have argued in Chapter three, the Supreme Court has brought 
																																								 																				
22Ibid.	para	87.	
23	Sidaway	v	Bethlem	Royal	Hospital	Governors	[1985]	1	A.C.	871	p.	889.	
24	Canterbury	v	Spence	(1972)	464	F2d	772.		
25Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11	para	87.	
26Rogers	v	Whitaker	(1992)	175	CLR	479.	
27Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11	para	87.	
28	See	Chapter	three	for	further	discussion.	
29	See	Chapter	three	for	further	discussion.	
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the law closer to the GMC’s guidance which might assist in clarifying that. Another issue 
Montgomery has emphasised is the legal duty to answer patients’ questions, it has reinforced 
Lord Bridge’s view in Sidaway to that doctor’s must answer the patient’s questions fully and 
truthfully.30 English law has also recognised in general that doctors should take all 
reasonable steps to seek to ensure that the provided information can be understood by the 
patient,31 although there is still uncertainty in Montgomery as to how doctors should fulfil 
this duty. Having reached these conclusions, in summary, it is argued that the first part of 
the test of the materiality of a risk in Montgomery is in line with Lord Scarman’s view in 
Sidaway when he argued for the application of the prudent patient standard. His Lordship’s 
view seems to meet the thesis’s proposed ethical standard of care, as it is difficult for the law 
to impose a purely subjective patient standard of care.32 Thus, I would agree with Lord 
Scarman’s view and justification that the prudent patient test is the next best test to be applied 
because on the one hand it gives more protection and respect for patients’ autonomy and 
reflects their wishes and values, on the other hand, it can be applied by the law. 
Having established the approach that English law has now taken and concluded that it meets 
to a large extent the ethical standard that was proposed, the thesis then turned to a 
consideration of how Saudi Arabian medical law has dealt with the issue of information 
disclosure. Having discussed the thesis’s proposed ethical standard and based on the 
conclusion of Chapters two and three, in Chapter four the thesis discussed the development 
of consent law based on Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian medical laws. It was noted that 
while the law in Saudi Arabia is based on Islamic Sharia, which prescribes some legal 
penalties, others are a matter of discretion for the courts, legislative bodies, and scholars. 
Islamic Sharia sources have been supplemented by legislation. It has shown that both Islamic 
Sharia and legislation give legal protection to the person’s bodily integrity, as dealing with 
a person’s body without his/her consent is a crime of assault. In terms of medical treatment, 
it is clear that generally the right of consent and refusal belongs to competent adult patients, 
but compared with English law, under Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian laws the competent 
adult patient has a more limited right to have his/her decision respected since actions must 
be in compliance with Islamic Sharia. This means, that in some cases a decision about 
medical treatment need not be complied with, in accordance with the principles set out in 
Chapters two and four. 
																																								 																				
30Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11	para	54	and	Sidaway	v	Bethlem	Royal	Hospital	Governors	
[1985]	1	A.C.	871	p.	898.	
31Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11	para	90	and	AlHamwi	v	Johnston	[2005]	EWHC	206	(QB)	para	
69.	
32	See	Chapter	three	for	further	discussion.		
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However, failure to obtain the patient’s valid consent would normally attract both criminal 
and civil liabilities. It is rare for doctors to have a criminal intention to administer treatment 
without consent or against the patient’s will in order to cause harm to the patient. However, 
Saudi Arabian law still holds that it is an offence for a doctor to not comply with LPHP2005 
by treating without a valid consent or refusal (unless the treatment falls under the rulings of 
being Wajib or Moharm). Therefore, if a doctor mistakenly or negligently treats without 
consent, his/her action will not be treated as a crime of assault as the doctor does not have 
the criminal motive to force treatment upon the patient in order to cause an injury. Instead, 
the action will be treated as an offence of not complying with LPHP2005.33 A patient who 
suffered a damage/injury as a result of the doctor’s action will also be entitled to a civil 
remedy under Islamic Sharia and LPHP2005 principles.34 This will be the case whether the 
treatment was provided intentionally against the patient’s will or where consent was not 
obtained due to negligence or a mistake in failing to obtain it. 
Thus, it can be said that Saudi Arabian medical law supports to some extent patients’ 
autonomy and in particular respect for bodily integrity. Apart from where consent has not 
been obtained, another form of protection by LPHP2005 to consider the patient’s autonomy, 
is when a doctor failed to inform the patient at all or failed to meet the professional standard 
to inform the patient, the doctor will be subject to a fine as he/she breached LPHP2005 and 
the patient will be subject for civil remedy if a damage/injury is resulted from the doctor’s 
action.35 
As in Chapter three, Chapter four focused on doctors’ civil liabilities and the elements for a 
legally valid consent were outlined. The issues that were addressed in Chapter three 
regarding the elements of a valid consent were revisited in this Chapter: competence and 
capacity, voluntariness and adequate information disclosure. Further, the issue of negligence 
was discussed. For a claim in negligence, to establish that the information given is below the 
appropriate standard of care there must be: a duty of care, a breach of that duty (AlTaadi), 
damage (AlDarar) and causation (AlIfdha).   
Regarding current Saudi Arabian medical law practice, Chapter four argued that the 
professional standard is the current standard of care which is applicable to all medical affairs, 
similar to Lord Diplock’s version in Sidaway. That can be understood, as I have argued in 
Chapter four, from article 26 in LPHP2005, which states in general that doctors should 
																																								 																				
33	See	Chapter	four	for	further	discussion.	
34Ibid.		
35	LPHP2005	articles	27	and	30.	See	Chapter	four	for	further	discussion.	
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conduct their duties of care in accordance ‘with commonly established professional 
standard’.36 Thus, as this is the only reference in LPHP2005 regarding the standard of care, 
it can be argued that the professional standard is applicable to all medical cases. This 
recognition by LPHP2005 of the professional standard, as I have argued in Chapter four, 
shows that, although LPHP2005 seems to acknowledge the respect for patients’ autonomy, 
it has failed to fulfil that recognition through the current standard of care. Thus, LPHP2005 
should replace the professional standard by the prudent patient standard to fulfil its 
commitment to protect patients’ autonomy in accordance with Islamic Sharia. 
Further, I have argued that the current practice of disclosing information and risks in Saudi 
Arabia suffers from considerable legal deficiencies. I have highlighted the problem areas as 
follows: the lack of detail on the level and type of risks that should be disclosed to competent 
adult patients; the lack of recognition of the doctors’ legal duty to inform the patients about 
the alternative treatments that are available; the failure to address the doctors’ duty to answer 
patients’ questions and how they should do so; the legal absence of the doctors’ duty to seek 
to ensure that the patient can understand the provided information; the lack of clarity of the 
application of therapeutic privilege.  
I would argue that this lack of clarity is because Saudi Arabian medical law has empowered 
doctors to set the standard of what information should be disclosed and has not intervened 
to set a more rigorous standard by itself. Throughout this Chapter there have been many 
points which show that Saudi Arabian medical law has relied on the professional practice of 
doctors. For example, SMPs utilise the professional standard of care to establish the failure 
of a doctor to disclose information or risks.37 This current practice by Saudi Arabian medical 
law is very similar to what used to be applied by English law through the standard of care 
that commenced with the Bolam test, which was used to establish a doctor-based standard 
of disclosure. Further, by identifying the additional legal deficiencies that Saudi Arabian 
medical law is suffering from, it seems that the application of the professional standard has 
undermined the respect for the patient’s autonomy on a wider range of specific issues. An 
emphasis on the professional standard of care fails to protect patients’ basic rights under 
Islamic Sharia, which includes respecting their autonomy. I have concluded that the current 
practice in Saudi Arabian medical law seems to fail to meet the thesis’s proposed standard 
of care, as it does not currently set a legal duty to provide patients with sufficient and 
																																								 																				
36	Ibid.	article	26.	
37	See	Chapter	four	for	further	discussion.	
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understandable information to enable them to be self-determining in making their decision, 
in accordance with Islamic Sharia principles. 
Additionally, as I have argued in Chapter four, the time seems appropriate to propose such 
reforms, as there is a growing demand from patients for respect for patient autonomy in the 
healthcare setting, which supports a move toward the notion of informed consent.38 As AlBar 
and Pasha have argued, patients now in Islamic countries’ hospitals have become more 
aware of their rights and the notion of respect for their autonomy.39 The prudent patient 
standard seems to be in accordance with in Islamic Sharia as I have argued in Chapters two 
and four so this approach would give more protection of the right to patient autonomy.40  
Therefore, I have proposed in Chapter four that Saudi Arabian medical law should depart 
from the professional standard of care and adopt the prudent patient standard of care as set 
out in the first part of Montgomery. This leads to the following question: based on the English 
law experience, what kind of specific reforms would this thesis suggest Saudi Arabian 
medical law should adopt?  
Given that I have concluded in Chapter three that English law now has developed a more 
appropriate approach to information disclosure and that the approach adopted can be seen to 
be consistent with Islamic Sharia, the basis for my proposals for reform is that the prudent 
patient test should be adopted in Saudi Arabian medical law. If this approach is adopted it 
will require reform both to the legislation and codes of practice that currently govern this 
area, and to the way in which the courts use medical evidence.  
It should be remembered that, unlike the English legal system, the Saudi Arabian legal 
system in general does not consider precedent law as an approach to establish or reform or 
develop law, the legal system entirely relies on legalisation that is based on or not in conflict 
with Islamic Sharia.41 Thus, the reform and development of medical law cannot be 
determined by courts of law (SMPs); it must be undertaken by the legislative bodies in Saudi 
Arabia. 
																																								 																				
38	For	example,	H	AlFaleh	et	al.	‘Detailed	Disclosure	to	Saudi	Arabian	Patients	on	Risks	Related	to	an	Invasive	
Procedure’,	M	Abolfotouh	and	A	Adlan	‘Quality	of	Informed	Consent	for	Invasive	Procedures	in	Central	Saudi	Arabia’	,	M	
Khedhiri,	A	Adlan	and	M	Abolfotouh	‘Informed	Consent	in	Clinical	Care:	Models	of	Patients’	Satisfaction	and	Attitude	
Based	on	General	Trust	and	Risks	Disclosure’	and	M	Hammami	et	al.	‘Patients’	Perceived	Purpose	of	Clinical	Informed	
Consent:	Mill’s	Individual	Autonomy	Model	is	Preferred’.	
39M	AlBar	and	H	Pasha	Contemporary	Bioethics	Islamic	Perspective	p.	111.	
40	See	Chapter	four	for	further	discussion.	
41	See	Chapter	three	for	further	discussion.		
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2. Proposed Reforms 
Reforms to the law in Saudi Arabia should be made to give greater legal recognition to the 
need for respect for patient autonomy, in so far as this is in line with Islamic Sharia. This 
thesis proposes that Saudi Arabian law should learn some lessons from the English law 
experience which has already developed greater respect for patient autonomy from a position 
that was very similar to that which is now applied in Saudi Arabia. There are therefore a 
number of aspects of the English law approach that can be recommended to be adopted to 
reform Saudi Arabian medical law.  
2.1. The standard of care in information disclosure 
It should be noted that this thesis is limited to reforming the current Saudi Arabian medical 
law by learning from English law experience; thus, the thesis will not suggest reform to 
English law or a solution to the uncertainties in the current decision of the English law case 
of Montgomery. 
Therefore, I would suggest Saudi Arabian medical law should amend the current LPHP2005 
(and as a result of that CEHP2013 will also require amendment) by introducing the prudent 
patient standard of care as it has been stated in the first part of Montgomery test. 
Thus, Saudi Arabian medical law should replace its current reliance on the professional 
standard of care set out in article 26 of LPHP2005 by adopting the first part of the test in 
Montgomery. The test in Montgomery is that the amount of information and risks that should 
be disclosed to competent adult patients is based on the materiality of the risk, which is to 
be determined as follows, 
‘The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a 
reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance 
to the risk,’42	
At present, the standard of care in article 26 of LPHP2005 is as follows: 
‘A healthcare professional governed by this Law [LPHP2005] shall exert due 
care in line with commonly established professional standard.’43 
Therefore, the thesis would propose the following formula to be adopted by LPHP2005: 
Doctors must disclose relevant and material information about treatment and the 
risks that a reasonable patient would want to know in order for him/her to make 
an informed decision whether to consent to or refuse medical treatment. This 
relevance and materiality of information is to be judged from the perspective of 
the reasonable patient not from that of accepted medical practice.   
																																								 																				
42Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11	para	87.	
43	LPHP2005	article	26.	
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This does not disturb the general principle set out in article 26, but it limits its application in 
respect of information disclosure. This will be a clear ‘revolution’ to adopt a standard of care 
that gives more respect to patient autonomy, and is in accordance with the Islamic Sharia 
tradition. Since the fundamental respect for autonomy is already espoused by academic 
writers and is nor against the principles of Sharia law, there should be no difficulty in 
accepting and adopting the proposed standard. More difficult will be its translation into law, 
given the nature of the Saudi Arabian legal system. However, it should be noted that it took 
English (and other) law some considerable time to mature into the prudent patient standard;  
that it may also take some time to change Saudi Arabian law is not, therefore, a barrier to 
advocating for change, and eventually realising it.44  
Acceptance and implementation of the proposed standard is called a ‘revolution’ here 
because it should be remembered that this recommendation would need to proceed through 
the Saudi Arabian legislative process for amendment of an Act as I have discussed in Chapter 
two. This proposed standard would be reviewed and discussed in the Saudi Arabian 
legislative bodies (the Council of Ministers and Shura Council). Although I have argued that 
the prudent patient standard is highly likely to be accepted by Islamic Sharia and it is 
appropriate as it gives more protection to patient autonomy, the final say on accepting or 
rejecting the adoption of the prudent patient standard in legislation is for the Saudi Arabian 
government.  
However, the adoption of the prudent patient standard does not mean that the standard should 
not be reviewed and developed and this would rely on how SMPs (or an alternative tribunal) 
in Saudi Arabia apply and interpret it, and ultimately the potential for developing precedent 
through appeals to the Administrative Court of Appeal in the Board of Grievances. Further, 
the standard would be subject to consideration by scholars, academics and lawyers. 
Therefore, the issue should be opened up for debate and discussion as this aims to develop 
the standard in a way that is in accordance with Islamic Sharia and to give more protection 
to patient autonomy. In other words, the adoption of the prudent patient standard is the first 
step to reform LPHP2005 in order to clarify and develop principles that protect patient 
autonomy. 
3. Recommendations to remedy other legal deficiencies 
Having highlighted the most significant developments in English law for the standard of 
care, and based on the discussion in Chapter four that Saudi Arabian medical law needs can 
																																								 																				
44	R	Heywood	‘R.I.P.	Sidaway:	Patient-Oriented	Disclosure	—A	Standard	Worth	Waiting	for?’	(2015)	23(3)	Med	Law	
Review	455–466.	
The Concluding Chapter 
	 287	
be reformed to give greater respect to the principle of autonomy, albeit in accordance with 
Islamic Sharia teaching.45 Saudi Arabian medical law can learn from the current English law 
experience in respect of the specific issues related to information disclosure below. The 
following recommendations are made: 
1. The legal duty to inform patients about available alternative treatments: Saudi Arabian 
medical law can learn from the decisions in Montgomery and Birch v UCL Hospital,46 
although it should be noted that, as I have stated in Chapter three and above, the extent of 
this duty is still uncertain under English law. Thus, the following formula is the same as in 
England, although there are problems with it and it will need further development in both 
countries. Therefore, the thesis would propose the following formula to be adopted by 
LPHP2005: 
Doctors must disclose to patients any reasonable alternative or variant treatment.  
2. The legal duty to answer patients’ questions: Saudi Arabian medical law should learn from 
the decision in Montgomery, which approved Lord Bridge’s approach in Sidaway. Therefore, 
the thesis would propose the following formula to be adopted by LPHP2005: 
When the patient asks a question, doctors must answer that question fully and 
truthfully. 
3. Information understanding: Saudi Arabian medical law should learn from the decision in 
Montgomery and AlHamwi v Johnston.47 Therefore, the thesis would propose the following 
formula to be adopted by LPHP2005, considering that this formula is the same as in 
English law, although there are problems with it and it will need further development in 
both countries: 
Doctors should take all reasonable steps to seek to ensure that the provided 
information can be understood by the patient. 
4. The therapeutic exception: Saudi Arabian medical law should learn from the decision in 
Montgomery and Islamic Sharia. Therefore, the thesis would propose the following formula 
to be adopted by LPHP2005: 
The application of a therapeutic exception should be used only in circumstances 
where disclosure would cause serious harm to the patient. Additionally, in the 
case where the patient has an obligation to consent to or refuse treatment the 
application of the therapeutic exception to withhold information should not be 
used by doctors to deprive the patient from making an informed decision. 
																																								 																				
45	See	Chapter	two	for	further	discussion.		
46	Birch	v	UCL	Hospital	[2008]	EWHC	2237	(QB).	
47	AlHamwi	v	Johnston	[2005]	EWHC	206	(QB).	
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5. With regard to providing information to a patient who does not want it: Saudi Arabian 
medical law can learn from English law experience and Islamic Sharia. Therefore, the thesis 
would propose the following formula to be adopted by LPHP2005: 
If a patient has clearly expressed that he/she does not want to know about his/her 
condition or the risk involved in the condition or in any treatment, doctors should 
respect the patient’s decision, although doctors should provide but not force 
basic information on the patient. 
6. I would argue that, it is not sufficiently practical simply to depart from the professional 
standard of care and adopt the prudent patient standard. This departure also requires 
reforming the composition and process of decision-making in SMPs. The fact that the SMP 
decision-makers include doctors, suggests that appropriate application of the new standard 
may be problematic as it is a legal and not a medical standard. Thus, it is proposed that: 
SMPs should be abolished and their jurisdiction should be moved to specialist courts 
of law. Further, that specialist courts must meet the LJ2007 requirements, to be 
composed of judges with Sharia and legal backgrounds not medical professionals.   
4. Concluding remarks 
In addition to the recommendations above, I would further emphasise that: 
1. Both the Saudi Arabian Ministery of Health and SCHS should do more in terms of 
educating medical staff regarding legal and ethical issues, specifically patients’ rights, 
consent and information disclosure. Further, Ministery of Health and SCHS should provide 
medical staff with all relevant principles and laws in a basic and clear form to be an easy 
guideline for them. That, I would argue, can be achieved by updating the ethical guideline 
(CEHP2013), which should contain clear instructions for the critical issues which daily face 
medical staff and patients, including the issues the thesis has highlighted. It is also necessary 
that CEHP2013 be brought into line with any recommendations for reform adopted in 
LPHP2005, since CEHP2013 is not only a source of ethical guidance for doctors but it has 
legal effect too. Since one of the aims of the thesis is to promote clarity and consistency of 
approach, it is essential that these two instruments are reformed together. Both the MoH and 
the SCHS should also educate patients and provide them with more and easier access to what 
they should know about their rights, such as obtaining their consent and their right to be 
provided with information.  
2. I would encourage legal academics and Saudi Arabian scholars to undertake different 
studies and research to discuss and address the different issues in the area of Islamic Sharia 
and Saudi Arabian medical laws which have so far not been widely debated, such as the 
issue of information disclosure. This could include, for example, reviewing a wide range of 
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Muslim scholars and jurists’ books to identify and verify medical principles and to format 
them into clear regulations. However, I would argue that it would also be beneficial if studies 
were made to compare different legal systems, to present and demonstrate different analyses 
that have previously not been considered in Saudi Arabian medical law literature. While not 
advocating a wholesale adoption of the jurisprudence of other legal systems, since Saudi 
Arabia has a rich tradition of its own, such studies could be used to provide additional ways 
of considering issues and developing them in a way that remains consistent with the 
governing principles of Islamic Sharia. 
3. Currently a draft Bill, entitled; Health Ethics Law (the Bill) is proposed by the Saudi 
Health Council48 (SHC) The main aim of this Bill is to place ethical duties on health 
professionals (doctors, nurses etc.) and healthcare providers (hospitals, clinics etc.) in regard 
to public health, patients’ rights, medical staff’s duties and medical institutions’ duties, to be 
enforced by law.49 
The Bill contains fifteen chapters. Most interesting is chapter three which is entitled ‘Ethics 
Towards Patients’. This chapter focuses on how both medical professionals and healthcare 
providers should deal with patients and ensure that they are respected.50 In the following I 
will consider and examine the articles that are related to the main focus of this thesis and its 
proposals for reform of the LPHP2005’s deficiencies in order to evaluate whether the Bill 
has met the thesis’s proposals or not.  
3.1. The Bill has reintroduced the notion of respecting patients’ choices and wishes,51 which 
has already been stated in LPHP2005 as I have explained in Chapter four. Hence, patients’ 
choices should be respected as long as they are in accordance with Islamic Sharia and Saudi 
Arabian law. Thus the Bill has just reinforced a well-established principle, so it does not add 
a new principle. But I would argue that, this reinforcement shows that Saudi Arabian law 
gives some protection to respecting patients’ choices and their rights. 
3.2. In regard to the matter of information disclosure, the Bill has adopted the concept of  
‘informed consent’52 (AlMowfaqh Almtabsserah). This has been defined by the Bill as ‘a 
consent that is given by a competent adult patient with his/her free will, and upon full 
																																								 																				
48	The	Saudi	Health	Council		http://www.chs.gov.sa/en/default.htm	(accessed	01/04/2016).	
49	The	Bill	article	2.		
50	Ibid.	chapter	three.	
51	Ibid.	article	5(1).	
52	Ibid.	article	1.	
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information and understanding of what is required from him/her, aiming to help the patient 
to make a free decision.’53   
It is obvious that, the Bill has introduced the notion of patients’ ‘informed consent’ to Saudi 
Arabian medical law.54 Thus, I would argue that the Bill by adopting the concept of 
‘informed consent’, which was not recognised by LPHP2005 and CEHP2013, represents the 
new stance of medical health authorities in Saudi Arabia in relation to the provision of more 
protection to patients’ rights and autonomy.  
3.3. The Bill has placed two ethical duties on medical professionals in order to obtain 
‘informed consent’; (1); they ‘…should provide clear and understandable medical 
information and explanations to the patient about his/her health conditions, the course of the 
treatment and advising the patient to follow the medical instructions and warn him/her of the 
consequences to not comply with that instructions.’55   
The other duty is that (2) medical professionals ‘..must not exceed a competent adult 
patient’s informed consent [save in the case of emergency].’56  
Although the Bill seems to place and recognise ethical duties on medical professionals to 
obtain an ‘informed consent’ and not exceeding the scope of the patient’s informed consent, 
(not recognised by LPHP2005 and CEHP2013), it seems that the Bill still suffers from some 
confusions and deficiencies. For example, it does not state clearly how medical professionals 
should fulfil these duties.  
Although the Bill proposes that doctors have an ethical duty to use the simplest and most 
clear way to inform the patient, specifically in cases of terminal illness,57 this, I would argue, 
seems to not be sufficient as it still falls short of stating which standard of care doctors should 
use in order to fulfil their ethical/and legal duty to obtain an informed consent.  
3.4. The Bill has emphasised an ethical duty on medical professionals to obtain patients’ 
consent in writing in any cases of medical operations.58 This ethical duty is not mentioned in 
LPHP2005, but it has been already recognised by CEHP2013 as I have explained in Chapter 
four. So, again, the Bill has simply reinforced an existing duty. 
																																								 																				
53	Ibid.	
54The	notion	of	informed	consent	is	already	recognised	by	Saudi	LERLC2010,	but	for	medical	research.	LERLC2010	has	
stated	that	an	informed	consent	must	be	obtained	in	any	medical	research	which	involves	humans.	See	footnote	no	319	
in	Chapter	four.		
55	The	Bill	article	8(1)a.	
56Ibid.	
57Ibid.	article	8(1)b.	
58	Ibid.	article	8(1)c(2).	
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3.5. The Bill has recognised patients’ rights to withdraw his/her consent and this right has to 
be respected.59 This right and the corresponding ethical duty on doctors were not stated in 
either LPHP2005 or CEHP2013.60 Thus, I would argue that the Bill seems to give more 
protection to patients’ rights and autonomy than did the previous legal position. This seems 
to be comparable to the judges’ views in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board,61  and 
other English law cases, where courts have begun to take ethical principles seriously in their 
judgments. Therefore, it can be argued that both legal systems seem to be driven by the same 
motive; namely, to pay more attention to the translation of ethical principles that protect 
patients’ rights into legal principles. For example, the decision in Montgomery to uphold the 
prudent patient standard and the Saudi Health Council to frame ethical duties in a law. 
With all due respect to the Bill, however, there are several important issues that have been 
missed. These issues are what I have highlighted in this thesis as significant legal 
deficiencies in both LPHP2005 and CEHP2013. Firstly, and most importantly, the Bill has 
not stated clearly which standard of care should be applied; that is, on what basis would 
doctors’ failure to disclose certain information be judged? Is it the professional standard of 
care or other standards of care? It is neither sufficient nor adequate for the Bill simply to 
adopt the use of the concept of ‘informed consent’ with no mention of what standard of care 
should be applied.   
Because, the usefulness of the term ‘informed consent’ is dependent on the standard of care 
that is applied by the courts, it is not necessarily associated with a specific standard of care.62 
Hence, it can not be said that just adopting the term ‘informed consent’ is adequate to 
determine the amount of information and risk which should be disclosed. Thus, the standard 
of care that should be applied must be clearly stated.   
Consequently, as the Bill does not state which standard of care should be applied, this will 
generate more confusion, because, courts in Saudi Arabia when the Bill becomes legally 
binding, will face a problematic question as what standard of care should be applied. Is it the 
professional standard which is stated by LPHP2005? Or because the Bill is a separate law 
might there be another standard of care, and if so what should it be?  
The Bill therefore, should clearly state which standard of care for information disclosure 
should be applied. For the reasons I have stated throughout this thesis and as the Bill seems 
to acknowledge patients’ rights, I would strongly recommend that the Bill should adopt the 
																																								 																				
59	Ibid.	article	9.	
60	See	Chapter	four	for	further	discussion.		
61	Montgomery	v	Lanarkshire	Health	Board	[2015]	UKSC	11	para	80-85	
62	See	for	example,	J	Berg	et	al.	Informed	Consent:	Legal	Theory	and	Clinical	Practice	(2nded	OUP	2001).	
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prudent patient standard as I have formulated above. This would avoid the same legal 
vacuums that applying the professional standard of care has generated in the current 
LPHP2005. 
Secondly, the Bill unfortunately does not include or mention any ethical duties concerning; 
doctors’ duty to disclose any available alternative treatments to patients, doctors’ duty to 
answer patients’ questions or doctors’ duties to take all reasonable steps to seek to ensure 
that patients can understand the provided information. Other important matters that are 
missing in the Bill are; the applicability of the therapeutic privilege exception (which to some 
extent was considered in LPHP2005)63 and finally doctors’ duties when dealing with a 
patient who refuses to be informed.  
Another problematic aspect of the Bill is that it follows the LPHP2005 pathway, by not 
considering handing jurisdiction in these matters to courts of law. The Bill empowers  Ethical 
Panels (composed of healthcare professionals), under the supervision of the Legal 
Department in the SHC, to apply the terms of the Bill and to investigate, and judge health 
professionals and healthcare providers’ actions.64 Further, the parties can appeal the decision 
first to the Legal Department in the SHC,65 then the Legal Department’s decision can be 
appealed to the Administrative Courts within 30 days following their being informed of the 
Legal Department’s decision.66  
Thus, I would argue that the composition of the Ethical Panels would raise the same question 
mark as to their objectivity as that which arises in the case of the SMPs. The Ethical Panels’ 
composition is problematic, because their members are healthcare professionals. Not only 
might they be seen as sympathetic to their peers, they may also find it difficult to apply a 
legal standard without training in the law. These, deficiencies in the Bill are cause for 
concern, as has been shown throughout this thesis.  Consideration of the proposals made in 
the thesis is strongly recommended before the Bill becomes final. Further, as I have argued 
above regarding the SMPs, the Bill should empower courts of law to apply the law;  it would 
be unfortunate were the Bill simply to entrench the same problems as currently exist in terms 
of expert and disinterested decision-making 
In conclusion, the Bill in its current form does not sufficiently and appropriately address the 
current deficiencies that the thesis has identified, and therefore provides no solutions to them. 
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While progress is to be welcomed, a more radical approach would be needed to satisfy the 
aim of protecting patients’ rights and demonstrating respect for their autonomy. 
Finally, based on what has been discussed and argued for in this thesis, it is clear that the development 
of English law has demonstrated that the considerably increased attention to patients’ rights has led 
the law away from reliance on the professional standard of care towards a prudent patient standard, 
which provides more consideration of some of the ethical principles that strongly safeguard patients’ 
autonomy and their roles in making informed decisions. This movement by English law towards 
protecting patients’ rights and autonomy can be traced clearly throughout the case law that was 
discussed in Chapter three. 
Thus, since the protection of rights in general, and patients’ rights specifically, is completely in 
harmony with Islamic Sharia and Saudi Arabian law, there is no reason for, nor is there a barrier to, 
Saudi Arabian medical law following the English law example, albeit that there are some limitations 
imposed by Islamic Sharia principles in regard to some aspects of patients’ consent and refusal. 
Nonetheless, these limitations do not directly affect the development of an appropriate information 
disclosure standard such as that developed in English Law. As the thesis has shown, both legal 
systems are in total agreement in their expressed commitment to the protection of patients’ rights. 
Therefore, as has been argued in this thesis, a major benefit of endorsing the English law approach 
and learning from its experiences is that it requires clarification of the problems identified in this 
thesis both in the existing Saudi Arabian medical law and in the proposed new Bill (Health Ethics 
Law). 
Remedying these problems will result in Saudi Arabian medical law achieving its goals of offering 
protection to the rights of patients to make an informed decision about their healthcare without 
negatively affecting medical practice. 
While the thesis did not set out to consider decision-making institutions directly, a consequence of 
the argument here is that development of a clear legal standard also requires re-evaluation of the 
current SMPs that are charged with the responsibility of deciding on issues of liability. 
Moving SMPs jurisdictions to courts of law comprising judges (with legal backgrounds) would give 
more assurance to patients that their rights to be informed will be appropriately protected and 
respected.  
Thus, I would conclude that the arguments developed in this thesis would help not only to reform the 
current Saudi Arabian medical law (LPHP2005), but also would supply solutions to the problems 
identified in the proposed new Bill. 
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